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
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
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THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR,
1870-71.

SECOND PART:—History of the War against the Republic.
NINETEENTH SECTION: OCCURRENCES ON THE SOUTH - EASTERN
THEATRE OF WAR UP TO THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY, 1871. EVENTS
BEFORE PARIS FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1871 TO THE
ARMISTICE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE
GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

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MAJOR F. C. H. CLARKE, C.M.G., R.A., PROFESSOR OF STAFF DUTIES
AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, AND LATE D.A.Q.M.G.
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OCURRENCES ON THE SOUTH-EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR TO
THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY, 1871.*

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF BELFORT AND MEASURES FOR
COVERING THE BESIEGING FORCE UP TO THE BEGINNING OF
JANUARY, 1871.†

Shortly after the middle of November General v. Mertens, who had been appointed to conduct the attack, and Lieutenant-Colonel v. Scheliha, commanding the siege artillery, had arrived before Belfort. By degrees also the siege guns and fortress companies were arriving from New Breisach.‡ Consequently the preliminaries to the formal attack ordered by the supreme authorities could now be taken in hand.§

Situated in the pass between the Vosges and the Jura known under the name of the Trouée de Belfort, and in the valley of the Savoureuse, Belfort, from its importance for all operations between the districts of the Upper Rhine and Upper Saône, was fortified as early as the middle ages. Upon the rocks, at the feet of which stretches the town of some 8,000 inhabitants,|| towered even in those days a strongly armed castle, which later on served as a redoubt to the enclosure of wall and rampart. The fortress afterwards had to undergo all the modifications, which progress in the art of attack and defence from time to time necessitated.

The older works of the fortress, which still existed at the outbreak of hostilities in 1870, are built chiefly on the principles of Vauban. The town is surrounded by a bastioned enceinte, is further secured on the north side by the Esperance Hornwork thrown out towards the Savoureuse Valley, and is completely commanded by the château, now enlarged into a citadel. Every effort has been made to ensure to the latter as great a development of fire as possible by several parallel lines of works; while there is no deficiency here of the necessary casemated accommodation for the garrison. A narrow ridge, which rises towards the town from the village of Roppe on the north-east, and then falls in steep slopes to the town, as also to the Savoureuse Valley, and to the La Forge pond, runs up to the Esperance Hornwork. On the highest point

* See Plans No. 31, A and B, and General Map No. 6.

† See Plan No. 32.

‡ Appendix CXXIX contains a list of the material collected in the siege park before Belfort, with a return of ammunition.

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 244.

|| This figure had fallen to some 4,000 at the commencement of the investment in the year 1870.

of this ridge, overlooking even the château, and at a distance of some 1,100 yards from the town fortifications, lies the Fort la Miotte. On a more southerly lower ridge, which runs from Les Fourches Wood towards the château, and at a distance of about 1,100 yards from the latter, rises the Fort la Justice. Both forts are connected together and with the main works by continuous lines, so as to present a well-protected fortified camp for some five or six thousand men. The Forts la Miotte and la Justice, which barred the Strasburg high road and the Basle road, flanked at the same time any attack directed against the château.

Favourable for such an attack, however, were the heights of Hautes and Basses Perches, facing the château at a distance of some 1,100 yards, and which at the outbreak of the war were still unfortified. By way of these, the assailant, after occupying the Bois de la Brosse, and the wooded heights of Le Bosmont, could approach the fortress without difficulty, and almost unseen. The heights of Hautes Perches, moreover, command even the château and overlook the works on the right bank of the Savoureuse.

There, on the west side of the fortress, the extension of the works had been commenced of late. A front parallel to the railway, and protecting the Faubourg des Ancêtres, as also the Fort des Barres, on the high ground near the hamlet of that name, had been commenced; these works, however, were by no means finished. The smaller fort of Bellevue was to afford the necessary protection to the railway station southwest of the town.

The entire fortress is overlooked from the elevated and forest-clad Mont du Salbert.* The construction thereon of extensive works of attack was, however, forbidden by the distance, as well as by the rocky soil and the dense wood.

For maintaining possession of the place it was of paramount importance to secure without delay the two heights of Hautes and Basses Perches. Temporary works on the summits of both were therefore at once commenced; but, at first, working power was very deficient, as since the departure of the 7th Corps, which had been assembled at Belfort under General Douay, there were only available up to date some 5,000 gardes mobiles.

The chief command at Belfort had passed on the 19th October into the hands of Colonel Denfert-Rochereau,† an officer who had been Commanding Engineer there for six years, and was thoroughly conversant with every detail of the fortress. His efforts were directed from the first to defending the outlying ground, with the object of rendering the investment difficult,

* At the present time it is crowned by one of the principal advanced works of the fortress.

† Before him Generals de Chargère, Cambriels, and Crouzat had been in command at Belfort.

hindering the artillery attack and delaying the regular attack. The examples of Schlettstadt and New Breisach did not tell in favour of the besieged sparing their fire. Colonel Denfert therefore ordered his artillery to employ against the assailant the longest ranges of which the guns at his disposal were capable. The works of the temporary fortifications on the two Perches were prosecuted with such energy, that at the commencement of the attack the upper fort was ready, while the other was but little behindhand. On the west side also the Bellevue fort, which was commenced the last, had made considerable progress. Starting from the railway front, temporary continuous works running across the suburbs to the Savoureuse were commenced in August, and completed towards the end of September. They consisted of ditches $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 8 feet deep, and 13 feet broad, with a rampart behind. A number of houses which impeded the defence of these lines were destroyed. The Le Fourneau suburb on the left bank of the Savoureuse was closed by shelter trenches and barricades.

Colonel Denfert next proceeded to fortify suitable localities in the outlying ground. As specially noticeable, the village of Pérouse, on the east side, and the straggling Danjoutin on the south, were occupied and provided with defences. All detachments posted there were assigned each day certain enterprises. The patrolling duties were performed with the help of the sedentary national guards of the neighbouring villages.

With equal care did Colonel Denfert arrange the garrison duties. The defence of the various works was committed to definite commanders and troops. The garrison, reinforced by calling out the sedentary national guards, was augmented to upwards of 17,000 men.* Only part, it is true, could be armed with Chassepôts, whilst the remainder received Tabatières and Sniders. For arming the fortress there were 341 guns available, but there was a deficiency of projectiles for the heavier guns. Of ammunition there were 400 rounds per man, besides 880,000 lbs. of powder, which was mostly stored in four bomb-proof magazines. Of provisions there were nearly five months' supply for the garrison and inhabitants.

The time intervening between the investment and the commencement of the artillery attack was also skilfully turned to account by the commandant. The works at the railway embankment behind Fort des Barres, at the station, in the suburbs, at Danjoutin, and at other points included within the defence, had been materially strengthened. In the town bomb-proof shelters were erected, and a projectile foundry. The barracks were provided with blindages, experiments were made with balloons and the electric light, and a fire brigade was organized. Colonel Denfert shifted his headquarters to the

* Appendix CXXX contains the Order of Battle of the Belfort Garrison on the 3rd November, 1870.

château from which place he directed all the details of the defence.

The reconnaissances undertaken by the Germans very soon served to show the great difficulties of the attack. The rocky soil could not fail to offer impediment to all earthworks; the inclement season was approaching, and the strength of the garrison foreshadowed a stubborn resistance, even though the quality of the troops might not be of the stoutest. The best prospect of success was promised by an advance against the Hautes and Basses Perches Forts, after the capture of which the château commanding Belfort might be reduced. To accomplish this, however, the available means of attack were insufficient. Consequently General v. Tresckow Ist determined upon a preliminary bombardment. This could be best effected from the Essert and Bavilliers heights. But before it could be done the troops must be pushed up nearer to the fortress.*

* On the 21st November the foremost line was roughly indicated by Sermamagny, Eloie, Roppe, Bessoncourt, Chèvreumont, Vezelois, Méroux, Moval, Sevenans, Dorans, Banvillard, Buc, Challonvillars, and Evette.

POSITION OF THE BESIEGING CORPS

on 21st of November.

Major-General v. Tresckow Ist. Headquarters :—Fontaine.

1st Reserve Division.

North Section : Colonel Gericke.

(2 battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, $\frac{1}{2}$ battery.)

Halberstadt Landwehr Battalion.

Pr. Stargardt " "

$\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd Squadron 2nd Reserve Lancers.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Reserve Battery IIInd Army Corps.

} At La Chapelle-sous-Chaux,
Sermamagny, and Eloie.

West Section : Colonel v. Ostrowski.

(4 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, $\frac{1}{2}$ battery.)

2nd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (21/54).

Neuhaldensleben Landwehr Battalion (3 companies).

6th and 7th Companies 67th Regiment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd Squadron 2nd Reserve Lancers.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Reserve Battery IIInd Army Corps.

} On the line Evette—
Chalonvillars — Buc
—Banvillard and be-
hind it.

East and South Section : Colonel Baron v. Buddenbrock.

(7 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, 1 squadron, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ batteries.)

1st Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (14/21),
11 companies.

8rd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (26/61).

1st and Fusilier Battalions 67th Regiment.

2nd Squadron 2nd Reserve Lancers.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Reserve Battery IXth Army Corps.

2nd Light Reserve Battery IXth Army Corps.

} Between Anjoutey and
the Savoureusc, be-
low Belfort at Seve-
nans and Dorans.

At Montbéliard : Colonel v. Bredow.

($\frac{1}{2}$ battalion, 1 squadron, $\frac{1}{2}$ battery.)

5th and 8th Companies 67th Regiment.

1 Company Konitz Landwehr Battalion.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Reserve Battery IXth Army Corps.

1st Fortress Pioneer Company IIInd Army Corps.

On the north side of Belfort the Germans occupied Valdoye on the 22nd November without resistance, the enemy contenting himself with bombarding the place. For the next day Colonel v. Ostrowski received orders, with a detachment consisting of 10 companies and 6 guns,* to drive back the French outposts at Essert and Cravanche. The attack was deferred, because fighting had been audible from the direction of the Doubs.† It was not until reports arrived at 4 p.m., showing that no support in that direction was necessary, that Colonel v. Ostrowski deployed his companies against the heights of La Côte, the villages of Essert, Cravanche, and the wooded heights lying between them. Essert was occupied after a brief contest, which the enemy for the most part carried on with the artillery of his works, and the Prussian picquets then took up a position under the shell-fire of the fortress. Cravanche fell after a brisker resistance into the hands of the 67th, who forced their way in with a cheer,‡ but it had to be again abandoned in consequence of artillery fire. Part of the hill Le Haut du Mont, which was occupied in greater strength,§ was held by the enemy through the night. At the farmsteads of Sous-le-Mont and Des Barres he commenced making defensive arrangements,

Detached.

At Lure (See next page, note †):—1 company Neuholdensleben Landwehr Battalion.

At Bretten:—4th Squadron 2nd Reserve Lancers, to form a horse dépôt.

Total:—15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 3 batteries.

The companies of fortress artillery which had arrived before Belfort were housed in La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont and Menoncourt, the fortress pioneer companies in Fontenelle, Chèvremont, Éloie, and Evette. The siege park was formed in the first instance at La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont.

The detachment of the 4th Reserve Division—2 battalions and 1 squadron—was employed to protect the line of communication and to oppose any interruption from without. In Part II, Vol. I, p. 245, the strength of this detachment is given at 3 battalions 1 squadron. The Osterode battalion had, however, been detached on the 20th November, whilst the Goldap battalion destined to take its place did not reach Lure until the 21st.

* Bromberg battalion, $\frac{6\text{th and } 8\text{th}}{\text{Deutsch-Krone}}$, $\frac{7\text{th and } 8\text{th}}{\text{Neuhaldensleben}}$, $\frac{6\text{th and } 7\text{th}}{67}$, and

$\frac{3\text{rd Light}}{4\text{th Res. Div.}}$, which had rejoined the Siege Corps on the 21st November (See next page, note †).

† On the night of the 20th—21st November a Prussian picquet had been surprised on the left bank of the Allaine at Montbéliard. On the 21st Colonel v. Bredow, advancing from Montbéliard, had met some gardes mobiles on the Doubs. Reinforced by 4 Landwehr companies and 6 guns, he afterwards advanced on the 23rd against Audincourt and Voujaucourt, dislodged the enemy with little trouble, and caused a number of boats on the Doubs to be destroyed. At the same time Colonel v. Schmidt, who had brought up fresh reinforcements from the 4th Reserve Division (See next page, note †), had advanced with 1 battalion, 1 squadron, and 2 guns, assigned to him by Colonel v. Bredow, from Hericourt towards L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs. He found the town clear of the enemy, and rejoined the investing troops on the 24th by way of Montbéliard.

‡ A detachment of the Pruss. Stargardt battalion rendered effective help from the corner of the wood south-west of Valdoye.

§ A battalion of the 57th Garde Mobile Regiment (Haute-Saône) and 4 companies of the 16th Garde Mobile Regiment (Rhône), followed by 3 other companies.

and on the 24th November, supported by the fire of the fortress, also made repeated attempts to recapture the lost positions. On the evening of this day the besiegers succeeded in gaining complete possession of the Haut du Mont.*

On the north-east side Vétrigne and Offemont had been captured on the night of the 22nd—23rd November, but had been again evacuated, as the former was vigorously bombarded from the fortress, and the latter was attacked by superior forces. On the other hand, an attempt on the part of the garrison to gain possession on the 24th of the villages of Méroux, Moval, and Sevenans to the south of the fortress ended in failure. On the 28th November Colonel v. Ostrowski forced his way into Bavilliers, which important point was held on the following night against a sortie of the enemy.

A continuous line of investment and of outposts could not be maintained, owing to the weakness of the besieging troops. Efforts were limited to securing by means of defensive works the foremost villages in the occupation of our troops, and throwing out picquets and sentries in advance. The communication between these cantonments was maintained by constant patrolling. Wooded country was watched by strong creeping patrols. By order of General v. Tresckow 1st large detachments were also moved hither and thither within sight, but beyond range of the artillery fire, of the fortress.

Meanwhile further reinforcements from the 4th Reserve Division had reached the besieging troops,† so that now altogether 20 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 4 field batteries‡ were at the disposal of General v. Tresckow 1st for the attack of Belfort. The Royal headquarters had signified approval of the contem-

* In the engagements round the Haut du Mont the two guns of the 1st Light Reserve Battery 11nd Army Corps, which were in the north section, took part from Valdoye.

† On the proposal of General v. Tresckow 1st, General v. Werder had on the 18th November expressed his readiness to send further reinforcements to the troops besieging Belfort. In consequence the 1st and 2nd Squadrons 3rd Reserve Lancers, as well as the 3rd and 4th Light Batteries of the 4th Reserve Division, under Colonel v. Schmidt, had advanced on the 21st from Vesoul towards Belfort. With them marched the Goldap battalion intended to relieve the Osterode battalion. (See Part II, Vol. I, p. 33.) In the next few days the Danzig and Marienburg battalions with 2 guns and a detachment of lancers also followed, while 1½ batteries and 2 squadrons rejoined the 4th Reserve Division at the beginning of December, so that thenceforward 5 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery of that Division remained for some time under the command of General v. Tresckow 1st with the besieging troops, whilst the rest of the East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, from which those five battalions were taken, was held in readiness at Vesoul to give any further support.

The Goldap, Danzig, and Marienburg battalions were employed in the west section of the line of investment, from which in consequence the Neuhaudensleben battalion passed to the north section. The other troops belonging to the 4th Reserve Division found employment partly on the east side of the fortress, partly as reinforcement to the detachment at Montbéliard, and partly to guard the neighbourhood of Mülhausen.

‡ Appendix CXXXI contains the Order of Battle of the Siege Corps in front of Belfort. The 1½ batteries and 2 squadrons which left at the beginning of December are no longer included in the above effective.

plated bombardment. Fifty siege guns and 12 fortress artillery companies had been collected mostly on the west side of the place, while the artillery park and part of the engineer park had been brought over to Chalonvillars. Moreover, by recent movements of troops, 11 battalions were placed in readiness on the west side. On the evening of the 2nd December a commencement could be made of the construction of the batteries and of the trenches for their protection, on the heights between Bavilliers and Essert. The works were commenced simultaneously at all points by 2,960 men, inclusive of artillerymen, and, as the reliefs arrived towards morning, were uninterruptedly continued. The Deutsch-Krone Landwehr Battalion was thrown out some 800 paces in front of Essert to cover the construction of the batteries; the Inowrazlaw Battalion was in support close by. In spite of the moonlight night the enemy did not disturb the working parties. Only occasional shots fell from the fortress, and these chiefly on the east side of the line of investment, where, in order to divert the enemy's attention, movements of troops were carried out. Before daybreak, in spite of the frost-bound soil, seven batteries were completed and armed.* A slight mist still enshrouded the valley, and only allowed the outline of the château and town to be seen. But when at 8 o'clock the sun broke through, and it became possible to take aim, all the guns opened fire. The fortress replied at first in a desultory fashion from the Bellevue and Des Barres works, the strengthening of which had been vigorously taken in hand by the commandant since the capture of Bavilliers. Shortly, however, the other batteries of the fortress took part in the contest, which was even shared in by Forts Justice and Miotte from their more elevated position to the north-east of the town, although at a distance of 4,700 yards. The special advantages of the fortress, which was able to bring nearly the whole of its artillery to bear on most of the fronts of attack, already became apparent at this stage of the proceedings.

The bombardment, which from the 3rd December became more vigorous by day and moderate at night, although continued without intermission, found town and fortress well prepared. The losses in the batteries and trenches† showed that

* No. 1 Battery, four 12-cm. guns on the height (387) south-east of Essert.

" 2 " two 12-cm. guns } on the left of No. 1.
" " two 15-cm. guns }

" 3 " four 15-cm. guns " No. 2.

" 4 " four 15-cm. guns " No. 3.

" 5 " four 12-cm. guns " No. 4.

" 6 " four 27-cm. smooth-bore mortars, on the left of No. 5, close to the south of the Essert—Belfort road.

" 7 " four French 15-cm. guns, north of the Essert—Belfort road, at the east extremity of Essert.

The batteries were connected by trenches.

Appendix CXXXII gives the details of the position, armament, and directions of fire of the batteries attacking Belfort.

† They amounted on the 3rd December to 80 men. Appendix CXLI contains

the defenders were firing at known ranges. The siege artillery, however, succeeded in causing conflagrations in the town and fortifications, especially in the Bellevue Fort, where the garrison, consisting of a battalion of the 57th Garde Mobile, which was detailed to extinguish them, refused to obey orders, and in consequence had to be disbanded.* From the 5th December also part of the works on the west side ceased firing at times, but no decisive success was achieved by the bombardment. The artillery of the château continued with undiminished activity. This key to the whole fortress was recognised generally as the most dangerous enemy. Severe cold, and especially an icy east wind, impeded work in the assailants' batteries; mist and snowstorms frequently hid the objects from view; the available maps proved insufficient, and to these difficulties was added, before long, a temporary deficiency of ammunition. With regard to the further prosecution of the siege, General v. Tresckow† resolved, as soon as the available means would permit, to strengthen the attack by laying out fresh batteries at Bavilliers, as also on the south side of the fortress. From them a more powerful effect against the château was also expected.

A forward movement, undertaken in the night of the 9th—10th December by a company,‡ and carried as far as the Bellevue Fort and the sawmill there, as also the occupation of La Tuilerie, which had been evacuated by the French several days before, kept the defenders' attention almost exclusively directed towards the west.‡ He had lately strengthened the fortifications there, included the sawmill within their circuit, and in the night of the 11th—12th December he attempted to recapture La Tuilerie with a detachment of infantry. The garrison, however, repulsed the attack. On the following night No. 8 Battery was thrown up to the south-east of Botans, on the Montbéliard road, for the purpose of bombarding Danjoutin.

On the 13th December five companies of the garrison made a sortie towards Bavilliers, and forced their way into the village; but they were again speedily dislodged by the 67th posted there. On the evening of the same day Colonel v. Ostrowski,§ with 8 companies of infantry, 1½ pioneer companies, and 2 guns,|| vigorously supported by No. 8 Battery,

details of the casualties among the troops investing Belfort between the 17th November, 1870, and the 18th January, 1871.

* See *La Défense de Belfort*, écrite sous le contrôle de M. le Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, par MM. Edouard Thiers et S. de la Laurencie, p. 162.

† By the $\frac{5\text{th}}{67}$.

‡ It was only on the north side that unimportant sorties took place towards Valdoye and the Forêt d'Arsot on the 9th, 10th, and 11th December.

§ Colonel v. Ostrowski commanded at the time on the south side, whilst Colonel v. Zimmerman, called up from Vesoul, had taken his place on the west side.

|| The Deutsch-Krone Battalion, $\frac{1\text{st and 3rd}}{\text{Gnesen}}$, $\frac{7\text{th and 8th}}{\text{Schneidemühl}}$, $\frac{1}{11}$ 1st Light Res., 4th Bavarian and $\frac{1}{2}$ Württemberg Fortress Engineer Companies.

captured Andelnans and the wooded heights of Le Bosmont after a brief struggle. The forward movement of a company from thence towards the strongly occupied Danjoutin failed, however, with no inconsiderable losses. On the right bank of the Savoureuse the 1st and 3rd Companies of the Konitz Battalion forced their way into the Grand Bois, and next morning also carried by storm the forest-girt farm of Froideval, the garrison of which, consisting of 1 officer and 63 men, was made prisoners.*

A renewed attack by the garrison on Bavilliers early on the 14th December had no better success than the like efforts of the previous day. The outposts of the investing troops took up a permanent and strong position along the north border of the Bosmont and the Grand Bois, whence they joined hands with the detachment in La Tuilerie. At this point they found themselves opposite the enemy at a distance of only 160 yards. On the evening of the 17th, No. 8 Battery, on the left bank of the Savoureuse, was removed to the height south of Andelnans†; and during the night of the 18th—19th No. 9 Battery was also commenced to the east of Bavilliers. In spite of the elevated position the working parties, in consequence of the thaw and rain which had set in for some days past and still continued, came at once upon water, so that the battery had to be made on the ground level, while all further mounting of guns had for the present to be deferred.

On the whole it appeared doubtful whether it was advisable to further augment the bombardment on the west side of the fortress, or to pass at once with all means to the regular attack. General v. Tresckow 1st resolved that the construction of batteries at Bavilliers should continue, so far as circumstances permitted, but that the new batteries there should prepare the regular attack, and should form later its left wing. Meanwhile 72 siege guns, with the necessary *personnel*, were at his disposal, so that on the evening of the 24th December the construction of four more batteries—Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 19—could be commenced to the north of Bavilliers and in the place itself. At the same time batteries Nos. 13 and 14 were also commenced at the east border of the Bois de la Brosse, in order to initiate the attack on Les Perches.

Owing to a change of weather, however, the frozen ground hindered the progress of these works almost to the same extent as the wet had done shortly before. On the Bavilliers heights, too, the works had to be stopped at daybreak. It was not until the 28th that the firing could commence from this point,‡ whilst the two batteries at the Bois de la Brosse, unobserved by the adversary, owing to their screened position,

* In the various fights of the 13th December the garrison lost upwards of 140 men.

† The Battery took for the future the number No. 8a.

‡ No. 19 Battery only opened fire on the 7th January.

had become ready on the 25th, and had at once commenced the bombardment of Hautes and Basses Perches.

The fortress answered, especially on the 28th, with great vigour, and on the 29th all the guns of Fort Bellevue directed their fire on Nos. 10, 11, and 12, but without any particular result. Meanwhile the construction of Batteries Nos. 16, 17, and 18, at the north border of the Bosmont Wood, near the Mérourx—Danjoutin road, as also of Battery No. 20, south of Chèvremont railway station, had been commenced. On the 31st December Battery No. 15 on the Bosmont was also taken in hand. The very unfavourable nature of the ground necessitated working at the majority of these batteries until the 6th and 7th January, but their fire was opened early on the 7th January.* The batteries of attack now formed three large groups—at Essert, at Bavilliers, and on the Bosmont, whilst an isolated battery in the south and another in the east acted in support.†

From the 9th January 50 guns fired on the fortress.‡ Only now did the unquestionable superiority of the assailants' artillery become manifest. The enemy continued the artillery struggle in a feeble manner. The Basses Perches fort was completely sub-

* Battery No. 9 also opened fire on 7th January, Battery No. 15 a day later.

† Of the older batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8a, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 were at this time active. Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 had already ceased. No. 6, which had at times been silent for want of ammunition, only fired at intervals. The distribution of the batteries taking part in the bombardment was as follows:—

1. At Essert.
 No. 5 Battery, four 12-cm. guns.
 „ 6 „ one 27-cm. smooth-bore mortar.
 „ one 22-cm. smooth-bore mortar.
 „ 7 „ four French 15-cm. guns.
2. At Bavilliers.
 No. 9 Battery, two 27-cm. smooth-bore mortars.
 „ 10 „ four 15-cm. guns.
 „ 11 „ four 12-cm. guns.
 „ 12 „ four 12-cm. guns.
 „ 19 „ two 21-cm. rifled mortars.
 two 23-cm. smooth-bore mortars.
3. At the Bois de la Brosse and on the Bosmont.
 No. 13 Battery, four 15-cm. guns.
 „ 14 „ four 15-cm. guns.
 „ 15 „ three 27-cm. smooth-bore mortars.
 one 22-cm. smooth-bore mortar.
 „ 16 „ four 12-cm. guns.
 „ 17 „ four 12-cm. guns.
 „ 18 „ four 12-cm. guns.
4. At Andelnans.
 No. 8a Battery, two 12-cm. guns.
5. At Chèvremont railway station.
 No. 20 Battery, four 12-cm. guns.

A new artillery park had been formed at Banvillard.

‡ After that on this same day No. 5, and on the previous day No. 8a and No. 9, ceased firing.

dued; conflagrations burst out at Pérouse, Danjoutin, and in the town.

The first successes had been utilised by General v. Tresckow Ist for a more serious enterprise.

SURPRISE OF DANJOUTIN ON THE 8TH JANUARY.

The French had continued to hold their ground in the entrenched position at Danjoutin. The capture of this village would admit of the line of investment being materially shortened, and, generally speaking, facilitate the advance against the "Perches" front.

Captain v. Manstein received orders in consequence to attack the village on the night of the 7th—8th January,* with the Schneidemühl Landwehr Battalion, two companies of the Inowrazlaw Landwehr Battalion, one company of the Gumbinnen Landwehr Battalion, and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company, Xth Army Corps. Half-an-hour after midnight this officer caused the 5th Company of the Schneidemühl battalion and the half-pioneer company to advance from the Bosmont Wood, at first in a northerly direction as far as the railway, and afterwards upon the signalman's house situated to the north of Danjoutin which was in the enemy's occupation;† whilst the 7th Company and the other half-pioneer company moved towards the eastern issue of the village, the 8th and 6th following in reserve. By this procedure the most strongly fortified southern part‡ of the village was avoided, the retreat of the garrison upon the fortress intercepted, and at the same time any offensive from thence prevented.

The enemy received the Landwehr, advancing with unloaded arms, with shots at long range. As the fire became heavier the Landwehr traversed the last part of the way at the double, and not only did the 5th Company succeed in dislodging the garrison of the signalman's house,§ but the 7th also surprised and took prisoner the enemy's picket at the issue from the village. Whilst the 5th and 8th Companies established themselves at the railway embankment, which was at once arranged for defence by the pioneers, and at this point repulsed several hostile companies advancing from Le Fourneau suburb towards Danjoutin, a long and vigorous struggle ensued in the village itself.

The 7th Company had rapidly gained the high road and had

* The necessary reconnaissances in detail had been previously executed by engineer officers.

† Where the Danjoutin—Pérouse road intersects the railway.

‡ Here lies, surrounded by arms of the Savoureuse, a large factory, which very much favoured the defence.

§ A company of the Saône and Loire Garde Mobile.

penetrated to the church, followed by the 6th.* The attack, however, came to a standstill before the southern part of the village, although the 8th Company, as also the two companies of the Inowrazlaw Battalion, which Captain v. Manstein had caused to follow to the railway cutting north of the Bosmont, were brought forward. In spite of the fact that several farmsteads and barricades were captured, the adversary was not overpowered at this point.† He, indeed, passed more than once to the attack, though in vain, with the object of regaining what had been lost. The landwehr companies had to content themselves with maintaining the captured part of Danjoutin.

On the other hand, a renewed attempt at relief on the part of the fortress failed against the fire which the batteries on the Bosmont now once more opened.

During the capture of the village First Lieutenant v. d. Goltz, with the 8th Company Gumbinnen Landwehr Battalion, had advanced from Bavilliers against the group of houses belonging to the village of Danjoutin, but lying on the right bank of the Savoureuse. After seizing a hostile picket,‡ he had, with no inconsiderable loss, captured the houses before day-break and established communication with the other companies.

At 11.30 a.m. the garrison shut up in the southern part of the village also surrendered. In all, 20 officers and nearly 700 men became prisoners of war. On the Prussian side the total loss amounted to some 90 men.

The outposts of the investing troops were henceforth pushed forward to the north of Danjoutin, resting their right on the Bois de la Brosse, and their left on the Grand Bois.

The noise of the musketry fire in the night engagement at Danjoutin had been audible only at intervals at the fortress, and in consequence had been regarded as an unimportant skirmish of outposts. The first news of what had happened reached the commandant from Le Fourneau, where fugitives had arrived, and, owing to this delay, the steps he had arranged for supporting the important post had only been partially carried into effect.

The loss of Danjoutin and the serious damage done to Fort Bellevue, the spread of disease,§ the enemy's manifest superiority in artillery, a succession of conflagrations, and other

* Of the enemy's forces, 4 officers and 150 men were made prisoners. The pioneers barricaded at once the captured parts of the village.

† In the attempt to penetrate further in this direction, First Lieutenant Zippmann, commander of the 8th Company fell, pierced by three balls.

‡ 1 officer and 50 men were made prisoners.

§ Towards the end of the year typhus and small-pox raged in the town. Eighteen persons on an average succumbed daily.

misfortunes,* did not fail to exercise their impression on the garrison and population of the fortress.

On the German side, the reinforcement of the landwehr battalions to a strength of 1,002 men, the arrival of reservists and of the troops set free at Mülhausen by the arrangements of the Government-General of Alsace, had by the middle of December brought the infantry of the siege corps to a force of 15,000 rifles. It is true that sickness, consequent upon the heavy duties and the unfavourable season, speedily reduced the fighting effective of the battalions to some 500 men;† on the other hand the last reinforcements had arrived from the 4th Reserve Division,‡ followed at the end of December by the troops of General v. Debschitz,§ placed at disposal by the Government-General of Alsace. The number of companies of fortress artillery also rose to eighteen, the available pioneer companies to six. Of the Bavarian Artillery Division appointed for Belfort six batteries were in front of the fortress. The forces present would have, therefore, sufficed for an energetic prosecution of the attack, and we should have been justified in expecting a speedy success, had not external circumstances opposed great difficulties. Already even the measures for preventing any attempt at relief demanded a very considerable expenditure of troops. Of the 30 battalions, 7 squadrons, and 6 field batteries, which General v. Tresckow Ist had at his disposal by the beginning of the new year, more than half, namely 15 battalions, 4½ squadrons, and 4½ batteries had to be posted to cover the siege towards the west and in the direction of the Upper Doubs.

Although the French towards the end of November had almost entirely disappeared from the district of the Doubs, a fact ascertained by a series of enterprises on the part of Colonel v. Bredow from Montbéliard, yet in the last days of December the news grew of the enemy's advance from Besançon upon Belfort.‖ Baume-les-Dames and Clerval were reported to be occupied, movements of troops between L'Isle sur-le-Doubs and St. Hippolyte were said to have been seen, and large hostile detachments to be assembled in a camp at Pontarlier.

General v. Tresckow Ist had resolved to resist to the last any attempt at relief on the part of the French. The important

* Among these was a scarcity of money, a remedy for which was attempted in the shape of a compulsory loan and the issue of paper money.

† On the 8th December one of the battalions had over 200 sick and only one officer for duty besides the commanding officer.

‡ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 101.

§ The Tilsit Battalion, coming from Vesoul, reached Frahier on the 20th December; the Insterburg Battalion, from Fresnes St. Mamès, reached Lure. The former found employment in the line of investment at Essert, the latter in guarding towards the west.

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 240, and note on p. 104.

Appendix CXXXI contains the Order of Battle of Debschitz' Detachment. Its strength amounted to 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries.

‖ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 108.

post of Montbéliard had already reached the strength of 1 battalion, 1 squadron, and 4 guns. The strong château* was moreover armed with four siege guns, its garrison reinforced,† and the defensive arrangements elaborated. Further, Colonel v. Ostrowski took post with 2 battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and 4 guns, between Doubs and the Swiss frontier, behind the line of the Gland, at the same time driving on the 29th December, the enemy after a brief engagement from Herimoncourt. When, later on, General v. Debschitz reached Delle, and from thence proceeded to the neighbourhood of Beaucourt, for the purpose of watching between Doubs and the Swiss frontier, Colonel v. Ostrowski retired behind the Allaine to Brognard, where he could act as reserve either to the troops at Beaucourt or to those at Montbéliard, and passed under the orders of Colonel v. Bredow. Moreover, Colonel v. Zglinicki, with 3 more battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and 6 guns, had been despatched to Arcey, where a battalion had been already posted for some time past. Colonel v. Zimmermann also received orders to hold three more battalions in readiness on the west side of the line of investment; these, if necessary, could move off to support the troops at Arcey. The fortress then was, if necessary, to remain invested by ten battalions, while all the rest could oppose the enemy's advance. The field guns still standing in the line of investment were replaced by guns from the siege park. General v. Tresckow 1st shifted his headquarters to Bourogne, south of Belfort, on the 28th December, in order to be closer to the expected theatre of coming events. The most effective support which the besiegers received consisted in the approach of the XIVth Army Corps, which was now on its way.

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 243. At times the detachment in Montbéliard had been still stronger, but the commencement of the artillery attack had necessitated the calling away of part of the troops employed there.

† One officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 40 men of the Fortress Artillery arrived; further, on the 12th January, two more Baden 12-prs., with the necessary detachment of gunners.

**EVENTS ON THE OGNON AND THE UPPER DOUBS UNTIL THE
BATTLE ON THE LISAINÉ. FORMATION OF THE SOUTH
ARMY.**

General v. Werder intended after his arrival at Vesoul, and on the approach of the 3rd Baden Brigade, which had reached Neuville-les-la-Charité on the 1st January,* to undertake a

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 104.

On the 1st January, 1871, the distribution of the troops of the XIVth Army Corps, exclusive of those belonging to the Corps investing Belfort, was as follows:—

Headquarters of General v. Werder.

Vesoul.

Of the Baden Field Division: Lieut.-General v. Glümer.

In Vesoul and the vicinity.

Staff.

1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades.

1st and 2nd Squadrons 3rd Dragoons.

3rd and 4th Light Batteries.

Artillery Division (1st Light, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Heavy, and Horse Artillery Battery).

Between Vesoul and Port-sur-Saône.

Cavalry Brigade.

In Neuville-les-la-Charité and Fresnes St. Mamès.

3rd Infantry Brigade.

4th and 5th Squadrons 3rd Dragoons.

2nd Light Battery.

Combined Prussian Brigade: Major-General Baron v. d. Goltz.

At and to the east of Vesoul as far as Calmoutier.

Staff.

34th Fusiliers.

2nd Reserve Dragoons.

1st Light Reserve Battery IIIrd Army Corps.

In Lure.

30th Regiment.

2nd Reserve Hussars.

Heavy Reserve Battery 1st Army Corps.

2nd Light Reserve Battery IIIrd Army Corps.

4th Reserve Division: Major-General v. Schmeling.

At Villers-èxel, also south and east of this village.

Staff.

2nd Combined Landwehr Regiment (No. 4/5).

Wehlau Landwehr Battalion.

2nd Battalion 6th Baden Regiment.

1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons 3rd Reserve Lancers.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Reserve Batteries.

In and near Rougemont.

25th Regiment.

1st Reserve Lancers.

1st and 2nd Heavy Reserve Battery.

Besides these there was in and near Port-sur-Saône a detachment of *étappen* troops under Major v. Schack, consisting of the Eupen Landwehr Battalion (6 companies), the 1st Squadron 4th Reserve Hussars, and the Heavy Reserve Battery VIIth Army Corps.

forward movement with considerable forces against Baume-les-Dames, and to that end had already made arrangements, when fresh intelligence of the rapid advance of large bodies of the enemy south of the Doubs, and the reported arrival of their advanced guard at Blamont, caused the immediate support of General v. Tresckow Ist to appear indispensable. He therefore gave orders on the 2nd January for the advance next day of the troops from Lure, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nachtigal,* towards Hericourt, and for the advance of the 4th Reserve Division upon Arcey, whilst General v. d. Goltz† received instructions to move to Villersexel. All these detachments were placed under the orders of General v. Tresckow Ist, so that this officer would be able on the 3rd January to oppose any attempts at relief from the direction of the Upper Doubs,‡ with a total force of 29 battalions, 17½ squadrons, and 14½ batteries.

In point of fact, Abévillers had on the 20th January been found by the lancers of Debschitz' detachment in the occupation of the enemy, and this, in conjunction with the other numerous reports of the adversary's advance, might have been taken as the commencement of an important enterprise. When, however, two companies of the Liegnitz Landwehr Battalions advanced from Croix towards Abévillers, they succeeded, after a slight skirmish, in driving a weak hostile battalion from the heights lying to the north-east of this village. Part of it indeed passed into Swiss territory, and was there disarmed. On the 3rd General v. Tresckow Ist, when the reinforcements assigned to him from the XIVth Army Corps reached the intended points, caused three battalions to move away in support from Arcey to Grandvillars, Beaucourt, and Lébétain. But the day passed without any serious collision with the enemy.§

General v. Werder, however, could have no doubt as to the proximity of considerable hostile forces. He had received news from Berne that the railway from Lyons by way of Besançon to Belfort had, up to the 3rd January, been appropriated for the transport of troops. The strength of the forces already accumulated at Besançon had been reported to him for certain at 62,000 men, partly consisting of regiments from the south, even from Algiers, the designations of which had not yet been seen on this theatre of war. In front of Baume-les-Dames, at Avilley, and at Clerval were seen hostile detach-

* 1st and 2nd and 2nd Lt. Res. passed to General v. d. Goltz' column.
2nd Res. Hus. III

† He was provided from the Baden Division with the requisite materials for bridging the Doubs.

‡ IInd
6th Bad. remained at Villersexel in order to join Goltz' Brigade, and subsequently to rejoin its command.

§ General v. Schmeling's patrols scouting along the Doubs were alone received with fire.

ments of infantry, and all reports were unanimous in speaking of impending attempts at relief on the part of the French.

When General v. d. Goltz ascertained, on the 3rd January, at Villersexel, that a strong hostile corps was expected on the following night at Rougemont, and he in consequence contemplated the occupation of the passages of the Ognon to the south of Esprels, General v. Werder, who rightly judged the covering of the siege to be the chief task, gave orders for his troops to concentrate more closely. The 4th Reserve Division and Lieutenant-Colonel Nachtigal's detachment were brought up to St. Ferjeux, the main body of the Baden Division placed in readiness at Vallerois-le-Bois, and the 3rd Baden Brigade summoned to Neurey-les-la-Demie. Vesoul remained in the occupation of the *étappen* troops, which had arrived there the day before.*

Early on the 4th January, however, Rougemont was found clear of the enemy, and the officers' patrols of the Baden Cavalry Brigade scouting along the Ognon saw no movements whatever on the part of the adversary. At 11 a.m. General v. Werder was able to dismiss his troops into cantonments between Vesoul and the Ognon, whilst Arcey was reoccupied by General v. Tresckow Ist. It was only on the road to Rioz that there occurred an unimportant skirmish with French detachments, which, in their movement towards Vellefaux, came into collision with a Baden squadron,† and later on were met in a position on the northern border of the Bois de la Bouloy by Baden infantry, who were advancing in pursuit.

OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT VESOUL ON 5TH JANUARY.

In the early morning of the 5th January a company‡ advancing to make a further reconnaissance from Echenoz-le-Sec found the adversary on the border of the Bois de la Bouloy, and also observed French infantry behind the wood. Later on some hostile battalions moved up from Authoison towards the high road, whilst others occupied Le Magnoray. Prisoners stated that 40,000 men were in the neighbourhood.

Echenoz-le-Sec, which was not suited for defence, was now evacuated by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Baden Regiment, but the 5th Company remained in the cemetery north of the village, and the 7th a little distance in rear as support. The other

* 1st and 4th and 2nd Saxon Light Reserve Battery, under Major v. Pacrinski-1st Rea. Rif. Tenczin. The Battery joined on the 5th the 2nd Baden Infantry Brigade.

† 1st
3rd Drag.

‡ 6th
3rd Baden.

companies* momentarily available at Echenoz-le-Sec and Vellefaux were posted by Lieutenant-Colonel Kraus in and near Vellefaux, whither General v. Werder now summoned the main body of the Baden Division. The 1st Baden and General v. d. Goltz' Brigade were brought up to Dampierre-les-Montbozon, General v. Schmeling to Valleriois-le-Bois.

Shortly after noon a detachment of French infantry with some cavalry showed to the south of Vellefaux, but were driven off by the shells of the 4th Light Baden Battery which had just arrived there. Half-an-hour later a battalion of garde mobile occupied Echenoz-le-Sec, whilst other troops deployed at Le Magnoray. The attempt made during the afternoon to press forward from Echenoz-le-Sec was defeated by a battalion of the 4th Baden Regiment.† This latter drove the enemy, after a brief struggle, back into the village, and made a number of prisoners. Shortly after the adversary evacuated the village.

The fusilier battalion 3rd Baden Regiment had received orders from General v. Glümer to advance from Andelare upon the enemy's left flank in the direction of Lévrecey. It joined at Velleguindry the fusiliers of the 5th Regiment, who had also been sent to the same point. With an enveloping and decisive attack, but with no inconsiderable loss, the Badeners forced their way into Lévrecey at 4.45 p.m., where Major Jacobi captured 100 prisoners belonging to the 42nd French Regiment de Marche. The defeated garrison disappeared in the falling darkness.

At other places, as well, the enemy had been met with during the day. A detachment‡ from Goltz' Brigade, which had advanced during the morning from Esprels towards Baume-les-Dames, found the road as far as Autechaux clear of the enemy, but found Avilley, south-west of Rougemont, occupied. At Huanne, south of this town, the enemy deployed infantry columns and lines of skirmishers. From Dampierre-les-Montbozon General v. d. Goltz dislodged some hostile cavalry at Filain and Vy-les-Filain. West of Vesoul Major v. Schack found Traves on the Saône occupied, and caused the village to be shelled. Two squadrons of French lancers had shown themselves on the Gray—Vesoul railway, and, when General v. Werder caused his troops to move into quarters that evening, at the same time causing the roads leading from Vesoul towards the enemy to be sufficiently guarded, strong hostile columns accompanied by artillery appeared in front of Velle-le-Chatel, which was occupied by Baden companies, and drove them by an outflanking movement from the village. Here the

* 1st, 6th, and 8th
3rd Baden

† 1st 4th Bad., under Lieut.-Colonel Arnold, whilst 11th 4th Bad. followed in reserve.

‡ 2nd and 3rd 34 and 1st 2nd Res. Drag., under Major Count v. Herzberg.

French quartermasters had already ordered billets for two Zouave battalions and a battery.*

With a loss of 90 men on the German side,† some 500 prisoners altogether had been brought in on the 5th January, from whose statements, taken in conjunction with other reports, it could be inferred with certainty, that the 18th, 20th, and probably also the 24th French Corps were on the march to Vesoul. The troops also with which we had had to deal were positively asserted to have belonged originally to the 1st Army of the Loire.

As the narrative will have shown in previous chapters, the Royal Headquarters had remained for a considerable time without positive intelligence as to the whereabouts of the forces assembled under General Bourbaki.‡

It is true that on the 24th and 25th December reports reached Versailles from Switzerland that a French corps had left Lyons for the relief of Belfort,§ and that considerable transports of troops had been passing from Lyons to Besançon. Wagoners who had furnished teams in the Sologne for the 1st Army of the Loire, had stated that since the 22nd this army had been in process of transport by rail from Bourges and Nevers to Châlons-sur-Saône.|| In consequence of these statements General v. Zastrow was ordered to move from Auxerre to Châtillon-sur-Seine, while all preparations for bombarding Langres were stopped. Upon similar reports the march of the XIVth Army Corps followed from Dijon to Vesoul,¶ while instructions were sent to the Government-General at Strassburg, to place at the disposal of General v. Werder, at Belfort, 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 reserve batteries under General v. Delbischitz. As, moreover, on the 27th the earlier news from Berne was confirmed, His Majesty the King now gave orders for General v. Zastrow to move up altogether to the Saône and assume the chief command of all troops on the south-east theatre of war.

Meanwhile, however, the statements with regard to a withdrawal, eastward, of General Bourbaki had in no wise received confirmation. On the contrary, the cavalry scouting in the Sologne had observed strong columns marching upon Aubigny

* They were taken prisoners by the Badeners on entering the place.

† Appendix CXLI contains details of the losses of the XIVth Army Corps, as of the 4th Reserve Division between the 1st and 18th January, 1871.

‡ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 97, *et seq.*

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 104.

|| These wagoners, after being discharged by the French, had been detained by the cavalry of the IInd Army. (See Part II, Vol. I, p. 97.) The communication in question reached Versailles through the headquarters of this Army.

¶ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 104-5.

Ville.* The Hessian Division at Briare had also been driven back on Gien, by superior forces on the 1st January.†

On the Upper Doubs the French remained tranquil,‡ and even on New Year's Day General v. Werder was able to report that their measures appeared solely directed to defensive objects; the Lyons—Besançon railway was, it is true, closed to private traffic, but the arrival of Bourbaki's troops was not confirmed. These circumstances, taken in conjunction with the offensive movements of the French on the Loir,§ still pointed to a joint advance of both Loire armies to succour the hard pressed capital as the most fitting, and consequently most probable, operation of the enemy.||

Under these suppositions the march of the IInd Army upon Le Mans, the despatch of the IInd Army Corps in the direction of Montargis were resolved upon, while orders were given to General v. Zastrow,¶ already halted in his advance at Nuits-sur-Armançon and Montbard,** to withdraw to Auxerre, with a view to securing the investment of Paris towards the south in conjunction with the IInd Corps.

From Berne came renewed reports of large movements of troops, and among the population the rumour was generally current that 10,000 men had been landed from Algiers; there was also no doubt that General v. Werder had in his front very considerable hostile forces, but up to the 3rd January he knew nothing positive as to the presence of General Bourbaki's army. On the 4th a summons was therefore sent to him to take the offensive with all his forces, in order to clear up the situation.

At length proceedings became known at Versailles, which enabled the real state of affairs to be gauged for certain. This happened through the telegraphic report of General v. Werder with reference to his engagement at Vesoul on the 5th, which left no doubt that Bourbaki's army was opposed to him.

The Royal Headquarters had remained for a long time in uncertainty with regard to this important circumstance, but now the most comprehensive measures were at once taken to meet the existing danger.

The IInd and VIIth Army Corps were already at Montargis

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 97. In point of fact the French 15th Army Corps was to continue in rear for the purpose of guarding Bourges, Nevers, and the Upper Loire, and to distract attention from the movement eastward of the 1st Army of the Loire. Notwithstanding the very large drafts it had given to that army, the Corps reached a strength of some 35,000 men by the end of December. (Compare Jacquin, "Les Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," p. 190.)

† See Part II, Vol. I, p. 97.

‡ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 105.

§ On the Loir, as is well known, the attack on Vendôme occurred on the 31st December, 1870.

|| The forward movement of General Bourbaki through Montargis had been actually commenced on the 19th December.

¶ By a cypher telegram of the 2nd January. Compare subsequent narrative.

** On the 30th December. See Part II, Vol. I, p. 98.

and Auxerre on the 6th January.* Telegraphic orders were at once sent to both of them to assemble in the neighbourhood of Nuits-sur-Armançon—Châtillon-sur-Seine.

The 14th Division, in process of transport to Mitry, at once had its direction changed to Châtillon-sur-Seine, where it was to unite with its Corps.†

All troops on the south-east theatre of war were to form a new army—the South Army—and pass under the orders of General Manteuffel.‡

General v. Zastrow, in his advance to the Saône, towards the end of December, was on the point of taking at first the direction of Dijon, when, on the 30th, he received telegraphic orders to remain at Nuits-sur-Armançon and Montbard, to leave General v. Werder independent, and to actively take in hand the disarmament of the country. In order now to relieve, at least indirectly, the XIVth Corps by diverting the enemy's attention to his movement, General v. Zastrow had, on the 1st January, assembled the main body of the 13th Infantry Division to the north of the line Pouillenay—Sémur, and caused the advanced guard to move forward to Flavigny and Pouillenay, while Sémur and Darcey were to be occupied from the flanks. On the 2nd January mixed detachments had been afterwards pushed forward in the direction of St. Seine, Sombornon and Saulieu. The one§ dispatched towards St. Seine, repulsed a franc-tireur detachment at the Pass of Courceau, reached Chanceaux, but retired on Frolois|| in consequence of the overwhelming force of Garibaldians which appeared there.

The telegraphic order for the march to Auxerre had reached the hands of General v. Zastrow in a partially mutilated state, on the 2nd January, but the further direction of march could be deciphered. On the following day the 13th Infantry Division had assembled between Flavigny, Sémur and Montbard, with the object, pending a reconnaissance in the meanwhile, of commencing the march to Auxerre by way of Noyers and Chablis. Six battalions, three squadrons, two batteries, under Colonel v. Dannenberg,¶ remained behind for the protection of the Chaumont—Nuits—Tonnerre line of railway.

On its arrival in the neighbourhood of Auxerre, on the 6th

* For the movements of the IIInd and VIIth Army Corps, see General Maps Nos. 6 and 7.

† See ante, p. 229. Three battalions were already detrained at Mitry before the change in direction was known on the 6th January.

‡ Appendix CXXXIII contains the details of the Order from the Royal Headquarters.

§ IIInd $\frac{4th}{72}$, 1st Res. Hus., and $\frac{1}{VII}$ 4th Lt.

|| Courceau lies $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the north-west of Chanceaux, Frolois about 3 miles to the west of Courceau.

¶ 60th and 72nd Regiments, $\frac{3rd \text{ and } 4th}{1st \text{ Res. Hus.}}$, $\frac{3rd}{5th \text{ Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{3rd \text{ and } 4th \text{ Lt.}}{VII}$.

January, the VIIIth Corps had discovered the presence of franc-tireurs at Avallon, as also strong bodies of French at Clamecy, and had thrown out a covering force towards the south; while with its advanced guard it had occupied Vallan* and Villefargeau, without finding the enemy in that direction. The corps now commenced from these points its march to the Upper Seine with a view to joining the Army of the South.†

The IInd Army Corps had commenced to move from Paris on the 2nd January, and on the 5th had already reached Montargis, by way of Melun and Fontainebleau, with its leading troops. On the 6th the Corps had concentrated closer to this town and had extended its line of outposts from Château de Platteville,‡ past Villemandeur§ and Amilly St. Firmin,|| as far as the Courtenay road. From thence it started for Nuits-sur-Armançon.¶

Meanwhile, these large bodies of advancing reinforcements could not make themselves immediately felt by the enemy in the basin of the Saône, and General v. Werder was in consequence thrown upon his own resources for the moment. He assembled his forces early on the 6th January, in a position previously selected by himself behind the Durgeon Brook near Vesoul, where the ground offered advantages enough to accept, with prospect of success, an engagement even with very superior forces. Only General v. d. Goltz remained in position to the south-east of the town, in order to keep a watch on the adversary's right flank. General v. Tresckow Ist placed at the disposal for the expected decisive engagement 5 battalions, 2½ squadrons, and 2 batteries, which assembled on that day under Colonel v. Brodow at Arcey.

The position which General v. Werder had taken up at Vesoul, indirectly covered at the same time the siege of Belfort. The adversary in his advance could not leave it unobserved, especially if he desired to use the road through Esprels, north of the Ognon. It is true that south of this river two other roads lead from Besançon to the neighbourhood of the fortress: namely, that through Rougemont to Héricourt, and that through Baume-les-Dames and L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs to Montbéliard; but these two were insufficient for the movement of an army of large size. A third south of the Doubs was of little account, as it traverses a difficult country with deep cuttings and rugged ridges, and, consequently, under the condition of slippery roads,

* On the Auxerre—Clamecy road, 3½ miles from Auxerre.

† The first troops of the 14th Division arrived at Châtillon-sur-Seine on the 7th, the Divisional Staff by rail on the 11th.

‡ On the Ladon road, about 1½ miles west of Montargis.

§ 1½ miles south of Montargis.

|| On the Château Renard road, 2½ miles south-east of Montargis.

¶ Appendix CXLII contains a return of casualties in the IInd and VIIIth Army Corps between the 1st and 12th January, 1871.

offered the greatest obstacles to unpractised troops. It might be assumed generally that a numerous and badly equipped force, especially in the prevailing cold of winter, could only move slowly, and could not go far from the railway, to which it was tied for its very existence.*

For the moment three hostile Corps were opposed in front to General v. Werder, and he calculated that if they moved away eastward, he could always take up in time a position immediately covering the siege of Belfort. Naturally it was necessary that in such an event any movement of the adversary should be discovered at its very commencement, which, in the highly enclosed country, was as difficult as it was important. An offensive movement with large forces in the direction of Esprels and Villersexel would give, however, the desired information.†

The 6th January passed without any molestation to General v. Werder in his position at Vesoul.‡ Colonel v. Ostrowski found L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs not occupied more strongly than was ordinarily the case. Only the advanced troops of General v. Debschitz had an unimportant collision with the enemy at Bondeval. On the 7th January the posts south-west of Vesoul reported that Raze was clear of the enemy, and when General Keller advanced with the reinforced 3rd Brigade into that neighbourhood, his cavalry scouting as far as Noidans-le-Ferroux and Mailley, he only met with French patrols. On the other hand, General v. d. Goltz found Bonnal, on the Ognon, in the occupation of gardes mobiles and franc-tireurs, and on the Villersexel road met with some armed peasants, a sure indication of the near approach of hostile forces. From Basle General v. Werder received the news from a trustworthy source that General Bourbaki, with an army of 150,000 men, was moving to the relief of Belfort.

On the 8th January§ Major v. Walther|| found, as a matter of fact, Villersexel unoccupied, and it was not until St. Ferjeux that gardes mobiles showed themselves. A reconnoitring detachment sent by General v. d. Goltz,¶ however, which advanced to the south of Vesoul towards Filain and Dampierre-les-Montbozon, perceived a column of all arms, estimated at 15,000 men, moving from Authoison in the direction of Montbozon.

All this unquestionably pointed to a movement of the French forces from the neighbourhood south-west of Vesoul towards the east. General v. Werder had already made the necessary

* General Count v. Moltke had drawn General v. Zastrow's attention to this matter in a despatch of 27th December.

† Generals v. Glümer, v. Schmeling, and Baron v. d. Goltz were informed of this view adopted on the evening of 5th January, as to the situation.

‡ Captain Baron v. Seldeneck arrived here with the Baden Sortie Battery, which was brought on the strength as the 5th Heavy Battery.

§ For the position of the armies on 8th January, see Sketch facing p. 313.

|| With the 2nd Reserve Dragoons.

¶ $\frac{1\text{st and } 4\text{th}}{30}$ and $\frac{4\text{th}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$ under Captain v. Rundstedt.

preparations for shifting the lines of communication of his corps to Upper Alsace. The reconnaissances during the moonlight night of the 8th-9th were carried on with redoubled energy. The villages south of Vesoul were found to be abandoned by the enemy, while Villersexel, on the other hand, was to all appearance strongly occupied. Hostile detachments had also advanced from Geney against the western outposts of General v. Tresckow Ist.

General v. Werder therefore made arrangements to follow forthwith the movement which he believed the enemy was making, and by a stroke in the direction of Villersexel to bring it at the same time to a standstill.

The 4th Reserve Division, which, already on the afternoon of the 8th had been brought forward to Noroy-le-Bourg, received orders to march on the 9th to Aillelans, and to move its advanced guard towards Villersexel. General v. d. Goltz was to be ready at Noroy-le-Bourg, the Baden Division was to move to Athesans by way of Vy-les-Lure, whilst Vesoul and Port-sur-Saône were for the time being to remain occupied by *étappen* troops and a mixed Baden detachment. Moreover, before day-break the intelligence as to the enemy's movements eastward was confirmed from so many sides, that it was in contemplation to reinforce General v. Tresckow Ist more speedily with parts of the Baden Division. An attack, however, by the French in this direction did not take place for the present; on the contrary, their movements were still directed against the XIVth Army Corps.

As early as the 19th December, General Bourbaki, at the repeated instances of the War Minister, had commenced with his scarcely reconstructed army the movements for crossing the Loire at Nevers and for advancing in the direction of Montargis and Fontainebleau towards Paris. Apprehending during this march an attack in flank by Prince Frederic Charles,* who at that time had just returned from the Loir to Orleans, he readily entered into new proposals of the Government, which held out promise of most important successes from an appearance of the First Army of the Loire in Eastern France. For this purpose the 18th and 20th Corps, and a reserve formed of the most serviceable parts of the 15th Corps, were in the first instance appointed. They were to be further joined by the 24th Corps, meanwhile formed at Lyons, and Crémér's Division, whilst to the Vosges Army of Garibaldi, busy with its preparations at Autun, fell the duty of protecting the left flank of the new Army of the East.† Moreover considerable reinforcements were expected from the levy of Garde Nationale in the south-east

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 79.

† Appendix OXXXIV contains the *Ordre de Bataille* of the French Army of the East at the beginning of January, 1871.

districts. For the protection of Bourges and Nevers only the larger part of the 15th Corps was to remain behind in the Loire country.

The task committed to General Bourbaki was very comprehensive and wide-ranging. No doubt was entertained that Dijon could be easily captured, or that the siege of Belfort must be abandoned by the Germans without a blow. The severing of the rearward communications of the enemy's armies operating in France was regarded as a certainty. The mere appearance of an army of 110,000 men would liberate the fortresses in the north. The next matter in contemplation was a co-operation with General Faidherbe's army.*

The movements of the French Army were attended with ill luck from the very outset.

The transport by rail of the troops from Bourges, Nevers, and La Charité to the Saône,† which commenced on the 23rd December, was delayed beyond all expectation. In consequence of the want of preparation much confusion and delay occurred, which, irrespective of the loss of time, entailed very great hardships on the troops owing to the severe cold of the time of year, and insufficient food. The horses especially suffered, and it was upon these that severe strain would fall during the marches in prospect. At first the detachments coming from the Loire were conveyed to Châlons-sur-Saône and Chagny. But when it meanwhile became known that the Germans had evacuated Dijon, it was resolved to entrain the already detrained troops, in order to bring them to Dôle and Auxonne nearer to the 24th Corps, which had been despatched from Lyons to Besançon. This measure was attended with new delays, for the Châlons—Dôle railway was still in charge of the contractor, while the carrying power of the mountain line by Lons-le-Saunier was slight owing to its steep gradients. The attempts of the War Delegate to bring pressure upon the railway companies were unproductive of any real result. It was not until the beginning of the new year that the army had concentrated between Besançon and Dijon.‡ Meanwhile General Bourbaki had applied to the Government to add the 15th Corps to the Army of the East, a request which was granted. This corps could not, however, commence to entrain before the 4th January, and required fourteen days to complete its transport, as it had to be carried up the Doubs

* Appendix CXXXV contains the proposal of the War Delegate de Freycinet to the War Minister Gambetta regarding the plan of operations for the First Army of the Loire (East Army).

† *See ante*, p. 154, note †. Certain units appear to have been despatched as early as the 22nd December.

‡ The following were the positions on the 2nd January:—24th Corps with the Army Reserve in and near Besançon; the 20th Corps at Dampierre; the 18th Corps at Auxonne; Crémier's Division at Dijon. The Headquarters of the Army remained at Besançon up to the 4th January.

beyond Besançon by a line which did not lend itself to large movements of troops.

On the 2nd January, the forward march of the rest of the army had commenced. The 18th Corps crossed the Ognon at Pesmes; the 20th moved in the first instance towards Marnay, and as it found the passage at that place impracticable, towards Voray. To the same place General Bourbaki transferred his headquarters on the 4th January, after that a resolution had been finally taken at a Council of War held that day at Besançon to advance the army upon Vesoul, where General v. Werder was believed to be with the bulk of his forces. On the 5th January the concentration of the army against these forces was to take place, the 24th Corps to gain by way of Marchaux the neighbourhood of Montbozon and Esprels, the 20th, Echenoz-le-Sec, the 18th, Grandvelle; but it was only the heads of columns that took part this day in the skirmishes at Vesoul which have been already described. The Army Reserve was, it would appear, marched to Rioz.*


The intention of the French Commander was to force away General v. Werder's Corps entirely from Belfort and the troops besieging this fortress, by turning his left wing. When news now arrived that Villersexel was strongly occupied by the Germans, General Bourbaki resolved for the attainment of his object to make a longer detour to the right, and commenced that march eastward which had been observed by the adversary on the 8th, whereby the decisive struggle had, of course, to be deferred.


On the 8th January the 18th Corps reached Montbozon, the 20th, Rougemont, the 24th, Cuse, whilst the 15th commenced its detrainment at Clerval. On the same day General Crémier† received orders to leave for Vesoul. For the 9th General Bourbaki ordered from Montbozon that the 24th and 20th Corps in the neighbourhood of Vellechevreux and Villargent were to move up to the road Villersexel—Arcey, the 18th to advance upon Villersexel and Esprels, the reserves to follow to Cubry, Abbenans, and Fallon. The headquarters proceeded to Bournel Château.‡

* In point of fact on the 5th January the 18th Corps reached Mailley, Rosey, Grandvelle, with its advanced troops Lévrecy—Velle-le-Châtel; the 20th, Le Magnoray, Authoison, and the Bois de Filain; the 3rd Division of the 24th Corps, Corcelle and Chaude Fontaine.

† General Crémier had moved off on the 2nd January from Dijon in the direction of Fontaine Française, but owing to apprehension for the safety of the Burgundian capital, had been recalled thither after a few days.

‡ Appendix CXXXVI contains the text of the marching orders for the Army of the East on the 9th, the corps orders of General v. Werder of the 9th January (3 a.m.), and of an order addressed that day to Colonel Bayer.





ENGAGEMENT AT VILLERSEXEL ON 9TH JANUARY.*

The 4th Reserve Division† had moved off about 7 a.m. on 9th January from Noroy-le-Bourg for Aillevans, where a bridge over the Ognon was at once proceeded with. The advanced guard sent on the right towards Villersexel, was received with fire from the scrub to the north of the place, and at once brought both its batteries into action at the southern border of the Le Grand Fougeret Wood.

The town, which on the further bank rises to a commanding height, the wall-girt park of the château, and the stone bridge over the Ognon were taken under fire, no less than the hostile columns advancing from the south. A first offensive movement undertaken at 10 o'clock by the fusiliers of the 25th Regiment failed. Meanwhile, however, First Lieutenant Hertel had observed a wire bridge leading from the Forge to the château park. With quick determination he, with the 11th Company, drove out the garrison and took possession of the château, some 90 Frenchmen and a colour falling into the hands of the assailants. From that point the defenders of the main bridge over the Ognon were now fired upon in rear. General v. Tresckow IInd at once caused strong detachments to follow in support.‡ The 25th forced their way into the town, repulsed two hostile companies standing on the Rougemont road, and secured the southern issues.

* See Plan No. 33 and Sketch.

† Distribution of the 4th Reserve Division
(9th January).

Commander: Major-General v. Schmeling.

Advanced Guard: Major-General v. Tresckow II.

25th Regiment ($\frac{1st}{25}$, apportioned at first to the main body, but afterwards sent to the advanced guard).

1st Reserve Lancers.

1st Heavy Reserve Battery.

2nd Heavy Reserve Battery.

Main Body: Colonel Knappe v. Knappstädt.

Wehlau Landwehr Battalion.

2nd Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiment (No. 4/5).

1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons 3rd Reserve Lancers.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Reserve Batteries.

2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIth Army Corps, with part of the Field Bridge Train.

$\frac{2nd}{Thorn}$ was detached as escort to the Divisional trains moving by the Lure road.

‡ In succession the $\frac{12th, 6th, 7th, 2nd, and 4th}{25}$, under the command of Colonel

v. Loos. The $\frac{5th}{25}$ occupied the Forge and the wire bridge. The $\frac{8th}{25}$ watched towards Moimay and did not rejoin the regiment until later. The $\frac{1st and 3rd}{25}$ were posted as reserve to the $\frac{9th and 10th}{25}$, left opposite the Ognon bridge.

When four companies,* under Major Malisius, now renewed their attack on the Ognon bridge, the enemy retired also thence along the Scey Brook in the direction of Beveuge. Of the 1st Reserve Lancers, which had rapidly advanced through Villersexel, Captain v. Wernsdorff's squadron (2nd) charged a hostile company, which was, at the time, endeavouring to reach Villers-la-Ville, and captured 60 prisoners.

The French had in vain endeavoured to support the garrison of Villersexel† by artillery fire from the south. By 1 o'clock all resistance was broken. Exclusive of wounded and dead some 500 unwounded prisoners remained in the hands of the Germans. The batteries of the advanced guard unlimbered on the heights south-east of the town, and a pause in the action ensued which lasted until 2 o'clock.

Meanwhile the right flank of the engaged troops had been seriously threatened by the advance of the 1st Division and the Reserve Artillery of the French 18th Corps. The 4th Reserve Division had caused this movement, which had been discovered early by a lancer patrol, to be watched by weak detachments, but General v. Werder had brought forward General v. d. Goltz's Brigade‡ to Grange d'Ancin and appointed it to guard the flank towards Marat and Moimay.

The attempt in passing to gain possession of Marat, which was already in the enemy's hands, was not successful.§ On the other hand, the advanced guard succeeded in throwing two more companies|| into Moimay, where there was already a detach-

* $\frac{9\text{th and } 1\text{st}}{25}$ in first, $\frac{10\text{th and } 3\text{rd}}{25}$ in second line.

† It consisted of a Corsican and a Vosges garde mobile battalion, 2 companies of the 1st Rhône Legion and 1 squadron.

‡ Distribution of Major-General Baron v. d. Goltz's Combined Prussian Brigade on January 9th.


Advanced Guard: Lieut.-Colonel Nachtigal.
1st and 2nd Battalions 30th Regiment.
3rd Squadron 2nd Reserve Hussars.
Heavy Reserve Battery 1st Army Corps.
1st Light Reserve Battery IIIrd Army Corps.


Main Body: Colonel Wahlert.
Fusilier Battalion 30th Regiment.
34th Fusiliers.
1st and 4th Squadrons 2nd Reserve Hussars.
2nd Light Reserve Battery IIIrd Army Corps.

$\frac{2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$ covered during the advance the right flank of the brigade, the $\frac{12\text{th}}{30}$ was detached to Lure as escort to the trains, $\frac{10\text{th}}{34}$ as escort to the regimental transport. The 2nd Reserve Dragoons, which had passed the night in Lure, moved to the neighbourhood of Aillevans.

§ $\frac{2\text{nd and } 3\text{rd}}{34}$ and $\frac{1\text{st}}{\text{Thorn}}$ had occupied part of the village, but were forced to evacuate it, as the enemy led forward against the place strong detachments of infantry, supported by several batteries.

|| $\frac{6\text{th and } 7\text{th}}{30}$.





ment of the 25th.* General v. d. Goltz perceived that he had considerable forces in his front, and that therefore the holding of Moimay was of importance. He caused the greater part of his main body† to advance thither. The batteries of the advanced guard had at first taken post to the north of Moimay and now came into action on the heights west of the village against the French artillery unlimbered at Rullet Farm.‡ They were joined by the battery of the main body. Some companies§ had pressed forward beyond Moimay into Les Broses Wood, where a brisk action ensued at 1 o'clock. General v. d. Goltz soon found himself strong enough, after consultation with General v. Schmeling, to despatch nine companies of the 30th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nachtigal, to Villersexel. They were to relieve at that place the troops of the 4th Reserve Division and render them available for proceeding to Belfort.

Meanwhile, however, General v. Werder, from his position on the Aillevans heights, whence an extended view was offered, had perceived that considerable reinforcements had joined the French forces opposite Villersexel.

The field bridge east of Aillevans had been established, and a detachment of the 4th Reserve Division|| pushed forward between Longeville and St. Sulpice for its protection. The advance across the Ognon had struck, as could now be perceived, not the flank of marching columns but the front of a superior force of the enemy. It was most important to prevent the enemy from crossing the river and thereby rendering the junction with General v. Tresckow Ist impracticable.

General v. Werder caused, therefore, the main body of the 4th Reserve Division to advance at 2 p.m. through Grange d'Ancin upon Villersexel, and ordered the return to Arpenans of the main body of the Baden Division already on the march to Athesans.¶ Before these movements were executed, the troops

* The bulk of the $\frac{8\text{th}}{25}$.

† $\frac{\text{IInd, 1st, 4th, 9th, 11th, and 12th}}{34}$ with the $\frac{2\text{nd Lt. Res.}}{\text{III}}$, under Colonel Wah-

lert. The $\frac{2\text{nd and 3rd}}{84}$ and $\frac{1\text{st}}{\text{Thorn}}$, which had been employed towards Marat, had moved partly to the edges of the wood north of the village and partly through Les Broses Wood to Moimay.

‡ The German reports speak of French batteries unlimbered at Autrey-le-Vay. The French sources make no mention of these batteries. It may be assumed that the batteries of the 20th French Corps deployed at Rullet Farm are meant, as the ranges at which the German batteries fired agree therewith.

§ $\frac{6\text{th and 7th}}{30}$ and $\frac{5\text{th, 7th, and 8th}}{34}$.

|| The $\frac{3\text{rd and 4th}}{\text{Thorn}}$, the Wehlau battalion, and $\frac{2\text{nd}}{3\text{rd Res. Lan.}}$, under Major v.

Keyserlingk, had partly waded through the river and partly crossed by a weir.

¶ The 1st Baden Brigade had continued its march with the object of reaching Couthenans *via* Lure, and bringing as speedy support as possible to General v. Tresckow Ist. But this brigade was also halted towards evening at Lure, and there passed the night.

in Villersexel had once more moved off towards Villers-la-Ville. The General commanding, who repaired in person to Villersexel, withdrew however the advancing detachments* back to the town, and the batteries to the right bank of the Ognon. The reinforcement detached to Villersexel from the combined Prussian Brigade and part of the Reserve Division were assigned to General v. d. Goltz, and, as that officer declared that he was not in need of support, were posted at the edge of the wood north of Villersexel.†

Meanwhile on the scene of the struggle at Moimay a renewed attack upon Marat‡ had failed. The batteries were in a critical position. In an attempt to take up a more effective position further in advance, the 1st Light Reserve Battery had been suddenly overwhelmed with infantry fire from Les Brosses Wood. Two guns broke down, but with the greatest coolness were again made fit to move.§ At 3 o'clock the wood had to be evacuated. But the attempts of the French to press forward on Moimay failed against the accurate shell fire of the Prussian guns, and, when these had been withdrawn at night-fall to a position north of the village, against the file-fire of the infantry. The main body of the Baden Division had continued its advance beyond Arpenans,|| and General v. Glümer caused three batteries¶ to come into action against Marat. Shortly after 5 o'clock the village was captured by the foremost Baden battalions** without great difficulty. At 6 p.m. the struggle round Moimay also came to an end.

Meanwhile, however, a stubborn night action had developed at Villersexel.

Some time after the nine companies of the 30th under Lieutenant-Colonel Nachtigal had been called away from the western part of the town, the French succeeded, under cover of the shades of evening, in penetrating into the park and chateau before these localities were reoccupied by the Prussians. Strong

* $\frac{1\text{st, 9th, 10th, and 12th}}{25}$, $\frac{5\text{th and 8th}}{30}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd Heavy}}{4\text{th Res. Div.}}$. The Ortelsburg Battalion, belonging to the main body of the 4th Reserve Division now arriving at Villersexel, and the 3rd Light Battery likewise took part in the attack.

† Only two companies of the Graudenz Battalion played a temporary part in the engagement round Moimay.

‡ By the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{84}$ and $\frac{1\text{st}}{\text{Thorn}}$. The latter returned shortly after to the main body of the 4th Reserve Division.

§ Non-commissioned officer Schuls was shot through the breast, but would not quit his gun until it had been brought back.

|| The 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, and the 2nd Heavy Battery from the main body of the Baden Division had relieved the detachment of the 4th Reserve Division in protecting the field bridge at Aillévans, and also occupied St. Sulpice as well as Notre Dame de la Pitié, and maintained the connection towards the side of Villersexel.

¶ $\frac{1\text{st and 4th Light, 1st Heavy}}{\text{Baden}}$

** $\frac{1\text{st and Fus.}}{3\text{rd Baden}}$

columns of the enemy advanced from the south towards the town, which was briskly cannonaded by his artillery.

The general situation did not absolutely require that Villersexel should be permanently occupied. General v. Tresckow Ind, therefore, ordered its evacuation. Colonel v. Loos was entrusted with covering the withdrawal, which, in consequence of the enemy's vigorous attacks, could only be effected with difficulty and by constantly assuming the offensive.

The town had not been fully evacuated by the German garrison, when an order arrived from General v. Werder to continue to hold it. The 3½ landwehr battalions* available to the north of Villersexel advanced at once, and on the Ognon bridge met the retiring 25th, who fronted, and under a heavy fire once more forced their way into the town. The fusiliers speedily made themselves also masters of the eastern part; but the 2nd Battalion† did not succeed in capturing the southern issue, through which the adversary was continually bringing up reinforcements.

The Wehlau landwehr battalion had moved against the park and château. After its attack was repulsed, Major v. Wussow, at the head of a detachment of the Osterode Battalion, had succeeded in penetrating into the lower story of the extensive building. He was speedily followed by the greater part of the Osterode and Wehlau Battalions. But the enemy held out obstinately in the upper story and the basement. The half of the Thorn battalion also took part from the side of the river,‡ and a brisk but changeful fight now ensued on the staircases and passages. In one of the rooms 120 prisoners were taken; to drive the French from others proved impracticable.§ Whilst a great part of the men returned to the Ognon bridge, Colonel v. Krane and Major v. Wussow remained with others in the burning building, and were surrounded by the adversary; still, with the assistance of the Thorn Battalion, they succeeded in cutting their way out. The attempts on the part of this battalion to gain the inside proved, however, abortive.

Two companies of the 1st Battalion 25th Regiment,|| which had been kept back in the town, near the Ognon Bridge, were

* Of the 5 Landwehr battalions, which had originally constituted the main body of the 4th Reserve Division moving on Villersexel, the Wehlau, Osterode, Ortelsburg, and two companies of the Thorn battalion were present. Besides the 2nd Company of the Thorn Battalion, the 4th was still detached. This latter guarded the field bridge at Aillevans till the arrival of the Baden detachment (see Note || on previous page), whilst the remaining troops of the Reserve Division posted there had followed their main body. Of the Graudenz Battalion two companies were fighting with General Baron v. d. Goltz. The other two were employed to transport prisoners.

† The officer in command of the battalion, Captain Reisewitz, was mortally wounded; several officers were placed *hors de combat*.

‡ The Ortelsburg battalion occupied the north-east entrance of the town, and despatched later two companies against the château.

§ On entering one of the occupied rooms First Lieutenant Foerstemann was killed.

|| 2nd and 4th.

also despatched against the château, but on the way thither became involved in a street action, in which many Frenchmen probably shared who had lain concealed there since the morning. The street fight continued with increasing briskness until 10 o'clock, illumined by the gleam of the burning houses.* In the general din, the effect of the hostile artillery was only marked in the bursting of the shell. The troops struggling in the interior of the town could be easily assailed in rear from the side of the château. Colonel v. Knappe, who had rallied the landwehr battalions on the bridge, ordered in consequence the attack on the park to be renewed. The two companies of the Thorn Battalion took up a strong position on the north side of the château, and successfully repulsed an attack of the enemy directed along the river; but neither they nor the other battalions were able to recapture the château hill.

General v. Werder had given orders between 7 and 8 p.m. for the troops to continue to hold during the night the positions which they were occupying. They encamped at Moimay, Marat, and Grange d'Ancin.† Only in Villersexel was the struggle for the possession of the town still undecided. When the General Commanding received news of this at 9.30 p.m., he left it to General v. Schmeling's judgment to break off the action if necessary. At 1 p.m. the evacuation of the town was definitively ordered. The 1st Battalion 25th Regiment undertook the covering of the retreat, which, without further incident, was completed by 2.45 a.m. The Division continued its march across the field bridges at Aillevans.‡ Its advanced guard reached St. Pulpice very early on the 10th January.

The German troops, of whom some 15,000 men with 54 guns had been engaged, had lost in this action 26 officers and 553 men, but in all had made 700 unwounded prisoners, and had held their ground on the Ognon against two French Corps, the 18th and 20th, as well as a detachment of the 24th.§

In the direction also of Belfort the enemy's presence had been noticed on the 9th January. French columns had been seen in the morning on the move towards Arcey by way of Corcelles. But they very soon ceased this movement, and later on commenced their return march. When Colonel v. Bredow then advanced on his side as far as Corcelles, he found the place occupied. He dislodged the enemy and took note of a

* The 6th and 7th ²⁵ also took part, and ultimately the 5th ²⁵ more especially.

† The 30th Regiment and the Graudenz Battalion held themselves, to the north of Villersexel, in readiness to support the troops engaged, but bore no share in the fight.

‡ On the afternoon of the 9th a second field bridge had been constructed near the first.

§ The enemy's losses, according to Chenu, amounted to 27 officers and 627 men killed and wounded.

large camp at Secenans, which interrupted his direct communication with General v. Werder.* The quarters of General v. Debschitz in front of the River Allaine, had also been disturbed by French detachments from Seloncourt.†

In point of fact, on the morning of the 10th January, three French Corps were just as near to Belfort as the three German Divisions, whose duty it was to cover the siege of the fortress which lay entirely on their flank. General v. Werder, who at the early dawn, had called up the Baden Division and General v. d. Goltz's Brigade to the Aillelans Heights, so that the whole of the XIVth Army Corps now stood concentrated here and at Longeville, had resolved to offer resistance in the event of his being attacked; otherwise, to withdraw. The enemy did not pass to the attack; in consequence, the withdrawal to the north-east was commenced early in the morning.

To cover it, the 4th Reserve Division took up a position at Athesans, behind which General v. d. Goltz's Brigade marched to Béverne, the Baden Division into quarters between Lure and Ronchamp. Under cover of a rear guard left at Leval and La Vergenne, the 4th Reserve Division subsequently withdrew, and sought quarters in the neighbourhood of Moffans. The detachments of Colonel Bayer and Major v. Paczinski left on the 9th at Vesoul and on the Saône, had also been brought up to Vy-les-Lure.‡ General v. Werder now formed, for the further observation of the enemy towards the west, as well as to the north in the direction of Epinal, a special detachment consisting of 8 companies, 13 squadrons, and 2 batteries,§ which were in the first instance to remain at Lure under the command of Colonel v. Willisen.

Colonel v. Bredow was not seriously molested this day, notwithstanding that considerable hostile forces showed themselves in front of his position. These troops were contented

* Corcelles was again abandoned in the evening.

† Colonel v. Bredow had in consequence been even obliged to despatch two battalions and a battery to Allanois, where they were to remain in readiness to support General v. Debschitz.

‡ Colonel Bayer had continued to occupy Vesoul with the 1st Ind and Fus., the 4th Baden, the Eupen Battalion, the 4th Res. Hussars, the H. Res. Battery, and the 2nd Lt. Res. Bat., whilst Major v. Paczinski-Tenczin was on the 9th at Port-sur-Saône with both his 1st Reserve Rifle Companies and the 1st Bad. B. G. Drag.

Colonel Bayer, who, in consequence of orders transmitted to him during the night, had in the morning first advanced on Les Belles Baraques, and from thence reconnoitred further towards Esprels, had met with French detachments at Vallois-le-Bois, and had a slight skirmish.

§ Eupen Landwehr Battalion (6 companies).

Two companies Reserve Rifles.

Baden Body Guard Dragoons.

1st Reserve Lancers.

2nd Reserve Dragoons.

1st Squadron 4th Reserve Hussars.

Heavy Reserve Battery VIIth Army Corps.

2nd Saxon Light Reserve Battery.

with having interrupted the communication with General v. Werder, and fired with their artillery upon Arcey at long ranges, without producing the least effect.

Before General v. Debschitz's front Captain Count v. d. Schulenburg had advanced in the direction of Abévillers, with three companies of the Apenrade battalion, a division of lancers, and two guns, had captured the village after a brief but sharp fight, and driven out the enemy.*

On the 11th January, the Baden Division reached the neighbourhood of Frahier and Chalonvillars; General v. d. Goltz marched to Chagey, Luzé, and Couthenans, the 4th Reserve Division to Tavey and Héricourt. Thus the XIVth Army Corps had reached the line of the Lisaine, and now stood between the besieged fortress and the enemy's army, for whose further observation Colonel v. Bredow remained at Arcey, and Colonel v. Willisen at Lure.†

Already on the previous day, General v. Werder had hurried forward in order to examine the localities on the Lisaine. At Ronchamp, he received from the hands of a Feldjäger‡ the general directions issued from the Royal Headquarters on the 7th. They informed him of the constitution of the South Army, relieved the XIVth Corps of the duties of watching the country west of the Vosges, and indicated as his chief task the covering of the siege of Belfort, for which object all troops that could be spared were to be employed. He was recommended to break up the roads in the Southern Vosges and to observe the enemy's movements west of the mountains, in conjunction with the Government-General of Lorraine. Any risings in his rear were to be put down with a strong hand; a course which was also recommended to the Government-General of Alsace. The Baden War Ministry was requested to station reserve troops in the south part of the Grand Duchy, for the purpose of opposing any possible passage of the Rhine by hostile bands of franc-tireurs. Lastly, the XIVth Corps was to keep constant touch of the enemy, in order to prevent him from throwing his whole force on the advancing Corps under General v. Manteuffel.§

The arrangements of General v. Werder now in process of execution, were perfectly in accordance with the objects pointed out by the Royal Headquarters.

General v. Tresckow Ist had proceeded for a verbal conference to Argièsans,|| from which place the General Commanding visited in detail the fighting position to be taken up on the Lisaine.

* As to the position of the armies on the evening of the 10th January, see Sketch facing p. 319. Colonel v. Zimmermann's Detachment consisted of the Goldap, Marionburg, and Gumbinnen battalions.

† See sketch.

‡ A field courier, ranking as sergeant-major, and belonging to a special corps attached to the Royal Headquarters who perform this class of duties in peace and war. They travel by rail, carriage, or horse, as the case may require.—TRANSLATOR.

§ Appendix CXXXVII contains the text of this despatch.

|| On the Belfort—Héricourt road.

11. January (Evening)



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
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The Lisaine, together with the Allaine, forms in the "Gap of Belfort" a line of defence stretching from the foot of the Vosges to the Swiss frontier; in its upper course, it is but an unimportant rivulet, and not until below Chenebier does it attain a breadth of 20 to 25 feet, and a depth of 20 to 40 inches, while in some places there are dams. During the struggles about to commence, however, the Lisaine was frozen over, and could only be made a frontal obstacle by breaking the ice.

The valley of the little river forms at Frahier a gentle depression, girt by hills, and afterwards, lower down as far as Chagey, is closed in by steep declivities, densely wooded and difficult of access. The more open ground near Héricourt is completely commanded by the high and rocky Mont Vaudois. Lower down the wooded hills of du Chanois and Dannin approach at times closely, but afterwards, as far as Montbéliard, the hills open out to a distance of 1,600 to 2,700 yards. From the elevated farmstead of La Grange Dame, situated close to the north of this town, a considerable reach of the valley can be overlooked, and brought under fire. The railway embankment in places also presents on the east bank of the Lisaine an obstacle presenting no small difficulty of passage.

Only two important roads lead from Arcey across the lower course of the river now coming chiefly under consideration. The one by Montbéliard is barred by the strong castle; that by Héricourt offers the defender a favourable position on the neighbouring Mont Mougnot, in the elevated cemetery on the Luze road, and at Bourangle Mill. Further in front lies Tavey, still within gun-shot, of Mont Vaudois. The less important roads which cross the valley are mostly narrow, deeply sunk, and, in consequence of the prevailing frost, were difficult to use.

The great road from Lure to Belfort, which traverses the more open district of Frahier, should also be mentioned.

The generally wooded district favours the enemy's approach under cover, but forms an impediment to his deployment, and limits the employment of large bodies of artillery to a few points.

The chief disadvantages of the position were its great extent and the deficiency of connecting roads behind the front, and as the assailants' points of attack could not be foreseen, the timely support of the defenders at those points was in consequence difficult. The distance which separated Frahier from Montbéliard was $11\frac{1}{4}$ miles.

Meanwhile General v. Tresckow Ist had prepared beforehand the battle-field by throwing up batteries in the most favourable positions and arming them with siege artillery. Of these 7 guns were placed on the slopes of Mont Vaudois, 5 on the La Grange Dame heights, 6 at Montbéliard Castle, and 16 at various points behind the Allaine.*

* The batteries were as follows :—

(1) On the slopes of Mont Vaudois, north-east of Héricourt, seven 12-cm. guns.

General v. Werder resolved to occupy the line of the Lisaine, and issued orders to carry out the occupation next day.*

In consequence the 4th Reserve Division, including the part hitherto employed before Belfort,† moved with one brigade and two batteries on the 12th and 13th January to Montbéliard and Sochaux, with the other brigade and four batteries to Héricourt. Joining him to the north came General v. d. Goltz at Couthenans, Luze, and Chagey. The Baden Division concentrated on the right wing its 2nd and 3rd Brigade in the neighbourhood of Frahier, and formed an artillery reserve of four batteries; the 1st Brigade was shifted further to the rear to Chalonvillars and Mandrevillars. The regimental transport assembled at Frahier were brought up, the trains sent to the Giromagny—Sentheim road.‡ The communications leading further north through the mountains were to be cut at the cross roads of St. Maurice.§

Most diligently were those hours, which the enemy's inactivity let slip, turned to account, in order to increase the defensibility of the position. The headquarters at Bréville were connected by telegraph on the one side with the right wing at Frahier, on the other side with General v. Tresckow 1st at Bourogne. Lines of relays on an extensive scale were formed. With the aid of almost all the companies of fortress pioneers shelter-trenches and gun emplacements sprung up at all the more important points. The passages of the river were partly destroyed, partly prepared for destruction; the ice-bound roads,

- (2) On the La Grange Dame Heights, north-east of Montbéliard, five 15-cm. guns.
- (3) At Montbéliard Castle, four 9-cm. guns and two 12-cm. guns. (*See ante*, p. 300.)
- (4) At Vieux Charmont, two 9-cm. guns.
- (5) At Allanoie, two 9-cm. guns.
- (6) On the heights west and north-east of Bourogne, at each point two 15-cm. guns.
- (7) North of Grandvillars, two 12-cm. guns.
- (8) North of Joncherey, four 15-cm. guns.
- (9) At Delle, two 12-cm. guns.
- (10) Later on three more 15-cm. guns reached Rougeot Mill (on the Frahier—Chalonvillars road).

* Appendix CXXXVIII contains the text of the orders issued by General v. Werder.

† Appendix CXXXI places the troops temporarily transferred from the 4th Reserve Division to the Siege Corps as still with the Siege Corps during the next few days, as the latter was in immediate connection with the troops of the XIVth Army Corps, and under the same command.

‡ About 3 miles east of Maasmünster on the Mülhausen road.

§ The detachment appointed for the purpose (5th and 8th Companies 6th Baden Regiment and $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, under Captain Rayle, and 4th Bavarian Fortress Engineer Company, Captain Nagel) commenced their march from Chaux in ankle-deep snow at noon on 12th January. At Maleveaux ($3\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Giromagny) everything that could be dispensed with had to be left behind. A sleigh drawn by six oxen served to carry four hundredweight of blasting powder. With 20 degrees of frost and a biting wind, the bleak Ballon d'Alsace, 4,081 feet high, was crossed, a bridge near St. Maurice blown up on the 14th, and on the way back the road was broken up at Le Paix, above Giromagny.

so far as possible, strewn with sand and ashes. Timely preparations were made for replenishing ammunition.*

The 4th Reserve Division relieved with its advanced guard the detachment at Arcey on the 12th. Colonel v. Bredow left there, however, a battalion† to strengthen the post, as it was immediately in front of the enemy. For further security General v. d. Goltz pushed forward that same day a detachment as far as Chavanne. According to the reports of Colonel v. Willisen the main forces of the French were still at Villersexel; detachments of them had advanced, indeed, as far as Moffans on his flank. He received orders, if pressed, to retire in the direction of Giromagny; yet there were no signs whatever that the enemy contemplated attacking the right flank of the German position.

The circumstance of his dependence on the railway made it probable that he would move against the left wing and centre.‡ General v. Werder believed in consequence that he might hold the Upper Lisaine with weak forces and employ the greater part of the Baden Division as reserve to the posts on the lower course of the river. The 1st Brigade was therefore transferred on the 13th from Mandrevillars southward to Bréviliers, Chatenois, and Grand Charmont, the 3rd with the cavalry was brought up to the neighbourhood of Mandrevillars; General v. Degenfeld, remained, however, with 2 battalions of the 3rd Regiment,§ 1 squadron, and a battery at Chenebier. Thither, also, Colonel v. Willisen, if compelled to retreat, was to send his infantry and artillery.||

After these precautionary measures General v. Werder now awaited the further movements of the adversary, but, even at this time, decided that in the event of the position on the Lisaine being broken through, the retreat was not to be carried further than behind the line of the Savoureuse.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the East, who had been present in person at the attack on Villersexel, had returned to his headquarters at Bournel Château under the impression that a victory had been gained. In such sense he reported that same night to the Government at Bordeaux.¶

* The bringing up food and ammunition met with considerable difficulties, as the wagons sent back through Epinal could not as yet arrive by way of Strassburg and Dammerkirch. The Baden War Ministry was requested to send 2,000 shells.

† Ist
67

‡ The railway through Vesoul was destroyed in several places.

§ Ind
3rd Baden was at Chagey, and was left there.

|| The squadron of reserve hussars with Colonel Baron v. Willisen was placed at disposal of the Étappen Commandant at Luxeuil, and left for that place on the 13th January.

¶ The telegram runs:—"Bournel, 10 Janvier, 1871, minuit et demi. L'armée a exécuté hier, 9, le mouvement ordonné. Le Général Clinchant a enlevé avec un entrain remarquable Villersexel; le Général Billot a occupé Vesprels et s'y est

to the northward. Ten guns deployed on the heights north of the village; two took up a position on the high road at Semon-dans. The fusilier battalion had been withdrawn to this village, the 1st Battalion of the 67th to Rainans and Issans.

Towards 3 p.m., the enemy appeared before this front, which his great superiority allowed him to outflank on both sides. He also shortly showed himself in considerable strength on the flank at Le Vernois. Colonel v. Loos, therefore, retired to Tavey, where he took up a fresh position at half-past 4 o'clock with all his troops.* The French did not follow any further, and only sent patrols through the wood.

tion at
Chavanne.

At the advanced guard also of General v. d. Goltz' Brigade† a report had been received shortly after 9 a.m. concerning the advance of the enemy along the Corcelles road and to the north of it, at Saulnot and Malval.

Lieut.-Colonel Nachtigal, besides Chavanne, where the battery unlimbered and opened fire, occupied also at the outset Villers-sur-Saulnot, and the brook flowing northward, with 3 companies.‡ A company, which had come into collision with the enemy at Malval, took up a position at the edge of the wood on the right wing.§ The fusiliers, with the squadron, were in reserve at and near Chavanne. But when the French had deployed a whole brigade, captured Gonvillars, and now advanced towards Villers-sur-Saulnot, all the troops were concentrated at Chavanne in a position between the village and the Bois du Mont. Although the adversary caused two batteries to come into action, his further advance was successfully prevented for some time. It was not until 2 o'clock, when the hostile turning movement gripped the left flank through the wood, that Lieutenant-Colonel Nachtigal proceeded through Le Vernois into a new position, east of Champey,|| which he reached without molestation, as the shell-fire of the battery prevented immediate pursuit by the French.

General v. d. Goltz, who had been present at the engagement, withdrew his advanced guard to Couthenans at 5 p.m., abreast of that of the Reserve Division.

Both advanced guards had accomplished their difficult task, but indeed with a loss of 139 and 107 men respectively. The adversary, according to French sources, had met with a like amount of casualties.¶

* $\frac{1st}{67}$ rejoined its regiment from the advanced guard.

† $\frac{1Ind \text{ and Fus.}}{30}$, $\frac{2nd}{2nd \text{ Res. Hus.}}$, and $\frac{1st \text{ Light Res.}}{III}$.

‡ $\frac{5th \text{ and } 6th}{30}$ in first line, $\frac{7th}{30}$ in reserve.

§ $\frac{8th}{30}$. A division of hussars watched on the flank.

|| To protect the right flank the $\frac{3rd}{30}$ had meanwhile also advanced from Champey to Essouavre mill.

¶ According to Chenu, 200 men.

[illegible]



In front of the Allaine, the detachments of the 7th French Military Division which had been despatched thither some time back from Besançon, had advanced against General v. Debschitz's outposts just at the moment—1 o'clock—when the Liegnitz Battalion was to be relieved at Dasle by the Oels Battalion. Both battalions took post between Vaudoncourt and the Charbonnière wood, whence 3 companies of the Oels Battalion* made a forward movement to meet the enemy deploying from the direction of Seloncourt. Their attack was repulsed. The companies, 5 officers† of which were speedily placed *hors de combat*, retired, and were supported in the outpost line by the 1st Company of the Oels Battalion, and by the part of the 3rd Company Liegnitz Battalion,‡ still at the outposts. These at once succeeded, with the assistance of the fire of a battery,§ in repulsing the adversary's superior force, and, with the reinforcement afforded by two hastily arriving companies of the Hirschberg Battalion, in pursuing the retreating foe for some distance towards Seloncourt, whence he retired to Bondeval at half-past 5 o'clock.

Engagement
at Dasle and
Croix.

The enemy had also deployed skirmishers and artillery against the garrison of Croix. A protracted skirmish ensued, but the enemy made no serious attack.

In the main position on the Lisaine, in consequence of the near approach of the outpost fight, the troops had partly got under arms, but generally speaking the defensive works were continued.||

On the 14th January the posts in front of Montbéliard¶ were repeatedly disturbed by hostile detachments, and became involved in an engagement at Dung. The enemy's skirmishers moving through the lateral valley of Présentevillers, and then along the Rupt brook, had endeavoured to press forward against the Prussian picquets. At 4 p.m. an offensive movement was made through Le Berceau Wood, which was, however, repulsed by the troops held in readiness to support the outposts.**

Outpost
affair at Du
and Bart.

* 2nd, 3rd, and 4th.

† Among these the commander of the battalion, Captain v. Münenberg, whose horse was also killed.

‡ Captains Knorr and Patrunky.

§ 1st Light Res.

VIII

|| For the position of the Armies on the evening of the 13th January, see sketch.

¶ Loetzen battalion.

** 1st and 2nd and 4th Light
Insterburg 4th Res. Div.

In front of the right wing of the Lisaine position, Colonel v. Willisen had, in accordance with orders, sent back his infantry and artillery to Frahier, but had remained with the cavalry at the Ognon bridge, south-east of Lure. From there he caused 50 dismounted dragoons, armed with Chassepôts, to drive out the enemy, who was then entering Lure. It was meanwhile ascertained that hostile infantry were advancing along the railway to Lure, and strong columns were on the march from Leval. At nightfall Colonel v. Willisen retired to Ronchamp, where the two reserve rifle companies and the 2nd Saxon Light Reserve Battery rejoined him.

Before the entire front of the XIVth Corps the opposed patrols were in contact. The enemy was in the immediate neighbourhood. A hard frost had destroyed the importance of the river Lisaine as a tactical obstacle. A general attack on the part of the French might take place at any moment. In point of fact it had been General Bourbaki's intention to attempt such on the 14th. The Germans might be supposed to be in a position corresponding to their small effective between Montbéliard and the further side of Héricourt, with their right flank appuyed on Mont Vaudois. In front of this extent of ground were three of his corps—the 15th, 24th, and 20th—closely concentrated at a distance of less than $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles on the line Dung—Aibre—Le Vernois. The strong left wing of the army, however, was considerably to the rear. The 18th Corps had not reached its destination on the 13th January, and by the 14th, in consequence of the hilly ground, could not be brought forward further than Lomont and Moffans, whilst Crémér's Division only left Vesoul on that day. And it was these two forces that were to facilitate the difficult frontal attack, as they were destined to cross the river above Mont Vaudois and strike the adversary's right flank. In the general scheme the army had in this attack to change front to the right, on the 15th Corps, as a pivot. Yet this latter* was to commence the engagement, while the 24th and 20th were to hold back until the advance of the two wings became effective.†

The execution of this plan had to be postponed until the 15th January.

On the 14th January General v. Werder felt it his duty to report by telegraph to Versailles the seriousness of his position.

But a further retreat of the XIVth Army Corps, even if executed of its own free will, would have had almost the same consequences as a lost battle: the nullification of all its previous efforts against Belfort, the loss of all the siege material, the


* Supported by four battalions of the 7th Military Division.

† The very detailed arrangements of General Bourbaki, as also a telegram directed to General Crémér at Lure are reproduced in Appendix CXXXIX.

With regard to the positions on the evening of 14th January, see Sketch.

14. January (Even)





discouraging effect on the troops, and the impulse to resistance in Paris and Bordeaux.

When on the 15th January the decisive order* arrived from the Royal Headquarters to accept battle on the Lisaine, General v. Werder had of his own resolution already fallen in with those instructions.



* Appendix CXL gives the text of the telegraphic correspondence in question.

THE BATTLE ON THE LISAINE, 15TH, 16TH, AND 17TH JANUARY.*

While the events described were happening to the XIVth Army Corps, General v. Tresckow Ist had continued the investment of Belfort with the 1st Reserve Division, but had held any parts of it that could be dispensed with ready to send away to the Lisaine, should the necessity arise. No important events had happened in front of the fortress since the capture of Danjoutin. The garrison maintained a moderate artillery fire, in order to give signs of life to the relieving army, of whose approach they had received information.†

From an early hour on the 15th January, the German troops were fully prepared in expectation of an attack on the Lisaine position. In front of the extreme right wing stood Colonel v. Willisen with his cavalry,‡ the two reserve rifle companies, and the Saxon reserve battery at Ronchamp and Champagny.§ The Eupen Landwehr Battalion with the heavy reserve battery VIIth Army Corps formed at Frahier the reserve to General v. Degenfeld, who, with two battalions, one squadron, one battery,|| held Chenebier and the neighbourhood.¶ General v. d. Goltz with his troops,** reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Baden Regiment and the 1st Heavy and 3rd Light Baden batteries, stood at Chagey, Luze, and at the west foot of Mont Vaudois. The centre of the position was occupied by seven battalions, two squadrons, and four batteries†† of the 4th Reserve Division. General v. Schmeling had occupied St. Valbert, Héricourt,‡‡ Le Salamou, and the western edge of the Bois du Mont Dannin, while the advanced guard under Colonel v. Loos

* See Plan No. 34.

† On the 13th January Colonel Denfert had received from a Sous-préfet in the neighbourhood the following report of the fight at Villersexel, which moreover had been audible at Belfort :—"Victoire à Villersexel, le 9. L'Armée de l'Est continue sa marche." In consequence of this he gave orders to commanders of batteries :—"Tirez à blanc jusqu'à la nuit en signe d'allégresse, cinq coups par pièce. L'armée Française s'avance." See "Le Siège de Belfort," par Belin, pp. 116 and 119.

‡ Baden Body Guard Dragoons, 1st Reserve Lancers, and 2nd Reserve Dragoons.

§ Of the 2nd Reserve Dragoons, one squadron maintained communication to the rear with the troops besieging the north side of Belfort, another at Frahier with the troops of General Baron v. Degenfeld at Chenebier.

|| 1st and Fus. 1st, and 2nd Heavy.
3rd Baden, 3rd Bad. Drag. Baden

¶ On the morning of the 15th January six companies and the squadron were in and near Etobon; they, however, on the approach of the enemy, retired on Chenebier, where the position selected for battle lay.

** Except the 2nd Reserve Dragoons, placed under Colonel v. Willisen. The 2nd Reserve Hussars, which in the morning were at Luze, had retired in the course of the day to the east of Echenans.

†† Combined Infantry Brigade, 2nd and 4th 1st Heavy, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light
3rd Res. Lan. 4th Res. Div.

‡‡ The defence of the position about Héricourt was entrusted to Colonel Knappe v. Knappstätt.

was at first left in its position at Tavey.* The remaining 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries† stood at Bussurel, Bethoncourt, and at Montbéliard; their outposts at Mont Chevis Farm and Ste. Suzanne, whither by order of General v. Werder they had retired in the early morning. South of the Allaine the position was extended from Exincourt to the Swiss frontier at Choix, by General v. Debschitz with his 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 3 batteries.‡

General v. Glümer, who in the course of the 15th January took over the command on the left wing, had at his disposal at Grand Charmont 6 battalions, 1 squadron, and 2 batteries of the Baden Division,§ in readiness either to give support on the Allaine or on the Lisaine; and, lastly, the General commanding had kept in reserve at Brévilliers 8½ battalions, 6 squadrons, and 5 batteries|| of the same Division.

The coat of ice on the Lisaine had been lifted in different places by damming. The pioneers were distributed so as to complete the defensive arrangements even during the engagement, and to destroy the ice as often as it formed again.¶

THE 15TH JANUARY.

In accordance with the plan of battle of the French Commander-in-Chief, the 15th Corps first advanced on the morning of the 15th January against the left wing of the German position on the Lisaine: namely, with the 3rd Division by way of Dung upon Ste. Suzanne, with the 1st from Présentevillers

Engagement
at Montbéliard.

* $\frac{1st}{25}$ had been already recalled on the 14th to the Héricourt railway station, in order to take post there and at various points in front of it.

† East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, $\frac{1st \text{ and } 3rd}{3rd \text{ Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{2nd \text{ Hvy. and } 4th \text{ Lt.}}{4th \text{ Res. Div.}}$.

The 1st Reserve Lancers were with Colonel Baron v. Willisen's detachment.

‡ Including the Bavarian Sortie Battery (4 guns) which had reached the Siege Corps before Belfort on the 3rd January, and had been assigned to General v. Debschitz. (*Vide* Appendix CXXXVIII.)

§ 1st Infantry Brigade, $\frac{2nd}{3rd \text{ Drag.}}$ and $\frac{1st \text{ Light and } 3rd \text{ Heavy}}{Baden}$.

|| 4th Regiment; 3rd Infantry Brigade, except the $\frac{5th \text{ and } 8th}{6th \text{ Bad.}}$, employed in destroying roads in the Vosges, and $\frac{6th}{6th \text{ Bad.}}$, with the trains; 2nd Dragoons and

$\frac{4th \text{ and } 5th}{3rd \text{ Drag.}}$; $\frac{2nd \text{ and } 4th \text{ Light, } 4th \text{ and } 5th \text{ Heavy, and H. A. B.}}{Baden}$. The $\frac{5th}{2nd \text{ Drag.}}$

was despatched in the course of the day to the neighbourhood of Frahier, to maintain communication with the right wing.

¶ The details of the position of the different parts of the XIVth Division are shown on Plan No. 34. The latter does not, however, represent in all cases the first, but, generally speaking, the position chosen for carrying on the engagement and the mode of occupation.

and St. Julien-les-Montbéliard upon Mont Chevis Farm,* whilst the 2nd Division was held in reserve.

The two objective points in question were occupied as already mentioned by the advanced troops of the East Prussian Landwehr Brigade.

At 10 o'clock the pickets of the Loetzen battalion standing at Mont Chevis Farm and Ste. Suzanne were pressed back by superior bodies of French infantry deploying from the woods in front.† Colonel v. Usedom, who was on the point of visiting the new outpost position, called up at once the companies at Ste. Suzanne to the battle-field.‡ Meanwhile the 2nd Company offered so successful a resistance§ on the heights north of the place, that time was gained for the arrival of the supports. Major v. Harder|| caused the arriving detachments to advance upon the enemy cheering. After the Loetzen battalion had thus been assembled, and the 7th Company of the Marienburg battalion, which, with the other three companies occupied Courcelles-les-Montbéliard, had joined it, they drove back this part of the hostile Division through the wood as far as the Rupt Brook. The outpost position was once more taken up.

The Marienburg battalion had also been attacked meanwhile from Bart, but with the three companies left to it steadily held the canal embankment in front of Courcelles-les-Montbéliard, and thereby prevented at the same time the Loetzen battalion from being outflanked up the valley.

In the first hour of the afternoon, however, the French were considerably reinforced at the edges of the wood. The advanced guard of the 1st Division advanced from Allondans to the attack of Mont Chevis Farm, so that the Loetzen battalion once more found itself hardly pressed. At 2 p.m. it received orders to retreat, and, in conjunction with the 7th Company of the Marienburg battalion, and with assistance from Courcelles, executed it with steadiness and in good order. At Ancienne Citadelle¶ it received support from the Insterburg battalion and from the 4th Light Reserve Battery, which directed

* Each of the two Divisions were reinforced by two batteries from the Reserve Artillery. Moreover, the reports of the two Divisional Artillery Commanders, at variance with the Order of Battle (see Appendix CXXXIV), show a large number of batteries as belonging to the Divisional Artillery. The data of Appendix CXXXIV, on the other hand, agree with those of General de Blois. See de Blois, "L'Artillerie du 15^e Corps pendant la Campagne de 1870-71."

† Mont Chevis Farm itself was occupied by a detachment of the Goldap battalion, and remained so until the afternoon.

‡ The 1st, 3rd, and 4th and 7th
Loetzen and Marienburg

The Landwehr battalions, which as units of their regiment were borne as 2nd battalions, have their companies numbered in some cases 1, 2, 3, and 4, in others 5, 6, 7, and 8. Here the appellation in vogue with the battalion has, as a rule, been retained.

§ The commander of the company, First Lieutenant Nikutowski, fell here.

|| Major v. Harder, as commander of a section of the position, had under him on this day the Loetzen and Marienburg battalions.

¶ There were but slight traces of the old works.

their fire with success against the vigorously advancing foe, as also upon his batteries opening from Allondans.* The loss of the Loetzen battalion during this brisk engagement was considerable.

Meanwhile Colonel v. Zimmermann, in accordance with the intentions of the General commanding, had ordered the entire evacuation of the right bank of the Lisaine, and the retirement of the troops there to the main position behind Montbéliard.† This movement took place under cover of the heavy artillery of the castle. After the retirement had been completed through the town, which was entirely commanded from the heights in front, the companies‡ held in readiness to support at the west and north border of it, as well as the Wehlau battalion posted inside and at La Petite Hollande, were also recalled. At Montbéliard there only remained the garrison of the strong château under Major v. Olszewski.§

At the same time General v. Glümer had brought up the 1st Baden Brigade, and caused the field batteries|| to come into action on the La Grange Dame Plateau, next the siege guns. Two battalions¶ guarded the flanks of this artillery position; another** was pushed forward towards the eastern issues from Montbéliard; the rest remained under cover of the heights. The Insterburg battalion occupied La Grange Dame,†† the Wehlau battalion the copse to the northward, in order to keep up connection with Bethoncourt. The other Landwehr battalions were withdrawn to La Chaux Wood and to Sochaux.

On the heights west of Montbéliard eight batteries at least of the 15th French Corps‡‡ had come into action one after another, and these maintained a brisk fire from half-past 3 until dark. In consequence of the long range, the German batteries husbanded their ammunition. The artillery of the château and the heavy guns at La Grange Dame chiefly replied. They compelled the adversary to change his position

* The artillery of the 1st Division 15th French Corps..

† The Marienburg battalion received the order at Courcelles too late, found the bridges at La Petite Hollande destroyed, and was forced to take a roundabout road south of the Allaine by way of Exincourt and Sochaux.

‡ 6th and 8th.

§ Gumbinnen.

¶ 5th and 7th; 6 siege guns, under Lieutenant Sauer.

|| Gumbinnen.

¶ 1st Light and 3rd Heavy and 2nd Heavy and 4th Light.

|| Baden 4th Res. Div.

¶ 1st and Fus.

¶ Baden B. G.

** Fus.

** 2nd Baden Gren.

†† Only one company was employed on the left wing of the position.

‡‡ Five batteries of the 1st, three of the 3rd Division. It would appear also that batteries of the reserve artillery also took part in the cannonade. It is not certain whether this large number of batteries were in action at one time. See De Blois, "L'Artillerie du 15^e Corps pendant la Campagne de 1870-1."

frequently. The artillery suffered no losses, while those of the infantry under cover were but slight.

At nightfall a brigade of the French 3rd Division entered the town which had been evacuated by its defenders of their own free will.* Sharpshooters ensconced themselves in the buildings surrounding the castle, and made loopholes in the walls. Detachments occupied the eastern part of Montbéliard, but never attempted to advance from the place. Some shells from the castle prevented any entry into the commissariat magazine, where there were still supplies, and communication with the castle also remained possible.† The German troops not employed on outpost duty sought quarters in rear as far as the Savoureuse during the bitter winter's night.

engagement
at Bethon-
court.

At the time when the detachments employed in front of Montbéliard were ordered back, two battalions of the French 2nd Brigade had advanced upon Mont Chevis Farm. They there dislodged a weak post,‡ after a vigorous resistance. Thereupon the batteries appearing on the heights north-west of Montbéliard directed their fire partly upon Bethoncourt. Some of the guns also of the 24th Corps in action at Vyans took part in cannonading this village. After 3 o'clock ensued the infantry attack, at first upon Le Petit Bethoncourt.

Major v. Normann, upon whom devolved the duty of defending this part of the battle-field with the Goldap battalion, had pushed forward the 7th Company to Le Petit Bethoncourt, and with the other three had taken post partly behind the railway embankment, and partly at the edge of the village.§ The 2nd Baden Fortress Pioneer Company here present was employed on the flanks. The ice of the Lisaine had been lifted, the stone bridge over the river blown up; the dam alone formed the means of communication between the two banks. On the steep heights of the left side of the valley, a second defensive position in rear of the first was prepared by arranging shelter-trenches.

General v. Glümer had observed from La Grange Dame the advance of strong hostile columns upon Bois Bourgeois, which lies close to the Lisaine, and ordered the 2nd Battalion Baden Bodyguard Regiment, and the 1st Light Baden Battery to move in support to the heights south-east of Bethoncourt. The attack of the two French battalions upon Le Petit Bethoncourt|| failed against the file fire of the 7th Company Goldap Battalion. Part of the repulsed enemy threw themselves into the unwallled cemetery to the north, on the right bank of the river, in order to get shelter from the fire, and in spite of heavy losses, held their ground until Lieutenant v. Berken, with some men of

* It had previously been entered by Algerian tirailleurs.

† A creeping patrol brought Major v. Olszewski the orders for the next day.

‡ See ante, p. 332, note †.

§ The 8th Company was kept in reserve at the village.

|| The heavy guns, under Captain Weisswange, and the field batteries had also brought their fire to bear from La Grange Dame upon it.

the 7th Company, advanced against this place of refuge, and made prisoners of its garrison of 1 officer and 60 men.*

The Baden battalion was not again engaged, but had caused one more company to advance to the village, and with another protected the battery, which effectively cannonaded the enemy from two different positions. The other two companies moved off towards Bussurel. They however found the fighting at that place already ended, and returned to Bethoncourt.

After the attack of the French had been repulsed, the night also passed quietly at this place. The pioneers again broke up the ice on the Lisaine, the thermometer standing at 12 degrees of frost, and strengthened the shelter trenches with wire entanglements.

Further north, towards Bussurel, the 24th French Corps had advanced, but it was 2 p.m. before its leading troops could debouch from the difficult forest defiles at Vyans, and pass to the attack.

Engagement
at Bussurel

Bussurel, which lies on the right bank of the river, had been abandoned by the defenders. The bridges at the north and east issues of the place were blown up. The 1st Company Danzig Battalion had been pushed forward to the mill buildings on the left bank, opposite the north issue from the village. With the other three companies of the same battalion Captain Kossak occupied the railway embankment. As the position to be held was very extensive, only a division remained in reserve.

Four French battalions, which opened fire at great distances with their long-range weapons, gradually approached Bussurel, occupied the village, deluged from thence the railway embankment with their bullets, and then advanced against the left wing, and subsequently against the centre of the defensive position. They were, however, repulsed in both directions with great slaughter.

A final attack made at 4 p.m. was aimed chiefly at the mill. It was vigorously supported by the enemy's artillery, already deployed at Vyans. But the 1st Light Baden Battery from its last position at Bethoncourt, was also able to take part in the struggle round Bussurel. From Brevilliers two Baden battalions with two batteries† under Colonel Sachs had also come up from General v. Werder's main reserve. The batteries at once drew the fire of the enemy's artillery upon themselves, but directed their own after a short time upon the enemy's advancing infantry and the columns emerging from the issues of the wood, throwing them into disorder. The 4th Baden Heavy Battery, which Captain v. Froben worked with great effect,

* According to a report subsequently found, the Savoy Garde Mobile Battalion which was engaged here, and the 1st Zouaves de Marche, a battalion of which also took part in this struggle, lost in the engagements on the Lisaine 15 officers and 444 men. It is probable that they sustained the greater part of these losses on 15th January.

† $\frac{1\text{st and 11th}}{5\text{th Baden}}$ and $\frac{4\text{th Heavy and 4th Light}}{\text{Baden}}$.

In this position, General v. d. Goltz's Brigade to the northward could give a hand to the Landwehr Brigade.

The 34th Regiment stood behind the Lisaine, left and right of the south-west point of Mont Vandois, but had pushed a division of the 12th Company across the river to Chevrot Filature, and the 11th Company to the neighbouring copse. Of the 30th Regiment, the 1st Battalion occupied the village of Luze, which had been arranged for defence. In rear stood the other two battalions in readiness.* At the foot of the Vandois, three more batteries† had unlimbered. On his extreme right flank, General v. d. Goltz had occupied the village of Chagey with the 2nd Battalion 3rd Baden Regiment placed under his orders.

Patrols of hussars had before 8 o'clock in the morning, fallen in with hostile infantry in the direction of Champey. Couthenans was evacuated an hour latter, and the 3rd Battalion 34th Regiment became involved in a stationary musketry action on the west bank of the Lisaine.

Colonel v. Loos was still posted with the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions 25th Regiment, one squadron,‡ and two batteries§ at Tavey, occupying Byans and watching towards Trémoins. At half-past 9 o'clock his batteries opened fire upon some advancing columns. The adversary's artillery deployed at Trémoins and Laire; sharpshooters forced their way into Byans, and advanced towards the Mougnot. They were, however, again driven back by the fire of parts of the Graudenz and Ortelburg battalions, to whose assistance came the hastily returning light battery. Colonel v. Loos, who commenced to withdraw without molestation at 11 o'clock, left both his battalions in reserve at the eastern issue from Héricourt, on the Belfort road, whilst the heavy battery occupied the prepared emplacements at the cemetery, next the Thorn battalion.

Altogether, therefore, in addition to Captain Schweder's seven heavy guns, there were nine batteries, making a total of sixty-one guns, on the 4,000 paces of front from Le Salomou to Luze.

General Clinchant, who had moved with the 20th Corps upon Héricourt, had, in accordance with the disposition issued from Army Headquarters, first to await the effect of the great outflanking movement which General Billot was to execute with the 18th Corps and Crémier's Division. He therefore satisfied himself for the present with holding the ground gained on the wooded heights close in front of the enemy's position, and maintained from thence a brisk but ineffective cannonade, which was only fitfully answered by the Germans.

* The 8th Company was pushed forward temporarily to Couthenans.

† 1st Light Res. 3rd Light 2nd Light Res.

‡ $\frac{\text{III}}{\text{2nd}}$, $\frac{\text{Baden}}{\text{III}}$

§ 3rd Res. Inf.

§ 3rd Light and 1st Heavy.
4th Res. Div.

The advance of the strong left wing of the French met, however, with unexpected obstacles, so that General Clinchant, uneasy at the delay in its arrival, took measures for guarding the left flank, while the Army Reserve was also brought forward in good time to Coisevaux, whence it took part in the artillery engagement with its three batteries. The orders from Army Headquarters did not reach General Billot's headquarters until midnight. This general at once sent a corresponding summons to Crémér's Division.* With great effort this Division had reached Lure only during the night, from which place to Chagey, the battle-field assigned to it, there still remained some 14 miles of road frozen like the surface of a mirror. Thoroughly determined to march onward under any circumstances, General Crémér reported that he could in no case arrive before 8 or 9 o'clock, and could only calculate with certainty upon reaching Béverne by that time.

To the 18th Corps as well, which had to execute a difficult march by forest tracks, deep with snow, there occurred many hindrances. The flank columns of the 1st and 3rd Divisions crossed on the march, and the 2nd Division following as reserve, came into collision at 8 o'clock in Lyoffans with Crémér's Division, which was already in the act of passing through the village. Further delays were caused by the order to let the reserve artillery pass from the tail of the column to the front, and also for the Divisional Artillery to come to the front. Thus the Corps was unable to deploy in front of Luze and Chagey until between 12 and 2 p.m.

The 1st Division reached the edge of the Bois de la Bouloye and of the Bois de la Vacherie, west of the Lure—Héricourt road, partly held back by the fire from the Vaudois. It occupied Couthenans with a battalion. With no little trouble the artillery was brought into position on the reverse slope of the heights north of this village. The 3rd Division advanced to the Bois de la Vacherie, east of the Lure—Héricourt road, and against Chagey. The 2nd Division had only reached Béverne, whence it pushed forward a brigade into the Bois de la Thure.

The cavalry of the Corps remained at Lyoffans.

Since noon five French batteries had been in action west and south-west of Luze, but they were so little able to cope with those of the defenders, that, after the lapse of a short time, there were on an average only two guns in several of the batteries fit for action, although the Germans were husbanding their ammunition as much as possible, in view of the difficulty of replacing it. Consequently an almost entire cessation in the artillery engagement took place in the afternoon, until it again burst forth with great

* Whether and at what hour the telegram of the Commander-in-Chief (see Appendix CXXXIX) reached General Crémér is unknown, but, as the General in any case marched onward as hard as he could, this is of no importance. According to Pouillet, "La Campagne de l'Est," General Crémér, who at the time of the despatch of the telegram had not yet reached Lure, never received it at all.

vehemence at 3 o'clock owing to the participation of freshly arriving French batteries.

Shortly after, part of the artillery of the 24th French Corps was turned from Vyans against the position on the Salamou, so that the 3rd Light Battery of the 4th Reserve Division, which had hitherto been in action on the Mougnot, was brought up thither as reinforcement. As the setting sun impeded the Germans very greatly in observing and directing their fire, they limited themselves here to replying only at intervals.

Meanwhile, the short winter's day had already passed before the French, on the front Luze—Héricourt, had been able to bring about a decision. An infantry attack on a large scale had, generally speaking, not been attempted.

On the other hand, a brisk infantry attack had developed in front of Chagey on the arrival of the 3rd Division of the 18th French Corps. The Bois de Nan stretches here as far as the first houses of that village, but the steep descent of the heights rendered the approach from this side exceedingly difficult. At half-past two o'clock two French battalions deployed further to the south from the Goutte St. Saul valley, and drove in the advanced posts of the Baden battalion. The attack on the village itself was to be supported by infantry from Couthenans, but the detachments advancing for this purpose were dispersed by the shell-fire from the other bank, and thus Major Lang* succeeded in repulsing the first attack on Chagey. But on a second attack, which was undertaken by the French with fresh and considerably augmented forces, the Zouaves penetrated into the village, where a vigorous street fight now ensued.

General Bonnet had brought four batteries into position at the edge of the Bois de la Vacherie. But at the same time Colonel Wahlert† had opportunely brought up the two batteries‡ from the south-west point of the Mont Vaudois to those already posted behind Luze. Once more the fire of the batteries stopped the hostile infantry moving from Couthenans to support those who had penetrated into Chagey.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion 6th Baden Regiment had also reached Chagey.§ With this battalion Captain v. Weinzierl at once advanced to the attack round and through the village. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment joined him. At 5 o'clock the enemy was thrown back into the woods.||

Later still the enemy made further preparations to renew

* IInd
3rd Baden

† This officer commanded the infantry of Goltz's brigade, and had been able to observe from Luze the advance of the French.

‡ Heavy Reserve and 1st Light Reserve.

I III

§ This battalion was really intended to relieve the 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, and make it available for General Baron v. Degenfeld.

|| Major Lang was here wounded, but remained with his men.

the attack. But reinforcements were now at the disposal of the defender. The Fusilier Battalion, as also the 7th Company 6th Baden Regiment, had hastened up with eight guns* from the reserve, the 2nd Battalion 25th Regiment moved up from Héricourt, while from the 30th Regiment as well supports were at hand. The adversary in consequence desisted from any further attempts. Neither during the night did he undertake any further enterprise in this quarter.

That the French had on the 15th made special efforts to gain possession of Chagey, is explained by the belief already mentioned on the part of their Commander-in-Chief, that the right wing of the Germans would be found on the Vaudois. Hence from Chagey it was to be outflanked.

ments at
Chenebier
and on the
extreme
flanks.

Despite the late hour of his arrival at Lure, General Crémier resumed his movement early on the 15th. In order to facilitate his march he had used the Héricourt high road for a considerable distance, but had thereby, after crossing as already mentioned the line of march of the 2nd Division at Lyoffans, come into collision at Béverne with the left wing of the 18th Corps then passing through this village. After arranging with General Bonnet, one of his brigades was inserted into the column of march, but some loss of time was thereby occasioned, as also by the simultaneous drawing forward of the artillery. The 1st Brigade, under the command of Colonel Poulet, an officer of the general staff, at once advanced to Etobon in order to cover the left flank of the army.

General v. Degenfeld on the appearance of the enemy had collected his weak detachment at Chenebier.† The Fusilier Battalion of the 3rd Baden Regiment occupied the southern part, or Courchamp, the 1st Battalion the northern part of the straggling village, behind which the battery took post on a slight rise of the ground.‡

Its fire repulsed at 12 o'clock some French infantry detachments, which commenced to advance from Etobon against Courchamp. Two of the adversary's batteries deployed before Etobon and on the slope of the chateau-topped hill.

At an earlier period the movement of hostile columns from Etobon in a south-easterly direction had been observed at Chenebier. General Crémier had caused his 2nd Brigade to follow to Etobon and there relieve the 1st Brigade, which, advancing through the Bois de la Thure, was to cross the Lisaine above Chagey. The condition of the roads leading thither was, however, such that the engineers were first obliged to make them passable in many places, and that repeated

* $\frac{2\text{nd Light}}{\text{Baden}}$ and $\frac{1}{2} \frac{5\text{th Heavy}}{\text{Baden}}$.

† The Eupen battalion with the $\frac{\text{Heavy Reserve}}{\text{VII}}$ was, as already mentioned, at Frahier.

‡ $\frac{2\text{nd Heavy}}{\text{Baden}}$.

delays occurred. Then followed also the 2nd Brigade, leaving behind only one battalion for the protection of the battery* remaining at Etobon. This latter did not follow until dark. In doing so its escort came into collision with the Baden outposts, and this circumstance acquired some importance in so far that General Cr  mer caused the lighted watch-fires of his Division now assembled in the wood to be extinguished and the troops to stand to arms during the cold winter's night. Three battalions† had been pushed forward by him to watch towards Courchamp.

Colonel v. Willisen was not molested at Ronchamp.

Before General v. Debschitz's front the outposts at Vaudoncourt,‡ supported by artillery,§ repulsed an attack after a brief engagement.

General v. Werder had watched the progress of the action from the heights north of H  ricourt, and had superintended the reinforcement of the threatened points from the reserve at Br  villiers. With the object of becoming quickly informed of all events occurring along the extended line of battle, officers of the general staff had been sent to the most important parts of it, in order to render reports without loss of time.

The replenishment of the ammunition occasioned serious anxiety to the General Commanding. The troops had been ordered to be exceedingly sparing, but the railway trains with the supply promised by the Baden War Ministry had not yet reached Dammerkirch. Only the available reserves in the ammunition columns could be for the present placed in readiness behind the right wing at Errevet, and behind the left at Vourvenans.||

The order issued at 9.30 p.m. appointed that all the troops, including those of General v. Degenfeld, should maintain their positions on the 16th. The detachments standing at the time in and near Chagey were placed under General v. d. Goltz's orders, while the 2nd Battalion 25th Regiment, which had moved thither from H  ricourt, was attached to the main reserve, to which General v. Schmeling had also to give up a battery. General v. Gl  mer was instructed, if possible, to occupy from Grand Charmont the edge of the valley behind Bussurel, and to send Colonel v. Sachs' detachment also to Br  villiers. That same night reports were to be furnished at what points the patrols met with the enemy, who, moreover, was to be harassed in all directions.

* The remaining battery of the two unlimbered at Etobon joined the 2nd Brigade.

† The nocturnal advance of a hostile detachment on Courchamp was repulsed by the picket under Lieutenant Kredell, by volleys from four ranks.

‡ 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

§ Liegnitz

§ 1st Light Reserve and § 2nd Light Reserve

VIII

|| The Siege Artillery supplied the heavy field batteries with ammunition.

All the parts of the Corps not on outpost duty were housed in the villages near the fighting line, whilst the French, in spite of the bitter cold, almost without exception bivouacked.

That an army consisting partly of levies rapidly gathered together would not, under such circumstances, hold together for any time might be taken for granted, and as the day's fighting just brought to a close had only entailed upon the Germans a loss of some 650 men, our confidence increased that we could continue to hold our own against the enemy, who was superior only in point of numbers.

On the French side the result of the day was not considered altogether unfavourable. The troops had in general showed a good bearing, and it was believed that the failure in bringing about a decision might in the main be ascribed to the circumstance that the outflanking movement of the left wing had not been carried out. After General Bourbaki had awaited this in vain, he sent, about 5 o'clock, his senior aide-de-camp, Colonel Leperche, to General Billot, in order to find out the reason. The General pointed out that the Mont Vaudois did not form the right flank of the Germans, but that the position of the defenders extended considerably further to the north, and that, therefore, a longer *détour* to the left must be made. General Bourbaki was of opinion that large reinforcements had reached General v. Werder, in which belief he was supported by some unfounded reports.* He estimated the strength of the Germans on the Lisaine at 80,000 to 100,000 men, but he still reckoned upon a favourable result when, on a second attack, the left wing, as he intended, would make a more effective outflanking movement. It was reported to the Minister of War that the army had fought all day and had captured Montbéliard, except only the château, as well as the villages on the right bank of the Lisaine as far as Chagey. On the 16th January at daybreak the attack was to recommence. The General hoped to obtain possession of Héricourt on that day, and to open for himself the road to Belfort.

In this sense the different Corps received orders. General Billot had in the narrow space at Couthenans and Chagey only been able to deploy 10,000 men and 30 guns out of his Corps, which numbered some 30,000 men and 85 guns. Under these circumstances he complied with General Crémier's request to undertake the security of the left flank of the army, and he instructed his 2nd Division to move off next day to Etobon.

THE 16TH JANUARY.

The positions in which the Germans again stood under arms

* The reinforcements consisted, besides the siege guns, of merely Colonel v. Zimmermann's Landwehr troops and a detachment of reservists of the 25th Regiment.

at 6.30 a.m. showed but unimportant changes from those of the 15th January.*

The patrols had during the night come into close contact at all points with the enemy; they had reported that he had taken up positions in the woods, and was also engaged in making emplacements for batteries.

The action commenced on the left wing.

At 7.30 a.m. a French parlementaire summoned the garrison of the château to surrender. After repelling this challenge, Lieutenant Sauer† opened fire upon the French artillery,‡ visible on the Ancienne Citadelle heights, with such good effect that they evacuated their position about 10 o'clock. Two of their guns, which had lost their gunners and teams, had to be left behind.§

Engagemen
at Montbé-
liard, Beth-
court, and
Bussurel.

From the houses arranged for defence the French infantry ensconced therein fired into the château most vigorously, rendering the serving of the guns difficult, and caused some losses to the landwehr companies, who answered the fire with much coolness; in other respects however the French achieved no result.

A new position which the French batteries, after being driven off by the guns of the château, had taken up in the neighbourhood of Mont Chevis Farm, was also brought under fire by the German artillery from La Grange Dame. The cannonade lasted with moderate strength until nearly 12 o'clock, but increased in vigour when three more French batteries|| unlimbered at Mont Chevis. In spite of the fact that they had succeeded in gaining cover against the flanking fire from the château of the town, and were in prepared emplacements, they were again compelled to frequent changes of position. Thus continued the artillery struggle until 3 p.m., at which time the adversary's fire ceased for awhile, but then was again resumed and continued until nightfall.

The French infantry had made no attempt to break through the German lines at Montbéliard.

On the other hand, there were constant infantry attacks at Bethoncourt. There the Goldap Landwehr battalion had taken up its position as on the previous day, the 2nd Battalion of the Baden Body Guard Grenadiers had reinforced the garrison of

* General v. Tresckow 1st had further placed the $\frac{1st}{67}$ and $\frac{\frac{3}{4} 1st Light}{IIInd}$ at disposal for the reserve at Charmont. The main reserve at Brévilliers consisted on the 16th January of the 4th Baden Infantry, $\frac{1st}{5th Baden}$, $\frac{IIInd}{25}$, three squadrons of the 2nd and two squadrons of the 3rd Baden Dragoons, the $\frac{5th Heavy and H. A.}{Baden}$, and $\frac{3rd Light}{4th Res. Div.}$: in all 5 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 3 batteries.

† Commanding the artillery of the Château.

‡ Estimated at two batteries.

§ It was not until the following night that the French were able to remove them.

|| At times also mitrailleuses.

Le Petit Bethoncourt with the 5th Company, and posted the 6th at the edge of the wood north of the village, whilst the other two remained in reserve.

French batteries speedily brought their fire to bear upon Bethoncourt. The assembly of large bodies of infantry at Bois Bourgeois bespoke the intention of breaking through at this point. General v. Glümer brought up in consequence another Baden battalion and two batteries* from Grand Charmont.

The 1st Light Baden Battery, which first came into action about 1 p.m., was vigorously cannonaded by the hostile artillery at Mont Chevis Farm, as also by a battery from Vyans. It was obliged to withdraw for a time to renew its teams, but by 2 p.m. was again in position to the north of Bethoncourt. The 1st Light Reserve Battery had come into action further to the south at the corner of the wood, between this village and Grand Charmont.

At 3 p.m., when, as already mentioned, the artillery fire at Mont Chevis Farm ceased, three French battalions emerged from the Bois Bourgeois. Two of these deployed in dense lines of skirmishers against Le Petit Bethoncourt and the south part of Bethoncourt, the third prepared the attack by a brisk fire from the edge of the wood. In spite of the powerful effect of the German artillery from the heights at Bethoncourt and La Grange Dame, the resolute attack reached close up to the village of Le Petit Bethoncourt, but was here received with so murderous a file-fire, that the storming battalions were dispersed, and hurriedly resought the shelter of the wood. Their loss was considerable, and a number of unwounded prisoners remained in the hands of the Germans. After half-an-hour, three other French battalions made a fresh attempt, this time against the German right wing north of Bethoncourt, but met with the same fate.

A third attack, undertaken with still larger forces, took place shortly after 4 o'clock. It was directed like the second, against the right flank of the position, which, however, had been already reinforced by the 7th Company of the Grenadiers, moved up from the reserve. According to the estimate made by the Germans, it was about a brigade which deployed from the north-east corner of the Bois Bourgeois. The enemy, however, never succeeded in completing his formation, as his battalions were at their very first appearance reached by the well-directed German projectiles. The fruitlessness of the preceding attacks, and the snow field littered with the dead, appeared to have produced a discouraging effect on the assailant.

It was the 1st Division of the 15th French Corps, reinforced

* $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{2nd Gren.}}$, $\frac{\text{1st Light}}{\text{Baden}}$, which already on the previous day had fought at Bethoncourt, and $\frac{\text{1st Light Reserve}}{\text{II}}$ placed at disposal by General v. Tresckow Ist.

by the 16th Line Regiment, which had fought at Bethoncourt, and had suffered no inconsiderable losses.

At Bussurel, the 24th French Corps threatened only to break through, without attempting it seriously. There stood assembled at that place, in addition to the Danzig Landwehr battalion, as on the 15th,* the 1st and 2nd Battalions 5th Baden Regiment, and two Baden batteries,† but the latter were on the height north of the place. Against these, five hostile batteries had deployed as early as 8 a.m. at Vyans. In the clearings of the wood infantry detachments were seen to be forming up, the strength of which was estimated at a Division.

With the view of giving support at the apparently threatened point, the General Commanding ordered in consequence General Keller to advance with the fusilier battalions of the 4th and 5th Baden Regiments from the main reserve at Brévilliers. The 5th Heavy Battery which hastened in advance, unlimbered at a quarter-past 10 o'clock, on the right flank of the batteries already in action. The adversary's fire visibly began at once to slacken. First the French artillery withdrew, and not long after, the infantry as well. At 12 o'clock, the heights west of Bussurel were occupied only in weak strength, but from the village hostile skirmishers continued to annoy the landwehr lying on the railway embankment. By continuance of the artillery fire, the village became a prey to the flames.

Up to past 3 o'clock, the enemy's columns were seen moving partly in the direction of Héricourt, partly upon Bethoncourt. When the French were preparing their attack on the latter village, the Baden Fusiliers of the 5th Regiment occupied the railway embankment on the left of the Danzig battalion. From here they supported the grenadiers, and the Goldap Battalion, when the adversary made his second onslaught at half-past 3 o'clock. On the right also, in the direction of Héricourt, the position was extended by one of the battalions left in reserve;‡ it did not, however, fire a shot.

In spite of their inferiority of numbers, the German batteries had maintained the artillery engagement at Bussurel with the best results, and with little loss to themselves. Here also the French left two guns behind on the battle-field.§

The valley at Héricourt was enveloped during the morning in a dense fog, which did not gradually commence to clear until between 11 and 12 o'clock. The fire, which the French artillery opened notwithstanding at early dawn from the heights at Tavey, was only answered at intervals by the Germans. At 9 o'clock an infantry attack was made from Byans upon St.

Engagement
at Héricourt,
Luze, and
Chagey.

* See Plan No. 34.

† 4th Light and 4th Heavy.
Baden

‡ Fus.
4th Baden.

§ They were, however, carried off later by the enemy.

Valbert. The Prussian companies standing there—the 11th of 34th Regiment, and the 1st of the Osterode—had, in order, at any rate, to obtain a view, moved to the knoll in front of the village without being observed by the enemy. From thence they received the advancing enemy with a sudden file-fire, and then at once repulsed him with the bayonet upon Byans, where the debouch of reinforcements had been checked by the flanking fire from the Mognot.*

In this short action, two company colours of the Alsace and Lorraine Legion† were captured, their bearers being killed.

The unsuccessful attempt of parts of the 1st Division of the 20th Corps was followed very shortly by a fresh one on the part of the 2nd Division from Tavey and Tavey Wood upon the Mognot.

In a strength of apparently three to five battalions, the attack was directed about half-past 9 o'clock upon the south and west side of this position. Supported by the company‡ hurrying up from Marion Farm, the men of the Ortelsburg and Graudenz battalions lining the shelter-trenches succeeded in beating off the enemy's attack after half-an-hour's fighting. In consequence of the fog, the artillery on the Mont Vandois only fired a few shells where the infantry fight was audible.

At half-past 10 o'clock the attack on the south side of the Mognot was renewed by the French, and furthermore directed against the defenders' left wing, but failed against their calm and steady defence.

When after 11 o'clock the fog began to lift off the hills, the batteries from the Salamou cannonaded the Bois de Tavey, where large bodies of troops were supposed to be. Some time afterwards followed a third attack from the Bois du Chanois. It was chiefly directed against the south issue of Héricourt. The 2nd Company of the Osterode Battalion standing here was reinforced in good time, and the attack repulsed.

A French battalion, favoured by the mist which still hung about the low ground, had approached unobserved to within a short distance of Bourangle Mill. Informed of this circumstance by their patrols, the 2nd Company of the 25th Regiment, supported by the 4th from the south side of Héricourt, received the adversary.§

After this enterprise on the part of the enemy had also failed, a pause in the fighting ensued during the first hour of

* Even when later the weather became perfectly clear, and the post in front of St. Valbert was withdrawn, a half division of the 34th held its ground in the sandpits south of the Bois Communaux.

† The Order of Battle does not include this corps. One of the Franc-tireurs corps present with the army may, however, have borne the designation in question.

‡ ^{4th} Ortelsburg. It was replaced at Marion Farm by ^{2nd} Graudenz, which, however, likewise shared in the defence of the shelter-trenches.

§ During the repulse of the attack the weather entirely cleared, and the retreating foe was now also reached by the shells of the Salamou batteries.

the afternoon. It was not until 2 o'clock that the French renewed the artillery fire in a brisk manner; about 4 p.m., they again gathered their infantry opposite the Mougnot, but abstained from any renewal of the attack, as the batteries on the Salamou directed their fire upon these preparations. The artillery struggle which continued until evening was without important results.

At Luze the 16th January passed without noteworthy incident.* Opposite the village, at the Bois de la Vacherie and to the north of the Bois Communaux, abreast of Couthenans, the enemy's guns were seen partly entrenched. But it was not until between 2 and 3 p.m., that the cannonade commenced, and this was only carried on by the Germans at all vigorously when some skirmishers showed signs of advancing upon Luze. No real attack was made.

At Chagey also the fighting was limited to a slight skirmish and a desultory cannonade.

At Chagey and Luze two Divisions of the 18th Corps were opposed to the Germans. In spite of a third having been despatched to Etobon,† General Billot was apprehensive for his left flank, whence certainly fighting was audible. Reinforcements which had arrived on the German side, at Chagey,‡ had not been unobserved. An attack was therefore considered less practicable on this than on the previous day.

Penhoat's Division, in accordance with the orders which it had received, had moved off early in the morning to Etobon, arrived there about 11 o'clock and joined hands with Crémier's Division.

Both Generals agreed to an attack on Chenebier, so that larger bodies of French were combined on this part of the extended line of battle, and in consequence of the weak effective of the German position the result could not be doubtful.

General v. Degenfeld, as already mentioned, had only at his disposal at Chenebier two battalions of the 3rd Baden Regiment, one squadron, and two batteries.§ The latter were posted on

Engagemen
at Chenebier

* The 1st Light Reserve
III, brought up on the 15th January from the west foot of the Mont Vaudois to Luze, had remained here, the Heavy Reserve
I, on the other hand, had returned. The 2nd Light
Baden, which had hastened forward from the main reserve towards Chagey, came into action to the north-east of Luze.

† See ante, p. 342.

‡ At Chagey there stood on the 16th Ist, Fus., and 7th, whilst IIInd occupied the high-lying south-west corner of the Bois de la Brisée. Of the main reserve the 6th
25 was despatched to the hamlet of Gënëchier, in order to guard the right flank.

§ Ist and Fus. Ist 2nd Heavy, and 2nd Light Res., which last had 3rd Baden, 3rd Bad. Drag., Baden, and XII been sent back in the afternoon of the 15th January by Colonel Baron v. Willisen from Ronchamp to Frahier for the disposal of General Baron v. Degenfeld.

the heights behind the north end of the straggling village, the scattered nature of which rendered the defence extremely difficult. The southern part was occupied by the Fusilier battalion, the northern by the 1st Battalion.

When two batteries of the 2nd French Division which had unlimbered at Etobon opened fire, General Cr mer deemed the moment opportune for his advance. He contemplated directing the decisive attack on the enemy's left flank at Colin Mill, where the copse stretching to Chenebier and the configuration of the ground favoured an approach under cover, and cutting the direct line of retreat of the Germans on Belfort; the latter were, at first, to be merely occupied in front. In spite of the considerable force belonging to the 18th Corps already before Chagey, he left behind in addition two battalions of the 32nd Regiment de Marche with a battery to guard in this direction.*

All the other batteries unlimbered by degrees during the first hour of the afternoon† before the north border of the Bois de la Thure, and, in conjunction with the artillery of Penhoat's Division, opened a vigorous fire in preparation of the infantry attack. From the direction of the wood, Colonel Poulet, Staff Officer of Cr mer's Division, afterwards led forward, at 2 o'clock, on a broad front, the 57th Regiment de Marche and the 86th Garde Mobile Regiment, making skilful use of the ground, and at half-past 2 advanced from the cover of the hollow against the scattered farmsteads on the heights south of Chenebier.

After the 9th Company of the 3rd Baden Regiment had received the adversary with a brisk fire, the 12th, under First Lieutenant Lutz, standing in reserve, made a vigorous counter-attack. In spite of heavy loss,‡ it drove, with the help of part of the 9th, with a ringing cheer, the nearest French battalion off the heights. As larger bodies of the enemy afterwards moved up, the company retired to its position.

Simultaneously with Cr mer's Division, General Penhoat had advanced on his side. From Etobon he moved with the 92nd Regiment of the Line and the 12th Chasseurs de Marche against the west front of Chenebier, whilst two battalions of the 52nd Regiment de Marche made a turning movement through the Bois de Montedun.

In order to meet the threatening danger, General v. Degenfeld had pushed forward the 2nd Company to the houses situated to the north-west of Chenebier opposite the issue from the wood. To extend also his right wing, two companies of

* Against the 2nd Battalion 3rd Baden Regiment at the high south-west corner of the Bois de la Bris e, near Chagey.

† A battery in action as early as 8 o'clock had been reduced to silence by the two German batteries, although it was ultimately supported by a second battery at Etobon. Frequent movements of French infantry towards the Lisaine had been observed. Skirmishes with the outposts had taken place during the morning.

‡ In this short but sharp action, wherein there was some hand-to-hand fighting, 1st Lieutenant Lutz and Lieutenant Villinger were badly wounded. Lieutenant R ckert took over the command and continued the forward movement.

the Eupen battalion had moved from Frahier into the Bois des Evants. Two other companies of this battalion and the Heavy Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps were later on ordered up by way of Echevanne to reinforce the left wing.

But against these the 83rd Gardes Mobiles, a battalion of the 32nd Regiment de Marche and the Gironde battalion had advanced, personally led by General Cr  mer. The first lost at the very outset its commander, as also a large number of the men, and came to a standstill, but Major de Carayon Latour resolutely led forward his Girondists and gave a fresh impulse to the forward movement. The fusiliers were unable for long to hold the south part of Chenebier. They were, after sustaining heavy losses,* supported in the northern part of the village by the 1st Battalion, and afterwards retired to Echevanne.

The direct road to Chalonvillars was now barred to the Baden troops. When subsequently the turning movement of the 2nd Division of the 18th French Corps through the Bois de Montedin made itself felt, General v. Degenfeld ordered Chenebier to be evacuated. The retreat to Echevanne was covered by the Saxon battery and two companies;† but when these were approaching the village, hostile detachments emerged from the wood to the west of the road. With some 80 men, who were on the spot, Major Unger drove the enemy again into it.

After General v. Degenfeld had again assembled his troops at Frahier about half-past 3 o'clock, finding that this place was not suited for defence, and learning that the enemy had already occupied the Bois d'Essoyeux, he took up a position further to the rear on the Chalonvillars road, at the Rougeot Mill on the high-lying ground. At 6 p.m. Colonel Bayer reached the spot with two battalions, a squadron, and a battery‡ as reinforcement.

The enemy however, had not carried the pursuit any further. Cr  mer's Division, the loss in which amounted to some 1,000 men,§ had in point of fact withdrawn to the Bois de la Thure, so that Penhoat's Division took over the complete occupation of Chenebier.

In consequence of the proceedings at Chenebier, Colonel v. Willisen had also commenced to retire in the prescribed direction of Giromagny.||

* Among these was Captain Hilpert, commander of the fusilier battalion, who was mortally wounded.

† 3rd and 4th

‡ 3rd Baden

§ 1st and 11th 2nd 3rd Light

|| 4th Baden 2nd Bad. Drag. 4th Res. Div.

§ In "Le G  n  ral Cr  mer, par un Officier d'  tat-Major," the losses of the Division in the three days are given on page 74 at from 1,000 to 1,100 men. On the 15th and 17th they can only have been insignificant.

|| 2nd

2nd Res. Drag.

|| which had maintained at Echevanne the connection with General Baron v. Degenfeld, had retired to Sermamagny, in order to join Colonel

General v. Werder had made a point during the day of continually adding to his main reserve. He had requested General v. Debschitz, before whose front little was happening,* to place two battalions at his disposal. At 5.15 p.m. orders were sent to General v. Glümer to give up as many troops as he thought he could spare on the left wing. The Danzig battalion, which required rest, was also relieved by the 2nd Battalion 5th Baden Regiment, and after 7 p.m. was brought up from Bussurel to Brévilliers. General Keller had also been called away with his troops;† he occupied, however, quarters at Mandrevillars, and was to assume command of the new main reserve now in process of formation.

On the other hand General v. Tresckow Ist had offered the 1st Battalion 67th Regiment to be in readiness early next morning at Grand Charmont for General v. Glümer, while the fusilier battalion of the same regiment was to be relieved in the shelter-trenches by landwehr and to be pushed forward to Chalonvillars. At the same time he now strengthened Colonel Gericke's detachment, which had been standing at the north side of Belfort.

General v. Debschitz sent the two battalions asked for to Sochaux to reinforce General v. Glümer, who thereupon set two of his battalions in movement to join the main reserve.

On the following morning, after General Keller had meanwhile received another destination, the strength of the main reserve amounted to 4 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 2 batteries.‡

Attention was paid, so far as the difficult circumstances permitted, to the replenishment of ammunition and food, of which there was great want.

The news which arrived in the evening of the evacuation of Frahier could not but provoke serious consideration. The adversary, should he follow thither, would be but 5 miles from Belfort. It was very probable that this first success would cause the French, instead of the previous feeble attacks along the whole front of the line of battle, to throw themselves with all their strength upon the German right wing. General v. Degenfeld could not have stemmed the advance of two Divisions with two battalions. It is true he still barred the main

Gericke's detachment of the Siege Corps. Colonel Baron v. Willisen housed his men at Plancher Bas, Auxelles Bas, and Giromagny.

* At 2 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon detachments of French infantry, on the second occasion accompanied by artillery, had appeared in front of the outposts on the line Dasle—Vaudoncourt—Croix. But only a skirmish and cannonade ensued. When darkness set in, the fire ceased.

† Fus. Fus. 5th Heavy
4th Baden 5th Baden Baden

‡ The Danzig battalion and 1st and 2nd Bad. Gren., which latter, however, did not arrive until 9 a.m. on 17th January, 11th 25, 3rd and 4th 2nd Bad. Drag. 4th and 5th 3rd Bad. Drag. and 5th Heavy and II. A. Baden

road to the fortress, in front of Chalonvillars, but with exhausted troops and in a position little capable of defence and not difficult to turn on the south.

General v. Werder had, therefore, firmly resolved to recommence without delay the fighting on his right wing. That same evening at 8 o'clock orders were sent to General Keller, while leaving behind his artillery, to move at once with the forces available at Mandrevillars against the enemy, and to recapture Frahier as well as Chenebier. The remaining troops received instructions to stand in readiness at their positions by 7 in the morning.

That same night there was little rest. On relieving the outposts in front of Bethoncourt, after 7 o'clock, a collision with the enemy occurred. The village was vigorously cannonaded, and the firing, which speedily assumed larger proportions, did not cease for some time. The 1st Battalion Baden Body Guard Grenadiers, which had hastened up from Chatenois, remained at Bethoncourt awaiting the issue of matters. On the other hand the defenders harassed the adversary left at Bussurel. The French answered with attacks on the Mougnot and on St. Valbert, which, it is true, were repulsed by the companies standing in first line, but caused both Colonel v. Knappe and General v. d. Goltz to call their troops to arms. The majority could be dismissed again at 3 o'clock, but certain detachments had to remain under arms in the defensive positions during the cold winter's night.

THE 17TH JANUARY.

The task entrusted to General Keller led at an early hour to the briskest fighting of that memorable day. The orders of the General Commanding had reached him at 8.30 p.m. on the 16th. After that he had requested General v. d. Goltz to co-operate in the enterprise on Chenebier, by despatching one or two battalions from Chagey, General Keller moved off at 11 p.m., with his two battalions ordered up from the position opposite Bussurel, reached Rougeot Mill at midnight and afterwards Frahier, which place he found re-occupied by Colonel Bayer and the Eupen landwehr battalion.* When somewhat later the fusiliers of the 67th Regiment also arrived, who had been much delayed in being relieved at the trenches, the General had at his disposal a total force of 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 24 guns.†

Engagements
in the Bois
des Evants
and at
Chenebier.

* The order for the re-occupation had been given by General Baron v. Degenfeld.

†

1st and Fus.	Eupen Battalion,	1st, Ind. and Fus.	Fus.	Fus.
3rd Baden		4th Baden	5th Baden	67
1st	2nd	2nd Heavy	3rd Light	2nd Light Res.
3rd Bad. Drag.	2nd Bad. Drag.	Bad.	4th Res. Div.	XII
				2 L

Subsequently the fusiliers of the 5th Baden and of the 67th Regiment, as also the Eupen Landwehr battalion were formed at the western issue from Frahier into a column intended to act against the northern part of Chenebier. With the 4th Baden Regiment, on the other hand, General Keller intended to advance in the Lisaine valley against Courchamp. Both columns were instructed on entering into the fight to deploy outwards, so as not to impede their mutual movements. The remaining troops were to remain in reserve at Rougeot Mill until 6 a.m., and then to take post at Frahier.

That same night Lieutenant-Colonel v. Scheliha had caused three 15 centimètre guns to be brought into position at Rougeot Mill.

The departure of the infantry took place at 4.30 a.m. amid perfect silence. The northern column came into collision at the south issue from Echevanne with one of the enemy's pickets, which was completely surprised by the leading 12th Baden Company. It was impossible, however, to prevent the musketry fire giving the French troops in Chenebier information of the danger threatening them.

Major Jacobi deployed eight companies* against the Bois des Evants, but met with a serious resistance inside. In the dense wood there ensued a musketry action, wherein German and French detachments became hotly mixed in a pell-mell struggle.† The still prevailing darkness caused serious fear lest our own troops should fire into one another. After some time the two companies of the left wing were in consequence temporarily withdrawn. They were followed by the remainder; all halted, however, at the border of the wood, which they proceeded to occupy.

When the first shots fell at Echevanne, the 4th Baden Regiment, which had just reached Colin Mill, hastened its onward march. The 2nd Battalion, followed by the Fusiliers,‡ dashed into Courchamp with a cheer, whilst the 1st moved towards the heights on the south.

The unexpected appearance of the Badeners caused great consternation among the French troops in the village. Isolated detachments attempted some resistance, but were quickly overpowered. The garrison suffered great losses and left 400 prisoners in the assailant's hands. The ground, however, favoured the enemy re-establishing himself and renewing the defence.

Heavy Res. 5th
VII 2nd Bad. Drag. maintained the connection with Colonel Baron v. Willisen.

* The fusiliers of 5th Baden Regiment advanced with three companies in first, and one company in second line; the fusiliers of the 67th Regiment with two companies on each flank. The Eupen battalion remained in reserve at Echevanne.

† Major Jacobi was wounded. Major v. Laue assumed the command on the right wing.

‡ One company received orders to seek connection with the other column on the right.

The right column, as already mentioned, had been unable to penetrate to the northern part of Chenebier. As, moreover, reinforcements were brought to the garrison of the village, the Baden battalions fighting in the southern part speedily found themselves overmatched. The breaking dawn showed the heights west of the place strongly occupied, while columns of all arms were moving up from Etobon. Colonel Bayer resolved, in consequence—at 8.30—to again abandon the half-captured village. Bringing off the prisoners with it, the regiment, under cover of an intermediate position at the Bois Fery, retired upon Frahier.* The wood in question was thereupon evacuated, but was again reoccupied by order of General Keller. The regiment now took up a position there, in order to bar to the enemy the direct road to Chalonvillars.

Meanwhile on the right wing Lieutenant-Colonel Kraus with the 1st Battalion 3rd Baden Regiment had arrived as reinforcement. At 9 o'clock there ensued a fresh general attack, the conduct of which devolved upon General v. Degenfeld.

With great resolution the troops once more forced their way into the Bois des Evants and gained complete possession of it after a sanguinary struggle of two hours' duration.† But the attempts to capture the barricaded and strongly occupied Chenebier proved fruitless. Lieutenants Wendler and Schmidt‡ captured, it is true, two houses in the village with men of Baden and Prussian Companies, but were unable to hold them. A small storming party, consisting of two companies of the Eupen battalion, with two divisions of Badeners at the head, advanced under the leading of Major Unger towards the entrance of the village, but gave way under the fire of the defenders.§ They had to content themselves with the occupation of the wood. In order to shelter the men in some degree from the heavy fire, the edge of the wood immediately opposite Chenebier had, moreover, to be abandoned.

Meanwhile Major Lang with the 2nd Battalion 3rd Baden Regiment, ordered by General v. d. Goltz to reinforce General Keller, had arrived on the left wing. That officer had started from Chagey at 3.30 a.m., in conjunction with two companies of the 6th Baden Regiment,|| but had found the deep gorge of the Lisaine north of the place barricaded with strongly defended abattis. He then after 10 o'clock made a détour with his battalion through Chatebie, and deployed for the attack at Colin Mill. But he, likewise, met with superior forces and had to abandon his project.¶ Weak counter-attacks of the French

* The losses of the regiment were considerable. Captains Wolf and Koch IIInd were killed, Captain Schonhart was mortally wounded, and Major Held wounded.

† Majors v. Lane and Unger were wounded, but remained with their men.

‡ Of the 67th Regiment.

§ One round of mitrailleuse mowed down 21 men of the Baden Division.

|| 9th and 11th.

¶ 6th Baden.

¶ The battalion hereupon returned by way of Frahier to Chagey.

were repulsed on this side by the 1st Battalion 4th Baden Regiment. At intervals hostile artillery also showed at Etobon and in the north part of Chenebier, with the object of cannonading the position of the Badeners.

With the numbers so disproportionate, General Keller could not attempt, after the failure of the morning surprise, to drive the enemy from his positions, but only to prevent his advance towards Belfort. This object was completely achieved. The French, held in check by the four German batteries, which General Keller had assembled at Frahier,* made no serious attempt to attack. And when the right wing, covered by the fusiliers of the 3rd Baden Regiment, which were moved forward to Echevanne, was withdrawn to Frahier at 3 o'clock, the enemy did not follow.

Here two more battalions had meanwhile arrived from the main reserve.† But there was no more fighting. Only a feeble cannonade continued until evening, when the 25th went on outpost duty.

It was considered quite safe to send the fusilier battalion 67th Regiment back to the trenches before Belfort. The cavalry was keeping up connection with the detachments of Colonels v. Willisen and Gericke. All danger for the right wing of the Corps had passed.

Although General Bourbaki had calculated upon a successful advance of his left wing to turn the German position, Penhoat's and Crémier's Divisions regarded their task more in the light of securing their own left flank, which appeared to them threatened, than in continuing the offensive. Hence the stubborn defence of Chenebier, and the neglect of any further enterprise.

When the first shots fell at Echevanne in the early morning, General Crémier had called his Division to arms at the Bois de la Thure, but had refrained from attacking in the darkness. The annoyance to which his outposts had been exposed, as already mentioned, in the Lisaine valley, in front of Chagey,‡ decided him to despatch fresh reinforcements in this direction. At day-break, on receipt of orders, he marched off with some troops to Etobon, where he took up a position, arranged it for defence, and rallied the stragglers. Only a small part of his forces co-operated later in the defence of Chenebier. Here was Penhoat's Division, which, in spite of the first surprise, had stubbornly

* The following were the positions:— $\frac{3\text{rd Light}}{4\text{th Res. Div.}}$ and $\frac{2\text{nd Light Reserve}}{\text{XII}}$, on the low height to the south-west of Frahier, north of the mill there; $\frac{2\text{nd Heavy}}{\text{Baden}}$ close to the north of Frahier on the slope of height 439, $\frac{\text{Heavy Reserve}}{\text{VII}}$ south of Frahier on the road to Colin Mill.

† $\frac{\text{I Ind.}}{2\text{nd Bad. Gren.}}$ and $\frac{\text{I Ind.}}{25}$.

‡ By Major Lang.

defended this much-contested post,* but contented itself with maintaining it, and occupying the Bois des Evants, after its evacuation by the Germans.

According to the idea of the French Commander-in-Chief, the other two Divisions of the 18th Corps, were to endeavour to envelop the Mont Vaudois, by continuing the attack. General Billot ordered the 1st Division to be ready to advance upon Luzé and the Mont Vaudois, and the 3rd to storm Chagey. The general attack was however to be prepared by artillery fire. But the French batteries were unable to cope with those of the Germans.

Engagements
at Chagey,
Luzé, and
Héricourt.

When Major Lang, after his first advance in the early morning, had returned to the corner of the wood immediately to the north of Chagey, there appeared in the Lisaine valley a battery, which cannonaded the village from the north. Two other batteries also shared in this cannonade from openings at the Bois de la Vacherie. With the infantry, however, which then advanced, there only ensued an indecisive skirmish. At half-past 9 o'clock the enemy's skirmishers again retired. Shortly after the 7th Company of the 6th Baden Regiment and two companies of the 30th Regiment† occupied the corner of the wood already mentioned, and Major Lang was able to advance a second time upon Chenebier. The Baden Horse Artillery Battery took post on the heights to the north-east of Chagey.

As preliminary to a fresh attack, some hostile guns showed at the issue from the gorge south of the Bois de Nan; they cannonaded Chagey at close range, but were speedily silenced by the Baden batteries.‡ The attack made at 10.30 upon the west side of the village was repulsed; an attack in greater force made at 11.30, after a brisk musketry action, shared the same fate. From 1 o'clock the cannonade alone continued.

Opposite Luzé strong bodies of French skirmishers lay at the edges of the wood in readiness to advance, but, held in check by the German artillery,§ they did not emerge to the attack.

Of the French batteries those at the Bois Communaux more especially took part in the struggle at this place. There also once more appeared the artillery of the army reserve, which had played an active part in the preceding fighting days.

At Héricourt, during the course of the forenoon there was a mere exchange of shell and a feeble attack on the railway

* General Billot had himself proceeded in the darkness to Chenebier, and nearly fell into the hands of the Badeners. (See "Enquête Parlementaire, Dépôtions des Témoins," Paris, 1873, Vol. III, p. 476.)

† 5th and 8th.

‡ 2nd Light and H. A.
Baden

§ Captain Fischer, commanding 2nd Light Reserve, was killed.

embankment, which was easily repulsed.* By noon the cannonade ceased, but only to begin again at 4 p.m., mingled with the fire of mitrailleuses.

Proceedings
on the left
wing.

On the left wing of the German position Russurel,† whence French sharpshooters pestered the defenders of the railway embankment, was set on fire as on the previous day. Otherwise nothing of any importance occurred either here or at Bethoncourt.‡ The town of Montbéliard was also taken under fire by the heavy guns at La Grange Dame and from the château, until a deputation appeared with a request that it might be spared, giving their assurance that the place was entirely evacuated by the French.

The Insterburg Landwehr battalion occupied the railway station, and re-opened communication with the garrison of the château, whilst an artillery struggle ensued with the French batteries at Mont Chevis Farm. At 10 a.m. hostile infantry appeared on the heights and at the edges of the wood. Between the Bois Bourgeois and Bethoncourt skirmishes took place. Towards noon the artillery fire increased in briskness. Then large bodies of infantry of the 15th French Corps, estimated at ten battalions, deployed from the Bois Bourgeois and from Mont Chevis Farm against La Grange Dame and Montbéliard. The advancing swarms of skirmishers opened fire at very long range, and then sought to gain ground to the front. As the attack was directed at an oblique angle to the German front, the left wing was received with flanking artillery fire from the heights at La Grange Dame, whither also the 1st Baden Light Battery was again brought forward from the reserve. This sufficed to repulse the attack generally. Only some isolated skirmishers reached the valley of the Lisaine. The right wing arrived as far as the Ancienne Citadelle heights; detachments advanced to Montbéliard, where they came into collision with the Insterburg Landwehr battalion, which awaited the attack at the railway station and embankment, as also with the 12th Company Baden Body Guard Regiment.

At 2 p.m. the offensive movement came to an end. The French infantry retired to the edges of the wood, while some troops occupied the Ancienne Citadelle heights. Patrols of the château garrison also found, at 3 p.m., the western issues from Montbéliard§ still in the enemy's hands. In other respects

* Fus. could in consequence be given up to the main reserve at Bréviliers.

† At Russurel the troops under Colonel Sauts were reinforced by the Breslau Battalion that brought up from Debschitz's Detachment.

‡ The Landwehr battalion, which had hastened forward during the night to Bethoncourt in consequence of the alarm, was again withdrawn to La Grange Dame. In lieu of this the Lauban Battalion of Debschitz's Detachment posted itself behind Bethoncourt.

§ The Landwehr was deployed from the houses of the town with small shot, and the central fire was opened.

the struggle at this point was likewise limited to a cannonade across the valley.*

In front of Debschitz's detachment, at Croix and Audincourt, only unimportant skirmishes took place.

Colonel v. Willisen, informed in the morning of General Keller's intentions, again advanced upon Ronchamp and Champagny, on learning that Frahier had been re-occupied. The reinforced troops under Colonel Gericke, which served as a reserve to his detachment, had taken independent measures of security at Evette and Sermamagny.

Proceedings
on the ex-
treme right
wing.

General v. Werder had already, during the 17th January, become impressed with the idea that the enemy had abandoned all further attack. The adversary's measures clearly showed that all he was now concerned with was a safe retreat. That very afternoon French columns had been seen from Bussurel retiring to the westward.

In vain had General Bourbaki awaited a decided success of his left wing and a sortie in his support from Belfort. At noon of the 17th January the Commander-in-Chief rode over the battle-field, to hear the opinions of the generals in command. They assured him that, with soldiers worn out, ill-fed, and suffering from cold, the German lines could not be forced.

At 3 p.m. there was another conference in the neighbourhood of Chagey with Generals Billot, Bonnet, Pilatrie, and other officers. Against the proposal made thereat to concentrate more troops on the left wing and to give the outflanking movement a more sweeping character, it was alleged that supply would thereby become extremely difficult, and that the German forces at Montbéliard might then assume the offensive and fall upon the rearward communications of the army.

The condition of the troops was too bad for the Commander-in-Chief to entertain the slightest hope of a successful issue to a final attack. The army, which during two bitterly cold winter's nights had bivouacked or stood to arms, had mostly been without food, and some of the troops had suffered heavy losses. All previous efforts had been unproductive of result, and now came in addition the threatening intelligence of the advance of General v. Manteuffel.†

Sick at heart, General Bourbaki resolved on retreat. His

* The Marienburg battalion could in consequence be given up to the main reserve. The ^{1st} also joined it.
67

† General Bourbaki and the Delegate of the War Minister at the headquarters of the Army of the East received from Bordeaux on and after the 12th January tolerably accurate news of the movements of the IInd and VIIth Prussian Corps. On the 16th the Prefect of the Côte d'Or reported the arrival of the Prussian advanced parties at Is-sur-Tille, Thil Châtel, and of reconnoitring detachments at Fontaine Française. When the telegram in question from the Prefect reached General Bourbaki is not known.

report, furnished that same evening to the Government, mentioned, it is true, only a change in position of the army, but the ultimate resolution could be clearly read between the lines.*

As to the impracticability of a resumption of the attack, once the retreat commenced, there could be scarcely a doubt in the mind of the practised commander. With the retreat begun an army like his was no longer capable of rapid and venturesome enterprises, and yet there was no alternative if anything was to be done, as in a few days the appearance of two fresh Prussian Corps might be looked for. The Army of the East must conquer on the Lisaine, or be prepared for the worst.

The losses of the French in killed and wounded amounted according to their own statements to nearly 8,000 men† in the three days, those of the Germans to 60 officers and 1,586 men.

45,000 men with 146 guns had been opposed to the threefold superior French Army of the East.

The steadiness of the troops assembled on the Lisaine under General v. Werder had removed all danger for the siege of Belfort, and the rearward communications of the German armies.

On the 18th January the troops under General v. Werder occupied in general the positions they had successfully held. The enemy was to be attacked and disturbed, whenever circumstances permitted. Montbéliard, it was reported, had already been abandoned on the previous evening by the French, in disorderly retreat. During the night much bustle, movement of wagons, and working at entrenchments were heard. In the morning, however, the enemy was still before the whole front of the position, and was strengthening at many points his preparations for defence. The right wing appeared even to be threatened with attack, for which reason reinforcements were sent thither. Shortly, however, General Keller observed the retreat of strong columns upon Etobon and Béverne. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Chenebier could be occupied.

ction at
lairegoutte.

Colonel v. Willisen had encountered at Recologne and Clairegoutte the enemy, with whom the Reserve Rifles repeatedly exchanged shots. His detachment now advanced to Ronchamp, where the 5th and 8th Companies of the 6th Baden Regiment, returning from the Vosges, also arrived. After a short rest Colonel v. Willisen ordered them, with the 1st Reserve Rifle Company and a division of dragoons, to advance to Clairegoutte,

* The telegram in question says—"De l'avis des commandants de corps d'armée, j'ai décidé à mon grand regret, que l'armée occuperait de nouvelles positions à quelques lieues en arrière de celles sur lesquelles nous avons combattu . . . Si l'ennemi se décidait à nous suivre, j'en serais enchanté; peut être nous offrirait-il ainsi l'occasion de jouer à nouveau la partie dans des conditions beaucoup plus favorables."—See "Enquête Parlementaire," Paris, 1873, vol. iii, p. 423.

† See "Enquête Parlementaire," Paris, 1873, vol. iii, p. 396.

in order by the capture of this place to compel the enemy to abandon Recologne, which was difficult to attack, and thus lay open the high road. With an enveloping movement, the Rifles following in reserve, Captain Rayle with the Baden companies first penetrated from the north and east into the brick-kiln to the north of Clairegoutte, and afterwards into the village, from which the enemy after a long musketry action was driven at nightfall. One officer and 60 Frenchmen were here taken prisoners.*

In front of Chagey, Luze, and Héricourt strong bodies of skirmishers appeared, which even renewed their advance during the day until driven back by the fire of the guns. Isolated hostile batteries also came into action. Two companies sent forward by General v. d. Goltz during the morning from St. Valbert, also came across strong bodies of the enemy in the Bois Communaux, and had to retire with loss; nevertheless, Couthenans could be occupied in the afternoon.† Two guns advanced to the Mougnot in order to cannonade the enemy's columns. The heavy guns under Captain Schweden took part in the cannonade and set fire to Byans, where strong hostile detachments were collected. The batteries of the left wing, particularly the heavy guns in Montbéliard Château and at La Grange Dame, brought their fire to bear on hostile columns.

Before Montbéliard the entire belt of wood curving from Le Petit Bethoncourt to Ste. Suzanne was still occupied by the French. At Mont Chevis Farm they were working at the trenches and abattis. Their outposts that evening, after the Germans had withdrawn behind the Lisaine, were again pushed forward as far as the Ancienné Citadelle heights.

General v. Debschitz, who saw in front of him, at any rate, strong detachments of the enemy, had assumed the offensive on this day, in accordance with the intentions of General v. Werder.

Engagements
at Bonderval,
Herimon-
court, and
Abévillers.

On his right wing three companies, a battery‡ and a division of lancers, under Major Brinkmann, advanced from Exincourt by way of Audincourt, whence the enemy showing on the other bank was dislodged by shell fire. The Germans occupied the houses of Valentigney situated on the east bank of the Doubs and destroyed the bridge. In conjunction with two companies of the Oels battalion, which advanced with two guns§ from Dasle,

* Colonel Baron v. Willisen was moreover reinforced by the Eupen battalion, H. A. Heavy Res. and 2nd Light Res., but these troops were not employed on the 18th.

† During the morning a small detachment of the 30th had temporarily ventured into the place.

‡ 3rd and 4th ^{3rd} ^{Hirschberg} ^{Tilsit}, and the Bavarian sortie battery (4 guns).

§ 2nd and 3rd ^{Oels} and ¹ ^{VIII} Light Res., under Captain Kiesel.

Bondeval was next captured. Four landwehr companies with four guns* and a detachment of lancers, under Major v. Sothen, had moved from Vaudoncourt towards Herimoncourt. They occupied the place, pursued the enemy through Tulay, and in the evening took possession of Roches.†

On the left wing five landwehr companies with four guns‡ and a detachment of lancers, under Captain Count v. d. Schulenburg, attacked Abévillers, where the enemy, supported by artillery, defended himself with great stubbornness. Although not without comparatively heavy loss to ourselves,§ the enemy was defeated, and after a protracted musketry action also driven from the heights south of the place. In the night Meslières and Glay were also occupied.

According to the statements both of the prisoners and of the inhabitants the district further in front was still full of French troops. The advanced detachments of General v. Debschitz retired to the line Exincourt—Croix.

From the reports received from various parts of the fighting position, General v. Werder had become convinced that the French would resume their retreat on the following day. He now resolved to bring into operation all the measures which, though long deferred, appeared necessary for the success of the siege of Belfort.

From the fortress the engagements on the Lisaine had been distinctly seen, but the place had remained perfectly inactive.¶ It was expecting relief, but did nothing to bring it about.

During these last days, in spite of the unfavourable circumstances, fresh batteries were partly commenced, partly placed in readiness by the few troops left before Belfort.‡ All the detachments, which up to the 11th January had carried on the investment, were now again placed at disposal for this purpose. General v. Debschitz once more superintended the watching

* 1st and 2nd 4th 2nd and $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Res.
Liegnitz, Jauer, Hirschberg, VIII

† An attempt of the French to recapture the place next morning ended in failure.

‡ 1st and 3rd 6th, 7th, and 8th, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 2nd Light Res.
Striegau, Apenrade, VIII

§ Some 50 men.

¶ A sortie on a small scale against Essert on the 16th, which was repulsed by the fusiliers of the 67th Regiment, appeared to have been undertaken merely with the object of finding out if the besieger had become weaker in that direction.

‡ Battery No. 21, two 27-cm. S.B. and two 21-cm. rifled mortars.

" 22, four French short 15-cm. guns.

" 23, four 15-cm. guns.

" 24, " " "

" 25, five 12-cm. guns.

These five batteries lay to the north of the Grand Bois, between the Savoureuse and the railway embankment. Battery No. 25 had been finished on the 14th, No. 21 on the 17th, No. 23 on the 18th. The other batteries were still in process of construction.

from Croix to Montbéliard, Colonel v. Zimmermann the same duties from the latter place to Luze.

A number of arrangements for the care of the wounded and to regulate the supply of the troops had to be made without delay. For although General v. Tresckow Ist had readily opened his magazine at Dammerkirch, absolute want was experienced at different parts of the line of battle. Likewise it was necessary not to lose touch of the enemy. In the first place steps were taken for the concentration of the Baden Division, which had fought during the three days at the most various points. The battalions at Montbéliard were relieved by landwehr battalions. General v. Glümer received orders to march on the 19th to Frahier and Etobon, and to push forward his advanced parties to Béverne. The advanced guards of General v. d. Goltz and v. Schmeling, keeping up close communication, were to occupy Saulnot and Arcey, but not to go beyond these places. All were instructed to avoid serious engagements, but at the same time to gain the touch of the enemy, to harass him in his cantonments, and to capture stragglers. For an immediate pursuit of the far superior enemy the forces of the XIVth Army Corps were by themselves insufficient. The fruits of the victory, which the steadiness of General v. Werder and his troops had gained, were not confined to the battlefield of the Lisaine, but had to be reaped in full from the impending co-operation of the approaching force under General v. Manteuffel.

OCURRENCES BEFORE PARIS FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1871 TO
THE ARMISTICE.

CONTINUATION OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PARIS.

OPENING OF THE ATTACK ON THE SOUTH FRONT.

Besides the repeated endeavours to break through the lines at the point of the bayonet, the defenders of Paris towards the end of the year 1870 had made the attempt to meet the hostile investment in like manner with counter-approaches. Extensive trenches had been run in various directions, and numerous batteries armed with fortress artillery, which were at first only opposed by field guns.

For a time it appeared as if a small and open village like Le Bourget would share the honour of a regular siege.*

It was only after the French position on the Mont Avron had been pushed forward in a threatening manner between the Saxon and Württemberg lines, that the Germans brought siege artillery into action. The loss of this post compelled the French to withdraw their line of defence abreast of Forts Romainville and Nogent.†

On the 24th December the headquarters of the Army of the Meuse had resolved, after the fall of Mont Avron, to extend the artillery attack on either side, and thereby give increased security to a larger part of the line of investment. Part of the available guns were then to prevent the adversary re-establishing himself on the Mont Avron; the remainder were to be employed in cannonading on one side the Marne Valley, on the other the plain of Bondy and the works of attack directed upon Le Bourget. As His Majesty the King approved of these proposals, they could, the enemy having abandoned the Mont Avron, be carried into effect without delay.

The Batteries Nos. 14 and 15 designated for cannonading the plain of Bondy and Drancy, had been thrown up on the night of the 29th-30th December, and were able to open fire on the 31st. Those batteries appointed to batter the enemy's works directed upon Le Bourget—Nos. 18, 19, and 20—were kept back on the right bank of the Morée Brook, in order not to make the village in question the focus of the fighting. In consequence of the severe cold these batteries were not in readiness until the 4th January,‡ on which day Batteries Nos. 16

* See *ante*, p. 135-6. The cold, which had fallen to 14 degrees of Reaumur, prevented the continuation of these works.

† On the 4th January, besides a number of light guns, 32 guns of heavy calibre were concentrated on the edge of the plateau between these forts.

‡ Battery No. 18 was armed on the night of the 1st-2nd January.

and 17, appointed to sweep the Marne Valley north of Chennevières, were also in a position to open fire.*

As the inundation of the Morée was frozen hard, and no longer covered satisfactorily the extensive position occupied by the Guard Corps, the XIIth Army Corps received instructions to extend its right flank as far as the Sausset Brook.† This Corps, since the evacuation of Mont Avron, had pushed forward its outposts to Villemomble, and its watch-posts as far as that hill.‡

With the IIIrd Army, after the IIrd Corps had left for Montargis,§ the Ist Bavarian Corps had been brought up from its quarters to the north of Etampes,|| where it had been re-establishing itself. This Corps, which the French leaders had looked upon as no longer in existence,¶ had so diligently proceeded with its recruitment, that it now, with a force of 17,500 men and 108 guns,** could with its 2nd Division, reinforced by artillery, take up a position on the right bank of the Seine, abreast of the VIth Corps, whilst the remainder were housed in the villages further in rear, on the Yères and Réveillon brooks.††

* See Plan No. 15.

Appendix CXLIII contains details of the site, armament, and direction of fire of Batteries Nos. 14 to 20.

† The position of the Army of the Meuse remained as follows until the end of the siege:—

IVth Army Corps between Bezons and Les Carreaux.

Guard Corps between Montmagny and the Sausset Brook.

XIIth Army Corps between Sausset Brook and the Marne.

Württemberg Field Division between Gournay and Ormesson inclusive.

See Plan No. 35, which shows the position of the investing force in January.

The Marne communications remained in January the same as given on page 136. After Mont Avron had been abandoned by the French, the pile bridge at Gournay could be again used. The boat bridges at Noisiel and Pomponne had to be slipped on different days on account of the ice drift.

‡ The posts were driven back with some loss on the night of the 4th–5th January.

§ See ante, p. 140.

|| The Ist Bavarian Corps had been placed since the 27th December as general reserve at Arpajon and Montlhéry. (See Part II, vol. I, p. 96.)

¶ See ante, p. 143, note †, and Chanzy, "La 2^e Armée de la Loire," p. 242.

** Three weeks later the Corps numbered upwards of 22,500 men.

†† After the 24th January the Divisions occupied parallel cantonnements by wings; the 1st Division took over the outposts and cantonnements to the west, the 2nd those to the east, of the line Bonneuil—Boissy—Yères.

In order to establish secure communication between the two banks of the Seine, which since Christmas was effected by the ice at Villeneuve St. Georges (see ante, p. 138, note †), and at Juvisy, the 1st Bavarian Field Engineer Division, when the mild weather supervened on the 9th January, constructed rafts for crossing at places where there was no ice near Ablon and Athis. On the 12th January the ferry at Ablon was replaced by a bridge constructed of Birago trestles and rough material some 175 yards long, which was removed again on the 19th owing to the break up of the ice, but on the following day again placed in position, and on the 26th January transferred to Villeneuve St. Georges—80 metres above the bridge restored by the VIth Army Corps on the 21st January.

Besides these the Bavarian 3rd Field Engineer Company commenced on the 15th January the construction of a pile bridge between Draveil and Juvisy, which, however, was not ready until the 1st February, up to which time a pontoon bridge

On the left bank of the Seine, to the south of Paris, the French had, since the re-occupation of the Villejuif Heights, also progressed with their works, in order to thrust back more and more the chain of investment, and eventually to break it. The fortifications of Les Hautes Bruyères commanded the plateau in front, and threatened to envelop the both important and dangerous position of the IInd Bavarian Corps, a proceeding which was only prevented by the resistance of the Vth Corps at L'Hay. But as at this point large detachments had to be pushed forward into the foremost line of defence, the strength of the troops was at the same time taxed to the very utmost.

West of the Bièvre it was perfectly impossible to avoid the investing troops being posted close up to the enemy's works, if the northern slopes of the ridge jutting towards the Seine at that place were to be commanded. Even the main positions were reached by the enemy's heavy projectiles.* The outposts stood within range of the Chassepôt, so that they could only be relieved at night. The more distant became the hope of relief from without, the more bountiful use did the fortress make of its artillery, almost as if they wanted to get rid of their ammunition. The results, however, were in no degree commensurate with the expenditure of material, and it was not the extent of the danger, but its constant presence, which claimed the complete devotion of the men, who were not safe for one moment by day or by night. The besieged could only be confronted with the same arm that they used.

In the first days of January all the preparations were ready for arming with heavy artillery the 17 batteries of the south front, which had been in readiness for a long time. Their positions naturally classed them in three groups. On the left wing, in the park west of Château Meudon, lay closely together the batteries Nos. 2, 16, 3, and 4 on the steep slope of the heights.† The central group consisted of batteries Nos. 5 to 10, 13, 14, and 17, on the Moulin de la Tour Plateau. The right wing was formed of batteries Nos. 11, 12, and 15 on a lower site, between Fontenay-aux-Roses and Bagneux. Apart from them lay battery No. 1, on the spur north of Sèvres in the Park of St. Cloud. Five intermediate ammunition depôts furnished the ammunition reserves from the three artillery parks situated to the north-east of Villacoublay.

In order to prevent the adversary enfilading the right flank of the batteries from the side of Montrouge, and from the works

constructed by the Bavarians on the 25th January at Corbeil formed the means of communication further up stream.

Below Paris the pontoon bridge at Les Tanneries which had been carried away on the 26th December was again opened for traffic on the 18th January. (*See ante*, p. 138, note †.)

* A shell of heavy calibre entered Villa Piscatore (*see* Plan No. 36) and destroyed all the papers of the 19th Infantry Brigade.

† *See* Plan No. 16.

at Les Hautes Bruyères and Villejuif, the VIth Corps was deputed to make a subsidiary attack. In the first place two batteries were thrown up on the cross road between Chevilly and La Rue, and armed with heavy artillery. The VIth and IInd Bavarian Corps were also instructed to engage with field artillery the enemy's field and mitrailleuse batteries, and to bring their fire to bear on his shelter trenches, encampments, and working parties.*

Generals v. Kameke and Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, to whom was entrusted, as already mentioned, the conduct of the engineer and artillery attack,† had taken up their quarters at Versailles. Under them Colonel v. Rieff commanded the main artillery attack, Colonel v. Ramm the subsidiary attack by the VIth Corps. In the groups of batteries "field officers of the day" had to direct the fire. Officers and men were relieved after twenty-four hours' duty in the batteries, and were then given, respectively, one day's rest to the former, and two days to the latter.

The command of the engineer works was exercised by Colonel Schulz. For daily duty a "field officer of the day" was detailed.

In the night of the 1st—2nd January, the tower‡ situated on the Châtillon Plateau, to the south-east of Clamart, and which offered a favourable mark for the adversary, was blown up. During the course of the day, telegraphic communication was established between the groups of batteries, dressing stations were formed, and the trenches completed. A brisk fire from the siege guns of the east front, as also large movements of troops in the Army of the Meuse, were intended to distract the defenders' attention from the south front. The latter, however, remained comparatively ineffective owing to the prevailing fog.

In order to protect the transfer of the heavy guns to the batteries, orders had been issued for the outposts to be moved forward on the evening of the 3rd January as far as the outer border of Bellevue, Meudon, Fleury, Clamart, and to the foot of the Châtillon heights. To strengthen this line were employed at first five, later 2½ pioneer companies, which were quartered in the adjacent villages. A "general of the day" exercised command over all the covering troops, as special reserve for which the 1st Guard Landwehr Brigade was brought up to Saclay.

The arming of the batteries protected from view, was completed in the forenoon of the 3rd January, that of the remainder

* Appendix CXLIV shows all the batteries thrown up against the south front during the bombardment, with their respective armament and direction of fire.

† See *ante*, p. 138. Appendix CXLV contains details of the composition of these Generals' staff. Appendix CXLVI shows the strength of the staff and troops for the artillery attack on the south front of Paris; Appendix CXLVII the same for the engineer attack.

‡ "Tour à l'Anglais."

during the following night, without the enemy attempting to disturb the working parties.

On the morning of the 4th January, in the batteries of the main attack, 98 guns stood ready to open fire; of these 28 were directed upon Issy,* 28 upon Vanves, 10 upon the emplacements between these two forts, and 18 upon Montrouge.†

From the forts mentioned, the French had already withdrawn those troops which could not be placed under bomb-proof cover. The artillery armament of the lines threatened by the Germans was more than sufficient. On the three sections of the city ramparts under consideration,‡ there were at least 300, about as many on Mont Valérien and in the three forts Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge, 34 in the intermediate batteries, and 40 to 50 heavy guns in the intrenchments at Villejuif§

A dense fog which overhung the whole of Paris prevented fire being opened on the 4th January. On the 5th the atmosphere cleared sufficiently for No. 8 Battery to give the first signal shot at 8.30 a.m.; all the batteries of the more elevated central group followed. These at first had a hard time,|| for the defender at once replied, whilst the lower-lying batteries of the right group were not able to take part in the struggle until 10.45 a.m., and those of the left not until 12 o'clock. Then, however, the better position and armament of the assailant's batteries became felt. The fire of Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries dislodged the enemy from Billancourt. The gun-boats appearing at Le Point du Jour, again retired. At 1.30 p.m. the fire was, it is true, taken up as well from the enceinte, but the Issy Fort, which sustained the heaviest cannonade, almost entirely ceased firing at 2 o'clock. Vanves¶ and the intermediate batteries answered only at intervals with a few guns. The more distant and less vigorously cannonaded Fort Montrouge, however, could not be brought to silence.

The two siege batteries of the subsidiary attack had on their side played a vigorous part in the struggle.** In like manner all the heavy field batteries of the VIth Corps participated. The fire held in check the works at Villejuif to such an extent that, not only was no sortie attempted from this direction, but, throughout, not a shot was directed against the batteries at Bagneux.

* 40 12-cm. and 52 15-cm. guns, as also 6 21-cm. mortars.

† The remaining 14 guns came into action against Boulogne, Billancourt, and the bordering portions of the enceinte. See Appendix CXLIV.

‡ See Plan No. 35.

§ According to Sarrepont, "Histoire de la Défense de Paris en 1870-71," the 6th Section had 157, the 7th 134, the 8th 114 guns on the 20th January. On the 28th Fort Mont Valérien numbered 106, Issy 90, Vanves 84, Montrouge 52 guns. Among these were one 24-cm. gun, two 19-cm. and a large number of 16-cm. guns.

|| Captain Hoffmann v. Waldau, who was commanding No. 8 Battery, was mortally wounded, Major Baron v. Cöster wounded.

¶ Of the 16 guns firing from Fort Vanves 9 were dismounted on the 5th January; the garrison had 6 killed and 23 wounded. (See De la Roncière le Noury, "La Marine au Siège de Paris," p. 349.)

** Colonel v. Ramm was wounded.

The IInd Bavarian Corps had brought the fire of nine field guns* to bear from the emplacements east of Sceaux upon the hostile batteries on the railway west of Cachan, and in the evening pushed forward its outposts as far as the redoubt constructed by the French at Notre Dame de Clamart. The work was reversed, and that same night five pioneer companies† commenced an enclosing trench to the north of it.

The successful result of the day had been attained with comparatively slight sacrifices.‡ The immediate object, the silencing of the forts, was achieved; from that moment they never again overpowered the attack.

A 15-cm. gun in No. 8 Battery had been appointed this day to give the great city itself a preliminary warning. In the succeeding days the firing, however, was mainly directed upon the forts. The assailant also employed with good results the captured long-range Chassepôts and wall-pieces, of which latter 75 pieces were manned by a wall-piece detachment composed of men of the Vth, VIth, and XIth Army Corps.§

Issy and Vanves became gradually silent, not so Montrouge and the battery to the east of Fort Issy, which was exceptionally well placed behind the high railway embankment, and armed with six 32-cm. mortars. But it was more particularly the straight southern front of the enceinte, some $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles long, from which at this time the struggle was maintained.

Owing to dull weather the bombardment of the forts had to be entirely stopped for several days, and on others moderated. The defensive power, however, especially that of Issy and Vanves, had become so weak that the French almost entirely evacuated the ground in front. This circumstance was turned to account by the Germans for fortifying the advanced position between Le Val, Notre Dame de Clamart, and Châtillon on the night of the 9th—10th. The fusilier battalion 87th Regiment covered the works on the left wing, by attacking and holding Les Moulineaux until they were completed. From this position, which had been advanced 815 and 490 yards respectively nearer the forts, the struggle with the hostile artillery and the bombardment of the city was successfully continued.

By the 11th January batteries Nos. 4, 10, 6 and 12, were dismantled, on the other hand batteries Nos. 18, 19, and 20 were brought into action, and were joined later by Nos. 22, 21, and 23.|| For the subsidiary attack, a third battery was thrown

* Three guns each of the 5th and 6th 6-pr. and 9th 12-pr.
4th Bav. 2nd Bav.

† Two Bavarian Field Engineer Companies, two Fortress Pioneer Companies of IVth and one of Vth Army Corps.

‡ Appendix CLV contains a return of casualties among the troops investing Paris for the month of January.

§ The detachment was 250 strong, and had been organized in October, 1870.

|| In the new batteries of the main attack 36 guns were brought into action, of which 6 were 12-cm., 26 15-cm. guns, and 4 28-cm. (S.B.) mortars. The 15-cm. guns were taken from the dismantled batteries. No. 24 Battery with 4 28-cm. S.B.

up in L'Hay Park, which, although itself enfiladed from Fort Bicêtre, effectually took Montrouge in flank and rear.* Ivry and Charenton also directed their projectiles at times upon the batteries in front of the VIth Corps, from which, however, only Bicêtre was kept under a moderate fire.

Although the silencing of the enceinte could not be achieved on account of the long range, the superiority in respect of artillery was such that along the entire south front the investing troops were quite free from the enemy's fire.

The approach of the assailant caused the French to make repeated reconnaissances towards Notre Dame de Clamart. Early on the 10th January, under cover of the darkness, a detachment succeeded in approaching the redoubt unobserved, through the vine-clad ground. There was only in the place one division of the 8th Company 6th Bavarian Regiment, which, taken unawares, was overcome after a brief hand-to-hand fight.†

After simultaneous attacks at other points of the outpost line had been repulsed, the enemy once more abandoned the redoubt. Clamart was now occupied by the Germans with three battalions, the redoubt with two companies. On the night of the 12th—13th January, two Bavarian field engineer companies, a half Bavarian Fortress Engineer Company, one Fortress Pioneer Company of the IVth, and one of the Vth Army Corps, with 300 men of the Guard Landwehr, connected Clamart and Châtillon by a shelter-trench some 1,300 yards long, without being disturbed in their work by the enemy.

But in the next night, the attack was renewed by the Paris garrison, in greater force. 500 Marines and several battalions of National Guards advanced upon Clamart, with the object of destroying the German works there.‡ Their advance was reported at midnight. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Bavarian Regiment occupied the border of the village, and, supported shortly after by the 1st Battalion of the same regiment, and by the 8th Company of the 14th, received the enemy with a brisk fire. The French responded vigorously for quite an hour, but with little effect. When Colonel v. Treuberg subsequently caused the 9th Company 15th Regiment to advance along the road, and this company, flanked on either side by the fire from the trenches, dashed towards the already wavering enemy, it forced him to seek safety in flight. Patrols followed the enemy close up to the trenches in front of Fort Issy.

In consequence of the extended position of the Bavarians,

mortars was not again employed. No. 18 Battery proved to be exceedingly well placed for cannonading the inner city.

* The guns of these batteries had been given up by the other two batteries of the subsidiary attack.

† Lieutenant Westphal received in the hand-to-hand struggle six bayonet wounds.

‡ The National Guards assembled with great noise at the railway station north of Clamart.

the Notre Dame de Clamart redoubt was thenceforth occupied by troops of the XIth Army Corps.

Of the German batteries, the one which suffered most was the isolated No. 1 Battery, which had to contend with Bastions Nos. 63 to 67,* and also with two batteries constructed next Le Point du Jour, on both banks of the Seine. Fort Mont Valérien† also brought several guns into action against it. The rocky slopes in front and rear of the battery offered such facilities for the enemy to watch the shot and obtain the range, that the crest of the parapet was at times completely honey-combed. It was only by an extreme effort that the struggle could be continued at this point. Battery No. 19, also cannonaded most obstinately from the enceinte, sustained great losses; while upon Battery No. 21, which was particularly dangerous to Fort Vanves, the adversary repeatedly concentrated a very heavy fire. The projectiles coming from the enceinte, struck mostly at an obtuse angle, and at times pierced the splinter-proofs close behind the parapet; this happened twice in Battery No. 17, where a large number of men were thereby placed *hors de combat*. In batteries Nos. 21 and 23 the powder-rooms were blown up.‡

The enemy's forts suffered more serious damage. As a rule Vanves opened the cannonade, but speedily became silent if it was answered, leaving the continuance of the action to Mont-rouge and the enceinte.§ The devastation at Issy was visible with the naked eye; frequent conflagrations broke out in the place; the powder magazine had to be emptied at great risk on the night of the 16th—17th. On the other hand Mont-rouge, up to the middle of the month, fired 500 to 600 shots from its 18 guns on certain days; but no one of the bombproofs still afforded shelter, and Bastion No. 4 was a heap of ruins.

Meanwhile, besides engaging the artillery and in spite of the brisk fire from the enceinte, part of the 15-cm. guns had been employed to annoy the city. With an elevation of some 30°,|| ranges were attained of 8,120, and even upwards of 8,650 yards. Pont St. Michel, Pont de Notre Dame, the Champ de Mars, the Jardin des Plantes, and the Isle de St. Louis, were struck.¶ Every day 300 to 400 shells were thrown into the city,

* See Plan No. 35.

† The shells from Mont Valérien ranged to 7,600 yards, as far as the vicinity of the batteries at Meudon, which could be enfiladed from that hill.

‡ Among the senior officers wounded in the course of the cannonade were Major v. Wohlgenuth, Colonel v. Rieff, and Major Eck. Captain Brauns was killed.

§ Up to the 19th January Fort Vanves lost 12 killed and 58 wounded. (See De la Roncière le Noury, "La Marine au Siège de Paris," p. 349.)

|| In order to obtain this elevation the breech of the gun was placed at first on the inverted nut of the elevating screw, afterwards on a beam inserted in the travelling holes of the carriage. The charge employed was 6·6 lbs., but was subsequently reduced to 5 lbs., on account of the damage to the gun and carriage.

¶ Pont St. Michel and Pont de Notre Dame lead across the two arms of the Seine

and were distributed over the square mile (German) of ground comprised within the area Auteuil, Passy, and the quarters on the left bank of the Seine.*

In the eastern part, as well, of the fortress, the German siege guns,† from the heights between Chennevières and Le Raincy, had also gained complete mastery over the far more numerous artillery of the adversary.‡ The Peninsula of St. Maur was evacuated by the defenders without a struggle. The forts, at intervals only, opened a vigorous fire, chiefly as an introduction to small sorties. The outposts of the east front were withdrawn close up to the works, along the railway from Nogent-sur-Marne to Rosny and Merlan. It was only at Bondy and Drancy that the advanced positions were longer held, although the batteries near the former place had been disarmed at the beginning of January.

The 2nd Paris Army, which since the failure of the sortie on the 21st December had remained in front of the Army of the Meuse,§ contented itself with causing frequent alarms to the German Corps in its front. Minor reconnaissances were succeeded on the evening of the 13th January by an enterprise on a larger scale. Supported by a brisk fire from Forts Aubervilliers and l'Est, as also from the emplacements on the flanks, hostile detachments advanced at 10 o'clock from Drancy and La Courneuve with the intention of making an enveloping attack on Le Bourget. The watchful garrison of that place, speedily reinforced by several companies, repulsed all the assaults, which were continued up to 2 a.m.|| In the succeeding four nights these alarms were repeated, mostly in the direction of the outpost line of the XIIth Army Corps. Another attack upon Le Bourget was made on the 15th, which however was repulsed, chiefly by the rapid firing of the artillery.

close below the cathedral of Notre Dame; the Isle de St. Louis is the island situated above the cathedral.

* An exchange of notes between Generals Trochu and Count v. Moltke respecting the bombardment of the city is given in Appendix CXLVIII.

Of the civil population of Paris, 97 persons were killed and 278 wounded during the siege. (See Vinoy, "Siège de Paris," p. 380.)

† Of the 76 siege guns originally placed on the east front, there remained in action on the 4th January 58, on the 20th only 44, on the heights between Chennevières and Le Raincy. The remainder were employed for the north attack. See subsequent narrative.

‡ In the eastern forts and the intermediate works and on St. Maur, 151 rifled guns were subsequently found, among which were 7 19-cm. and 42 16-cm. guns.

§ The 2nd Paris Army stood at the beginning of January with the 1st Corps in Clichy la Garenne, St. Ouen, Aubervilliers, and Pantin, with the 2nd Corps in Bondy, Bagnolet, Montreuil-sous-Bois, Fontenay-sous-Bois, and Nogent-sur-Marne, with Faron's Reserve Division in Drancy and Bobigny.

|| The following were at Le Bourget:—

	Ind	3rd	
	Queen Elisabeth	Queen's	and
2nd		10th and 11th	
Guard Sharpshooters		Queen Elisabeth	and

: the following advanced in support:—

1st, 2nd, and 4th	
Queen's	

Batteries Nos. 18, 19, and 20 could have cooperated with their fire against this night attack, as directing points had already been arranged on the previous day.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Meuse ordered on the 17th January the batteries on the Morée Brook to bombard Drancy heavily for 48 hours, as it was the chief point of assembly for the enemy's enterprises. As meanwhile clear weather had supervened, the firing had good effect. Early on the 19th, several companies advanced to reconnoitre.* Drancy was found strongly occupied, the enemy on the alert. On the other hand the 3rd Company of the Saxon Body Guard Grenadiers, under Captain v. Friesen, surprised two hostile companies at Grosley Farm, and captured four officers and 109 men. The place subsequently remained unoccupied. At Bondy and Drancy the French thenceforth only maintained watch posts, which were reinforced at night. The works for the attack of Le Bourget were now also abandoned. The defender retired to the south of Petit Drancy Farm, where powerful batteries had been constructed.

The night attacks of the French had in no case achieved any real success, but had this disadvantage for the investing troops, that even the detachments in reserve had to stand for hours under arms, as it could not be foretold whether these outpost skirmishes might not be the prelude to more serious engagements. It was therefore highly desirable to drive the enemy also from the ground in front of St. Denis, by taking it likewise under the fire of the heavy guns.

To this end, after the works on Mont Avron had been razed and therefore a re-occupation by the French was no longer to be feared, while the front of the Württemberg position had been materially strengthened by further works, the artillery attack on the north front of Paris, which had been so long contemplated and so often deferred, was now carried into execution.

In the French capital the state of affairs had, during the course of January, taken a manifest turn for the worse. The inhabitants began to experience the horrors of a siege. Provisions had run short. In order to provide bread and meat, the military garrison had to give up part of their flour supplies, and part of their horses. In consequence of the continued cold the fuel ran short, particularly the coal; in lieu of lighting by gas, petroleum was used.† All provisions had risen greatly in price, privations were everywhere felt, and to these miseries was added the further danger of the projectiles from the German guns. Many inhabitants took refuge in their cellars,

* Against Drancy :— $\frac{1}{2}$ 10th and $\frac{1}{2}$ 11th Alexander and $\frac{10th}{Queen's}$; against Grosley Farm :— $\frac{12th}{Queen's}$ and $\frac{2nd}{1st B. G. Gren.}$; through the scrub S.E. of Grosley Farm the $\frac{10th}{101}$.

† On the 5th January the forts were instructed to hand over to the Intendence for the use of the civil population all flour in excess of the requirements for 2,500 men at two meals each for 45 days. Later on the forts had each to give up 10 tons of coal.

others migrated to remoter quarters of the city. All communication was cut off with the provinces, and the little news that found its way in gave little hope of speedy relief.

The Government had by its official proclamations encouraged in the illiterate masses the belief that they were invincible. These, in their turn, now clamoured for battles and victories, when a success was no longer possible. Supported by a large section of the press, they blamed the measures which had been taken, and upbraided the army with inactivity.

The ill-success of previous attempts to break their bonds, the loss of Mont Avron, and the increasing privations could but operate disadvantageously upon the spirit of the troops. Frost, sickness, and desertion had reduced the strength of the sortie troops by one-third of their previous numbers; and yet nowhere were the cries for fresh enterprises shriller than among the members of the Government.

Since New Year's night a series of consultations had taken place, to which the various commanders and officers of rank were summoned. Nearly all far-seeing soldiers were unanimous in the belief that to break through the investment was impracticable without the co-operation of an army of relief. Yet, in regard for "public opinion," words so potent in France, a fresh sortie *en masse* was preached. Attack by sap was dismissed as too lengthy a process; an enterprise against the German batteries at Châtillon was proposed, but ultimately the advance through Bougival towards Versailles was decided upon. But as the Minister Gambetta reported on the 8th January a victory on the part of the Northern Army,* and promised the advance of both Armies of the Loire, the Governor desired first to await the moment when, notably by the operations of General Bourbaki, the Germans would be forced to weaken themselves before Paris by sending away fresh detachments. In this, however, he was resisted by the other members of the Government, more especially by Jules Favre, who declared that the mayors were exasperated at the bombardment, and insisted upon an immediate sortie, which the army ought long ago to have put in execution. He demanded that the representatives of the city should be given an insight into the military situation.

Thus, ultimately, on the 15th, the resolution was taken to make a sortie *en masse* against the German lines at Montretout, Garches, and Buzanval.

As a matter of fact this was indeed the only direction possible. Opposite St. Denis the besiegers' attacking batteries were already on the increase. It was only on the south part of the Gennevilliers peninsula and under the protection of Mont

* The Minister communicated a despatch from General Faidherbe as follows:—
 "Anjourd'hui, 3 Janvier, bataille sous Bapaume, de 8 heures du matin à 6 heures du soir. Nous avons chassé les Prussiens de toutes les positions et de tous les villages: ils ont fait des pertes énormes et nous des pertes sérieuses." (See Ducrot, "La Défense de Paris," Pt. IV, p. 40.)

Valérien that large bodies of troops could assemble. Before all the other fronts they would have been exposed for hours to the fire of the German artillery. To carry out the assembly under cover of the darkness, in the condition of the bulk of the troops, could but have led to the most serious embarrassments.

The attack was fixed for the 19th January, and already on the 17th part of the troops of the 2nd Army appointed for the sortie—Susbielle's, Berthaut's, and Bellemare's Divisions—were relieved in their positions on the north and east front of Paris by mobilised National Guards. On those fronts General Exéa assumed the command, whilst General Trochu reserved to himself the conduct of the sortie.



PROCLAMATION BY THE EMPEROR.

Whilst on the 18th January, that day so full of memories for Prussia, distress and internal strife reigned in Paris, the unity of the German nation under the Emperor William was solemnly proclaimed in the palace of Versailles. The Army Order, by which His Majesty the Emperor and King announced this event to the Army, was worded as follows:—

On this day, memorable for me and my House, I assume, with the concurrence of all German Princes and of all German peoples, in addition to the position transmitted to me, by the grace of God, of King of Prussia, that also of a German Emperor. Your bravery and steadfastness in this war, for which I have repeatedly expressed to you my deepest acknowledgements, have hastened the internal union of Germany, a result which you have achieved by the sacrifice of your blood and your life.

Be ever mindful that the feeling of honour, true comradeship, bravery, and discipline make an army great and victorious. Maintain this feeling and the Fatherland will always, like to-day, regard you with pride, and you will ever be its mighty arm.

Headquarters, Versailles, 18th January, 1871.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

THE BATTLE OF MONT VALÉRIEN ON 19TH JANUARY.*

The attack contemplated on the 19th January by the French was to be executed in three columns advancing simultaneously in a strength altogether of some 90,000 men.†

The left wing, under General Vinoy, was to assemble at Briqueterie, and, supported by the fire of the 6th section of the enceinte, to capture the Montretout redoubt. In the centre the detachments of General Bellemare were to concentrate at Fouilleuse, and advance against the Garches heights and the south extremity of Buzanval park. Guarding the right flank by posting a strong detachment at Rueil, General Ducrot, from Maison Crochard, was to attack the Haras by way of Château Buzanval and Porte de Longboyau. The points of assembly, Briqueterie, Fouilleuse, and Maison Crochard, had been already provided with defensive works.

During the advance crossings occurred, which delayed considerably the arrival of the troops. As the French had already at the beginning of the investment blown up the suspension bridge at Suresnes, the troops brought up from the north and east fronts could only cross the Seine at Asnières and Neuilly. Owing to the great haste with which the operations had been initiated, no general arrangement for this movement had been made.

The commencement of the attack was originally appointed for 6 a.m., but was deferred for half-an-hour on the representation of General Ducrot. But as, after the lapse of this time, the Governor had not reached Fort Mont Valérien, the commandant of the latter delayed the concerted signal for advance until 7 o'clock.

At this hour the only troops ready for fighting on the left wing were the leading échelon of Vinoy's column—Beaufort's Division; Courty's Division was passing through Suresnes. The central column following behind was not yet clear; the rearmost detachments reached far into the Avenue de Neuilly. The right wing was on the march between Courbevoie and to the rear of Asnières; only three batteries had reached the neighbourhood of Nanterre. After the signal for attack had been given, the report from General Ducrot reached General Trochu, who had just arrived at Mont Valérien, that the column of the right wing was not in position. The endeavours to halt the left wing failed. It was already engaged.

On the German side there stood on the 19th in the position

* See Plan No. 36.

† Including 42,000 National Guards. The distribution of the troops making the sortie is shown in Appendix CXLIX.

of the Vth Army Corps in first line: the 17th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 20th on the left.* The pickets extended from the south east corner of St. Cloud Park by way of Porte Jaune to the Haras, thence by way of Porte de Longboyau and La Malmaison as far as the Seine. The outpost companies were respectively in St. Cloud Park, at Villeneuve, at the redoubts east of La Celle St. Cloud, and at the east issue from Bougival. Ville d'Avray, Marnes, Vaucresson, La Celle St. Cloud, and Bougival, were occupied by the special reserves. The rest of the corps lay in Versailles and the villages on the Versailles—Marly-le-Roi road. In front of the position stretched a chain of small watch posts, from the railway embankment at Montretout along the north-east wall of Buzanval Park to La Malmaison.

Up to 8.15 a.m. the observatories at Ville d'Avray and La Jonchère had only been able to report "dense fog." Immediately after followed the enemy's attack. General v. Bothmer, commanding on the right wing, received the report that strong hostile detachments were advancing upon St. Cloud, and he at once called his men to arms. The news which reached the Corps headquarters at 9 a.m. from the left wing, led to the belief that this also was threatened, and it was soon apparent that we had to deal with a serious enterprise on the part of the adversary.

The main reserves of the Corps received orders to move to Jardy and Beauregard. General v. Kirchbach repaired to the 9th Infantry Division at Le Butard. The Crown Prince ordered for all eventualities, six battalions of Guard Landwehr† as also a brigade of the IIInd Bavarian Corps‡ to Versailles, ordered the VIth Army Corps to support the IIInd Bavarian if necessary, and rode forward to Hospice Brezin, which point, owing to the difficulties of the ground, promised the best facilities for leading the troops. His Majesty the Emperor and King proceeded to the water tower at Marly.

Without preparing the attack by artillery, some 15 French battalions, shrouded at first by the fog, had moved in three

* See Part II, vol. I, p. 103, and Plan No. 36. In the course of the investment a group of redoubts and emplacements had been thrown up in the main position between Étoile de Chasse and Porte Verte, as also at Le Butard. In front of the main position the Bergerie had been prepared for defence, and a battery emplacement prepared in rear on the Jardy heights.

Appendix CL gives the distribution of troops of the Vth Army Corps on the 19th January, 1871.

† Five battalions of the 1st Guard Landwehr Brigade from Saclay and

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Ist} \\ \text{2nd Guard Gren. Landw.} \end{array} \text{ from St. Cyr; } \begin{array}{c} \text{IIIrd} \\ \text{1st Guard Landw.} \end{array} \text{ remained behind at} \\ \text{Pt. Jony; } \begin{array}{c} \text{IIInd} \\ \text{2nd Guard Gren. Landw.} \end{array} \text{ was at Versailles.}$$

‡ Combined Brigade: $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{7}$, $\frac{\text{Ist and IIInd}}{14}$, $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{15}$, 3rd Rifle Battalion,
 $\frac{\text{7th and 8th G-pr.}}{4\text{th Bav.}}$, and $\frac{\text{3rd and 4th}}{\text{1st Chevauxlegers}}$.

columns against the north end of St. Cloud, the Montretout redoubt, and the heights north-east of Garches.* They only met with patrols and isolated watch-posts, which withdrew to Montretout. The redoubt there was a work constructed by the French, which, after its capture by the Germans at the end of September, had been reversed and opened at the new gorge. After some supports hastening forward had reached the redoubt, 89 men of the 58th Regiment and 5th Rifle Battalion assembled therein, under Lieutenant v. Kauffungen,† and, cast entirely upon their own resources, offered a stubborn resistance to vastly superior numbers. It was not until 9.45 a.m., after the enemy had penetrated into St. Cloud, that the post was abandoned. The small band, with its officers and non-commissioned officers at the head, forced their way out at the point of the bayonet, losing a number of prisoners, some of them wounded. The French occupied the redoubt with two battalions and sent detachments to St. Cloud and Montretout Park.

Meanwhile, Fournès' and Colonien's brigades had advanced from Fouilleuse upon Garches and Buzanval Park, had driven without much difficulty the outposts from the heights at Maison du Curé, occupied the furthestmost houses of Garches, and forced their way into the east part of Buzanval Park through the outer wall which was broken through in many places.‡ At this time—soon after 9 o'clock—the first German reinforcements arrived at the front line of defence.

In accordance with the arrangements of the Corps headquarters, the 5th Rifle Battalion, belonging to the 9th Division, was to move up into the line of watch-posts, and by a delaying musketry action to force the adversary to deploy and thus give time for the rearward troops to occupy the defensive positions. In consequence of the comparatively late discovery of the hostile attack, the Rifles had only just been called to arms when the adversary was already ascending the Montretout and Garches heights.

In consequence, the 2nd and 3rd Companies only reached at the appointed time the Grille d'Orleans and the Porte Jaune, where they took over the defence in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion 58th Regiment, whilst the 1st Battalion of this regiment occupied on the right the château and park of St. Cloud. The 4th Rifle Company, under Captain v. Bünau, which had hastened forward at the double to Garches, drove the adversary again from the place with the help of the detachments already

* Height 112.

† Of the 58th Regiment. The other leaders were Lieutenant v. Döring, Vice-Sergeant-Majors Tischler and Säckel, as also non-commissioned officer Gude.

‡ A distinction must be drawn between the outer and inner park wall at Buzanval; the former runs from the Porte de Longboyau past Buzanval Château to the Bergerie, the latter goes from the Porte de Longboyau past Garde des Forains in a southerly direction. The inner wall was the main object of the French when attacking the position of the 10th Infantry Division.

engaged there,* and in concurrence with the 8th and parts of the 7th Companies 59th Regiment occupied the cemetery and north-east border of the village. The attempt to capture also the heights at Maison du Curé had to be given up, owing to the enemy's superiority.† Six musketeer companies 59th Regiment moved up into defensive positions, partly between the Porte Verte and the Haras and partly between the latter and Garches.‡ The 1st Rifle Company, under Captain v. Schwemler, reached in good time the advanced post of the Bergerie.§

Against the position thus occupied General Bellemare ordered his column, at 9.30, to advance to a decisive attack.

At Porte Jaune and opposite Garches the enemy was unable to make progress; the detachments at these places repulsed him with file-fire. The 3rd Rifle Company then dashed forward from the Porte Jaune and gained ground to the northward, whilst the 2nd, under Captain v. Strantz, advanced from the Grillo d'Orleans, and received the garrison of the Montretout redoubt, which was in the act of retiring. The 10th and 11th Companies 58th Regiment, which had meanwhile advanced from Ville d'Avray to the Porte Jaune, and the last-mentioned Rifle Company took up a firm position in the Rue Impériale of Montretout, and stayed the further advance of the enemy in St. Cloud.

The enemy's most vigorous and persistent attacks were directed upon the Bergerie. Against this place moved five French battalions and a section of engineers, which latter, with great bravery, attempted to blow up the surrounding wall. Their intention did not succeed, as the dynamite was frozen and would not explode. Supported by the gradually arriving artillery, the weak garrison of the Bergerie maintained their important post with resolute coolness during the entire day.

Of the German artillery, the 1st Heavy Battery came into action south of the Porte Jaune, the 2nd Light at the Hospice Brezin. Both were able to share in the repulse of the French main attack. Later on the 2nd Heavy Battery unlimbered at the emplacement south-east of Porte Verte, the 1st Light Battery at the Haras.

In St. Cloud the 1st Company 58th Regiment had recaptured the railway station, which had been strongly occupied by the enemy; but in the north part of the village, where Captain

* Two rifle posts and men of the $\frac{6\text{th}}{58}$ and $\frac{7\text{th}}{59}$.

† Captain v. Büнау was badly wounded here.

‡ $\frac{5\text{th}}{59}$ took post at Porte Verte, $\frac{6\text{th}}{59}$ at Hospice Brezin; $\frac{1\text{st and } 2\text{nd}}{59}$ occupied the Emperor William Redoubts at the south-east corner of the Haras, $\frac{3\text{rd and } 4\text{th}}{59}$ the redoubts between the latter and Garches.

§ Here also a detachment of the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{59}$ under Lieutenant v. Kamptz also took post.

Wernecke was in command, the street fighting continued with the enemy in the interior, even after General v. Bothmer had brought up four fresh fusilier companies of his two regiments; these had come into action partly at the Grille d'Orléans, partly at St. Cloud.* On the other hand the 4th Heavy Battery,† from the south side of Porte Jaune, brought a very effective shrapnel fire to bear upon the Montretout redoubt. After the 3rd Light Battery had also been brought up at 1 o'clock to the Hospice, there stood in action in the position of the 9th Division 36 guns, with which the French were quite unable to cope.

General Vinoy's batteries after being considerably delayed by crossing with the central column, had arrived late, and were detained at Briqueterie in order to meet any possible retirement. The batteries of the centre had attempted to ascend the northern slopes of the Garches plateau, but their efforts failed in consequence of the sodden ground and the exhausted condition of the teams.‡ They took up a position at Fouilleuse. Their fire was, however, kept down by the Germans.

The superiority of the German artillery, which became manifest about noon, contributed in no slight degree to the success of the day. Of the special reserves of the 9th Division six companies were still kept back at this time.§ Three battalions and two batteries of the main reserve|| also stood at General v. Sandrart's disposal between Jardy and Vaucresson.

On the left flank of the German position—at the 10th Division—whither General v. Kirchbach betook himself about half-past 11 o'clock, the 50th Regiment had taken up its fighting position immediately the alarm sounded. Its 2nd Battalion occupied the shelter trenches at La Jonchère, the gamekeeper's lodge at the Porte de Longboyau, and the abutting inner wall of the park. The fusilier battalion served as immediate support, and occupied as well the block-house north of the Empress's Kiosk with the 11th Company; the 1st remained in reserve at the entrenchments east of La Celle St. Cloud. The

* $\frac{9\text{th and } 12\text{th}}{58}$ from Étoile de Chasse, $\frac{9\text{th and } 12\text{th}}{59}$ from the north side of Hospice Brezin. The $\frac{\text{IInd}}{88}$, placed at disposal from the 21st Division, was also brought up about 11 o'clock from Sèvres to St. Cloud and the Grille d'Orléans.

† In action next the $\frac{\text{1st Heavy}}{\text{V}}$.

‡ See Ducrot, "La Défense de Paris," Part IV, p. 121.

§ $\frac{\text{1st}}{7}$ at Clos Toutain, $\frac{10\text{th and } 11\text{th}}{59}$ at the Hospice. The $\frac{\text{IInd}}{47}$ had been otherwise disposed of (see Appendix CL), namely, $\frac{5\text{th, } 6\text{th, and } 8\text{th}}{47}$ had taken post at the railway tunnel south-west of St. Cloud, while $\frac{7\text{th}}{47}$ remained in readiness to move at Sèvres.

|| $\frac{\text{Fus. 1st and Fus.}}{7}$, $\frac{3\text{rd Heavy and } 4\text{th Light}}{47}$, and $\frac{\text{V}}{\text{V}}$.

engagement in Buzanval Park was directed by Colonel Michelmann and Lieutenant-Colonel v. Sperling, both of the 50th Regiment. In the interval between La Jouchère and the Seine stood the 2nd Battalion 37th Regiment; the 2nd Company of the same regiment being at the barricade between Bougival and La Malmaison. Behind the left flank of this position the 5th Light and 5th Heavy Batteries were unlimbered at St. Michel; the duty of escort devolved upon three fusilier companies of the 6th Regiment.*

General Ducrot commenced the engagement with the fire of his numerous artillery,† which had at an early hour deployed on either side of Rueil. The swarms of skirmishers which then pressed forward reached the inner park wall, occupied by the defenders, and even penetrated beyond through the gaps existing at different points. They were met, however, by two fusilier companies‡ of the 50th, which hastened up under Captain v. Boguslawsky, and by a vigorous attack were again driven to the further side of the inner wall.

Now—10.30 o'clock—followed the main attack of the French right wing. Susbille's Division moved upon La Malmaison, where an advanced non-commissioned officer's post was driven in, and the park wall occupied; Berthaut's Division advanced upon Buzanval, supported and joined on the left by Valentin's Brigade belonging to General Bellemare's command.§

Meanwhile the fighting line of the 50th Regiment had been reinforced by six companies of the 37th Regiment.¶ General v. Schmidt held his other battalions in readiness at Beauregard.

In face of the murderous fire of the infantry in first line, mostly under cover, the French attack came to a standstill, and changed about noon along the whole front into a stationary musketry action. The defence was effectively supported by the two heavy batteries of the Guard Landwehr Division, which General v. Loën, in accordance with a summons from General v. Kirchbach, had despatched under escort of a battalion¶ from St. Germain-en-Laye to Louveciennes to reinforce the two batteries

* $\frac{9\text{th}, 11\text{th}, \text{and } 12\text{th}}{6}$. Later on these companies rejoined the main reserve, on relief by the $\frac{\text{1st and 11th}}{2\text{nd Guard Grenadier Landwehr}}$, which advanced from Versailles. $\frac{6\text{th Heavy}}{V}$, which had been assigned to the 20th Infantry Brigade, was not employed.

† In all:—10 batteries, including three mitrailleuse batteries.

‡ 9th and 12th.

§ Faron's Division remained in reserve at Rueil.

¶ The following were the positions:— $\frac{4\text{th}}{37}$ at La Jouchère, $\frac{1\text{st}, 9\text{th}, 11\text{th}, \text{and } 12\text{th}}{37}$ at the shooting lodge, $\frac{10\text{th}}{37}$ in Buzanval Park.

¶ $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{1st Gd. Gren. Landw.}}$

of the Vth Corps in action near St. Michel. Two battalions* and the light reserve battery of the Guard advanced to Chatou, where the latter took up the struggle with an ironclad railway train, halted at Rueil station. After this had executed a short forward movement it steamed back with some losses to Nanterre, whence it again took part later on in the engagement.

With no less vigour did four batteries of the IVth Army Corps bear a hand in the fight; they had been despatched from the Army of the Meuse under infantry escort to Montesson, and were brought into position by Colonel Crusius to the north of Chatou, on the road to Carrières St. Denis.† Without heeding the fire from Mont Valérien, from Moulin-des-Gibets, and from the Rueil railway station, they poured their shells into the hostile masses of infantry halted between that place and Nanterre. They also inflicted serious damage on the ironclad train and forced it once more to retreat.

Towards 2 o'clock the enemy resolved upon a fresh attack. Two batteries unlimbering to the east of La Malmaison overwhelmed Porte de Longboyau with their shells. Miribel's Brigade then advanced against this post, Bôcher's Brigade against the inner park wall, whilst strong detachments of Faron's Division followed in support. With equal intrepidity, but with no better result than at La Bergerie, a detachment of engineers endeavoured to blow up the wall. The whole of the party, 1 officer and 10 men, fell. The columns had approached to within 200 paces, but the fire of 13 companies‡ now present brought them to a standstill. In spite of the most self-sacrificing efforts on the part of the officers the movement was checked, and changed to a badly ordered retreat, which was in some degree covered by those holding the outer wall.

Against the left wing of the 10th Division a weak blow had been directed, which was easily repulsed by the 8th Company 37th Regiment. One of the French batteries standing at La Malmaison was forced to limber up by the fire of the Prussian artillery.

On the right wing of the French the force of the attack had spent itself. As early as 3 p.m. rearward movements were visible on that side. As the evening closed the 6th and 7th Companies 37th Regiment, by order of General v. Schmidt, retook possession of La Malmaison, whence two battalions of Garde Nationale sought safety in flight. Later on the garden there was also

* IIrd and IIIrd 1st Gd. Gren. Landw. IIIrd 2nd Gd. Gren. Landw. was furnishing the outposts along the Seine. With respect to the other Landwehr battalions of the Guard, see ante, p. 376, note †.

† 5th and 6th Light, 5th Heavy, and 3rd H. A., escorted by 9th, 11th, and 12th.
IV 71

‡ 1st, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th and 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th.
37 60

captured after a brief engagement. Only at the outer wall of Buzanval Park were there some weak French detachments left. The special reserves of the 10th Division were withdrawn to La Celle St. Cloud; the main reserve returned to its quarters. The General Commanding had watched the course of the fight from La Jonchère,* and afterwards proceeded to Hospice Brezin.

With the 9th Division also the fighting continued into the afternoon, but was carried on by the French more on the defensive than the offensive.

About 2 o'clock, when the firing became brisker at the 10th Division, General v. Sandrart had brought up the fusilier battalions of the 7th and 47th Regiments to the Haras, in order to be able to defeat any attempts at breaking through the centre.† But as the struggle gradually waned on the left, he considered the time opportune for taking the offensive.

From Hospice Brezin, where the Crown Prince had remained under fire with the 2nd and 3rd Light Batteries,‡ which were at times reached by Chassepôt bullets, the 10th and 11th Companies 59th Regiment, under the command of Major Cumme, advanced from the special reserve against the south wall of Buzanval Park, which the French had very skilfully arranged in a short time for defence. This attack, which was also joined from La Bergerie by detachments of the 3rd and 7th Companies, failed with heavy losses.§

As the enemy was apparently preparing a counter-attack at this point, and the general result of the fight along the line could not yet be estimated, the Crown Prince caused the 1st Guard Landwehr Brigade, belonging to the main reserve at Versailles, to advance upon Vaucresson. But it never came into action.

In the already commencing twilight Colonel v. Köthen led the fusilier battalion of the King's Grenadiers from the Haras to Garches, and in conjunction with the three companies|| standing to the east of the village entered the fight. As the heights in front appeared to be but weakly occupied, Colonel v. Köthen, without awaiting the arrival of the 1st Battalion King's Grenadiers from Clos Toutain, at once moved forward against them. The stormers¶ were received by a sharp musketry fire which increased in briskness. The skirmishers of Fournès' Brigade, already wavering, were reinforced by four battalions and the franc-tireurs of Courty's Division, which

* Immediately after the General had quitted the Observatory it was reduced to ruins by the enemy's shell.

† So that there only remained from the main reserve at Vaucresson the $\frac{1st}{47}$.

‡ Gunner Ziegert, of the 3rd Light Battery, was wounded in the immediate neighbourhood of the Crown Prince.

§ Here fell mortally wounded Captain v. Scheve.

|| $\frac{5th \text{ and } 8th}{59}$ and $\frac{4th}{5th \text{ Rifles}}$.

reached the heights at the double. At the same moment the further advance was threatened from Montretout.

In consequence Colonel v. Köthen was obliged to take the resolution of outflanking the enemy's right by an advance from La Bergerie.

To carry this out the fusilier battalion 47th Regiment, under Captain Masuch, which had likewise followed from the Haras, was directed towards the farmstead, where it joined the left of the fighting line. The 12th Company originally left at Garches, and the greater part of the 1st Battalion King's Grenadiers, brought up by Captain v. Malotki, moved up into the front,* just in time to meet a threatening reverse, for the skirmishers had expended their ammunition and the enemy was evidently on the point of passing to a counter-attack. With the aid of these reinforcements, and supported by the fire of the Hospice and Dornbusch batteries, a fresh attack was undertaken at 5 o'clock, and the enemy driven with a cheer from his positions between the Bergerie and Maison du Curé. Lieutenant v. Grotthuss with the 2nd Company of the King's Grenadiers pursued the enemy close up to Fouilleuse.

The dispositions of attack for the right wing had been to General v. Bothmer. The General had ordered the 9th Company 59th Regiment and the 3rd Rifle Company to move from the Porte Jaune, and support the attack upon the Garches heights by advancing to the cross roads, east of the cemetery. The first-mentioned company encountered superior hostile forces, and had to retire to the park of St. Cloud, while the rifles, who advanced on the left of the 59th, reached beyond the road leading from Montretout to Maison du Curé, and were able also to hold their ground there, as the victorious advance of the King's Grenadiers then made itself felt.†

On the other hand, an attack made by order of General v. Bothmer upon the Montretout redoubt with five companies failed. The 2nd Rifle Company and the 12th Company 59th Regiment, which were to make an outflanking movement through St. Cloud, encountered in the well-barricaded houses of the north part of this village a resistance which they could not overcome, and, in consequence, the companies making the frontal attack—the 7th and 10th of the 58th Regiment, joined by the 7th Company of the 88th—were unable to make any headway.

In consequence of the importance which the undisturbed possession of Montretout had for the security of the right flank, General v. Kirchbach gave orders for this post to be captured at all hazards, either that evening or early next day. As a precaution he had ordered the 46th Regiment of the 10th Division to be called to arms and join the 9th Division.

* $\frac{4\text{th}}{7}$ remained at Garches.

† In this advance Captain Jänsch was mortally and Captain Nolte severely wounded.

General v. Sandrart resolved upon its immediate capture and placed the 46th Regiment and the 1st Battalions of the 47th and 88th Regiments* at the disposal of General v. Bothmer as reinforcement for the six companies already engaged between St. Cloud and Montretout. At 8 p.m. three columns advanced to make an enveloping attack.† The left column moving from Garches and the central column, the latter under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Eberhardt, found the redoubt only occupied by a few Frenchmen, who were taken prisoners; the right, under Major Schulz, on the other hand, experienced again a stubborn resistance at St. Cloud. With heavy loss, the 2nd and 4th Companies 47th Regiment endeavoured, but without success, to carry the houses by assault. They ultimately limited themselves for the moment to closely investing them.‡

The 46th Regiment and the two battalions of the 88th returned in the night to their Divisions, as also did a combined brigade of the VIth Corps,§ which had been held in readiness between Wissous and Massy to give any support that might be needed to the Bavarians. The reserve—1st Guard Landwehr Brigade, and a combined brigade of the IInd Bavarian Corps—was allotted quarters in Versailles.|| It had to hold itself in readiness to meet any renewal of the attack early next day.

But General Trochu, who had been present at the struggle for the Garches heights, had that afternoon come to the conclusion that the attempt to break through had failed along the entire front, and that, in the demoralisation which prevailed, especially among the National Guards, any further continuance of the struggle was perfectly useless. At half-past 5 o'clock he, in consequence, gave orders to the centre and left wing to retire. The brave garrison of the houses in St. Cloud were forgotten in this order; they did not surrender until the following afternoon, and then only after a long parley, and when two guns were unlimbered against them.

On the 19th January the reserves held in readiness by the

* $\frac{1st}{88}$ had arrived at 6 p.m. as further reinforcement from the 21st Division.

† Left wing column :— $\frac{5th}{58}$ and $\frac{3rd}{5th Rifles}$.

Central column :— $\frac{7th \text{ and } 9th}{58}$, $\frac{1st, 5th, 6th, \text{ and } Fus.}{46}$, and $\frac{7th}{88}$.

Right wing column :— $\frac{1st}{47}$ and $\frac{2nd}{5th Rifles}$.

In reserve :— $\frac{1st}{88}$ at Étoile de Chasse, and $\frac{7th \text{ and } 8th}{46}$ on the Vaucresson—St. Cloud road.

‡ For this purpose the following were employed :— $\frac{3rd}{47}$ and $\frac{2nd}{5th Rifles}$. $\frac{1st}{47}$ occupied the Montretout redoubt.

§ $\frac{1st \text{ and } IInd}{22}$, $\frac{Fus.}{23}$, $\frac{1st \text{ and } Fus.}{62}$, $\frac{IInd}{63}$, and $\frac{5th Heavy}{VI}$

|| Only the cavalry and artillery of the Bavarian Brigade returned that same evening to their Corps.

Germans were not brought into action. The Vth Army Corps had with only a slight support from the flanks maintained its fighting position against a four-fold superiority of force, and had indeed brought the attack to a standstill in front of the real line of defence.* This success had been gained at a sacrifice of 40 officers and 570 men. The losses of the French amounted to 189 officers and 3,881 men, of whom 44 officers and 458 men were prisoners.†

On the morning of the 20th, the patrols reported that the outer wall of Buzanval Park, against which General v. Kirchbach contemplated a combined attack of both his Divisions, was also abandoned by the French, and when the thick mist lifted at 11 o'clock, the enemy's long columns could be seen retiring from the Gennevilliers Peninsula to Paris.‡

CONTINUATION OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK. ITS EXTENSION TO THE NORTH FRONT.

At the time when the final attempt of the Army of Paris to break through the line failed, the preparations for the artillery attack on the north side of the place also were approaching completion.§

For some time past a very large quantity of material for constructing batteries had been prepared by the Army of the Meuse, and had been brought up to Arnouville and Montmorency; a park of 600 wagons had been collected, and a siege park formed at Villiers le Bel. In a report to His Majesty the King, General v. Hindersin had already at the end of November pointed to the possibility of bombarding Paris if the positions of St. Denis were captured, and at the same time had suggested the bringing up of the siege artillery now free at Thionville and La Fère, with a view to its employment for the attack on the north front. On the 1st December, this proposal in respect to the greater part of the artillery companies and siege guns from La Fère had been agreed to, but in consequence of the events on the Marne, their employment had become necessary in the first instance for the east front.¶ A successful result having been attained on this side, 32 guns

* According to the states of the 11th January the Corps numbered 20,788 infantry, 1,115 horses, and 84 guns.

† See Ducrot, "Défense de Paris," Part IV, p. 188. About a third of the losses fell upon the National Guards.

‡ A two days' armistice, which had been requested during the day by the Governor of Paris, had to be refused, but the advanced troops received orders to avoid everything which might interfere with the removal of the wounded and the interment of the dead.

§ With regard to the plan of attack, see Part II, vol. I, p. 129.

¶ See ante, p. 128.

could be given up for the attack on St. Denis.* The fall of Mézières and Péronne rendered a further supply of siege material available.

Whilst the artillery material was in process of transport, 12 batteries had been gradually built in the line Le Bourget—Lac d'Enghien.†

The direction of the artillery attack devolved at the north front also upon Colonel Bartsch.‡ Ten of the fortress artillery companies set free at Mézières were assigned to the north attack, and with the companies hitherto engaged on the east front, were combined into five divisions.§

On the second day after the battle at Mont Valérien 81 guns, of which 69 were in the newly-constructed batteries of attack, stood in readiness to open fire upon the positions at St. Denis.||

At 9 a.m. on the 21st January, fire was opened. Eleven guns were directed on La Briche, 28 on Double Couronne du Nord, 13 on Fort de l'Est. The French opposed with 143 heavy rifled guns, and replied briskly. But their position in the ground in front was no longer tenable. After the very first shots Château Villetaneuse was evacuated by them, and that same evening was occupied by a company of the 1st Guard Infantry Division. During the night the assailants' fire was directed upon St. Denis.¶

Dull weather on the 22nd did not permit a vigorous continuance of the bombardment until the afternoon. Double Couronne and Fort de l'Est answered with a brisk but unsuccessful fire. During the night the outposts were pushed forward from Villetaneuse to Le Tems perdu.**

On the 23rd and 24th, the assailants' fire was continued with increased briskness, and was now supplemented by the two Batteries Nos. 21 and 33 situated near Le Bourget. The artillery of the fortress, already kept fully occupied by the south

* See ante, p. 370, note †.

† Batteries Nos. 21 to 32. Later on No. 33 Battery. Batteries No. 21 and 33 could not open their fire until later, owing to their exposed position. The former was ready on the 19th January and armed on the 22nd. Battery No. 23 had been constructed between the 4th and 7th January by pioneers of the IVth Army Corps. The building of Batteries Nos. 22, 24, and 25 commenced on the 10th, the arming followed on the night of the 16th—17th January. Batteries Nos. 26 to 32 had been built entirely by the Field Artillery of the Guard and of the IVth Army Corps between the 13th and morning of the 17th January, but were not armed until the nights between the 18th and 21st January.

Appendix CLI shows the Batteries Nos. 21 to 33, and Nos. 36 to 39 on the north, and Nos. 34 and 35 on the east front.

‡ By order from the Royal Headquarters of 11th December, 1870, he had been charged "with the supreme command of the siege artillery within the rayon of the Army of the Meuse."

§ Appendix CLIII shows the staff and troops for the artillery attack on the north and east fronts on the 20th January, 1871. Appendix CLIV a similar statement with regard to the engineer attack on the north front.

|| Of the old batteries only Nos. 18 and 19 shared in the bombardment of St. Denis. Appendix CLII gives details of the armament of the batteries of the east and north attack between the 4th and 28th January.

¶ Orders were given to spare the cathedral as much as possible.

** The post was then taken over by the IVth Army Corps.

attack, had to all intents and purposes become overpowered on the 23rd. La Briche was completely silenced, the other two forts only fired salvos at intervals. Frequent conflagrations broke out in the city.

In consequence of the rapid evacuation by the French of the ground in front, it became possible to shift forward the batteries, and to commence the regular attack, which during the preparations for the bombardment had again been mooted. His Majesty the King and Emperor having, on the 22nd, sanctioned its execution, the forward shifting of four batteries was resolved upon next day, and their construction carried out on the night of the 25th—26th. On the following morning three of them were able to open fire.* They were pushed forward to within 1,300 and 1,950 yards respectively of the enemy's main works. The success proved so promising, that on the same day it was decided to move to the front a second series of batteries. These were made ready on the night of the 27th—28th, so that the front of attack on St. Denis, originally upwards of 7,580 yards long, was shortened to 5,420 yards.† The last constructed batteries, however, never opened fire.

The effect of only six days' bombardment by the artillery of the attack, reinforced to 80 guns, had been very considerable. La Briche and Double Couronne had more especially suffered. In the latter work, on the 26th alone, 15 carriages had been destroyed. Both works lacked bomb-proof shelter; the provisional bomb-proofs were pierced, and the powder magazines were in the highest degree endangered. The garrison suffered heavily. The inhabitants of the town fled in vast crowds to Paris. The forts in the north, unlike those in the south which had a powerful support in the fire from the enceinte of the city, were in such a state that nothing would have prevented the carrying out of the regular attack already decided upon, if the resistance had been longer continued. These forts were not sufficiently free from escalade, and could scarcely have withstood an assault.

Up to the present time the north attack had only cost one officer and 25 men. The defender's loss was much greater.‡

On the east front the Germans had contented themselves with continuing the fire as before. Any further pressing forward of the attack on this side did not appear desirable. Even the occupation of the bare plateau of the Mont Avron, swept as it was by the fire of the nearest forts and intermediate batteries, was difficult; while, if the attack on the strong hostile position north of Fort de Rosny were successful, the assailant

* Batteries Nos. 24, 25, 29, and 30 ceased firing. On the other hand, Nos. 36 to 39 opened; No. 38 never fired again.

† Batteries Nos. 22, 23, 31, and 32 were to cease firing; the new batteries were numbered 40 to 43.

‡ According to Vinoy 180 men, according to de la Roncière 132 men.

would still have been separated from the enceinte of the beleaguered city by a distance of 4,875 yards. The task of the very reduced force of German artillery* was to keep the upper hand of the adversary at this point. As the latter was improving his works at Vincennes and the Faisanderie redoubt, two new batteries were constructed at Villiers and Champigny, which could open fire on the 23rd and 24th January.† Along the east front there reigned almost absolute quiet; only on the 23rd January hostile detachments showed on the east part of the St. Maur Peninsula which, however, were cannonaded by the Württemberg 1st Field Artillery Division unlimbering at Chennevières and Champigny, and prevented from again establishing themselves on that ground.

The forts also of the south front had been seriously damaged by the continued bombardment. The barracks appeared to be destroyed, in places gutted. The powder magazines had for the most part to be emptied, and were used as places of refuge for the garrison. The terrepleins did not permit of free movement; the ramparts no longer gave any protection. In Vanves seven embrasures were completely filled in and abandoned, seven others were temporarily restored with sand-bags. Of 19 blocks of casemates in the south curtain of Fort d'Issy, five had been shot through in the external wall and rebuilt on the inside with sand-bags. This destruction had been caused more particularly by the long shells of the 15-cm. guns in Batteries Nos. 19 and 21, whilst the shells of the rifled 21-cm. mortars pierced in all directions the covered buildings, or rendered them so dangerous that they had to be abandoned. Even the detached gorge walls of Vanves and Montrouge were laid low. The cemetery battery west of Fort d'Issy had suffered little. On the other hand the remaining intermediate batteries, especially those by Clamart railway station, were almost entirely destroyed. There, at Issy and Vanves, some 40 dismounted guns and 70 destroyed carriages were found at the capitulation.

The forts would have been able to offer but slight resistance to a regular attack. The city enceinte continued, it is true, to fire to the end;‡ but on the whole the artillery defence was well-nigh exhausted. There were no further offensive enterprises on the part of the besieged against the lines of investment.

* See ante, p. 370.

† Batteries Nos. 35 and 34, which were armed with guns from Batteries Nos. 12, 13, and 16.

‡ In order to reduce the enceinte, at any rate in parts, to silence, the erection of three new batteries—Nos. 25 and 26 with 8 9-cm. guns each and No. 27 with 8 12-cm. guns—was contemplated between Le Val and Bellevue; but this was never carried out.

THE CAPITULATION.

In Paris a numerous class of the community had an interest in seeing perpetuated the condition of things created by the revolution of the 4th September, which gave them food without requiring that they should work or run any particular bodily risks. The democratic clubs and the press had clamoured for arms, and when on the 19th January the sortie at Mont Valérien had so completely failed, the most lively agitation pervaded the city.

Many demanded a fresh sortie of the whole population. Riots had to be repressed by force; internal disorder, however, continued, and part of the Garde Nationale shared in the revolutionary attempts which were to find expression a few weeks later in the horrors of the Paris Commune.

The Government could not deceive itself that all means of defence were exhausted. General Trochu declared on the 20th that all further attempt to break through was hopeless. Still they ventured to entertain the hope of relief from outside; now, however, a despatch arrived from the Minister Gambetta, announcing the failure of the Second Army of the Loire at Le Mans, and complaining of the inactivity of the capital. A close investigation showed that the supplies of food would only last until the 24th, and that from that date the stores of the forts and those belonging to the troops must be drawn upon in order to feed the population. To this state of things was now added the cannonading of St. Denis and the flight *en masse* of the inhabitants from thence to the capital. But after all the previous and much-promising declarations that had been made no one dared to give expression to the inexorable truth of facts. Fear of public opinion prevented the only possible resolution still left from being adopted.

Jules Favre believed that he had discovered a means for quieting the populace in the retirement of the Governor. The mayors of the city wards were summoned to a session of the Government on the 20th January; they rejected all idea of a capitulation, and demanded a fresh sortie *en masse*. This enterprise was declared impracticable at a council of war of all the Generals summoned on the following day. It was then thought that counsel should be sought from the younger officers, of whom, as might have been expected, some expressed themselves in favour of the proposal. Ultimately it was resolved on the morning of the 22nd to abolish the post of Governor of Paris. General Trochu retained the Presidency, General Vinoy assumed command of all the troops, General Ducrot resigned the command of the 2nd Army.

But this did not alter the state of things. It only opened

the door for a capitulation. On the 23rd Jules Favre appeared at Versailles with a view to negotiations.

If the fearful horrors of certain famine to a population of over 2,000,000 were to be avoided, it was necessary before everything to speedily re-establish communications with the exterior. It is plain, however, in this case that the besieger must have some guarantee that the resistance would not be renewed after the provisioning had taken place. As pledge thereof the French had to agree to the occupation of all the forts, including Mont Valérien and the town of St. Denis, and the disarming of the city enceinte. An agreement was come to that hostilities were to cease before Paris at 12 p.m. on the 26th, and that all convoys should have free ingress. On the 28th January a general armistice of 21 days, commencing on the 31st, was agreed to, from which, however, were excluded the Departments of Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or and the fortress of Belfort, where operations were then going on, from which both sides anticipated a successful result.*

The entire garrison became prisoners of war, although for the moment their removal was to remain in abeyance. The line troops, Garde Mobile, and Marines, with the exception of 12,000 men left on duty to maintain order, were at once to surrender their arms.

The occupation of the forts and of the town of St. Denis took place on the 29th January without any disturbing incident.

The French field army handed over 602 field guns, 177,000 stand of arms—among them 150,000 Chassepôts—and some 1,200 ammunition wagons. The captured fortress *matériel* consisted of 1,362 fortress guns, 1,680 carriages, 860 limbers. Of ammunition there was taken 3,500,000 rounds of Chassepôt ammunition, 7,000 cwts. of powder, nearly 200,000 loaded and unloaded shells for rifled guns, and upwards of 100,000 loaded and unloaded mortar-shells.

The 132 days' investment of the French capital was at an end; part of the forces which had been so long detained under its walls had become available to terminate the war in the open field.

* Appendix CLVI contains the text of the treaty of 28th January and the additional clauses of the 29th January. A special treaty of the 30th January regulated the use of the railways for bringing in provisions. Further details are given in the subsequent narrative.

APPENDIX CXXIX.

RETURN OF MATERIAL IN THE SIEGE PARKS BEFORE BELFORT.

1. PRUSSIAN PARK.

Date of arrival.	Prussian artillery.								Captured artillery.				Total.	
	Guns.				Mortars.				Guns.		Mortars.			
	Long 15-cm.	Short 15-cm.	12-cm.	9-cm.	Rifled 21-cm.	28-cm.	23-cm.	15-cm.	Short 15-cm.	Long 15-cm.	27-cm.	22-cm.	Guns.	Mortars.
18. 11. 70.	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	12	—
21. 11. 70.	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
24. 11. 70.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6
25. 11. 70.	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
30. 11. 70.	—	—	8	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—
1. 12. 70.	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	8	—
4. 12. 70.	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
14. 12. 70.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	12
16. 12. 70.	6	—	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—
22. 12. 70.	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12
31. 12. 70.	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
3. 1. 71.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	12	12
5. 1. 71.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	12
10. 1. 71.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—
15. 1. 71.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
26. 1. 71.	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—
28. 1. 71.	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
29. 1. 71.	2	—	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	16
4. 2. 71.	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
6. 2. 71.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	2	—	—	—	12	8
10. 2. 71.	4	—	4	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	8	12
Total	24	11	38	14	2	4	4	20	7	5	8	2	99	40
Obtained as follows—														
From Prussian Siege Park at Stras-	24	11	38	14	2	4	4	20	—	—	—	—	87	30
burg	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	7	—
Captured from the French at Stras-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	6	2	5	8
burg	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	12
Ditto at Schlestadt	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ditto at New Breisach	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	24	11	38	14	2	4	4	20	7	5	8	2	99	40

II. BAVARIAN PARK.

		Guns.		Mortars.	Total.	
		Long 15 cm.	12 cm.	60-pr.	Guns.	Mortars.
Park formed on 18. 12. 70	..	8	4	—	12	—
Further arrivals—						
1. 1. 71	—	4	—	4	—
9. 1. 71	4	—	—	4	—
22. 1. 71	8	—	—	8	—
7. 2. 71	8	—	8	8	8
Total	..	28	8	8	36	8

Of these four 12 cm. guns formed part of the armament of the fortress of Landau, the remainder belonged to the fortress of Germersheim.

III. BADEN PARK.

		Guns.	Mortars.	Total.
		12 c.m.	60-pr.	
Park formed on 21. 12. 70	6	—	6
Further arrivals—				
24. 12. 70	—	6	6
At different times	..	10	—	10
Total	..	16	6	22

All the guns formed part of the armament of the fortress of Rastatt.

TOTAL GUNS IN THE PARKS AT THE END OF SIEGE.

	Guns.	Mortars.	Total.
I. Prussian park	99	40	139
II. Bavarian park	36	8	44
III. Baden park	16	6	22
Total	151	54	205

		Guns.		Mortars.			Total.	
		Long 15 cm.	12 cm.	28 cm.	23 cm.	15 cm.	Guns.	Mortars.
Held in readiness.								
(1.) At New Breisach	—	—	4	8	6	—	18
(2.) At Dammerkirch	4	8	—	—	—	12	—
Total	4	8	4	8	6	12	18

Total available					Guns.	Mortars.	Total.
In the parks	151	54	205
Elsewhere	12	18	30
Total available guns					163	72	235

Of these the following became unserviceable during the siege:—

By enemy's fire	2 guns.
By our own fire	55 „
			57 guns.*

Thus at the capitulation there were respectively 148 or 178 guns serviceable.

At the capitulation the following were mounted in the works:—

69 guns } 97 pieces.†
28 mortars }

Return of Ammunition.

Receipts up to the surrender of the fortress.

(1.)	From Siege Park before New Breisach				} Total 81,987 rounds.
(2.)	"	"	Strassburg		
(3.)	From artillery depôt at		Strassburg		
(4.)	"	"	Schlettstadt		
(5.)	"	"	New Breisach		
(6.)	"	"	Spandau		
(7.)	"	"	Coblenz		
(8.)	"	"	Magdeburg		
(9.)	"	"	Metz		
(10.)	"	"	Diedenhofen		
(11.)	From Bavaria	48,000 rounds.
(12.)	From Baden	20,600 "
					<hr/>
Total ..				145,587	"
Issues from the parks ..				100,179	"
					<hr/>
Remains				45,408	"
Present in the batteries at the surrender ..				1,627	"
					<hr/>
Total available at surrender				47,035	"
Total expended				98,552	"

* Two rendered unserviceable by the enemy's, and four by our own fire, were repaired and are not included in the number 57.

† Of these 40 pieces (38 guns and 2 mortars) had not yet been in action in the new batteries.

APPENDIX CXXX.

GARRISON OF BELFORT ON 3RD NOVEMBER, 1870.

Commandant: Colonel Denfert Rochereau.
 Commandant de Place: Colonel Jacquemet.
 Commander of Arsenal: Major Bouquet.
 Commanding Engineer: Major Chapelain.

Line Troops.

Infantry: 1 Battalion of 84th Line Regiment.*
 1 Battalion of 45th Line Regiment.*
 Dépôt Battalion of 45th Line Regiment.
 Artillery: 1 Garrison Half Battery of 7th Artillery Regiment.
 4 Garrison Half Batteries of 12th Artillery Regiment.
 Engineers: 1 Half Company of 2nd Engineer Regiment.

Garde Mobile.

Infantry: 57th G.M. Regiment (Upper Saône), 3 Battalions.
 4th G.M. Battalion (Upper Saône).
 16th G.M. Regiment (Rhône), 2 Battalions.
 65th G.M. Regiment (Rhône), 2 Battalions.
 5 G.M. Companies (Saône et Loire).
 2 G.M. Companies (Vosges).
 3 G.M. Companies (Upper Rhine).
 Artillery: 3 G.M. Batteries (Upper Rhine).
 2 G.M. Batteries (Upper Garonne).
 Engineers: 1 G.M. Engineer Company of the Upper Rhine.

Garde Nationale.

Infantry: 3 Companies mobilised G.N. of the Upper Rhine.
 Some 390 Sedentary G.N. of Belfort.

Also—

About 100 Douaniers.
 Some mounted gendarmes.
 Some troopers left in Belfort.

A mounted sortie battery of 3 rifled 4-prs. and a rifled 12-pr. was formed on the 6th November of the existing material. This was the only field artillery.

* Probably the 4th battalions of these regiments.

APPENDIX CXXXI.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the Siege Corps before Belfort.*

COMMANDER: MAJOR-GENERAL V. TRESCKOW 1ST,†
Commanding 1st Reserve Division.

Officer of General Staff: *Captain v. Schultzenborff.*

Adjutants: (1) *Captain Störmer, 43rd Regiment*; (2) 1st
Lieutenant v. Bassewitz, 2nd Grenadiers.

Commanding Siege Artillery: *Lieut.-Colonel v. Scheliha, Staff.*

Adjutants: (1.) *Major Neumann, 8th Artillery Brigade*; (2.)
2nd Lieutenant Walkhoff, 36th Reserve Landwehr
Battalion.

Attached: (1.) *Captain Priwe, 7th Artillery Brigade* (from
 14. 1. 71); (2.) 1st *Lieutenant Meier, 4th Artillery*
Brigade.

Commanding Engineer: *Major-General v. Mertens.‡*

Adjutant: 1st *Lieutenant Wolff 1st, 3rd Engineer Inspection.*

Majors of the Trenches: (1.) *Lieut.-Colonel Sander, Engineers*;

(2.) *Major Schulz, War Ministry.*

Engineer Officers: (1.) *Captain Koch, Baden Fortress Pioneer*
Company; (2.) *Captain v. Scheven, 3rd*
Engineer Inspector (from 10. 2. 71).

Also 8 Lieutenants.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Batts.
<div>—</div> <div>1ST RESERVE DIVISION.</div> <div>Commander. General Staff. } See Staff of Siege Corps. Adjutants. }</div> <div>1st LANDWEHR BRIGADE : Colonel Baron v. Buddenbroek.</div> <div>Adjutant : 1st Lieut. v. Studnitz, 49th Regt.</div> <div>1st Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (14 21), Colonel v. Zitzewitz</div>	3	---	—	—	—

* Period of service shown in the case of the field troops which arrived after the investment (3rd November) and in the case of the technical troops.

† Promoted Lieut.-General 18. 1. 71.

‡ Promoted Lieut.-General 18. 2. 71.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies	Fortress Art. Coa. or Batta.
Gnesen Landwehr Battalion (from 5. 11. 70), Major Grupe, 14th Regiment. Schneidemühl Landwehr Battalion, Major Weissshun.* Konitz Landwehr Battalion, Captain Kausch, 61st Regiment.					
2nd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (21 54), Colonel v. Ostrowski - Inowrazlaw Landwehr Battalion, Captain v. Chagnian, 54th Regiment. Bromberg Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Petery, 54th Regiment. Deutsch-Crone Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Pawelsz, 21st Regiment.	3	—	—	—	—
2nd LANDWEHR BRIGADE, Major-General v. Avemann.†					
Adjutant: 1st Lieutenant Naundorf, 93rd Regiment.‡					
3rd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (26 61), Colonel v. Berger, 26th Regiment - Stendal Landwehr Battalion, Major Repert. Burg Landwehr Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel Schütz. Neustadt Landwehr Battalion, Captain Baron v. Tschammer, 61st Regiment.	3	—	—	—	—
4th Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (61 66), Colonel Gericke, War Ministry (from 8. 11. 70) - Halberstadt Landwehr Battalion, Captain Uterwedde (from 8. 11. 70). Neuhaldensleben Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Westernhagen, 26th Regiment (from 8. 11. 70). Prussian Stargardt Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Bojan, 61st Regiment (from 8. 11. 70).	3	—	—	—	—
ATTACHED TO 2ND LANDWEHR BRIGADE.					
67th Regiment, Colonel v. Zglinicki - 1st Battalion (from 18. 11. 70), Major v. Kutschenbach. 2nd Battalion (from 14. 11. 70), Major v. Schramm.	3	—	—	—	—

* On account of ill-health replaced by Captain v. Manstein, 18. 12. 70.

† During the illness of General v. Avemann, the Brigade Staff was joined with the Divisional Staff. On 7. 2. 71 Colonel Gericke assumed command of the brigade.

‡ See next page, note ‡.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Balts.
Fusilier Battalion (from 11. 11. 70), Captain Cludius.*					
2nd Reserve Lancers, Colonel v. Bredow	—	4	—	—	—
Combined Artillery Division, Major Weigelt, 8th Artillery Brigade.					
1st Light Reserve Battery, IIInd Army Corps (from 5. 11. 70), Captain Lange- mak	—	—	6	—	—
1st Light Reserve Battery, IXth Army Corps, Captain v. Braunschweig	—	—	6	—	—
2nd Light Reserve Battery, IXth Army Corps, Captain Weinberger	—	—	6	—	—
1st Fortress Pioneer Company, IIInd Army Corps, Captain Reese	—	—	—	1	—
Total 1st Reserve Division	15	4	18	1	—
MAJOR-GENERAL V. DEBSCHITZ'S DETACH- MENT.					
(Reached the fortress 29th—30th Dec., 1870.)†					
Commander: Major-General v. Debschitz.					
General Staff Officer: Major Szmula.‡					
Adjutant: Lieutenant v. Rehdtger, 50th Land- wehr Regiment.					
Attached from Governor-General of Alsace: Colonel v. Daum.					
1st Battalion 7th Landwehr Regiment, Major v. Borowski	1	—	—	—	—
2nd Battalion 7th Landwehr Regiment, Major v. Sothen, 7th Grenadiers	1	—	—	—	—
1st Battalion 47th Landwehr Regiment, Major Kierstein, 47th Regiment	1	—	—	—	—
2nd Battalion 47th Landwehr Regiment, Major Brinkmann	1	—	—	—	—
1st Battalion 10th Landwehr Regiment, Captain Arretz 1st, 10th Grenadiers	1	—	—	—	—
1st Battalion 50th Landwehr Regiment, Captain v. Schmidt, 50th Regiment	1	—	—	—	—
2nd Battalion 50th Landwehr Regiment, Captain v. Münenberg, § 50th Regiment	1	—	—	—	—

* After 14. 12. 70 Major v. Laue.

† The Striegau Battalion did not reach Belfort until 6. 1. 71.

‡ Relieved on account of illness by 1st Lieutenant Naundorf, 93rd Regiment, from 2. 1. 71. Between 15. 1 and 20. 1. 71 Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, performed the duties of general staff officer with the detachment.

§ During his wound, Captain Kiesel.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Batts.
2nd Battalion 84th Landwehr Regiment, Captain Count v. d. Schulenburg, 84th Regiment - - - - -	1	—	—	—	—
2nd and 3rd Squadrons 6th Reserve Lancers - - - - -	—	2	—	—	—
1st Light Reserve Battery, VIIIth Army Corps, Captain Holtzberg - - - - -	—	—	6	—	—
2nd Light Reserve Battery, VIIIth Army Corps, 1st Lieutenant Hartmann - - - - -	—	—	6	—	—
Mixed Infantry and Artillery Ammunition Column.* - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—
Total of the Detachment - - - - -	8	2	12	—	—
TEMPORARILY ATTACHED FROM 4TH RESERVE DIVISION.					
Commanders: Major-General Tresckow IIInd, Commander 4th Reserve Cavalry Brigade (from 3. 11 to 17. 11. 70).					
Adjutant: 1st Lieutenant Sartorius, 19th Dragoons.					
Colonel v. Zimmermann, Commander East Prussian Landwehr Brigade (from 11. 12. 70 to 18. 1. 71, and from 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Adjutant: 2nd Lieutenant Meerwein, 43rd Landwehr Regiment.					
1st Battalion 25th Regiment, Major Kricse (from 3. 11 to 8. 11. 70) - - - - -	1	—	3	—	—
2nd Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiment (4 5), Colonel v. Krane (from 3. 11 to 17. 11. 70) - - - - -	2	—	—	—	—
Osterode Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Wussow (3. 11 to 20. 11. 70).					
Ortelsburg Landwehr Battalion, Captain Moeschke (from 3. 11 to 17. 11. 70).					
1st Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiment (1 3), Lieutenant-Colonel Scheuermann (from 24. 12. 70 to 18. 1. 71 and 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Tilsit Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Felgenhauer (from 20. 12. 70 to 18. 1. 71 and 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Wehlau Landwehr Battalion, Captain Karitzky (from 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Insterburg Landwehr Battalion, Captain v. Cölln (from 21. 12. 70 to 18. 1. 71).					

* A reserve commissariat column was attached from the train of the Siege Corps.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Batta.
Gumbinnen Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Olzowski (from 20. 11. 70 to 29. 1. 71, and from 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
3rd Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiment (43 45), Colonel v. Usedom (from 21. 11. 70 to 30. 1. 71)	4	--	--	--	--
Loetzen Landwehr Battalion, Major Kintzel (from 17. 11. 70 to 30. 1. 71, and from 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Goldap Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Normann (from 21. 11. 70 to 29. 1. 71, and 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
Danzig Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Gozdziowski (from 26. 11. 70 to 18. 1. 71).					
Marienburg Landwehr Battalion, Major v. Harder (from 26. 11. 70 to 30. 1. 71, and 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71).					
3rd Reserve Lancers, Colonel v. Schmidt	--	4	--	--	--
Part of 2nd Light Reserve Battery, Captain Siegert (from 26. 11. to 5. 12. 70)	--	--	2	--	--
3rd Light Reserve Battery, Captain Müller (from 3. 11 to 5. 12. 70, and 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71)	--	--	6	--	--
4th Light Reserve Battery, Captain Grottke (from 3. 11 to 17. 11. 70, and 21. 11. 70 to 18. 1. 71)	--	--	6	--	--
2nd Heavy Reserve Battery, Captain Otto (from 11. 2 to 18. 2. 71)	--	--	6	--	--
Division of 4th Fortress Artillery Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Sasse.					
5th Company, Captain Ströhmer (from 12. 12. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
6th Company, Captain v. Sichart (from 6. 12. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
7th Company, 1st Lieutenant Pierer (from 24. 11. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
8th Company, Captain Schweder (from 30. 11. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
15th Company, Captain Weisswange (from 24. 11. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
Attached: 3rd Company, 7th Fort. Artillery Regiment, Captain Hüger (from 16. 12. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
Attached: 3rd Company, Guard Fort. Artillery Regiment, 1st Lieutenant v. Seebach (from 22. 12. 70)	--	--	--	--	1
Division of 6th Fortress Artillery Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Wahlen-Jürgass.					
1st Company, 1st Lieutenant Schoof, later Captain Heimbrod (from 20. 11. 70)	--	--	--	--	1

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Batta.
2nd Company, 1st Lieutenant Lancelle, later Captain Uhde (from 20. 11. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
4th Company, Captain v. Mechow (from 20. 11. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
6th Company, Captain v. Schramm (from 20. 11. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
16th Company, Captain Hasse (from 18. 11. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
Bavarian Division, Lieut.-Colonel Baron v. Neubeck.					
4th Fort. Battery, 1st Artillery Regiment, Captain v. Sutner (from 17. 12. 70)-	—	—	—	—	1
5th Fort. Battery, 2nd Artillery Regiment, Captain Reverdys (from 17. 12. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
Park Battery, 2nd Artillery Regiment, Captain v. Hartlieb (from 17. 2. 71) -	—	—	—	—	1
2nd Fort. Battery, 3rd Artillery Regiment, Captain Fahrmbacher (from 23. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
3rd Fort. Battery, 3rd Artillery Regiment, Captain Schulze (from 17. 12. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
4th Fort. Battery, 3rd Artillery Regiment, Captain Petri (from 17. 12. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
3rd Fort. Battery, 4th Artillery Regiment, Captain Mieg (from 17. 12. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
Sortie Battery,* Captain Keinath from 3. 1. 71)	—	—	4	—	—
Württemberg Division, Colonel v. Barttruff.					
1st Company, Captain Koob (from 30. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
3rd Company, Captain Breyer (from 16. 2. 71)	—	—	—	—	1
4th Company, Captain Imle (from 30. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
Baden Division, Lieut.-Colonel Rhuon v. Wildegg.					
3rd Company, Captain Weiss (from 26. 12. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
6th Company, Captain Föhrenbach (from 17. 2. 70)	—	—	—	—	1
8th Company, Captain Mohl (from 17. 2. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
9th Company, Captain Meess (from 17. 2. 70) -	—	—	—	—	1
Combined Pioneer Battalion, Captain Mentzel.†					
1st Field Pioneer Company, VIIth Army Corps, Captain v. Oidtman (from 20. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	1	—

* Attached as a Field Battery to Dobaschitz's detachment.

† Hitherto commanding 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company, Xth Army Corps.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Fortress Art. Cos. or Batta.
1st Field Pioneer Company, VIIIth Army Corps, Captain Pflaume (from 8. 2. 71) -	—	—	—	1	—
2nd Fortress Pioneer Company, VIIIth Army Corps, Captain v. Aster (from 3. 2. 71) -	—	—	—	1	—
2nd Fortress Pioneer Company, Xth Army Corps, 1st Lieutenant Baron v. Richthofen (from 19. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	1	—
4th Bavarian Fortress Engineer Company, Captain Nagel (from 10. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	1	—
Württemberg Field Engineer Company, Captain Schmoller (from 8. 12. 70) -	—	—	—	1	—
2nd Baden Fortress Pioneer Company, 1st Lieutenant Riesterer (from 19. 11. 70) -	—	—	—	1	—
Train Division, Major v. Maltitz.					
‡ Sanitary Detachment.					
4 Commissariat Columns.*					
7 Wagon Park Columns.					
1 Train Escort Squadron.†					
Horse Depot.					
3 Field Hospitals.					
Prussian Siege Park.‡					
Captain Schering to 25. 11. 70, then 1st Lieutenant Meier to 26. 12. 70, lastly 1st Lieutenant Schoof.					
Total siege troops -	34	10	54	8	26

* One with Debschitz's detachment.

† The trains joined the Siege Corps by degrees.

‡ For the administration of the Bavarian Park the 4th Fortress Battery was first attached, later on part of it was administered also by the 4th Fortress Battery 1st Artillery Regiment. On 17th February the Park Battery of the 2nd Regiment arrived to take over the park. For the Baden Park the 9th Company of the Baden Division was attached as Park Battery during the greater part of the siege.

APPE

POSITION, ARMAMENT, AND DIRECTION OF

No. of battery.	Description.	Direction of fire.	Range. Metres.	Armament.										
				Guns.					Mortars.					
				French.		Prussian		12	9	Smooth.				
				15 cm.		15-cm.		cm.		27	22	60	28	23
				Long.	Short.	Long.	Short.			cm.	Pounders.			cm.
1	Gun battery	{ Fort de Bellevue	1,600 }	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Town	3,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	"	{ Fort des Basses Perches	3,200 }	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Chateau	3,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	"	{ Chateau	3,200 }	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort des Barres	2,000 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4	"	{ Chateau	3,200 }	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
5	"	{ Fort des Barres	2,000 }	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Town	3,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	Mortar battery	{ Fort des Barres	2,000 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort de Bellevue	1,700 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	Gun battery	{ Town	3,000 }	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Chateau	3,200 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	"	{ Andelnans	1,200 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
		{ Danjoutin	2,250 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8a	"	{ Danjoutin and the rail- }	2,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	—	—	—
		{ way to the north	2,600 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9	Mortar battery	{ Danjoutin	1,700 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
		{ Fort des Basses Perches	2,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	Gun battery	{ Chateau	2,600 }	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort de la Justice	3,800 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort de la Miotte	4,000 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11	"	{ Fort de Bellevue	1,050 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Town	2,600 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
		{ Hornwork del'Esperance	2,800 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12	"	{ Fort des Hautes Perches	3,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort des Basses Perches	2,650 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13	"	{ Fort des Hautes Perches	2,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
14	"	{ Fort des Hautes Perches	2,100 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
		{ Fort de la Justice	3,500 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15	Mortar battery	{ Fort des Hautes Perches	1,750 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—
		{ Fort des Basses Perches	1,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16	Gun battery	{ Fort des Basses Perches	1,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—
		{ Fort des Basses Perches	1,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
17	"	{ Railway at Danjoutin	800 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
		{ Fort des Basses Perches	1,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18	"	{ Railway at Danjoutin	800 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Chateau	2,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
19	Mortar battery	{ Town	2,500 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
		{ Fort de Bellevue	850 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20	Gun battery	{ Pérouse	3,000 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
		{ Chateau	2,250 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
21	Mortar battery	{ Town	2,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Fort de la Justice	3,400 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22	Gun battery	{ Fort de la Miotte	3,800 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		{ Chateau	2,250 }	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23	"	"	2,250	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
24	"	"	2,250	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

XII.

THE SIEGE BATTERIES BEFORE BELFORT.

Garrison.		Date of Construction.	Opened fire.	Remarks.
Fortress Company or Battery.	Artillery Regiment.			
Capt. Schweder) -	4th Prussian -	2. 12. 70.	3. 12. 70.	Ceased 31. 12. 70. } Disarmed on the night of 1-2 Jan., 1871.
at Lt. Pierer) -	4th " -	"	"	" 28. 12. 70. }
at Lt. Schoof) -	6th " -	"	"	{ Ceased 4. 1. 71. Disarmed on night of 6-7 Jan., 1871.
Capt. Weiswange) -	4th " -	"	"	{ Ceased owing to guns disabled 23. 12. 70. Disarmed on night of 1-2 Jan., 71.
Capt. Schramm) -	6th " -	"	"	{ Ceased 9. 1. 71. Disarmed on night of 9-10 Jan., 71.
Capt. Hame) -	6th " -	"	"	{ 2 mortars withdrawn 30. 12. 70. A 27-cm. mortar exchanged for a 22-cm. on 5. 1. 71. Ceased 16. 1. 71. Disarmed 19. 1. 71.
Capt. Koob) -	Württ. Art. -	"	"	2 guns withdrawn 11. 2. 71.
Capt. Schulze) -	3rd Bavarian -	11-12. 12. 70.	13. 12. 70.	Ceased and disarmed 16. 12. 70.
" -	3rd " -	17. 12. 70.	18. 12. 70.	Ceased 8. 1. 71. Disarmed 9. 1. 71.
Capt. Hüger) -	7th Prussian -	18-22. 12. 70.	7. 1. 71.	Ceased 8. 1. 71. Disarmed 26. 1. 71.
1st Lt. Lancelle) -	6th " -	24-27. 12. 70.	23. 12. 70.	{ After 19. 1. 71. only guarded and equipped with 3 shrapnel per gun. Disarmed 30. 1. 71.
Capt. von Sichert) -	4th " -	"	"	Ceased and disarmed 31. 1. 71.
Capt. Imle) -	Württ. Art. -	"	"	Ceased 9. 2. 71. Disarmed 12. 2. 71.
Capt. Mieg) -	4th Bavarian -	24-25. 12. 70.	25. 12. 70.	Ceased 2. 2. 71. Disarmed 8-10. 2. 71.
Capt. von Suttner) -	1st " -	"	2 p.m.	Ceased and disarmed 10. 2. 71.
Capt. Weiss) -	Baden Art. -	{ 31. 12. 70. } { to 7. 1. 71. }	8. 1. 71.	{ Up to 11. 1. 71. armed with 3 27-cm. and 1 22-cm. mortar. Ceased and disarmed 2. 2. 71.
Capt. Beverdys) -	2nd Bavarian -	28-31. 12. 70.	7. 1. 71.	Ceased and disarmed 2. 2. 71.
Capt. Mohl) -	Baden Art. -	{ 28. 12. 70. to } { 6. 1. 71. }	"	Ceased and disarmed 10. 2. 71.
Leut. Föhrenbach) -	" -	{ 27. 12. 70. to } { 6. 1. 71. }	"	Ditto.
at Lt. von Seebach) -	Guard -	{ 24. 12. 70. to } { 6. 1. 71. }	"	Rifled mortars withdrawn 27. 1. 71.
Capt. Fahrmbacher) -	3rd Bavarian -	28-31. 12. 70.	29. 1. 71.	Ceased and disarmed 22. 1. 71.
at Lt. von Seebach) -	Guard -	14-28. 1. 71.	{ 30. 1. 71. }	With 21-cm. guns.
Capt. Koob) -	Württ. Art. -	16-21. 1. 71.	21. 1. 71.	With 27-cm. mortars.
Capt. von Mechow) -	6th Prussian -	10-18. 1. 71.	"	1 gun withdrawn 12. 2. 71.
Capt. Hüger) -	7th " -	10-18. 1. 71.	"	{ On 12. 2. 71. Prussian 15-cm. guns replaced by French.

[illegible]

Garrison.		Date of Construction.	Opened fire.	Remarks.
Fortress Company or Battery.	Artillery Regiment.			
5th (Capt. Ströhmer) -	4th Prussian -	10-13. 1. 71.	21. 1. 71.	The fifth gun placed in position 30. 1
16th (Captain Haase) -	6th " -	28-31. 1. 71.	31. 1. 71.	Ceased 8. 2. 71. Disarmed 11. 2. 71.
7th (1st Lt. Pierer) -	4th " -	30-31. 1. 71.	1. 2. 71.	Ceased and disarmed 10. 2. 71.
3rd (Capt. Weiss) -	Baden Art. -	28-31. 1. 71.		Ceased 8. 2. 71. Disarmed 11. 2. 71.
1st (Capt. Heimbrod)-	6th Prussian -	1-3. 2. 71.	3. 2. 71.	Ceased 8. 2. 71. Disarmed 10. 2. 71.
2nd (Capt. Uhde) -	6th " -	1-2. 2. 71.	2. 2. 71.	} Ceased 8. 2. 71.
- - - - -	6th " -	5-6. 2. 71.	6. 2. 71.	
4th (Capt. Petri) -	3rd Bavarian -	1. 2. 71.	3. 2. 71.	
2nd (Capt. Schulze) -	3rd " -		"	
6th (Capt. von Sichert)	4th Prussian -	1-2. 2. 71.		
8th (Capt. Schweder) -	4th " -	2. 2. 71.	4. 2. 71.	Ceased 8. 2. 71. Disarmed 12. 2. 71
6th (Capt. Mohl) -	Baden Art. -	10. 2. 71.	-	
6th (Capt. Schweder) -	4th Prussian -	4. 2. 71.	5. 2. 71.	{ A 9-cm. gun removed 6. 2. 71. to the crochet of 2nd parallel to batter de Bellevue. Ceased and disa 8. 2. 71. The 2nd 9-cm. placed in position 9. 2 Guns again withdrawn 9. 2. 71.
"	4th " -	6. 2. 71.	7. 2. 71.	
"	4th " -	8. 2. 71.	-	
3rd (Capt. Schulze) -	3rd Bavarian -	24. 1. 71. to	9. 2. 71.	Armed 3. 2. 71.
3rd (Capt. Mieg) -	4th " -	8. 2. 71.	-	
4th (Capt. Petri) -	3rd " -	- - - - -	- - - - -	Armed 4. 2. 71.
5th (Captain Beverdys) -	2nd " -	"	"	
2nd (Capt. Fahrmbacher) -	3rd " -	"	"	Armed 3. 2. 71.
16th (Capt. Haase) -	6th Prussian -	7-9. 2. 71.	10. 2. 71.	2 27-cm. mortars ceased 13. 2. 71.
9th (Capt. Meese) -	Baden Art. -	9-11. 2. 71.	12. 2. 71.	
5th (Capt. Ströhmer) -	4th Prussian -	7-9. 2. 71.	10. 2. 71.	
8th (Capt. Mohl) -	Baden Art. -	10-13. 2. 71.	-	
6th (Capt. Fehrenbach) -	" -	"	-	
15th (Capt. Weisswange) -	4th Prussian -	9-13. 2. 71.	-	The battery was never ready.
3rd (Capt. Hüger) -	7th " -	12-13. 2. 71.	-	
1st (Capt. Heimbrod) -	6th " -	10-13. 2. 71.	-	
7th (1st Lt. Pierer) -	4th " -	11-13. 2. 71.	-	
4th (Capt. v. Mechow) -	6th " -	10-13. 2. 71.	-	
8th (Capt. Schweder) -	4th " -	11-13. 2. 71.	-	
2nd (Capt. Uhde) -	6th " -	10-13. 2. 71.	-	
4th (Capt. Imle) -	Würt. Art. -		-	
4th (Capt. v. Sutner) -	1st Bavarian -	7-13. 2. 71.	-	Not armed.

APPENDIX CXXXIII.

Headquarters, Versailles, 11th January, 1871.

As it has become necessary, in addition to the force under General v. Werder, to employ temporarily both the IInd and VIIth Army Corps in Southern France, it is my will that these troops bear during the time that they are combined the name of "South Army." At the same time the War Ministry is informed that General Baron v. Manteuffel, commanding the Ist Army, has left to join the VIIth Corps, which belongs to his army, but is now in the southern theatre of war, and as Senior General Officer will assume the chief command of the South Army. In the command of the Ist and VIIIth Army Corps General Baron v. Manteuffel will be succeeded by the Senior General of these two army corps—General v. Goeben. The War Ministry will take the necessary steps at once to make the foregoing order known.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

(Countersigned) V. ROON.

To the War Ministry.

APPENDIX CXXXIV.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the French Eastern Army.†

(Commencement of January, 1871.)

Commander-in-Chief: General Bourbaki.
 Chief of the Staff: General Borel.
 1st Adjutant: Colonel Leperche.
 Commanding Artillery: *
 Commanding Engineers: General de Rivière.
 Army Intendant: Intendant Friant.

15TH ARMY CORPS (some 35,000 men).

General Commanding: General Martineau des Chenez.
 Chief of the Staff: Colonel des Plas.
 Commanding Artillery: Colonel de Blois de la Galande; after the
 20th January, Colonel Hugon.
 Commanding Engineers: Lieut.-Colonel Odier.

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Dastugue.

1st Brigade: General Minot.*

1st Zouaves de Marche.
 12th Gardes Mobiles (Nièvre).
 1 Savoy Garde Mobile Battalion.

2nd Brigade: General Questel.

Algerian Tirailleurs.
 18th Gardes Mobiles (Charente).
 4th Chasseurs de Marche.
 Artillery, 3 batteries.
 Engineers, 1 section.

† The number of the battalions, squadrons, and guns cannot be stated with any certainty; as a rule each infantry regiment had three battalions, each cavalry regiment four squadrons, each battery six guns. But there were many exceptions. Only the approximate strength of the corps is given. Where there is any doubt as to the holder of an office, or as to whether it was filled in January, an asterisk * is placed.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Rébillard.

1st Brigade: General Le Camus.

- 39th Regiment of the Line.
- Foreign Legion.
- 25th Gardes Mobiles (Gironde).
- 5th Chasseurs de Marche.

2nd Brigade: General Choppin Mercy.

2nd Zouaves de Marche.
30th Regiment de Marche.
29th Gardes Mobiles (Maine et Loire).
Artillery: 3 batteries.
Engineers: 1 section.

3RD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Peytavin.

1st Brigade: General de Jacob de la Cottière.

16th Regiment of the Line.
33rd Regiment de Marche.
32nd Gardes Mobiles (Puy de Dôme).
6th Chasseurs de Marche.

2nd Brigade: General Martinez.

27th Regiment de Marche.
34th " "
69th " "
Artillery: 2 batteries.*
Engineers: 1 section.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Garland de Longneruc.

1st Brigade:

11th Chasseurs.
6th Dragoons.†
6th Hussars.

2nd Brigade: General de Boërio.

1st Chasseurs de Marche.
2nd Lancers.
9th Cuirassiers.

* The third battery of the Division had become separated from the corps at the Battle of Orléans.

† One squadron of this regiment with the 24th Corps. See p. 163§.

3rd Brigade: General Tillen.

5th Lancers.

1st Cuirassiers de Marche.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Commander: Lieut.-Colonel Telsier.

4 8-pr. batteries	} 12 batteries.
4 H. A. batteries	
2 mitrailleuse batteries	
2 mountain batteries	

Total strength of the artillery of 15th Army Corps: 20 batteries with 114 guns.

18TH ARMY CORPS (about 30,000 men).

General Commanding: General Billot.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel du Sacy de Fourdrinoy.

Commander of Artillery: Colonel Charles.

Commander of Engineers: Colonel de la Berge.*

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Feillet-Pilatric.

1st Brigade: Colonel Leclaire.

42nd Regiment de Marche.

19th Gardes Mobiles (Cher).

9th Chasseurs de Marche.

2nd Brigade: General Robert.

44th Regiment de Marche.

73rd Gardes Mobiles (Loiret, Isère).

Cavalry: 1 sqn. 3rd Lancers de Marche.

Artillery: 3 batteries.

Engineers: 1 section.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: Rear-Admiral Penhoat.

1st Brigade: General Perrin.

52nd Regiment de Marche.

77th Gardes Mobiles (Maine et Loire, Tara, Allier)-

12th Chasseurs de Marche.

2nd Brigade: General Perreaux.

92nd Regiment of the Line.
1 Regiment of African Light Infantry (2 battns.)†
Cavalry: 1 sqn.. 5th Dragoons de Marche.
Artillery: 3 batteries.
Engineers: 1 section.

3RD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Bonnet.

1st Brigade: Colonel Goury.

4th Zouaves de Marche.
81st Gardes Mobiles (Charente Inférieure, Indre, Cher).

2nd Brigade: Colonel Brémens.

53rd Regiment de Marche.
82nd Gardes Mobiles (Vaucluse, Drôme, Var).
Cavalry: 1 sqn. 3rd Lancers de Marche.
Artillery: 3 batteries.
Engineers: 1 section.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commander: General de Bremond d'Ars.

1st Brigade: General Charlemagne.

2nd Hussars de Marche.
3rd Lancers de Marche.‡

2nd Brigade: General Guyon-Vernier.*

5th Dragoons de Marche.§
5th Cuirassiers de Marche.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Commander: Lieut.-Colonel de Miribel.*

7 batteries.

† This regiment was attached later to the Cavalry Division and replaced in the 2nd Infantry Division by the 49th Regiment de Marche.

‡ A squadron to each of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions.

§ One squadron assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.

20TH ARMY CORPS (about 25,000 men).

General Commanding: General Clinchant.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Varaigne.

Commander of Artillery: Colonel Chatillon.

Commander of Engineers: Colonel Picolet.

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General de Polignac.

1st Brigade: General Godefroy.*

Gardes Mobiles of the Loire.

50th Regiment de Marche.†

55th Gardes Mobiles (Jura).

2nd Brigade: Colonel Brisac.

67th Gardes Mobiles (Haute Loire).

24th Gardes Mobiles (Haute Garonne).

4th Garde Mobile Battalion (Saône et Loire).

Franc tireurs of the Upper Rhine.

Cavalry: 2nd Lancers de Marche.

Artillery: 2 batteries.

Engineers: 1 company.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Thornton.

1st Brigade: General Bernard de Seigneurens.

34th Gardes Mobiles (Deux-Sèvres).

1 Garde Mobile Battalion (Savoy).

25th Chasseurs.

2nd Brigade: Colonel Vivenot.

3rd Zouaves de Marche.

68th Gardes Mobiles (Haut Rhin).

Cavalry: 7th Chasseurs.

Artillery: 2 batteries.

Engineers: 1 company.

† Instead of this regiment the 85th Line Regiment is elsewhere mentioned. Probably the depot companies of this latter served as the nucleus for forming the 50th Regiment de Marche.

3RD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Ségard.

1st Brigade; General Durochat.

47th Regiment de Marche.

Corsican Gardes Mobiles.

2nd Brigade: General Simonin.

78th Regiment of the Line.

58th Gardes Mobiles (Vosges).

2 battalions Garde Mobile (Eastern Pyrénées).

1 Garde Mobile Battalion (Meurthe).

Allier Franc-tireurs.

Nice Franc-tireurs.

Cavalry: 6th Cuirassiers de Marche.

Artillery: 2 batteries.

Engineers: 1 company.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Commander: Lieut.-Colonel d'Auvergne.*

At least 3 batteries.†

24TH ARMY CORPS (some 25,000 men).

General Commanding: General de Bressolles.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Tissier.

Commander of Artillery: Colonel Wartelle.

Commander of Engineers:*

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General d'Aries.

63rd Regiment de Marche.

15th Chasseurs de Marche.

Garde Mobile Regiment (1 battalion each from Haute Garonne, Tarn et Garonne, and Haut Rhin).

3rd Rhône Legion.‡

Artillery: 2 batteries.

Engineers: 2 sections.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Comagny.§

1st Brigade: General Irlande.

60th Regiment de Marche.

61st

21st Chasseurs de Marche.

† The artillery of the 20th Corps had probably been strengthened in December.

‡ This legion did not join the Division until the retreat.

§ The assumed name of General Thibaudin.

1st Brigade: General Bramas.

14th Gardes Mobiles (Yonne).
 87th " " (Lozère, Tarn et Garonne).
 Detachment of Engineers.
 Artillery: Unknown strength.

3RD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander: General Carré de Busserolle.
 1st Rhône Legion.
 2nd " "
 89th Gardes Mobiles (Var).
 1 Garde Mobile Battalion (Loire).
 Artillery: 3 batteries.

CORPS CAVALRY.

7th Mixed Cavalry Regiment de Marche.
 1 sqn. 6th Dragoons.
 1 " 10th "

RESERVE ARTILLERY.†

Unknown strength.

CRÉMER'S DIVISION (about 15,000 men).

Commander: General Crémer.

Staff Officer: Colonel Pouillet.
 Commander of Artillery: Major Camps.*
 Commander of Engineers: Captain Lemor.

1st Brigade: Colonel Millot.

1 Garde Mobile Battalion (Gironde).
 32nd Regiment de Marche.
 57th " "

2nd Brigade: General Carot-Tevis (later Lieut.-Colonel Reboulet).

La Vendée Franc tireurs.
 83rd Gardes Mobiles (Aude, Gers).
 86th " "
 Artillery: 5 batteries with 32 guns.
 Engineers: 1 company.
 Cavalry: 1 detachment of Eclaireurs.

† At the time of the move of the corps from Lyons to Besançon no reserve artillery had yet been formed; but such a unit took part in the engagements in January.

ARMY RESERVE (about 10,000 men).

Commander: General Pallas de la Barrière, Captain in the Navy.

Staff Officer: Chef d'Escadron Maumigny.

Infantry: 38th Regiment of the Line.

29th Regiment de Marche.

2nd Marine Infantry de Marche.

Cavalry: 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique de Marche.

3rd Dragoons de Marche.

Artillery: 3 batteries.

Engineers: A detachment.

TROOPS OF THE 7TH MILITARY DIVISION
(Besançon).*

Commander: General Rolland, Captain in the Navy.

Infantry: 3 Garde Mobile Battalions of Doubs (54th Regiment de Marche).

1 Garde Mobile Battalion (Vosges).

1 " " (Upper Alps).†

Mobilised National Guards of the Haute Saône.

Miners of the Loire.

9 battalions Mobilised National Guards (Hérault, Vaucluse, Drôme).†

Cavalry: 5th Lancers de Marche.

Artillery: 1 horsed battery.

* After transfer of the troops employed to form the 1st Division of the 24th Army Corps.

† Only temporarily present at Besançon.

APPENDIX CXXXV.

PROPOSAL OF M. DE FREYCINET, WAR DELEGATE, TO M. GAMBETTA, MINISTER OF WAR, AS TO THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST ARMY OF THE LOIRE.

(From de Freycinet, "La Guerre en Province.")

"On renoncerait, quant à présent, à marcher directement sur Paris. On séparerait les 18^e et 20^e Corps du 15^e, et on les porterait rapidement, en chemin de fer, jusqu'à Beanne. Ces deux Corps, conjointement avec Garibaldi et Crémier, seraient destinés à s'emparer de Dijon, ce qui semblait très-réalisable puisqu'on ferait agir 70,000 hommes environ contre 35,000 à 40,000 ennemis. Pendant ce temps, Bressolles et son armée se porteraient par chemin de fer à Besançon, où ils ramasseraient les 15,000 à 20,000 hommes de garnison. Cette force totale de 45,000 à 50,000 hommes, opérant de concert avec les 70,000 victorieux de Dijon, n'aurait pas de peine à faire lever, même sans coup férir, le siège de Belfort et offrirait une masse compacte de 110,000 hommes, capable de couper les communications dans l'Est, malgré tous les efforts de l'ennemi. La seule présence de cette armée ferait lever le siège de toutes les places fortes du Nord et permettrait au besoin de combiner plus tard une action avec Faidherbe. En tout cas, on aurait la certitude de rompre définitivement la base de ravitaillement de l'ennemi.

"Quant au 15^e Corps, séparé des 18^e et 20^e, il aurait pour mission essentielle de couvrir Bourges et Nevers en se retranchant dans les positions de Vierzon et en occupant solidement la forêt."

The War Delegate caused this proposal to be laid before the Minister by M. de Serres on the 19th December at Bourges. M. Gambetta hereupon empowered M. de Serres to hold a verbal conference on the plan of the War Delegate with General Bourbaki, who had already commenced a movement of his army upon Montargis. As the General declared his readiness to carry out the plan, the Minister approved it on the night of the 19th-20th, and submitted it to the Generals of the Army, who were unanimous in their acquiescence. The execution was to be commenced on the 20th.

APPENDIX CXXXVI.

ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT POUR LE 9 JANVIER, 1871.

Montbozon, 8 Janvier, 1871.

L'armée continuera demain, 9 du courant, le mouvement commencé les jours précédants. La partie disponible du 15^e Corps occupera les positions qui s'étendent le long de la route de Fontaine à Belfort par Arcey, depuis La Guinguette jusqu'au village d'Onans.

Le 24^e Corps appuiera son extrême droite au ruisseau du Scey; il occupera Vellechevreux et s'étendra par sa gauche jusqu'à Georfans et Grammont. Le 20^e Corps occupera les villages de Villargent, Villers-la-Ville et Les Magny. Le 18^e Corps occupera Villersexel, Autrey-le-Vay, Esprels, le Bois de Chassey; la réserve occupera Abbenans et Cubry. La brigade de réserve de cavalerie sera cantonnée à Fallon. Le grand quartier général sera établi à Bournel, entre les villages de Cuse et de Cubry.

Toutes les dispositions prescrites les jours précédants pour assurer la sécurité des troupes, pendant la durée du mouvement, comme pour dissimuler le mieux possible notre marche à l'ennemi et pour relier les corps entr'eux, seront scrupuleusement observées.

Tous les convois du 18^e Corps seront tenus sur la rive gauche de l'Ognon; les troupes laissées sur la rive droite recevront des instructions précises pour passer l'Ognon si elles se trouvaient obligées de se replier devant des forces supérieures.

Les reconnaissances seront poussées au loin et faites avec le plus grand soin.

Les commandants de corps d'armée feront connaître au général en chef le point choisi par eux pour établir leur quartier général.

CORPS ORDER.

9th January 1871, 3 a.m.

The enemy has occupied Villersexel in force; his outposts are withdrawn from Echenoz-le-Sec. The Grand Ducal Baden Division will therefore start at once, and march by way of Vy-les-Lure to Athesans.

Schmeling's Division will march at once on Villersexel, keeping back the main body in position at Aillelans. General v. d. Goltz will at once move forward his cavalry towards Les Monnins and Vallerois-le-Bois, and march with his detachment to Noroy-le-Bourg, where he will receive further orders.

General Keller will not reconnoitre to the south with the 3rd Brigade.

Two battalions of the Baden Division, if possible those furnishing the outposts, will remain at Vesoul under the command of a regi-

mental Commander or Lieutenant-Colonel,* whither six more companies, one squadron, and two batteries will join from Porte-sur-Saône.

Reports will find me at Noroy-le-Bourg, afterwards with Schmeling's Division.

(Signed) V. WERDER.

* Colonel Bayer, who had been deputed to hold Vesoul, received the following order:—

“Vesoul, 9th January, 1871.

“Your mission is to occupy Vesoul and, unless attacked by very superior forces, to hold it. You will watch and reconnoitre without intermission towards the south and Combeaufontaine. At Porte-sur-Saône there are for this purpose at your disposal two rifle companies and a squadron. You will give orders on this subject to Major Paczinski, in command. Should retreat become necessary, your line will be by Luxeuil.

“You will report by telegraph by way of Lure twice daily to me on the situation, as also to Colonel and Etappen Inspector v. Schmieden at Epinal.

“You will place yourself in communication with the prefect of this town, Herr v. Lauer, and take up your quarters in the prefecture.

“Signed: V. WERDER.”

APPENDIX CXXXVII.

Headquarters, Versailles, 7th January, 1871.

To General v. Werder, Commanding XIVth Army Corps.

EXCELLENCY,

I beg to inform your Excellency that our information is also to the effect that in all probability the greater part of Bourbaki's Army has moved in your direction. His Majesty has in consequence ordered the concentration of the IInd and VIIth Corps on the line Châtillon-sur-Seine—Nuits, and with a view to unity of command on the eastern theatre of war has been pleased to entrust the command of these Corps, as well as the troops under your Excellency's orders, to General Baron v. Manteuffel. The General will reach Châtillon-sur-Seine in a few days.

Until General v. Manteuffel assumes in person the command of the army thus constituted, your Excellency will independently direct the operations of those troops already under your orders, and, as has hitherto been the case, will report direct to this office.

I would draw your Excellency's attention to the following points :

(1.) The siege of Belfort is to be covered under all circumstances. His Majesty hopes, as your Excellency is relieved of guarding the country west of the Vosges, that, by calling up if required all troops not absolutely necessary for the investment, you will be able to oppose any hostile offensive movement towards Belfort until the arrival of the two army corps above mentioned. Your Excellency would only have to see to the security of your own right flank, in which respect it may be important to effectually destroy the roads leading through the south part of the Vosges, and watch them with detachments.

(2.) Your Excellency will not lose sight of a possible enemy advancing west of the Vosges in a northerly direction, and to this end will remain in communication with the Government-General of Lorraine, to which a similar order has been addressed.

(3.) The Government-General of Alsace is instructed to prevent by all means any insurrection in your Excellency's rear. Should an outbreak be apparent within the area of your command, the interest of the latter and of the people themselves demands the severest punishment of individuals and of entire villages.

(4.) Your Excellency in the possible case of a momentary retreat will constantly strive to keep the closest touch of the enemy, with the object, when the latter becomes weaker in your front, of at once assuming the offensive and thereby preventing him from throwing himself with superior force upon the IInd and VIIth Corps now moving towards you.

(5.) As the operations of the enemy's forces, owing to generally defective organisation of the commissariat and ammunition train, are tied to the railways, a threatening of these, towards the rear of any enemy passing by your front, would hamper the latter greatly,

and this also would affect the choice of time for the offensive. The Government-General of Lorraine is requested to prepare, and, if necessary, to carry out the destruction of the railways Langres—Chaumont and Epinal—St. Loup. As the line Belfort—Mülhausen will not be passable for some time, your Excellency, if necessary, will take measures for destroying the line Mülhausen—Basle in such way that will certainly prevent its restoration for eight to fourteen days.

(6.) The Grand Ducal Baden War Ministry has been requested to move suitable bodies of reserve troops to the south part of the Grand Duchy, with a view to any observation of the Rhine that may be temporarily necessary later on, and to preventing the passage of any hostile raiding detachments.

(Signed) COUNT MOLTKE.

APPENDIX CXXXVIII.

Headquarters, Brevilliers, 11th January, 1871, 10 p.m.

I have this day assumed command of the troops besieging Belfort. These troops belong, with the XIVth Army Corps, to the South Army under the command of General v. Manteuffel. The troops occupy the following positions:—

General v. Debschitz's detachment retains its previous position at Delle and Beaucourt, Exincourt, but will call in the battalion hitherto posted at Sochaux, as soon as it is relieved by the 4th Reserve Division. The Bavarian Sortie Battery will pass under the orders of the 4th Reserve Division.

General v. Schmeling's Division will relieve early to-morrow (12th January), Colonel v. Bredow's detachment at Arcey. The troops of the 4th Reserve Division hitherto detached to the Siege Corps will again pass under the orders of General v. Schmeling, as soon as they are relieved in their trench duties by v. Tresckow's Division; with regard to the relief itself, General v. Tresckow will communicate with General v. Schmeling. At noon on the 13th, v. Schmeling's Division will carry out the following arrangements:—One infantry brigade and four batteries to give the outposts and occupy the position at Héricourt; one brigade, two batteries and Keinath's Bavarian Sortie Battery at Sochaux, to furnish the Montbéliard outposts, to occupy Chateau Montbéliard with two companies, and Bethoncourt and Sochaux with a battalion each. In the position Héricourt—Montbéliard, which v. Schmeling's Division has to defend, the batteries must be in emplacements at those places from which they are to fire. Men and horses are to be housed in the adjacent villages. Whether General v. Schmeling is to place his outposts at Arcey, or on the Rupt brook, is left to his discretion. In any case such a serious resistance must be offered to the enemy as will compel him to deploy considerable forces in order to make headway.

General v. d. Goltz's detachment will join v. Schmeling's Division on the north, his advanced guard being at Couthenans, his main body at Chagey and Luze.

The 1st Baden Infantry Brigade, two batteries and one squadron will occupy the villages of Echenans, Mandrevillars, Buc, and Chalonvillars; in the event of an alarm, its rendezvous will be at Mandrevillars. The 2nd and 3rd Baden Infantry Brigades will concentrate round Frahier, maintaining connection with Colonel v. Willisen at Lure by way of Ronchamp. Outposts at Etobon, facing Béverne. Four batteries of the Baden Division, formed as corps artillery, will occupy Chalonvillars, and eventually Frahier. The Baden Divisional Staff will proceed to Frahier, will there receive all letters for the Corps Headquarters, and despatch them, after taking note of their contents, according to their urgency, by post-relays. Colonel v. Willisen.

will remain at Luré, and if pressed will retire on Ronchamp, and afterwards on Giromagny.

The Divisions will keep one another informed of all occurrences. Relays will be established between all cantonments, and the cavalry distributed accordingly. The post-relays are to be clearly indicated (at night by lanterns), and to be as far as possible in or near the Mairies.

The pioneers of the Siege Corps will blow up the bridges at Bethoncourt and Bussurel; the bridges at Sochaux, and those up stream as far as Delle are to be mined and guarded by pioneer detachments.

A fortress pioneer company, under escort of a division of cavalry and two companies of infantry of the Baden Division, with 5 centners of powder, will assemble at noon on the 12th at Chaux. The captain of pioneers has received instructions.

The Siege Artillery will augment the number of guns in the Château of Montbéliard, and will construct a strong battery on the heights east of this place, in order to be able to sweep the valley at Bethoncourt and at the same time keep Montbéliard under fire. Should there be no good position here, one must be selected to the north-east of Bethoncourt.

The trains at Frahier will be drawn nearer by the troops early on the 12th. Major-General Count Sponeck will send an infantry ammunition column to General v. Schmeling at Héricourt. After emptying, it will proceed to Dannemarie. The heavy trains of the Corps, under the command of Major v. Chelius, will proceed on the 12th to Giromagny, on the 13th to Massevaux and Sentheim. The Baden Division will send this order to Major v. Chelius.

The Grand Ducal Baden Division will direct the commissariat and wagon park columns, which are at Ronchamp and on the road to Champagny, upon Frahier and Mandrevillars. After emptying they will at once return to Sentheim. Returns of Quarters are to be sent by 11 to-morrow morning.

(Signed) V. WERDER.

Headquarters, Bréville, 12th January, Noon.

In the event of a general attack upon the position Delle—Montbéliard—Héricourt—Luze, the officers commanding Divisions will regulate their proceedings by the following general directions:—When the attack on Héricourt—Montbéliard or Delle, as the case may be, becomes manifest, the general reserve, the 1st and 2nd Baden Infantry Brigades, and Baden Corps Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-General v. Glümer, will move to Banvillard or Chatenois. All roads leading from these two places to the position will be at once most carefully reconnoitred. Argiésans and Sevenans can be kept under fire from the fortress. The 3rd Baden Brigade will have the task, at a suitable spot, probably at Echevanne, of preventing at all hazards the enemy's advance upon Frahier. Colonel v. Willisen will bar the road at Ronchamp. The Baden Division will post this day at General v. d. Goltz's disposal two batteries at Echenans. Should the enemy succeed in forcing the line at any one

point, and the corps be compelled to a rearward movement, this should in no case be carried beyond the Savoureuse. For this purpose bridges will be at once made by the pioneers of the Siege Corps at Chatenois leading to Vourvenans. At the commencement of the fight or on a general alarm all carriages, with the exception of ammunition wagons and ambulances, will be despatched to the following points:—

Those of the 4th Reserve Division, General v. d. Goltz's detachment, the Corps Staff, and the 1st Baden Brigade will move by way of Bourogne, Eschène to Vellescot.

Those of the rest of the Baden Division will go to Gros Magny.

By to-morrow morning telegraphic communication will be arranged to Bréville, and Delle, Montbéliard, Bourogne, and Frahier will be in connection. Telegrams in clear will only be sent when that which has to be reported is well established.

The Siege Artillery will at once place some more heavy guns on the heights north of Héricourt, to fire upon Tavey and Bussural. Keinath's Bavarian Sortie Battery will not pass under the orders of the 4th Reserve Division, but will remain with General v. Debschitz, who will call it in. The eventual retreat of the troops at Exincourt will not be on Sochaux, but to the eastward.

(Signed) V. WERDER.

APPENDIX CXXXIX.

ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT POUR LE 15 JANVIER, 1871.

Onans, 14 Janvier, 1871.

L'armée continuera demain sa marche offensive. Toutes les troupes devront avoir mangé la soupe et prendre les armes à 6 heures et demie du matin.

Dès que le jour commencera, le 15^e Corps se dirigera sur Montbéliard en faisant fouiller tous le bois avec le plus grand soin, s'avançant avec précaution et surveillant la route qui longe le Doubs sur son flanc droit; il s'emparera du Bois Bourgeois, de la ferme de Mont Chevis et des positions avoisinantes de la rive droite de la Lisaine; il fera ouvrir contre la citadelle et la ville le feu de son artillerie. Le 24^e Corps, se laissant un peu devancer par le 15^e, occupera le bois dit Montévillars, le Grand-Bois, le Bois de Tavey et celui du Chanois; il se portera jusqu'à la Lisaine et s'emparera des différents points de passage de cette petite rivière. Il disposera son artillerie sur la rive droite de la Lisaine, de manière à battre le mieux possible l'autre rive.

Le 20^e Corps marchera sur Héricourt, en passant par Tavey, dont il s'emparera s'il est nécessaire, en se reliant avec le 24^e dans le bois de ce nom et avec le 18^e dans les bois communaux qui couvrent les hauteurs entre Coisevaux et Byans; il aura pour mission d'occuper Héricourt; mais il ne s'emparera de ce village qu'après que l'effet voulu aura été produit par le 18^e Corps et la division Crémer, comme par les mouvements tournants à plus court rayon, qu'il devra exécuter par sa propre gauche.

Le 18^e Corps, se reliant par sa droite comme il a été dit avec le 20^e Corps, occupera Couthenans, Luze et Chagey.

La division Crémer, venant de Lure opérera à la gauche du 18^e Corps; elle se mettra en route assez tôt pour arriver sur la Lisaine dès 6 heures du matin, en évitant de suivre, s'il est possible, la partie de la route de Lure à Chagey, la plus voisine de ce dernier village qui est affectée spécialement au 18^e Corps; cette division exécutera un mouvement tournant à notre extrême gauche, en passant, s'il est possible, la Lisaine à deux kilomètres en amont de Chagey, et laissant le pont de ce village à la disposition du 18^e Corps. Elle se dirigera sur Mandrevillars et Echenans, et subordonnera son action à celle du 18^e Corps, qui passera par Chagey et Luze; elle observera avec grand soin les routes ou chemins permettant de se porter de Belfort sur notre flanc gauche, notamment par Frahier et Chalonsvillars.

La réserve ne se mettra en marche qu'après que tout le 24^e Corps sera tout entier à droite de la route d'Arcey à Héricourt, de façon à ne pas entraver le mouvement de ce corps; elle s'établira entre les villages d'Aibre et de Trémoins, en ayant le plus grand soin de laisser

la route libre et de se tenir prête à se porter en avant partout où sa présence serait jugée nécessaire.

L'action devra s'engager par la droite, c'est-à-dire par le 15^e Corps, qui soutiendra le 24^e en se portant sur la Lisaine. Le rôle du 1^{er} de ces corps sera d'occuper Montbéliard, mais sans brusquer le mouvement, de façon à réduire les chances de pertes et à bénéficier du mouvement de notre extrême gauche destiné à rendre plus aisées les opérations du reste de l'armée. Sa mission sera d'ailleurs facilitée par le mouvement de quatre bataillons qui, par ordre du Général Rolland, commandant la division militaire de Besançon, ont quitté la position de Blamont et doivent menacer la retraite des défenseurs de Montbéliard en descendant le Doubs sur la rive droite en se portant sur Exincourt et Sochaux. Le 15^e Corps ne perdra pas de vue qu'il sert de pivot et que le mouvement de conversion doit être exécuté par les autres corps.

Le 24^e Corps, dans le même but, ne hâtera pas trop sa marche en avant; il occupera les points de passage de la Lisaine et jettera des tirailleurs sur la rive gauche de cette rivière, ne la franchissant complètement qu'autant qu'il en recevra l'ordre.

Le 20^e ne lancera sa droite et son centre sur le village d'Héricourt qu'après l'avoir fortement canonné et avoir laissé se produire les effets du mouvement de sa propre gauche et ceux du 18^e Corps et de la division Crémier.

Le 18^e Corps quittera ses bivouacs au point du jour, mais il ne s'engagera qu'après avoir entendu le canon du 15^e Corps; il fera prévenir le Général Crémier du moment où sa division devra se porter en avant, afin de bien coordonner le mouvement de cette division avec le sien. Si le mouvement général de l'armée réussit, la division Crémier occupera à la fin de la journée le village d'Argiésans et les positions avoisinantes; le 20^e Corps occupera Héricourt et les positions en avant de ce village; le 18^e Corps sera entre le 20^e et la division Crémier; le 24^e Corps tiendra le cours de la Lisaine à partir d'Héricourt, en se reliant par sa droite au 15^e qui occupera Montbéliard; la réserve recevra sur le terrain même les ordres relatifs à la position qui lui sera assignée.

Les commandants de corps d'armée feront les recommandations les plus expresses pour que toutes les attaques soient préparées par le feu de l'artillerie, et que l'infanterie se fasse toujours précéder à bonne distance par de nombreux tirailleurs. L'armée doit se faire éclairer avec soin sur son front et sur ses flancs, afin que la présence de l'ennemi, ou celle des ouvrages qu'il aurait pu élever, ou les travaux de défense qu'il aurait préparés, soient toujours signalés à temps. Il arrive fréquemment que les bois occupés par l'ennemi sont garnis de fils de fer; les tirailleurs devront porter leur attention sur ce point et se mettre en mesure de les détruire.

Les corps d'armée se relieront avec un soin d'autant plus grand que le terrain est plus coupé, plus couvert; les commandants de ces corps communiqueront entr'eux aussi souvent que possible, et s'attacheront à faire connaître les points sur lesquels on pourra les rencontrer. Les points de passages devront être reconnus le mieux possible. Toutes les mesures précédemment ordonnées seront prises pour faciliter l'emploi des routes et chemins et les rendre moins glissants, les arbres nécessaires pour la construction des ponts seront abattus, les rampes pour le passage de ces ponts, faites rapidement, les ouvriers et les outils seront tenus à portée des points où leur emploi sera jugé utile.

Les convois de vivres seront laissés en arrière. Il en sera de même des réserves de munitions, mais elles précéderont ces convois, afin que le remplacement des munitions puisse être effectué en temps opportun.

Dès aujourd'hui, des distributions de vivres et de munitions devront être faites dans chaque corps. Le ravitaillement des ces munitions pendant le combat ne saurait être opéré utilement, qu'autant que l'emplacement exact des réserves sera parfaitement connu des commandants de corps et de divisions.

Le 18^e Corps devra, si'il est nécessaire, assurer pendant le combat les besoins en munitions de la division Crémer.

Le Général en Chef se tiendra, autant que possible, sur la route d'Aibre à Héricourt.

(Signé) C. BOURBAKI, *Général de Division, Commandant-en-Chef la Première Armée.*

TÉLÉGRAMME DU GENERAL BOURBAKI AU GÉNÉRAL CRÉMER.

Onans, 14 Janvier, 1871, 2 heures soir.

J'attaquerai demain, 15. Reliez-vous avec le Général Billot; mettez-vous en route assez tôt pour arriver sur la Lisaine dès 6 heures du matin; suivez la route directe de Lure à Héricourt le moins longtemps possible, afin de ne pas vous rencontrer avec la gauche du 18^e Corps; quittez-la dans ce but s'il est possible, avant Béverne.

Vous avez pour mission d'opérer un mouvement tournant à notre extrême gauche, en vous jetant tout d'abord dans le Bois de la Brisée, après avoir passé la Lisaine à 2 kilomètres environ en amont de Chagey et vous dirigeant sur Mandrevillars et Echenans.

Vous subordonnez votre action à celle du 18^e Corps, qui pourra passer par Chagey et Luze, c'est au commandant de ce corps que vous auriez à vous adresser s'il devenait urgent de remplacer les munitions dépensées.

Vous observerez avec soin les routes ou chemins permettant de se porter de Belfort sur notre flanc gauche, notamment par Chenebier et Chalonvillars.

Si le mouvement général de l'armée réussit, vous devez occuper à la fin de la journée le village d'Argiésans et les positions avoisinantes; le 20^e Corps tiendra Héricourt; le 18^e sera entre le 20^e et vous.

APPENDIX CXL.

TELEGRAM.

Brévilleiers,
14th January, Evening.
General Count Moltke,
Versailles.

Fresh hostile troops are marching from south and west towards Lure and Belfort. At Port-sur-Saône presence of large detachments established. In front the enemy attacked in vain to-day the outposts at Bart and Dung.

Whether Belfort is to be held against these enveloping movements in superior force, I request may be urgently considered. I believe Alsace can be held, but not at the same time Belfort, unless the existence of the Corps is to be imperilled. By holding on to Belfort I am deprived of all freedom of movement. The rivers are passable in the frost.

(Signed) V. WERDER.

TELEGRAM.

Versailles, 15th January, 3 p.m.
General v. Werder,
Brévilleiers.

Attack is to be awaited and battle accepted in the strong position covering Belfort. Of greatest importance to this end is the holding of the road from Lure to Belfort; watch-post at St. Maurice desirable. The advance of General Manteuffel will make itself felt in a few days.

(Signed) COUNT MOLTKE.

APPENDIX CXLI.

TURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE SIEGE CORPS* BEFORE BELFORT, FROM 17TH NOVEMBER, 1870, TO 18TH JANUARY, 1871, AND IN THE XIVTH ARMY CORPS, AND 4TH RESERVE DIVISION, FROM 1ST TO 18TH JANUARY, 1871.†

y Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Res. Divn.	21st November.												
	Konitz Landw. Battalion	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	23rd November.												
	Konitz Landw. Battn.	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	2	-
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	67th Regiment	-	-	2	-	5	-	-	-	-	7	1	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. IInd A.C.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
	24th November.												
	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	2	24	-	-	-	2	25	-
						and 1 Assist. Surgeon.					and 1 Assist. Surgeon.		
	Deutsch Crone Landw. Battn.	-	-	2	-	1	15	-	-	-	1	17	-
	67th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	1st L. Res. Battery IInd A.C.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	26th November.												
	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	67th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	27th November.												
	Burg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	28th November.												
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	1	8	-	-	-	1	9	-
	Neuhaldensleben Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	29th November.												
	Neustadt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	30th November.												
	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Deutsch Crone Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st December.												
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

* Including the troops detached here from the 4th Reserve Division.

† This return also includes the losses of the Etappen troops called up by General v. Werder for the period 3rd to 18th January, 1871.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	2nd December.												
1st Res. Divn.	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
	3rd December.												
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	-	1	3	-	15	-	-	-	-	1	18	-
	Deutsch Crone Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	67th Regiment	-	-	3	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	14	-
	Halberslalt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	3	-	17	-	-	-	-	1	20	-
Siege Artillery	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
	6th Co. 8th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	1st Co. Wart. Art.	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
	4th December.												
4th Reserve Div.	Marlenburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Siege Artillery	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	5th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Siege Art.	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	6th December.												
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	Marlenburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	1st Co. Wart. Art.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	Neuhaldensleben Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	1	2	-
Siege Art.	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	9th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	-	-	1	-	6	-	-	6	-	1	13	-
4th Res. Divn.	Goldap Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Danzig Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Siege Art.	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	10th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	Halberstadt Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	11th December.												
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Neuhaldensleben Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	2	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	12th December.												
s. Divn.	Stendal Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
sa. Divn.	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Art.	Danzig Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	13th December.												
s. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
	Deutsch Crone Landw. Battn.	—	3	—	2	27	—	—	6	—	2	36	—
	67th Regiment	—	6	—	—	21	—	—	3	—	—	30	—
								and 1 Assist. Surgeon.			and 1 Assist. Surgeon.		
s. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
ers of Siege ps.	Würt. Fort. Eng. Co.	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	14th December.												
s. Divn.	Konitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Neustadt Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
sa. Divn.	67th Regiment	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
Art.	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	15th December.												
s. Divn.	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	67th Regiment	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Burg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Neustadt Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Art.	Halberstadt Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	16th December.												
s. Divn.	67th Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Art.	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
ers of Siege ps.	2nd Baden Fort. Pioneer Co.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	17th December.												
s. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	2nd Light Res. Battery IXth Army Corps	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
sa. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Art.	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	16th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	18th December.												
s. Divn.	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
sa. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
Art.	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1st Co. Würt. Artillery	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	19th December.												
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	20th December.												
s. Divn.	67th Regiment	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	Neuhaldensleben Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	23	-
	Lötzen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
	Danzig Landw. Battn.	-	1	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	34	-
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	33	-
Siege Art.	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
21st December.													
1st Res. Divn.	Könitz Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Siege Art.	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
22nd December.													
4th Res. Divn.	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Siege Art.	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
23rd December.													
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Burg. Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	Neuhaldenleben Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4th Res. Divn.	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
24th December.													
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	1st Light Res. Battery II A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
25th December.													
	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
4th Res. Divn.	Lötzen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	6th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
26th December.													
4th Res. Divn.	Goldap. Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
27th December.													
1st Res. Divn.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Siege Art.	4th Fort. Battery 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	1	4	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	1	12	-
28th December.													
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	6th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Fort. Battery 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	2nd Baden Fort. Pioneer Co.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
29th December.													
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	-	2	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
	1st Light Reserve Battery IX A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
4th Res. Divn.	Tilsit Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
30th December.													
	Tilsit Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
31st December.													
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.	-	1	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	2	8	-
	Lötzen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
itz Ditch.	6th Reserve Lancers - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
rt.	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. - -	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	3rd Fort. Battery 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
1871.													
1st January.													
i. Divn.	Lötzen Landw. Battn. - - -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Goldap Landw. Battn. - - -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Marienburg Landw. Battn. - -	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	3rd Reserve Lancers - - -	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3
2nd January.													
i. Divn.	1st Reserve Lancers - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	3	—
itz Ditch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. - - -	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
3rd January.													
Divn.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
rt.	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	4th Co. Würt. Art. - - -	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
4th January.													
i. Divn.	Konitz Landw. Battn. - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
rt.	4th Co. Würt. Art. - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
5th January.													
OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT VESOUL.													
Baden Field Division.													
-	3rd Infantry Regiment - - -	—	5	—	—	25	—	—	1	—	—	31	—
	4th Infantry Regiment - - -	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
	5th Infantry Regiment - - -	—	2	—	2	33	—	—	—	—	4	40	—
	6th Infantry Regiment - - -	—	1	3	—	10	—	—	—	—	1	13	—
	3rd Dragoons - - -	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
i Troops	25th Landw. Regt. Eupen Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
TOTAL FOR THE OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT VESOUL.		3	17	—	2	75	—	—	1	—	5	93	—
6th January.													
Goltz's Detachment.													
Divn.	2nd Reserve Dragoons - - -	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	1
	Konitz Landw. Battn. - - -	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	67th Regiment - - -	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	3	—	—	7	—
Divn.	Danzig Landw. Battn. - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
rt.	4th Würt. Art. - - -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
8th January.													
SURPRISE OF DANJOUTIN.													
Regt.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn. -	1	11	—	—	45	—	—	2	—	1	58	—
	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn. - -	—	3	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	1	8	—

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
4th Res. Regt. - Pioneers of Siege Corps.	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn. - - 2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C. - - TOTAL FOR THE SURPRISE OF DANJOUTIN.	- - 1	6 - 20	- - -	1 - 2	18 1 69	- - -	- - -	- - 2	- - -	1 - 3	20 1 91	- - -
XIV. - -	Goltz's Detachment.												
1st Res. Divn. -	2nd Reserve Dragoons - Gnesen Landw. Battn. - Konitz Landw. Battn. - Deutsch Crone Landw. Battn. - Tilsit Landw. Battn. - Lötzen Landw. Battn. - Marienburg Landw. Battn. -	- - - - - - -	- 4 1 - - - -	- - - - - - -	- - - - - - -	3 12 - 1 1 3 1	- - - - - - -	- - - - - - -	- 3 - - - - - -	- - - - - - -	- - - - - - -	3 19 1 1 1 3 1	- - - - - - -
4th Res. Regt. -	9th January.												
	ACTION AT VILLERSEXEL.												
XIV. - -	a. Baden Field Division.												
	3rd Infantry Regiment - Field Artillery -	- -	- -	- -	- -	5 1	- 1	- -	- -	- -	- -	5 1	- 1
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
4th Res. Divn. -	30th Regiment - 34th Fusiliers - Combined Artillery Division - 25th Regiment - Staff of 2nd Cmb. East Pruss. Landw. Regiment - Osterode Landw. Battn. - Ortelsburg Landw. Battn. - Graudenz Landw. Battn. - Thorn Landw. Battn. - Wehlau Landw. Battn. - 1st Reserve Lancers - 3rd Reserve Lancers - Combined Artillery Division - Sanitary Detachment -	- 1 - 3 - - 2 - - 1 3 - - - -	8 13 2 39 - - 14 - 8 8 - 1 2 - -	- - - - - - - - - - 1 2 - -	- - - - - - - - - - 1 2 - -	13 44 8 109 - - 61 11 4 21 31 1 2 6 2	- - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - -	- - - 69 - - - - - - 12 - - - - 8	- - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - -	- 2 3 9 - - 1 6 - - 1 4 - - -	25 61 10 217 - - 106 28 5 22 51 2 2 10 10	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -	
	TOTAL FOR ACTION AT VILLERSEXEL	10	96	8	15	319	8	1	138	-	26	553	16
1st Res. Divn. -	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn. - Lötzen Landw. Battn. - 3rd Reserve Lancers - 67th Regiment - Neustadt Landw. Battn. -	- - - - -	- 2 - - -	- - 2 - -	- - - - -	7 9 2 1 1	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	7 11 2 1 1	- - - - -
Debschitz Ditch. Siege Art.	Janer Landw. Battn. - 6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. - 3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. - 6th Co. Baden Artillery -	- - - -	1 - - -	- - - -	- - - -	4 1 1 1	- - - -	- - - -	- - - -	- - - -	- - - -	1 1 1 1	- - - -
	10th January.												
XIV. - -	Baden Field Division.												
	3rd Infantry Regiment - 4th Infantry Regiment - 2nd Dragoons - 4th Reserve Hussars - Gnesen Landw. Battn. - Marienburg Landw. Battn. - Apenrade Landw. Battn. - 6th Reserve Lancers - 3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. -	- - - - - - - - -	- 1 - - - - 5 - -	- - - - - - 1 - -	- - - - - - - - -	2 - 1 - 2 39 - 2	- - - - 3 - - - -	2 - 1 - - - - - -	- - 1 - - - - -	- - 1 - - - - -	- - - - - - - - -	2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2	- - - - - - - - -

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	11th January.												
Res. Divn.	Neuhaldensleben Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Res. Divn.	1st Reserve Lancers	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
schütz. Dsch.	6th Reserve Lancers	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
pe Art.	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Reg.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	4th Co. Würt. Artillery	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	12th January.												
7.	Baden Field Division.												
	3rd Dragoons	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	3	—
Res. Divn.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Konitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Res. Divn.	Lützen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Marientburg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1st Reserve Lancers	—	—	2	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	3	3
schütz. Dsch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
pe Art.	6th Co. Baden Artillery	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	13th January.												
	FIGHT AT CHAVANNE.												
	Goltz's Detachment.												
	30th Regiment	1	14	—	3	79	—	—	9	—	4	102	—
									and 2 Staff Surgeons and 1 Assist. Surg.			and 2 Staff Surgeons and 1 Assist. Surg.	
	2nd Reserve Hussars	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1st Light Res. Battery III A.C.	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
	TOTAL FOR THE FIGHT AT CHAVANNE	1	14	—	3	80	4	—	9	—	4	103	4
									and 2 Staff Surgeons and 1 Assist. Surg.			and 2 Staff Surgeons and 1 Assist. Surg.	
	FIGHT AT ARCHY ST. MARIE.												
Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	—	1	—	2	29	—	—	30	—	2	60	—
Res. Divn.	25th Regiment	2	10	—	—	46	—	—	6	—	2	62	—
	3rd Res. Lancers	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	1
	1st Heavy Res. Batty.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
	1st Light Res. Batty.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	TOTAL FOR THE FIGHT AT ARCHY ST. MARIE.	2	11	1	2	78	2	—	46	—	4	135	3
	OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT DASLE AND CHOIX.												
schütz. Dsch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	Striegau Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
	Oels Landw. Battn.	1	9	1	5	26	—	—	5	1	6	40	2
	6th Reserve Lancers	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	1st Light Res. Battery, VIII A.C.	—	—	—	—	3	8	—	—	—	—	3	8
	2nd " " "	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	TOTAL FOR OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT DASLE AND CHOIX.	1	11	1	5	33	10	—	5	1	6	49	12
	Goltz's Detachment.												
	2nd Reserve Dragoons	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
Res. Divn.	Konitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Art.	1st Co. Würt. Art.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	14th January.												
	Goltz's Detachment.												
	2nd Res. Dragoons	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Tot		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	
	OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT DUNG AND BART.												
4th Res. Div.	Insterburg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
	Lötzen Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	1	
	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	TOTAL FOR FIGHT AT DUNG AND BART	—	2	—	1	10	—	—	—	—	1	1	
	1st Reserve Lancers	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	
	15th January.												
Siege Art.	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	16th January.												
1st Res. Divn.	Inowrazlaw Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	1	2	—	—	1	—	1	—	
	67th Regiment	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	17th January.												
Siege Art.	3rd Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	4th Co. Würt. Art.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	BATTLE ON THE LISAINE, 15th, 16th, AND 17th JANUARY.												
	15th January.												
XIV.	a. Baden Field Division.*												
	1st Body Guard (Grenadier)	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	
	2nd Grenadiers	—	5	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	17	
	5th Infantry Regiment	—	5	—	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	28	
	6th Infantry Regiment	—	9	—	—	36	—	—	—	—	1	45	
	3rd Dragoons	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	
	Field Artillery	—	3	7	2	15	23	—	—	—	2	18	
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
	30th Regiment	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	
	34th Fusiliers	—	1	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	15	
	2nd Reserve Hussars	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
	Combined Artillery Division	—	1	4	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	10	
		Total of XIV A.C.	1	25	12	2	117	23	—	—	—	3	142
	4th Res. Divn.	25th Regiment	—	5	—	—	11	—	—	2	—	—	18
		Ortelsburg Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	1	—	—	8
Graudenz Landw. Battn.		—	3	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	7	
Wehlau Landw. Battn.		—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	
Insterburg Landw. Battn.		—	6	—	—	15	—	—	20	—	—	41	
Gumbinnen Landw. Battn.		—	1	—	—	7	—	—	6	—	—	14	
Lötzen Landw. Battn.		—	13	—	2	71	—	132	—	—	3	216	
Goldap Landw. Battn.		—	1	—	—	—	6	—	3	—	—	4	
Danzig Landw. Battn.		—	1	—	1	3	—	—	2	—	1	6	
Marienburg Landw. Battn.		—	13	—	2	71	—	132	—	—	3	216	
		and 1 Sub-Surgeon.											
		Combined Art. Division	—	1	24	—	15	7	—	1	—	—	17
		2nd Fort. Pion. Co. VII A.C.	—	1	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	8
	Total of 4th Res. Division	1	47	24	5	212	7	—	233	—	6	442	

* The losses of 3rd Infantry Regiment and 3rd Light Battery in the three days, are shown under the 16th January.

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Divn. - Dutch.	1st Light Res. Batty. II A.C. -	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. -	—	3	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	6	—
	6th Reserve Lancers -	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	16th January.												
	a. Baden Field Division.												
	1st Body Guard (Grenadiers) -	—	4	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	21	—
	3rd Infantry Regiment -	2	51	—	10	167	—	32	—	—	12	250	—
	4th Infantry Regiment -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	5th Infantry Regiment -	—	3	—	—	18	—	—	—	—	—	21	—
	1st Body Guard Dragoons -	1	1	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	1	1	1
	Field Artillery* -	—	1	19	—	32	—	—	—	—	—	33	38
						and 1 Field Surgeon.						and 1 Field Surgeon.	
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
	30th Regiment -	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
	34th Fusiliers -	—	4	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	1	8
	Combined Artillery Division -	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	1
	Total of XIV A.C. -	2	64	21	14	246	19	—	32	—	16	342	40
						and 1 Field Surgeon.						and 1 Field Surgeon.	
Div.	25th Regiment -	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	Osterode Landw. Battn. -	—	2	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn. -	—	2	—	1	7	—	1	—	—	1	10	—
	Graudenz Landw. Battn. -	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Thorn Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Tilsit Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Insterburg Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
	Gumbinnen Landw. Battn. -	—	3	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	12	—
	Goldap Landw. Battn. -	—	4	—	1	7	—	—	—	—	1	11	—
	Danzig Landw. Battn. -	—	2	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
	Marientburg Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1st Reserve Lancers -	—	—	14	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	14
	Combined Artillery Division -	—	—	6	1	7	3	—	1	—	1	8	9
	Total of 4th Res. Division -	—	15	20	3	59	3	—	2	—	3	76	33
s Ditch. Troops	Striegau Landw. Battn. -	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Oels Landw. Battn. -	—	3	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	9	—
	1st Reserve Rifle Battn. -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	2nd Saxon Light Res. Battery -	—	1	1	1	6	5	—	—	—	1	7	6
t.	8th Co. 4th Art. Regt. -	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	15th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	17th January.												
	a. Baden Field Division.*												
	1st Body Guard Grenadiers -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	4th Infantry Regiment -	5	43	—	7	156	—	52	—	—	12	251	—
	5th Infantry Regiment -	—	10	—	5	42	—	15	—	—	5	67	—
	6th Infantry Regiment -	—	3	—	2	18	—	—	—	—	2	21	—
	3rd Dragoons -	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
	Field Artillery -	—	2	—	1	4	2	—	—	—	1	6	2
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
	30th Regiment -	—	2	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	19	—
	34th Fusiliers -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
	Combined Artillery Division -	1	1	4	2	11	4	—	—	—	3	12	8
	Total XIV A.C. -	6	61	5	17	253	6	—	67	—	23	381	11

* See note on preceding page.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
1st Res. Divn. -	67th Regiment -	1	17	-	4	84	-	3	-	-	5	134	-
4th Res. Divn. -	Osterode Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
	Ostelsburg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Graudenz Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Tilsit Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	Insterburg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	3	-
	Gondap Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Reserve Lancers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Combined Artillery Division -	-	1	3	-	2	2	-	2	-	-	5	5
	Total 4th Res. Divn. -	-	2	3	-	11	2	-	5	-	-	18	5
	TOTAL FOR THE BATTLE ON THE LISAIN.	12	230	86	46	1004	67	-	343	-	58	1586	153
	18th January.				1 Sub-Surgeon.		1 Field Surgeon.				1 Sub-Surgeon.		1 Field Surgeon.
XIV. -	a. Baden Field Division.												
	6th Infantry Regiment	-	5	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	14	-
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
	34th Fusiliers -	-	11	-	2	31	-	-	-	-	3	43	-
4th Res. Divn. -	25th Regiment	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Graudenz Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Tilsit Landw. Battn. -	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Debschitz Divn.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	1	10	-	-	-	-	1	16	-
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. -	-	5	-	-	12	-	-	6	-	-	17	-
	Striegau Landw. Battn. -	-	6	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	2	13	-
	Breslau II Ind Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	6	-	-	12	-
	Oels Landw. Battn. -	-	2	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
	Apenrade Landw. Battn. -	-	4	-	2	34	-	-	-	-	2	38	-
	6th Reserve Lancers -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	2nd Light Res. Batt'y. VIII A.C. -	-	1	-	-	2	10	-	-	-	-	3	10
	Bavarian Sertie Battery -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Etappen Troops	1st Res. Rifle Battn. -	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	-	-	10	-
	Bromberg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Total Losses -	33	551	104	112	2367	111	1	597	4	146	3515	219
					1 Ass. Surgeon.		2 Staff and				2 Staff Surgeons.		
					1 Sub-Surgeon.		2 Ass. Surgeons.				3 Ass. Surgeons.		
					1 Field Surgeon.						1 Sub-Surgeon.		
											1 Field Surgeon.		

1875

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.

Staff and Regiment.		Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
XIV A.C.	Baden Field Division	11	163	29	31	641	45	—	105	1	42	909	75
	Goltz's Detachment	4	58	11	14	247	8	—	20	—	18	325	19
	4th Reserve Division	12	178	62	24	714	24	1	383	2	37	1275	88
	1st Reserve Division	3	82	—	24	460	2	—	68	—	27	610	2
	Debschitz's Detachment	1	44	1	14	175	24	—	19	1	15	238	36
	Siege Artillery	2	25	—	3	105	—	—	—	—	5	130	—
	Pioneers of Siege Corps	—	—	—	1	7	—	—	1	—	1	8	—
	Etappen Troops	—	1	1	1	18	8	—	1	—	1	20	9
TOTAL		33	551	104	112	2367	111	1	597	4	146	3515	219
					and 1 Assist. Surgeon, 1 Sub-Surgeon, 1 Field Surgeon.			and 2 Staff Surgeons, 2 Assist. Surgeons.			and 2 Staff Surgeons, 3 Assist. Surgeons, 1 Sub-Surgeon, 1 Field Surgeon.		

1885

NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS, AND THOSE DOING DUTY IN THAT CAPACITY, WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, OR MISSING.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	23rd November.		
1st Res. Divn.	Konitz Landwehr Battalion.	- - - -	(1) Capt. v. Germar. (2) Vice Sergeant-Major Dörschlag.
	Inowrazlaw Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Wierzbinski.
	Pr. Stargardt Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Hensel.
	1st Fort. Pioneer Co. II A.C.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Zieger.
	24th November.		
	Bromberg Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) Capt. Beer. (2) 2nd Lt. v. Wedell. Asst. Surgeon Dr. Schmidt.
	Deutsch Crone Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Petersen.
	25th November.		
	Inowrazlaw Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) Vice Sergeant Major Kietzmann.
	3rd December.		
	Inowrazlaw Landwehr Battalion	(1) 1st Lieutenant Wurzbinsk.	
	Deutsch Crone Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) Vice Sergeant Major Polzin.
	Pr. Stargardt Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Schmidt.
Pioneers of Siege Corps	4th Bav. Fort. Engineer Co.	- - - -	(1) Lt. Thoma.
	8th December.		
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) Vice Sergeant-Major Fuhrmann.
	9th December.		
	67th Regiment	- - - -	(1) Capt. Meyrick.
	12th December.		
Siege Artillery	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regiment	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant de Nerée.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
1st Res. Divn.	13th December. Deutsch Crone Land- wehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Westermann. (2) 2nd Lieutenant v. Borch.
	67th Regiment -	- - - -	<i>Missing.</i> Asst. Surgeon Dr. Riedel.
	27th December.		
Siege Artillery	4th Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	1st Lt. Wanner -	
	28th December.		
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Land- wehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) Vice Sergeant- Major Hoffmann.
	29th December.		
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Schmidt I.
	31st December.		
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Land- wehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Wenghoffer. (2) Vice Sergeant- Major Lapper.
	1871.		
	5th January.		
	OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT VESOUL.		
XIVth -	Baden Field Division. 5th Infantry Regt.	(1) 2nd Lt. Delorme (2) Vice Sergt.- Major Merlet.	(1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Stengel. (2) 2nd Lt. Klorer.
	6th Infantry Regt. -	(1) 1st Lt. Mezger	
	8th January.		
	SURPRISE OF DAN- JOUTIN.		
1st Res. Divn.	Schneidemühl Land- wehr Battalion	(1) 1st Lt. Zippmann	
	Inowrazlaw Land- wehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant v. Gottberg.
4th Res. Divn.	Gumbinnen Land- wehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Ehmer.
	9th January.		
	ACTION AT VILLER- SEHEL.		
XIVth -	Goltz's Detachment. 34th Pom. Fusiliers -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Seelmann.	(1) Ens. Wedewer.

1905

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died Wounds.	Wounded.
XIVth -	Combined Artillery Division	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Amecke. (2) 2nd Lt. Dethier. (3) Ensign Roloff.
4th Res. Divn.	25th Regiment -	(1) Capt. Reisewitz (2) 2nd Lt. Strebits (3) 2nd Lieut. Pütz	(1) Capt. Valkampf. (2) Capt. Traumann. (3) 2nd Lieutenant Hüttmann. (4) 2nd Lieutenant v. Westhoven. (5) 2nd Lieutenant Jacobsen. (6) Vice Sergeant- Major Houben. (1) Col. v. Krane.
	Staff of Comb. East Pr. Landwehr Regt. Osterode Landwehr Battalion	- - - - (1) 1st Lieutenant Forstmann. (2) 1st Lt. Kurreck.	(1) Capt. Czigan. (2) 2nd Lieutenant Zimmermann. (3) Vice Sergeant- Major Neumann. <i>Missing.</i> 2nd Lt. Oelschläger.
	Thorn Landwehr Battalion	(1) 1st Lieut. Oeder	
	Wehlau Landwehr Battalion	(1) 2nd Lt. Becker- (2) 2nd Lt. König - (3) 2nd Lt. Castell -	(1) Vice Srgt.-Major Gebhardt.
Siege Artillery	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. 6th Co. Baden Art. -	- - - - - - - -	(1) Capt. Mieg. (1) Capt. Föhren- bach.
	10th January.	- - - -	(1) Capt. Caspari.
Debschitz's De- tachment	Apenrade Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	
	11th January.	- - - -	
	6th Reserve Lancers	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant v. Krane-Matena.
	13th January.	- - - -	
	FIGHT AT CREVANSSE.	- - - -	
XIVth -	30th Regiment -	(1) Vice Sergeant- Major Bleyen- häft.	(1) Capt. v. Fischer Treuenfeld. (2) 2nd Lt. Fehres. (3) 2nd Lt. Rothe. <i>Missing.</i> (1) Staff Surgeon Dr. Scholl. (2) Staff Surgeon Dr. Coulon. (3) Asst. Surgeon Dr. Aenstots.

1915

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	FIGHT AT ARCEY— ST. MARIE.		
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment -	- - - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Grahl.
4th Res. Divn.	25th Regiment -	(1) Capt. Haccius - (2) 2nd Lt. Steffens	(2) Ensign v. Brauchitsch.
	OUTPOST AFFAIRS AT DASLE.		
Detaschitz's De- tachment	Oels Landwehr Battalion	(1) 2nd Lt. Heider-	(1) Captain v. Münenberg. (2) Capt. Kiesel. (3) 1st Lt. Rojahn. (4) 2nd Lieutenant Döhrring. (5) 2nd Lieutenant Graisberg.
	Geltz's Detachment.		
XIVth -	2nd Res. Dragoons -	- - - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant v. Brandt.
	14th January. OUTPOST AFFAIR AT DUNG AND BAET.		
4th Res. Divn.	Insterburg Land- wehr Battalion	- - - - -	(1) Vice Sergeant- Major Paschke.
	16th January.		
1st Res. Divn.	Bromberg Landwehr Battalion	- - - - -	(1) Captain v. Schroeder.
	FIGHT ON THE LI- SAINNE, 15TH, 16TH, 17TH JANUARY.		
	15th January.		
XIVth -	Baden Field Divn.*		
	6th Infantry Regt. -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Heuberger.	(1) 2nd Lt. Beck. 2) 2nd Lt. v. Renz.
4th Res. Divn.	Lötzen Landwehr Battalion	(1) 1st Lieutenant Nikutowski.	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Lomler. (2) Vice Sergeant- Major Saro.
	Dannig Landwehr Battalion.	- - - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant v. Drygalski.

* See note on p. 1845.

1925

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
4th Res. Divn.	Marienburg Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Mühle. (2) Non-Com. Off. Gardien and Sub-Surgeon Dr. Klotow.
	16th January.		
XIVth - -	a. Baden Field Division.*		
	1st Body - Guard Grenadiers.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Herrmann.
	3rd Infantry Regt. -	(1) Capt. Hilpert - (2) 1st Lt. Lacher -	(1) Major Unger. (2) Major Lang. (3) 1st Lt. Seiler. (4) 1st Lt. Lutz. (5) 2nd Lieutenant Baron v. Stengel. (6) 2nd Lt. Count zu Rantzau. (7) 2nd Lieutenant Württenberger. (8) 2nd Lieutenant Stempf. (9) 2nd Lieutenant Villingner. (10) 2nd Lieutenant Kredell.
	Field Artillery -	- - - -	(1) Capt. Baron v. Seldeneck, and Field Surg. Kaiser.
XIVth - -	b. Goltz's Detachment.		
	34th Fusiliers -	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Wenckstern.
	Combined Artillery Division	- - - -	(1) Capt. Riemer.
4th Res. Divn.	Ortelsburg Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Kahlbach.
	Goldap Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieutenant Sanio.
	Combined Artillery Division	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Rasim.
Etappen Troops	2nd Saxon Light Reserve Battery	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Frank.
Siege Artillery	8th Co. 4th Fort, Artillery Regt.	(1) Ensign Heyland	
	17th January.		
XIVth - -	a. Baden Field Division		
	4th Infantry Regiment	(1) Capt. Wolf - (2) Capt. Schonhart - (3) Capt. Koch II -	(1) Major Held. (2) 1st Lt. Heusch. (3) 2d Lt. Eichfeld.

* See note on p. 1845.

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Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
XIVth - -	4th Infantry Regiment	(4) 1st Lieutenant v. Kleiser. (5) 2nd Lieutenant Quilling.	(4) 2nd Lt. Dress. (5) 2nd Lt. Vogel. (6) 2d Lt. Haefner. (7) Ensign v. Can- crin.
	5th Infantry Regiment	- - - -	(1) Major Jacobi. (2) Capt. Baron Rüd- t. v. Collen- berg. (3) 1st Lt. Sido. (4) 2nd Lieutenant Gugelmeier. (5) 2nd Lt. Baron v. Seldeneck.
	6th Infantry Regiment.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Keller. (2) 2nd Lieutenant v. Wanker.
	Field Artillery - -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Jägerschmidt.
	b. Goltz's Detachment.		
	Combined Art. Divn.	(1) Capt. Fischer -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Behrens. (2) Vice Sergeant- Major Jackwitz.
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment- -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Münscher.	(1) Major v. Laue. (2) 2nd Lieutenant Wendler. (3) 2nd Lieutenant Grundmann. (4) 2nd Lt. Mühl.
	18th January.		
XIVth - -	Goltz's Detachment.		
	34th Pom. Fusiliers -	2nd Lt. Kahlo -	(1) Capt. Sintenis. (2) 2nd Lieutenant Reichard.
Debschitz's De- tachment	Liegnitz Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Hayn.
	Striegau Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant v. Wietersheim. (2) 2nd Lieutenant Demuth.
	Apenrade Landwehr Battalion	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant v. Stabenow. (2) 2nd Lieutenant Weise.
	6th Reserve Lancers- 2nd Light Reserve Batty. VIII A.C.	- - - -	(1) Captain Stute.
		- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Stein.

1945

APPENDIX CXLII.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE IIND AND VIIITH ARMY CORPS* BETWEEN 1ST AND 12TH JANUARY, 1871.

Army Corps.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
VIIth - - -	1st January.												
	1st Reserve Hussars - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd January.												
	13th Regiment - -	-	-	1	-	1	3	-	2	-	-	2	4
IInd - - -	3rd January.												
	9th Kolberg Grenadiers - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	13th Regiment - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	7th January.												
VIIth - - -	72nd Regiment - -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	1st Reserve Hussars - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th January.												
	72nd Regiment - -	-	1	-	2	17	-	-	-	-	2	18	-
	11th January.												
	60th Regiment - -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	9	-	-	13	-
	12th January.												
	1st Reserve Hussars - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Total of Casualties - -		-	2	1	2	27	3	-	13	-	2	42	4

SUMMARY OF LOSSES.

IInd Army Corps - -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIIth Army Corps - -	-	-	2	1	2	26	3	-	13	-	2	41	4
Total - -	-	-	2	1	2	27	3	-	13	-	2	42	4

* Including the 60th and 72nd Regiments assigned to the VIIth Army Corps, the 5th Reserve Lancers, and the 1st Reserve Hussars (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 97). The losses of the 14th Infantry Division in the Coup de-Main on Rocroy are shown in Appendix CXXVII.

195§

NOMINAL ROLL OF WOUNDED, DOING DUTY AS OFFICERS.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	8th January.		
VIIth - -	72nd Regiment - -	- - - - -	(1) Ensign Baron v. Stein. (2) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Kohlschütter.

APPENDIX CXLIII.

POSITION, ARMAMENT, AND DIRECTION OF FIRE OF BATTERIES NOS. 14-20 OF THE EAST ATTACK.*

No. of Battery.	Position.	Armament.†	Direction of Fire.	Distance.	Remarks.
14	} On the edge of the Raincy } Plateau north of No. 1 Battery.	4 15-cm. guns -	Bondy Plain and Village of Bondy -	Mètres. 2,700-3,600	The distances are reckoned to the church steeples of the villages.
15		6 12-cm. guns -	Village of Drancy-le-Grand -	5,900	
16	} North of Chennevières on the left } bank of the Marne -	6 12-cm. guns -	} St. Maur Peninsula and Marne Valley	to 5,000	
17		4 short 15-cm. guns -			
18	North-east of Le Blanc Mesnil -	6 15-cm. guns -	} Plain east of St. Denis, Village of } Drancy-le-Grand, La Courneuve, } Grosley Farm, &c.	to 5,500	
19	North of Le Blanc Mesnil -	6 12-cm. guns -			
20	North-east of Dugny -	6 12-cm. guns -			

* See Part II, Appendix CXVIII. Of the batteries mentioned there No. 4 ceased firing and gave up its guns to Battery No. 17. Batteries Nos. 9 and 10 gave three guns each to No. 16. The guns for Nos. 18, 19, and 20 were taken from Nos. 5, 7, 12, and 13.

† Short 15-cm. guns are in this Appendix specially indicated as such.

APPENDIX CXLIV. BATTERIES ON THE SOUTH FRONT BEFORE PARIS.

Name and Number of the Batteries.	Position.	First Armament.*	Later Armament.	Direction of Fire.	Range, Mètres.	Remarks.
I. LEFT WING.						
1. (St. Cloud) - - - -	In south-east corner of St. Cloud Park	6 12-cm. guns - -	3 15-cm. guns - 4 12-cm. "	Billancourt, Boulogne, and Le Point du Jour	800-3600	The ranges have been calculated: (a.) Shell batteries. From centre of battery front to centre of fort. (b.) In the case of curtains being the object, to their centre. (c.) In bastions and villages, to their centre or church steeples. Ceased 9th Jan.
2. (Meudon Terrace) - -	In the Château Park west of Meudon	8 12-cm. guns - -	4 15-cm. guns - 4 12-cm. "	Do., and the Seine islands and bridges	to 4250	
16. Counter Battery (Meudon) -		4 12-cm. guns - -	4 12-cm. guns -	Intermediate batteries near Fort Issy	2600 to 3300	
3. Enfilade and counter (Meudon)		8 15-cm. guns - -	6 15-cm. guns - 2 12-cm. "	South and west fronts of Fort Issy	2700	
4. Enfilade and counter (Meudon)		6 15-cm. guns - -	4 15-cm. guns - 2 12-cm. "		2750	
19. Counter and breaching (Fleury)	East of Fleury - -	4 15-cm. guns - 4 short 15-cm. guns	4 15-cm. guns - 4 short 15-cm. guns	South bastion and south-west curtain of Fort Issy; city enceinte	1650-4000	Opened fire 10th Jan.
20. Counter (Clamart) - -	West of Clamart - -	6 15-cm. guns - -	6 15-cm. guns - -	South front and left flank of north-west bastion of Fort Vanves	2500-2900	Opened fire 11th Jan.
23. Shell Battery - - -	At Notre Dame de Clamart	4 28-cm. S.B. mortars	4 28-cm. S.B. mortars	Fort d'Issy - - - -	1150	Opened fire 20th Jan.
II. CENTRE.						
5. Enfilade and counter (Clamart)	South of Clamart - -	6 15-cm. guns - -	1 15-cm. gun 2 12-cm. guns 3 9-cm. "	South bastion and south-west curtain of Fort Issy	2500-2900	Ceased 9th Jan.
6. Enfilade (Clamart) - -		6 15-cm. guns - -	6 15-cm. guns - -	South front of Fort Vanves - -	2900	
13. Shell battery - - -	On the Moulin de la Tour Plateau	2 21-cm. rifle mortars	2 21-cm. rifle mortars	Fort Issy - - - -	2200	
7. Enfilade and counter (Moulin de la Tour)		6 15-cm. guns - -	1 15-cm. gun 5 12-cm. guns	West front of Fort Issy and left face of south-west bastion	2150	
17. Counter (Moulin de la Tour)		6 12-cm. guns - -	6 12-cm. guns - -	Batteries between Fort Issy and Vanves	1800	
8. Counter and bombarding (Moulin de la Tour)		6 15-cm. guns - -	6 15-cm. guns - -	South front of Fort Vanves - -	1700	

* Short 15-cm. guns are so indicated in this Appendix.

Name and Number of the Batteries.	Position.	First Armament.	Later Armament.	Direction of Fire.	Range. Metres.	Remarks.
14. Shell battery.	-	2 21-cm. rifled mortars	2 21-cm. rifled mortars	Fort Vanves - - -	1900	
9. Enfilade and counter (Moulin de la Tour)	On the Moulin de la Tour Plateau	8 12-cm. guns -	8 12-cm. guns -	West front of Fort Vanves and south-west bastion	1700-1800	
10. Enfilade and breaching (Moulin de la Tour)		6 15-cm. guns -	6 15-cm. guns -	West and south fronts of Fort Vanves	1725-1800	Ceased 10th Jan.
21. Counter (Châtillon)	West of Châtillon	6 short 15-cm. guns -	6 short 15-cm. guns -	South-west front of Fort Vanves, and the adjoining gun emplacements	1480-1850	Opened fire 15th Jan.
24. Shell battery	-	4 23-cm. S.B. mortars	4 23-cm. mortars -	Fort Vanves - - -	1200	Did not fire.
III. ROUET WISE.						
11. Enfilade and counter (Fontenay)	North side of Fontenay-aux-Roses	8 12-cm. guns -	8 12-cm. guns -	West front of Fort Montrouge -	2700	
12. Enfilade and counter (Fontenay)		8 15-cm. guns -	8 15-cm. guns -	West front of Fort Montrouge -	2750	Ceased 11th Jan.
18. Counter and bombardment (Châtillon)		6 15-cm. guns -	6 15-cm. guns -	Fort Montrouge, the emplacements on the west, and the city	2000 to 7000	Opened on 8th Jan.
16. Shell battery	West of Bagneux	2 21-cm. rifle mortars	2 21-cm. rifle mortars	Fort Montrouge - - -	2200	
22. Counter and enfilade (Châtillon)		6 12-cm. guns -	6 12-cm. guns -	West front of Fort Montrouge and emplacements on west	2100 to 2300	Opened 18th Jan.
SECONDARY ATTACK BY THE VITH ARMY CORPS.						
No. 1 Battery*	In the communication between La Rue and Chertilly, 80 p. from latter	6 12-cm. guns -	4 12-cm. guns -	Redoubt and batteries at Les Hautes Bruyères; Villejail	1900 to 2450	
No. 2 Battery*	Do., 50 p. from La Rue	6 12-cm. guns -	4 12-cm. guns -		1850 to 2600	
No. 3 Battery*	At the south-west corner of L'Hay	4 12-cm. guns -	4 12-cm. guns -	South front and interior of Fort Montrouge and redoubts at Cuchau	2150-3600	Armed out of the material in Nos. 1 and 2 on 8th Jan.

* Not numbered on Plan 15.

APPENDIX CXLV.

STAFF OF THE ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER ATTACK ON PARIS.

(A.) ARTILLERY ATTACK.

Chief Director: Major-General Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen.*

Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel Heydenreich, XIIth Army Corps.

Adjutants: (1) 1st Lieutenant Braumüller, } Guard Artillery
(2) 2nd Lieutenant Clauson v. Kaas, } Brigade.

(B.) ENGINEER ATTACK.

Chief Director: Lieut.-General v. Kameke.†

Adjutants: (1) Major Peters,‡ } Engineer Corps.
(2) Captain v. Fritze,‡ }

* Hitherto commanding Artillery of Guard Corps.

† Hitherto commanding 14th Infantry Division.

‡ Hitherto Adjutant to the Inspector-General of Engineers.

APPENDIX CXLVI.

DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND TROOPS FOR THE ARTILLERY
ATTACK ON THE SOUTH FRONT OF PARIS.

Commanding Siege Artillery on South Front: Colonel v. Rieff, à la
Suite of the War Ministry.

Chief of Staff: Colonel Michaelis, 6th Art. Brig.

Adjutants: (1) Major Sallbach, War Ministry.
(2) Capt. Neumeister, 5th Art. Brig.
(3) 1st Lieut. Nippold, 8th Art. Brig.
(4) " Strasser, 5th " "
And 1 Store Lieutenant.

Attached: (1) Major Hucke,* 3rd Art. Brig.
(2) " Kleinschmit,† 4th Art. Brig.
(3) " Röttiger,‡ 6th " "

Instructors: (1) Captain Müller, 2nd " "
(2) " Kayser, 6th " "
(3) " v. Gironcourt, 6th Art. Brig.
(4) " Küper, 4th " "
(5) 1st Lieut. Kegel, 1st " "
(6) 2nd " Ritscher, 3rd " "
And 1 Lieutenant Fireworker.

Director of Park: Major Crüger, Master Fireworker.

Directors of Divisions of Field Park:

(1) Captain Witteke, 2nd Art. Brig.
(2) " Kluck, 7th " "
(3) " Bode, 3rd " "

Store Personnel:

1 Store Captain.
2 " Lieutenants.
3 Lieutenant Fireworkers.

* Assumed command of 1st Division of the Siege Artillery Regiment in January.

† Detached to Nanteuil and Choisy-le-Roi to superintend the transport of ammunition.

‡ Fell sick before the bombardment and relieved of command on 22. 11. 70.

SIEGE ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

Commander: Colonel Höckner, 4th Art. Brig.

I. Prussian Troops.

1st Division: Major v. Schmeling,* Guard Art. Brig.

6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Hoffmann v. Waldau. §

7th " " " " Baron v. u. z. Gilsa.

11th " " " " 1st Lieut. Barchewitz.

7th Co. 2nd " " " " Capt. Wilcke.

2nd Division: Major v. Dewitz, 3rd Art. Brig.

1st Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Gottschalk.

2nd " " " " Matthie.

3rd " " " " Korsch.

9th " " " " Millies. ‡

10th " " " " Wyneken.

11th " " " " 1st Lieut. Schultze.

3rd Division: Major v. Storp, § 4th Art. Brig.

1st Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Meyer.

2nd " " " " Wittich.

3rd " " " " Leo.

4th " " " " Kloer.

14th " " " " Schrecker.

4th Division: Major Müller, 7th Art. Brig.

1st Co. 5th Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Keyl.

7th " " " " Brauns. ||

8th " " " " Homeyer.

1st Co. 7th " " " " Rochlitz. ¶

9th " " " " 1st Lieut. Wonneberg.

5th Division: Major Metting, 8th Art. Brig.

2nd Co. 8th Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Mattner.

4th " " " " Kaulbach.

5th " " " " Küllenberg.

13th " " " " Neudorff.

6th Division: Major Eck, Guard Art. Brig.

5th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt., Capt. Lentz.

13th** " " " " 1st Lieut. Zinken-Sommer. ††

12th †† 5th " " " " Koehler.

15th †† " " " " Steinmetz.

* On his falling sick in December, was relieved first by Captain Wilcke, in January by Major Hücke.

† After he was wounded, 1st Lieutenant Boetticher.

‡ On his falling sick, Captain Reichardt.

§ Replaced by Major Boehncke, 10th Artillery Brigade.

|| On his death, Lieutenant Haupt.

¶ On his falling sick, Lieutenant Schimmelpfennig.

** With the subsidiary attack of the VIth Army Corps.

†† On being wounded, Captain Richers.

‡‡ Arrived during the bombardment.

7th Division : Major Rantenberg, 5th Art. Brig.*
 1st Co. 11th Hess. Fort. Art. Div., 1st Lieut. Vocke.
 2nd " " " Capt. Sterzel.
 4th " " " " Erdmann.

II. Bavarian Troops.

1st Division : Major Baron v. Cöster.
 2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Art. Regt., Capt. v. Linprun.
 3rd† " " " Passavant.

2nd Division : Major Zeller.
 1/2 2nd Fort. Batty. 4th Art. Regt., Capt. Metz.
 4th " " " Gessner.
 5th " " " Ammon.

Wall-piece Detachment : 1st Lieut. Baron v. Wagenheim, with 250
 infantry soldiers of Vth, VIth, and XIth Army Corps.

* Did not arrive until 26th January.

† With the subsidiary attack of the VIth Army Corps.

APPENDIX CXLVII.

DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND TROOPS FOR THE ENGINEER
ATTACK ON THE SOUTH FRONT OF PARIS.

Engineer-in-Chief: Major-General Schulz.*
 Chief of the Staff: Lieut.-Colonel Wischer, Staff of Engineer Corps.
 Adjutants: (1) Major Schumann.† " "
 (2) Capt. Heyde,† " "
 (3) 1st Lieut. v. Kleist,† } Eng. Corps.
 Majors of the Trenches: (1) Major Bayer, }
 (2) " Rotte, } Staff of Eng. Corps.
 Attached: (1) Captain Berger, }
 (2) " Thelemann, }
 (3) " Bornemann,† }
 (4) " Zech, }
 (5) " Dielitz, }
 (6) " Wagner, } Eng. Corps.
 (7) 1st Lieut. Otten, }
 (8) " Foerster, }
 (9) " v. Keiser I, }
 (10) " Volkmann I, }
 (11) 2nd Lieut. Frantz, }

I. PRUSSIAN TROOPS.

Commander of Pioneers: Colonel Klotz, Staff of Eng. Corps.

1. Under Command of Capt. Guhl.†

2nd Field Pion. Co. VIth A.C., 1st Lieut. v. Nowag-Seeling.

3rd " " " Capt. Glum.

2. Under Command of Capt. Pirscher.†

2nd Field Pion. Co. Vth A.C., Capt. Hummell.

3rd " " " Güntzel.

3. Under Command of Major Crüger.†

2nd Field Pion. Co. XIth A.C., Capt. Eckert.

2nd Fort. " IIIrd " " Birkholz.

3rd " " " " Blumensath.

2nd " " IVth " " Lücke.

3rd " " " " Bethe.

* Hitherto commanding Engineers and Pioneers at Headquarters of IIIrd Army.

† Major Schumann, hitherto with Headquarters of IIIrd Army and detached to force under Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, Captain Heyde, and Lieutenant Kleist, hitherto on Staff of Commander of Engineers with IIIrd Army; Captain Guhl, hitherto commanding Engineers VIth Army Corps; Captain Pirscher, hitherto on Staff Vth Army Corps, Major Crüger, hitherto commanding Engineers XIth Army Corps.

‡ Later on Engineer officer on Staff of the Attack on north front of Paris. See Appendix CLIV.

4. Under Command of Major Schnitz.

2nd Fort. Pion. Co. With A.C. Capt. v. Klaeden,*
 3rd " " " " Westphal.
 1st " " With " " Schumrigk.
 1st " " With " " Pertz.
 1st " " With " 1st Lieut. Froese.†

5. Photographic Detachment: Capt. Burchardi.

II. BAVARIAN TROOPS.

Commander: Lieut.-Colonel Vogt.

From 1st Field Engineer Division.

1st Field Eng. Co., Capt. J. Weidner.

2nd " " " Lorenz.

2nd Field Engineer Division: Major Kern.

4th Field Eng. Co., Capt. Schels.‡

5th " " " Gerber.§

Fortress Engineer Division: Lieut.-Colonel Windisch.

2nd Fort. Eng. Co., Capt. de Ahna.

3rd " " " Burchardt.

* From January, 1st Lieutenant Stephan.

† From January, 1st Lieutenant Baron v. Eys.

‡ Replaced on falling sick by Captain D. Weidner.

§ Replaced on falling sick by Captain Kreuzer.

APPENDIX CXLVIII.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERALS TROCHU AND COUNT V.
MOLTKE WITH REFERENCE TO THE BOMBARDMENT OF PARIS.(1.) *Déclaration du Gouverneur de Paris à M. le Général Comte de Moltke,
Chef d'Etat-major des Armées Allemandes.*

Depuis que l'armée Allemande a ouvert le feu de ses batteries au Sud de Paris, un grand nombre d'obus sont venus atteindre des établissements hospitaliers consacrés de tout temps à l'assistance publique, tels que la Salpêtrière, le Val-de-Grâce, l'Hôpital de la Pitié, l'Hospice de Bicêtre, et l'Hôpital des Enfants Malades.

La précision du tir de l'artillerie et la persistance avec laquelle les projectiles arrivent dans une direction et sous une inclinaison constantes, ne permettent plus d'attribuer au hasard les coups qui viennent frapper dans les hôpitaux les femmes, les enfants, les incurables, les blessés ou les malades, qui s'y trouvent enfermés.

Le Gouverneur de Paris déclare ici solennellement à Monsieur le Général Comte de Moltke, Chef d'Etat-major des Armées Allemandes, qu'aucun des hôpitaux de Paris n'a été distrait de sa destination ancienne. Il est donc convaincu que conformément au texte des conventions internationales et aux lois de la morale et de l'humanité, des ordres seront donnés par l'autorité militaire Prussienne pour assurer à ces asiles le respect que réclament pour eux les pavillons qui flottent sur leurs dômes.

Paris, 11 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé) GÉNÉRAL TROCHU.

Headquarters, Versailles, 15th January, 1871.

(2.) *Declaration of General Count v. Moltke, Chief of the General Staff
of the German Armies, to General Trochu, Governor of Paris.*

The Chief of the General Staff of the German Armies emphatically protests against the supposition that the hospitals have been taken as a mark by the German batteries.

The humanity with which the war has been conducted by the German armies, so far as has been compatible with the character which the French have given to it since the 4th September, is sufficient guarantee against any such imputation.

As soon as a clear atmosphere and short ranges permit the recognition of the domes and buildings which are indicated by white flags with the red cross, it will be possible to avoid even chance injuries.

(Signed) COUNT MOLTKE.

APPENDIX CXLIX.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE SORTIE OF
19TH JANUARY, 1871.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: GENERAL TROCHU, GOVERNOR OF PARIS.

LEFT WING: GENERAL VINOY.

Beaufort's Division.

Noël's Brigade: 1st Battn. 139th Regiment of the Line.
4th Garde Mob. Battn. Lower Loira.
Section Engineers.
Company Engineers (Auxiliary).
2nd Garde Nationale Regiment.†

Madelor's Brigade: 3 Battns. La Vendée Garde Mobile.
42nd Garde Nationale Regiment.

Reserve: 4 Battns. Garde Mobile.

Main Reserve.

Courty's Division.

Franc tireurs.

Avril de l'Enclos' Brigade: 123rd Regt. of the Line.
124th " " " " " " " " " " " "
5th Garde Nat. Regt.

Pistonley's Brigade: 125th Regt. of the Line.
126th " " " " " " " " " " " "
34th Garde Nat. Regt.

Column on Maison de Béarn‡: 3rd Garde Mob. Battn. Isle et
Vilaine.
6th Garde Nat. Regt.

Artillery: 10 batteries.

Total Left Wing: 22,000 men (including 800 Nat. Guards).

CENTRE: GENERAL DE BELLEMARE.

Left Attacking Column: General Valentin.

Franc tireurs.

109th Regiment of the Line.

Section Engineers.

(Auxiliary).

16th Garde Nationale Regiment.

* According to Ducrot, "La Défense de Paris."

† The regiments of National Guards, all mobilised, consisted of four battalions each.

‡ Béarn House and Park lie between Montretout and the Seine.

Special Reserve.

110th Regiment of the Line.
18th Garde Nationale Regiment.

Centre Attacking Column: General Fournès.

Franc tireurs.
4th Zouaves.
Section Engineers.
" " (Auxiliary).
11th Garde " Nationale Regiment.

Special Reserve.

Garde Mobile Regiment Seine et Marne.
14th Garde Nationale Regiment.

Right Attacking Column: Colonel Colonieu.

Franc tireurs.
136th Regiment of the Line.
Section Engineers.
" " (Auxiliary).
9th Garde " Nationale Regiment.

Special Reserve.

Morbihan Garde Mobile Regiment.
10th Garde Nationale Regiment.

Main Reserve.

General Hanrion.

135th Regiment of the Line.
5 Garde Mobile Battalions Seine.
20th Garde Nationale Regiment.

Colonel Valette.

3 Garde Mobile Battalions Seine.
1st " " Battalion Finistère.
5th " " " Isle et Vilaine.
4th " " " Vendée.
21st Garde Nationale Regiment.
Artillery: 10 batteries.

Total Centre: 34,500 men (including 16,000 National Guards).

RIGHT WING: GENERAL DUCROT.

Left Attacking Column: General Berthaut.

Franc tireurs.
Bôcher's Brigade: 119th Regiment of the Line.
120th
17th Garde " Nationale " Regiment.
Miribel's Brigade: Garde Mobile Regiment Loiret.
Lower Seine.
8th Garde " Nationale " Regiment.

Right Attacking Column: General Baron Susbille.

Franc tireurs.

Ragon's Brigade: 115th Regiment of the Line.

116th

" "

51st Garde Nationale Regiment.

Lecomte's Brigade: 117th Regiment of the Line.

118th

" "

23rd Garde Nationale Regiment.

Main Reserve: General Faron.

Franc tireurs.

Mariouse's Brigade: 35th Regiment of the Line.

42nd

" "

Garde Mobile Regiment Seine et Oise.

19th Garde Nationale Regiment.

Lespiau's Brigade: 121st Regiment of the Line.

122nd

" "

125th Garde Nationale Regiment.

At the Rueil Railway Station.

44th Garde Nationale Regiment.

52nd

"

"

"

55th

"

"

"

Artillery: 10 batteries.

Total Right Wing: 83,000 men (including 18,000 Garde Nationale).

**Grand Total Army of Sortie: 90,000 men (including 42,000
Garde Nationale) and 30 batteries.**

APPENDIX CL.

 DISTRIBUTION AND POSITION OF THE VTH ARMY CORPS ON
19TH JANUARY, 1871.

GENERAL COMMANDING: GENERAL V. KIRCHBACH.

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

Major-General v. Sandrart.

OUTPOSTS AND SPECIAL RESERVES.

Major-General v. Bothmer, Commanding 17th Infantry Brigade.

RIGHT WING.

Ville d'Avray Outpost Detachment.

Lieut.-Colonel v. Klass.

Advanced Post of 5th Rifle Battalion* (from the St. Cloud—Suresnes road past the Montretout Redoubt to the Garches Plateau.

1st Battalion 58th Regiment (from the Lanterne de St. Cloud to the Grille d'Orléans).

2nd Battalion 58th Regiment (from the Grille d'Orléans to Porte Verte).

Special Reserve.

Fusilier Battalion 58th Regiment at Etoile de Chasse.

1st Heavy Battery in the emplacement at the Porte Jaune.

LEFT WING.

Vaucresson Outpost Detachment.

Colonel Eyl.

Advanced Post of 5th Rifle Battalion (from the Garches Plateau along the outer wall of Buzanval Park to Buzanval Château).

1st Battalion 59th Regiment (Redoubts at the Haras and as far as Garches).

2nd Battalion 59th Regiment (from Villeneuve to Hospice Brezin).

Special Reserve.

Fusilier Battalion 59th Regiment at the Hospice Brezin.

1st Battalion 7th Grenadiers on working party at Clos Tontain.

2nd Light Battery in the Hospice emplacement.

MAIN RESERVE (Jardy Plateau).

Major-General v. Voigts-Rhetz, Commanding 18th Infantry Brigade.

Fusilier Battalion 7th Grenadiers, 1st and Fusilier Battalions 47th Regiment; 1st Light and 2nd Heavy Batteries; 2nd Field Division.

 * The 5th Rifles were at Ville d'Avray, Marnes, and Vaucresson.

10TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

Lient.-General v. Schmidt.

OUTPOSTS AND SPECIAL RESERVES.

Major-General Walther v. Monbary, Commanding 20th Infantry Brigade.

RIGHT WING.

Jägershaüschen Outpost Detachment* (from Bazanval Château to La Jonchère).

Colonel Michelmann.

2nd Battalion 50th Regiment.

9th, 10th, and 12th Companies 50th Regiment.

LEFT WING.

Bougival Outpost Detachment (from La Jonchère to the Seine via Malmaison).

Colonel v. Heinemann.†

2nd Company 37th Fusiliers.

2nd Battalion " "

Special Reserve.‡

At La Celle St. Cloud: 1st, 4th, 9th, 11th, and 12th Companies 37th Fusiliers.

1st Battalion and 11th Company 50th Regiment.

At St. Michel: 5th Heavy and 5th Light Batteries.

Main Reserve§ (Beauregard).

Major-General v. Henning auf Schönhoff, Commanding 19th Infantry Brigade.

19th Infantry Brigade.

14th Dragoons.

6th Heavy and 6th Light Batteries and Horse Artillery Division.

Employed elsewhere:

6th and 8th Companies 47th Regiment, to protect No. 1 Siege Battery.

5th and 7th Companies 47th Regiment, at disposal of 21st Infantry Division at Sèvres.

2nd Battalion 7th Grenadiers on guard at Versailles.

2½ squadrons 4th Dragoons, at disposal of Commandant at Versailles.

1½ " " at Ville d'Avray, Vaucresson, and Marnes.

3rd Company 37th Fusiliers, as escort to the trains at St. Cyr.

10th " " on working party at St. Cucufa.

1st Field Pioneer Company, at the Les Tanneries bridge.

* Near Porte de Longboyau.

† Colonel v. Heinemann commanded the outposts on both wings.

‡ The special reserve was common to both wings.

§ The men of the 2nd and 3rd Field Pioneer Companies not on working party held themselves in readiness to march at Ville d'Avray. See Appendix CXLVII.

APPENDIX CLI.

TABLE SHOWING THE BATTERIES ON THE NORTH AND EAST FRONTS.

No. of battery.	Position.	Armament.*	Direction of Fire.	Distance.	Remarks.
21	North-east corner of Le Bourget	6 12-cm. guns	Fort Aubervilliers	Mètres. 3,700	(1) The distances are calculated to the centre of the fort or to the church steeples, as the case may be.
22	Halfway between Garges and Stains	6 15-cm. guns	Fort de l'Est and Aubervilliers	3,500—5,300	
23	On the heights north of Stains.	6 short 15-cm. guns	Double Couronne du Nord and Fort de l'Est	3,400—3,700	
24		8 12-cm. guns	Double Couronne, Fort de la Briche, and Villetaneuse Château.	3,400—4,000	
25		8 12-cm. guns	Double Couronne du Nord	2,250	
26	East of } Pierrefitte	3 21-cm. rifled mortars	Ditto, and Fort de la Briche	2,600—2,700	(2) For the batteries directed against Double Couronne and Fort de la Briche, the distance for the bombardment of St. Denis is to be increased by about 1,000 mètres.
27	West of }	6 15-cm. guns	Ditto	2,500—2,600	
28	North-east of Villetaneuse	8 12-cm. guns	ditto	4,000—4,600	
29†	Fontaine Dupin, south of Montmorency	6 15-cm. guns	Ditto, and Villetaneuse Château	2,100—3,700	
30	North-east of }	8 12-cm. guns	Ditto, and the inundation dam between Double Couronne du Nord and Fort de la Briche	2,400—3,900	
31	South of }	4 short 15-cm. guns	Ditto	2,750—4,200	
32	West of }	6 15-cm. guns	Fort Aubervilliers and the La Chapelle, La Villette, and Belleville Quarters	3,900 or 6,500—7,000	
33	North of Le Bourget	5 15-cm. guns	Gravelle and Faisanderie Redoubts and also Vincennes	4,000—6,000	
34‡	North-east of Champigny-sur-Marne	4 15-cm. guns	Double Couronne du Nord and Fort de la Briche	5,000—6,300	
35	North-west of Villiers-sur-Marne	6 12-cm. guns		1,400—2,300	
36	South-west of Stains	8 12-cm. guns		2,000—2,200	
37	South-west of Pierrefitte	8 12-cm. guns		1,400—2,100	
38	West of Villetaneuse Château	6 15-cm. guns			
39		8 12-cm. guns			

* Short 15-cm. guns are so indicated in this table.

† Not numbered on Plan 15.

‡ Battery No. 43 situated at Epinal les St. Denis is shown on Plan 15 as No. 34.

APPENDIX CLII.

ARMAMENT OF THE BATTERIES OF THE EAST AND NORTH
ATTACK (4TH—28TH JANUARY).

Battery.	4th January.			21st January.				28th January.				Remarks.
	15 cm.		12 cm.	15 cm.		12 cm.	21 cm. mortar.	15 cm.		12 cm.	21 cm. rifled mtr.	
	Long.	Short.		Long.	Short.			Long.	Short.			
1	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	Never opened fire. } Armament suspended in consequence of armistice.
2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	
4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
6	6	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	
7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
8	—	—	6	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	
9	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
10	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
11	6	—	—	} 8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
12	3	—	—		—	—	—	—	4	—	—	
13	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
14	4	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	
15	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	
16	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	
17	—	4	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	
18	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	
19	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	
20	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
21	30	10	36	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	
22	} 76 guns.			6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	
23				—	6	—	—	—	6	—	—	
24				—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	
25				—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	
26				—	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	
27				6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	
28				—	—	8	—	—	—	8	—	
29				6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
30				—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	
31				—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	
32				6	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	
33				} 44 20 58 3				5	—	—	—	
34								4	—	—	—	
35				} 125 guns.				—	—	6	—	
36								—	—	8	—	
37								—	—	8	—	
38								6	—	—	—	
39								—	—	8	—	
40								—	—	—	—	
41								—	—	—	—	
42								—	—	—	—	
43								—	—	—	—	
49 20 58 3												
130 guns.												

APPENDIX CLIII.

DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND TROOPS FOR THE ARTILLERY
ATTACK ON THE NORTH AND EAST FRONTS OF PARIS.

Commander of Siege Artillery : Colonel Bartsch, 11th Artillery Brig.
 Chief of the Staff : Lieut.-Colonel Himpe, 8th Artillery Brigade.
 Adjutants : Captain Reinsdorff, 1st Artillery Brigade.
 2nd Lieutenant v. Fransecky, 7th Artillery Brigade.
 Knebel, Guard "
 Siege Park : Major Hoffmann, 7th Artillery Brigade.
 Captain Collet, Instructor and Technical Assistant, 8th
 Artillery Brigade.
 1st Lieutenant Kortmann, 7th Artillery Brigade.
 Osterloh, 12th "
 2 Store Lieutenants. "
 4 Lieutenant Fireworkers.

TROOPS.

1st Division : Lieut.-Colonel Gärtner, 10th Artillery Brigade.
 1st Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt., Captain Mogilowski.
 9th " " " " " 1st Lieutenant Ihlenfeld.
 6th " 2nd " " " Captain Thilo.
 16th " 8th " " " 1st Lieutenant v. Ascheberg.
 4th " 12th " " " Captain Bucher.
 2nd Division : Lieut.-Colonel Bothe, 8th Artillery Brigade.
 6th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt., Captain Siehr.
 9th " 4th " " " Schilde.
 8th " 8th " " " Bodecker.
 2nd " 12th " " " v. Wolf.
 3rd Division : Lieut.-Colonel Jahn, 11th Artillery Brigade.
 3rd Co. 1st Fort. Art. Regt., Captain Hildebrand.
 4th " 3rd " " " 1st Lieutenant Grandke.
 5th " 6th " " " Captain v. d. Lochau.
 13th " " " " " Stephan.
 4th Division : Major v. Schmeling, 1st Artillery Brigade.
 2nd Co. 1st Fort. Art. Regt., Captain Nollau.
 7th " 6th " " " v. Berge.
 15th " " " " " 1st Lieutenant Pfister.
 Detachment of Experimental Company of the Ordnance Experimental
 Committee, under Captain Pirscher.
 5th Division : Major Bausch, 5th Artillery Brigade.
 2nd Co. 10th Fort. Art. Regt., Captain Streich.
 4th " 2nd " " " Sonnenberg.
 12th " " " " " Drewsen.

APPENDIX CLIV.

DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND TROOPS FOR THE ENGINEER
ATTACK ON THE NORTH FRONT OF PARIS.

Engineer-in-Chief: Lieut.-Colonel Oppermann, Commanding Engineers
and Pioneers of Meuse Army.

Engineer Officer of the Staff: Captain Bornemann.

Adjutant: 1st Lieutenant Hoffmann I.

Commander of Pioneers: Lieut.-Colonel Bogun v. Wangenheim, Com-
manding Engineers and Pioneers of Guard
Corps.*

TROOPS.

1st Fort. Pion. Co. 1st Army Corps, Captain Andreae.

1st " " " IVth " " 1st Lieutenant Siewert.

Also the Field Pioneer Companies of the Meuse Army when not
employed on works connected with the investment.

* By Royal Cabinet Order of 11. 12, 70 appointed to command 2nd Grenadiers of the Guard. In the middle of January Lieut.-Colonel v. Eltester, commanding Engineers and Pioneers of IVth Army Corps, was appointed to conduct the engineering works before St. Denis.

APPENDIX CLV.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES AMONG THE TROOPS INVESTING PARIS IN
JANUARY, 1871.*

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
1st January.													
IVth -	7th Dragoons -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Vth -	58th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
VIth -	38th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	23rd Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IInd Bav.	15th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
2nd January.													
IVth -	96th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth -	58th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIIth -	100th Body Guard Grenadiers	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
G. Landw. Divn.	1st Guard Gren. Landw. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Fort. Pioneers	1st Fort. Pion. Co., XIIth A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
3rd January.													
Guard -	1st Grenadiers of the Guard -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	6	-	-	8	-
IInd -	9th Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	10th Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	80th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIIth -	103rd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Würt. Divn.	5th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Artillery	1st Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4th January.													
VIth -	10th Grenadiers -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIIth -	101st Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-
	106th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Ist Bav. -	3rd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-
	12th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
5th January.													
Guard -	2nd Grenadiers of the Guard -	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	4	-
Vth -	4th Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	37th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	Corps Staff -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	51st Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	80th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
XIIth -	100th Body Guard Grenadiers	-	-	-	-	4	-	2	-	-	-	6	-
	101st Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
Ist Bav. -	2nd Rifle Battalion -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	3
IInd Bav.	6th Regiment -	-	4	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	7	-

* The losses between the 4th and 16th January in the 11th and 13th Cavalry Brigades (5th Cav. Divn.) are here shown. At other times for this Division see Appendices CX, CXXII, and CXXVII.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
IIInd Bav.	8th Rifle Battalion - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Sanitary Company - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	10th Rifle Battalion - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	1	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	7th Co. 2nd " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 3rd " - - -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	7th Co. 5th " - - -	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	8th Co. 5th " - - -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	1st Co. 7th " - - -	-	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	4th Co. 8th " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	13th Co. 8th " - - -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	Staff 1st Divn. Bav. Fort. Art.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Fort. Pion.	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. IIInd A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Bav. Fort. Engineer Division	-	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
6th January.													
Guard -	Fusiliers of the Guard - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth -	47th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vlth -	51st Regiment - - -	-	3	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	6	-
	62nd Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	87th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
IIInd Bav.	15th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
Siege Art.	1st Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	6th Co. Guard " - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	7th Co. Guard " - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	9th Co. Guard " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Co. 2nd " - - -	-	2	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	1	8	-
	2nd Co. 3rd " - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	10th Co. 3rd " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	13th Co. 3rd " - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	9th Co. 4th " - - -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	8th Co. 5th " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 7th " - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	9th Co. 7th " - - -	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	2nd Co. 8th " - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Fort Pion.	3rd Fort. Pion. Co. IIInd A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
7th January.													
Vth -	50th Regiment - - -	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Vlth -	22nd Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	63rd Regiment - - -	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	3	-
XIth -	80th Fusiliers - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IIInd Bav.	3rd Sanitary Co. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	5th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Guard Landw.	1st Guard Landw. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Divn.	2nd Guard Landw. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	7th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	11th Co. Guard " - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	7th Co. 2nd " - - -	-	3	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
	1st Co. 3rd " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Co. 5th " - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	4th Co. 8th " - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	-	2	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	1	6	-
Fort Pion.	2nd Bav. Fort. Eng. Co. - - -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
8th January.													
IVth -	86th Fusiliers - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	96th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Grenadiers - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Vth -	5th Pioneer Battalion - - -	-	2	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
Vlth -	51st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	80th Fusiliers - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IIInd Bav.	8th Rifle Battalion - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	14th Regiment - - -	-	5	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
	3rd Rifle Battalion - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Sanitary Co. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	5th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
5th Cav. Divn.	4th Cuirassiers - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Siege Art.	1st Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Art.	3rd Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	7th Co. 5th " -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	1st Co. 7th " -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bay. Art. Regt. -	-	3	-	1	16	-	-	-	-	1	19	-
9th January.													
-	4th Grenadiers of the Guard -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	96th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	37th Fusiliers -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	87th Regiment -	-	4	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	14	-
-	100th Body Guard Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
av.	5th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
Art.	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
-	2nd Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
-	5th Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	13th Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
10th January.													
-	3rd Foot Guards -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	86th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	47th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
-	1st Cavalry Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1
v.	3rd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
av.	6th Regiment -	-	2	-	1	3	-	18	-	-	1	23	-
Divn.	2nd Rifle Battalion -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	2nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
and. Div.	1st Guard Gren. Landw. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
r. Divn.	4th Cuirassiers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	8	8
Art.	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	7th Co. Guard " -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
-	7th Co. 2nd " -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
-	1st Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
-	3rd Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
-	11th Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	1st Co. 5th " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	7th Co. 5th " -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
11th January.													
-	1st Field Pion. Co. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	3rd Sanitary Detachment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	38th Fusiliers -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	22nd Regiment -	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
-	62nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
-	23rd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	6th Field Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
-	80th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	104th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	5	-
av.	14th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	3rd Battn. 11th Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
and. Div.	1st Guard Gren. Landw. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Art.	7th Co. 2nd Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	3rd Co. 3rd " -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
-	11th Co. 3rd " -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
-	7th Co. 5th " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	3rd Fort. Batty. 1st Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
12th January.													
-	6th Field Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	11th Rifle Battalion -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
-	105th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	106th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
iv.	6th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	14th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Art.	7th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	11th Co. Guard " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	3rd Co. 3rd " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	1st Co. 5th " -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
-	8th Co. 5th " -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bayn. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
-	2nd Fort. Batty. 4th " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-

		Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
15th January.													
Guard -	3rd Grenadiers of the Guard -	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	14	-
	4th " " " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth -	7th Grenadiers " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	6th Grenadiers " " -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	87th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
Ind Bav.	14th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	15th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Siege Art.	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Co. Guard " " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Co. 3rd " " -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	1st Co. 5th " " -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
Fort. Pion.	3rd Fort. Pion. Co. Vth A.C.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14th January.													
Guard -	1st Guard Lancers -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
IVth -	71st Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth -	16th Grenadiers -	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
XIth -	101st Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
XIth -	101st Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Ind Bav.	14th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
	15th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Würt. Divn.	5th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Fort. Pion.	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. IIIrd A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd " " " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
15th January.													
Guard -	4th Foot Guards -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	1st Grenadiers of the Guard -	-	2	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
	3rd Guard Lancers -	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth -	50th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Vth -	10th Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	6th Rifle Battalion -	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	87th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
XIth -	103rd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-
Ind Bav.	14th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	5th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Battn. 11th Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	Staff -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	9th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	13th Co. 3rd " " -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
	8th Co. 5th " " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	12th Co. 5th " " -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	6th Field Art. Regt. " -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	3	-
	2nd " 4th " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th " 4th " " -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Fort. Pion.	Bavarian Fort. Eng. Divn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
16th January.													
XIth -	82nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth -	130th Body Guard Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	101st " " " " -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	103rd Regiment " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
1st Bav.	1st Cavalry Regiment -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	10th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Ind Bav.	14th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Rifle Battalion -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	9th Regiment -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Battn. 1st. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Würt. Divn.	2nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
5th Cav. Divn.	17th Hussars -	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Siege Art.	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 3rd " " -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 5th " " -	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
17th January.													
Vth -	58th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-

Army Corps, &c.		Staff and Regiment.		Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
				Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Vth	-	10th Grenadiers	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		18th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		51st Regiment	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
		6th Rifle Battalion	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		62nd Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		6th Field Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
Xth	-	80th Fusiliers	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
IIad Bav.	-	7th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		5th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Siege Art.	-	7th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
		7th Co. 2nd	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		3rd Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
		1st Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
		2nd Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
		7th Co. 5th	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		8th Co. 5th	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
		2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
		2nd " 4th "	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
18th January.															
IVth	-	26th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Vth	-	82nd Regiment	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IIad Bav.	-	6th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
		14th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
		15th Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grd. Land. Div.	-	1st Guard Gren. Landw. Regt.	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	-	8th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
		2nd Co. 3rd	-	-	-	4	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
		9th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
		10th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		11th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
		1st Co. 4th	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	-
		2nd Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
		1st Co. 5th	-	-	-	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
		8th Co. 5th	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
		3rd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
		2nd " 4th "	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Fort. Pion.	-	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. IVth A.C.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
19th January.															
BATTLE ON MONT VALÉRIEN.															
IVth	-	71st Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
		4th Field Art. Regt.	-	-	-	1	6	3	5	-	-	-	-	4	11
		Total IVth A.C.	-	-	-	1	6	4	5	-	-	-	-	5	11
Vth	-	58th Regiment	-	-	2	32	-	2	50	-	-	-	-	82	-
		59th Regiment	-	-	3	25	-	5	84	-	1	-	4	110	-
		7th Grenadiers	-	-	1	28	-	1	44	-	1	-	2	73	-
		47th Regiment	-	-	1	11	-	6	39	-	-	-	7	50	-
		5th Rifle Battalion	-	-	-	14	-	4	49	-	7	-	4	70	-
		4th Dragoons	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1
		No. 1 Sanitary Detachment	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
		37th Fusiliers	-	-	1	23	-	6	39	-	1	-	7	63	-
		50th Regiment	-	-	3	24	-	3	60	-	-	-	6	84	-
		5th Pioneer Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
		No. 2 Sanitary Detachment	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		5th Field Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	3	10	16	-	-	-	-	10	19
		Total Vth A.C.	-	-	11	158	3	28	380	16	-	11	1	39	549
XIth	-	88th Regiment	-	-	-	3	-	1	11	-	-	-	1	14	-
		2nd Field Pion. Co.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
Grd. Land. Div.	-	2nd Guard Grd. Gren. Landw. Regt.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
TOTAL FOR THE BATTLE ON MONT VALÉRIEN															
			-	-	11	162	9	29	397	21	-	11	1	40	570
Guard	-	4th Grenadiers of the Guard	-	-	-	3	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	9	-
Vth	-	51st Regiment	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth	-	100th Body Guard Grenadiers	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
XIth	101st Grenadiers	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	102nd Regiment	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
	106th Regiment	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
IIInd Bav.	6th Regiment	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	3rd Battn. 11th Regiment	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
	2nd Sanitary Co.	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	Staff	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	9th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	7th Co. 2nd	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
	9th Co. 3rd	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	13th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	2nd Co. 4th	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Co. 5th	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	1	5	-
	1st Co. 7th	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
20th January.													
Guard	3rd Grenadiers of the Guard	-	2	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	4	-
	2nd " "	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th " "	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
IVth	4th Rif. Battalion	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth	59th Regiment	-	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	6th Pioneer Battalion	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth	18th Regiment	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	22nd Regiment	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	23rd Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	63rd Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth	87th Regiment	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Ist Bav.	1st Battn. 4th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	10th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Fort. Pion.	1st Fort. Pion. Co. XIth A.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
21st January.													
Vth	59th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth	18th Regiment	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	63rd Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IXth	11th Rifle Battalion	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
IIInd Bav.	15th Regiment	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Siege Art.	7th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	11th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	2nd Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	12th Co. 5th	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	7th Co. 6th	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Co. 12th	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
22nd January.													
Vth	59th Regiment	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIth	87th Regiment	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	88th Regiment	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
IIInd Bav.	3rd Rifle Battalion	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	3rd Battn. 11th Regiment	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Siege Art.	Staff	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	7th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	3rd Co. 3rd	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	11th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	13th Co. 3rd	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 4th	-	1	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
	9th Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	14th Co. 4th	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Co. 5th	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	7th Co. 5th	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	15th Co. 5th	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
23rd January.													
Guard	2nd Foot Guards	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Guard Lancers	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Vth	38th Fusiliers	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	63rd Regiment	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Xth	88th Regiment	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Siege Art.	1st Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
—	1st Co. 3rd	—	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
—	3rd Co. 3rd	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
—	4th Co. 3rd	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	9th Co. 3rd	—	1	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	1	6	—
—	13th Co. 3rd	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	3rd Co. 4th	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
—	7th Co. 5th	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
—	8th Co. 5th	—	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
—	8th Co. 8th	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	2nd Co. 12th	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	2nd Fort. Batty. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	3rd	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Fort. Pion.	3rd Fort. Pion. Co. Vth A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
24th January.													
Guard	2nd Light Battery	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
—	4th Grenadiers of the Guard	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Vth	5th Pioneer Battalion	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
Vth	38th Fusiliers	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
XIth	105th Regiment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Siege Art.	Staff	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
—	6th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
—	1st Co. 5th	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
25th January.													
IVth	66th Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	71st Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
XIth	102nd Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Siege Art.	3rd Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	7th Co. 5th	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	7th Co. 6th	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	13th Co. 6th	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
—	8th Co. 8th	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	2nd Co. 10th Fort. Art. Divn.	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
—	4th Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Fort. Pion.	3rd Fort. Pion. Co. IIIrd A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. Vth A.C.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
26th January.													
IVth	31st Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Vth	58th Regiment	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Wart. Divn.	7th Regiment	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Siege Art.	3rd Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
—	13th Co. 3rd	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
—	4th Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
27th January.													
Vth	58th Regiment	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
28th January.													
Fort. Pion.	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. IIIrd A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total losses													
		19	310	14	66	1038	25	1	72	12	86	1420	51

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.

Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Guard Corps - - - - -	-	13	-	2	41	3	-	7	-	2	61	3
IInd Army Corps - - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
IVth " - - - - -	-	1	7	-	16	5	-	1	-	-	18	12
Vth " - - - - -	11	173	3	28	409	16	-	12	1	39	594	20
VIth " - - - - -	-	18	-	5	42	-	-	4	-	5	64	-
XIth " - - - - -	-	10	-	3	61	-	-	-	-	3	71	-
XIIth " - - - - -	-	2	1	-	30	-	-	18	1	-	50	2
Ist Bavarian Army Corps - - - - -	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	3	1	1	7	1
IInd " - - - - -	-	20	-	3	90	-	-	18	-	3	128	-
Württemberg Field Division - - - - -	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
Guard Landwehr Division - - - - -	-	2	1	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	13	1
5th Cavalry Division - - - - -	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	9	9	-	9	11
Siege Artillery - - - - -	8	70	1	24	315	-	-	-	-	32	385	1
Fortress Pioneers - - - - -	-	1	-	1	10	-	-	-	-	1	11	-
Total- - - - -	19	310	14	66	1038	25	1	72	12	86	1420	51



**NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS, AND THOSE ACTING IN THAT
CAPACITY, WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, OR MISSING.**

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	5th January.		
VIth - -	Corps Staff - - -	- - -	(1) Col. v. Ramm.
XIth - -	80th Fusiliers - - -	- - -	(1) 1st Lt. Wagner.
			<i>Missing.</i>
Ist Bavarian -	2nd Rifle Battalion -	- - -	Lt. Baron v. Barth.
Siege Artillery	6th Co. Guard Fort. Artillery Regt.	(1) Capt. Hoffmann v. Waldau.	
	Staff Bav. Fort. Art.	- - -	Major Baron v. Cöster.
	6th January.		
VIth - -	51st Regiment - - -	- - -	(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Kehler.
Siege Artillery	7th Co. 2nd Fort. Artillery Regt.	- - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Lorenz.
	13th Co. 3rd Fort. Artillery Regt.	- - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Zinken-Sommer.
	1st Co. 7th Fort. Artillery Regt.	- - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Jansen.
	7th January.		
VIth - -	63rd Regiment - - -	- - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Schmiedicke.
Siege Artillery	11th Co. Guard Fort. Artillery Regt.	- - -	(1) 1st Lt. Barchewitz.
	2nd Fort. Batt. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	- - -	(1) Lieut. Jahn.
	8th January.		
	2nd Fort. Batt. 1st Bav. Art. Regt.	- - -	(1) Captain v. Linprun.
	9th January.		
	6th Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	- - -	(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Wittken.
	10th January.		
IIInd Bavarian	6th Regiment - - -	- - -	(1) Lt. Westphal.
	11th January.		
VIth - -	22nd Regiment - - -	- - -	(1) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Kretschmer.
Siege Artillery	3rd Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	(1) 2nd Lt. Reitzenstein	
	11th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	(1) 2nd Lt. Rothenberger	

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	13th January.		
Siege Artillery	1st Co. 5th Fort. Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Oswald.
Fort. Pioneers-	3rd Fort. Pioneer Co. Vth A.C.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Eyss.
	14th January.		
Vith - -	10th Grenadiers	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Wollenhaupt (taken prisoner).
	15th January.		
Siege Artillery	Staff - - - -	- - - -	(1) Capt. and Adj. Neumeister.
	6th Field Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) Major v. Wohlgemuth.
	4th Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	(1) Lieut. Lohrey.	(2) 2nd Lt. Richter.
	16th January.		
Ind Bavarian Siege Artillery	9th Regiment - -	- - - -	(1) Lieut. Kieser.
	1st Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regiment	- - - -	(1) Captain Gottschalk.
	17th January.		
	2nd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	(1) 1st Lt. Helfreich	
	18th January.		
	1st Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regiment	(1) 2nd Lt. Witteke.	
	19th January.		
	BATTLE ON MONT VALÉRIEN.		
Vth - -	38th Regiment-	(1) 2nd Lt. Lange II	(1) Sergeant-Major Czarcinski.
		(2) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Tischler.	(1) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Bonstedt.
	59th Regiment	(1) Capt. Jaüsch -	(1) 1st Lt. Berka.
		(2) Capt. v. Schöve.	(2) 2nd Lt. Baack.
		(3) 2nd Lt. Meyer.	(3) 2nd Lt. Schmidt III.
			(4) 2nd Lt. Przykalla.
	7th Grenadiers -	(1) 1st Lt. v. Gersdorff.	(5) 2nd Lt. Elsner.
	47th Regiment -	(1) 2nd Lt. Borsche	(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Rokowski.
			(1) 1st Lieut. v. Winning.
			(2) 1st Lt. Hertel.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
Vth	47th Regiment	- - - -	(3) 2nd Lieut. v. Dresky. (4) 2nd Lieutenant Matthaei. (5) Ensign Schulze. (6) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Albert.
	5th Rifle Battalion	- - - -	(1) Capt. Nolte. (2) Capt. v. Bünau. (3) Ensign Junk. (4) Ensign v. Saint Paul.
	37th Fusiliers	(1) 2nd Lt. Toporski	(1) Capt. Reinhard. (2) Capt. v. Keisenberg. (3) 1st Lt. Rennhoff. (4) 1st Lieut. v. Fumetti. (5) 2nd Lt. Timm. (6) 2nd Lieut. v. Kurnatowski.
	50th Regiment	(1) Sergeant-Major Poser (2) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Hübner (3) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Niedlich	(1) 1st Lieut. Rosemann. (2) 2nd Lieut. Barbenés. (3) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Pohlmann.
	No. 2 Sanitary Detachment.	- - - -	(1) Captain Rose.
XIth	88th Regiment	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Baerthol.
IIInd Bavarian	6th Regiment	- - - -	(1) Lieut. Baron v. Eschenbach.
Siege Artillery	Staff	- - - -	(1) Col. v. Rieff.
	9th Co. Guard Fort. Artillery Regt.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieut. v. Ihlenfeld.
	13th Co. 3rd Guard Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Schmidt.
	7th Co. 5th Guard Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Oehmke.
	20th January.		
Guard	3rd Grenadiers of the Guard	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Engells.
	21st January.		
Siege Artillery	7th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	(1) 2nd Lt. Regely.	
	22nd January.		
XIth	88th Regiment	- - - -	(1) Ensign Gessner.
Siege Artillery	Staff	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Müllensiefen.
	11th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Klapp. (2) 2nd Lieut. v. Cordier.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment. = 8	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
Siege Artillery	13th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt. 15th Co. 5th Fort. Art. Regt. 23rd January. 9th Co. 3rd Fort. Art. Regt. 7th Co. 5th Fort. Art. Regt. 24th January.	- - - - - - - - (1) Capt. Brauns.	(1) 1st Lieut. v. Niebelschütz. (1) 1st Lt. Stein- metz. (1) 2nd Lt. Thomas.
Guard - -	2nd Light Battery -	- - - -	(1) Captain Kuhl- mann.
Siege Artillery	Staff - - -	- - - -	(1) Major Eck.

APPENDIX CLVI.

CONVENTION

Entre Monsieur le Comte de Bismarck, Chancelier de la Confédération Germanique, stipulant au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, et Monsieur Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, munis de pouvoirs réguliers, ont été arrêtées les Conventions suivantes :

Article I.

Un armistice général sur toute la ligne des opérations militaires en cours d'exécution entre les armées Allemandes et les armées Françaises, commencera pour Paris aujourd'hui même, pour les départements dans un délai de trois jours ; la durée de l'armistice sera de vingt-et-un jours à dater d'aujourd'hui, de manière que sauf le cas où elle serait renouvelée, l'armistice se terminera partout le 19 Février, à midi.

Les armées belligérantes conserveront leurs positions respectives qui seront séparées par une ligne de démarcation. Cette ligne partira de Pont l'Evêque sur les côtes du Département de Calvados, se dirigera sur Lignières dans le Nord-Est du Département de la Mayenne en passant entre Briouze et Fromental ; en touchant au Département de la Mayenne à Lignières, elle suivra la limite qui sépare ce département de celui de l'Orne et de la Sarthe jusqu'au Nord de Morannes, et sera continuée de manière à laisser à l'occupation Allemande les Départements de la Sarthe, Indre et Loire, Loir et Cher, du Loiret, de l'Yonne, jusqu'au point où à l'Est de Quarré les Tombes se touchent les départements de la Côte d'Or, de la Nièvre, et de l'Yonne. À partir de ce point, le tracé de la ligne sera réservé à une entente qui aura lieu aussitôt que les parties contractantes seront renseignées sur la situation actuelle des opérations militaires en exécution dans les Départements de la Côte d'Or, du Doubs, et du Jura. Dans tous les cas elle traversera le territoire composé de ces trois départements, en laissant à l'occupation Allemande les départements situés au Nord, à l'armée Française ceux situés au Midi de ce territoire.

Les Départements du Nord et du Pas de Calais, les forteresses de Givet et de Langres, avec le terrain qui les entoure à une distance de 10 kilomètres, et la péninsule du Havre jusqu'à une ligne à tirer d'Etretat dans la direction de St. Romain resteront en dehors de l'occupation Allemande.

Les deux armées belligérantes et leurs avant-postes de part et d'autre se tiendront à une distance de 10 kilomètres au moins des lignes tracées pour séparer leurs positions.

Chacune des deux armées se réserve le droit de maintenir son autorité dans le territoire qu'elle occupe, et d'employer les moyens que ses commandants jugeront nécessaires pour arriver à ce but.

L'armistice s'applique également aux forces navales des deux pays en adoptant le méridien de Dunkerque comme ligne de démarcation à l'Ouest de laquelle se tiendra la flotte Française, et à l'Est de laquelle se retireront, aussitôt qu'ils pourront être avertis, les bâtiments de guerre Allemands qui se trouvent dans les eaux occidentales. Les captures qui seraient faites après la conclusion et avant la notification de l'armistice, seront restituées de même que les prisonniers qui pourraient être faits de part et d'autre dans des engagements qui auraient eu lieu dans l'intervalle indiqué.

Les opérations militaires sur le terrain des Départements du Doubs, du Jura, et de la Côte d'Or, ainsi que le siège de Belfort se continueront indépendamment de l'armistice jusqu'au moment où on se sera mis d'accord sur la ligne de démarcation dont le tracé à travers les trois départements mentionnés a été réservé à une entente ultérieure.

Article II.

L'armistice ainsi convenu a pour but de permettre au Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale de convoquer une assemblée librement élue, qui se prononcera sur la question de savoir : si la guerre doit être continuée ou à quelles conditions la paix doit être faite.

L'assemblée se réunira dans la ville de Bordeaux.

Toutes facilités seront données par les commandants des armées Allemandes pour l'élection et la réunion des députés qui la composeront.

Article III.

Il sera fait immédiatement remise à l'armée Allemande par l'autorité militaire Française de tous les forts formant le périmètre de la défense extérieure de Paris, ainsi que de leur matériel de guerre. Les communes et les maisons situées en de hors de ce périmètre ou entre les forts, pourront être occupées par les troupes Allemandes jusqu'à une ligne à tracer par des commissaires militaires. Le terrain restant entre cette ligne et l'enceinte fortifiée de la ville de Paris, sera interdit aux forces armées des deux parties. La manière de rendre les forts et le tracé de la ligne mentionnée formeront l'objet d'un protocole à annexer à la présente convention.

Article IV.

Pendant la durée de l'armistice, l'armée Allemande n'entrera pas dans la ville de Paris.

Article V.

L'enceinte sera désarmée de ses canons dont les affûts seront transportés dans les forts à désigner par un commissaire de l'armée Allemande.

Article VI.

Les garnisons (armée de ligne, garde mobile et marins) des forts et de Paris seront prisonnières de guerre, sauf une division de 12,000 hommes que l'autorité militaire dans Paris conservera pour le service intérieur.

Les troupes prisonnières de guerre déposeront leurs armes qui seront réunies dans les lieux désignés et livrées suivant règlement par

commissaire suivant l'usage ; ces troupes resteront dans l'intérieur de la ville dont elles ne pourront pas franchir l'enceinte pendant l'armistice. Les autorités Françaises s'engagent à veiller à ce que tout individu appartenant à l'armée et à la garde mobile, reste consigné dans l'intérieur de la ville. Les officiers des troupes prisonnières seront désignés par une liste à remettre aux autorités Allemandes.

À l'expiration de l'armistice tous les militaires appartenant à l'armée consignée dans Paris, auront à se constituer prisonniers de guerre de l'armée Allemande si la paix n'est pas conclue jusque là.

Les officiers prisonniers conserveront leurs armes.

Article VII.

La garde nationale conservera ses armes. Elle sera chargée de la garde de Paris et du maintien de l'ordre. Il en sera de même de la gendarmerie et des troupes assimilées, employées dans le service municipal, telles que garde républicaine, douaniers et pompiers : la totalité de cette catégorie n'excédera pas 3,500 hommes.

Tous les corps de franc-tireurs seront dissous par une ordonnance du Gouvernement Français.

Article VIII.

Aussitôt après la signature des présentes et avant la prise de possession des forts, le commandant en chef des armées Allemandes donnera toutes facilités aux commissaires que le Gouvernement Français enverra tant dans les départements qu'à l'étranger, pour préparer le ravitaillement et faire approcher de la ville les marchandises qui y sont destinées.

Article IX.

Après la remise des forts et après le désarmement de l'enceinte et de la garnison stipulés dans les Articles 5 et 6, le ravitaillement de Paris s'opérera librement par la circulation sur les voies ferrées et fluviales. Les provisions destinées à ce ravitaillement ne pourront être puisées dans le terrain occupé par les troupes Allemandes, et le Gouvernement Français s'engage à en faire l'acquisition en dehors de la ligne de démarcation qui entoure les positions des armées Allemandes, à moins d'autorisation contraire donnée par les commandants de ces dernières.

Article X.

Toute personne qui voudra quitter la ville de Paris, devra être munie de permis réguliers, délivrés par l'autorité militaire Française et soumis au visa des avant-postes Allemands. Ces permis et visas seront accordés de droit aux candidats à la députation en province et aux députés à l'assemblée.

La circulation des personnes qui auront obtenu l'autorisation indiquée ne sera admise qu'entre six heures du matin et six heures du soir.

Article XI.

La ville de Paris payera une contribution municipale de guerre de la somme de 200,000,000 de francs. Ce paiement devra être

effectué avant le quinzième jour de l'armistice. Le mode de paiement sera déterminé par une commission mixte Allemande et Française.

Article XII.

Pendant la durée de l'armistice il ne sera rien distrait des valeurs publiques pouvant servir de gage au recouvrement des contributions de guerre.

Article XIII.

L'importation dans Paris d'armes, de munitions ou de matières servant à leur fabrication, sera interdite pendant la durée de l'armistice.

Article XIV.

Il sera procédé immédiatement à l'échange de tous les prisonniers de guerre qui ont été faits par l'armée Française depuis le commencement de la guerre.

Dans ce but les autorités Françaises remettront dans le plus bref délai des listes nominatives des prisonniers de guerre Allemands aux autorités militaires Allemandes à Amiens, au Mans, à Orléans, et à Vesoul. La mise en liberté des prisonniers de guerre Allemands s'effectuera sur les points les plus rapprochés de la frontière. Les autorités Allemandes remettront en échange sur les mêmes points et dans le plus bref délai possible un nombre pareil de prisonniers Français, de grades correspondants, aux autorités militaires Françaises.

L'échange s'étendra aux prisonniers de condition bourgeoise, tels que les capitaines de navires de la marine marchande Allemande et les prisonniers Français civils qui ont été internés en Allemagne.

Article XV.

Un service postal pour des lettres non cachetées sera organisé entre Paris et les départements par l'intermédiaire du quartier général à Versailles.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont revêtu les présentes conventions de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux.

Fait à Versailles, le 28 Janvier, 1871.

(L.S.) V. BISMARCK.

(L.S.) FAVRE.

ANNEXE A LA CONVENTION DU 28 JANVIER, 1871.

Art. 1. *Lignes de Démarcation devant Paris.*

Les lignes de démarcation seront formées du côté Français par l'enceinte de la ville, du côté Allemand :

(1.) Sur le front sud, la ligne partant de la Seine à la hauteur de l'extrémité nord de l'île St. Germain, longera l'égout d'Issy et continuera entre l'enceinte et les forts d'Issy, de Vanves, de Montrouge, de Bicêtre, d'Ivry en se tenant à une distance d'environ 500 mètres des fronts des forts jusqu'à la bifurcation des routes des Paris à Port à l'Anglais et d'Alfort.

(2.) Sur le front est, depuis le dernier point indiqué la ligne traversera le confluent de la Marne et de la Seine, longeant ensuite les lisières de l'Ouest et du Nord du village de Charenton pour se diriger directement à la porte de Fontenay en passant par le rondpoint de l'obélisque. Puis la ligne se dirigera vers le Nord jusqu'à un point à 500 mètres à l'Ouest du fort de Rosny et au Sud des forts de Noisy et de Romainville jusqu'à l'endroit où la route de Pantin touche au bord du canal de l'Ourcq.

La garnison du château de Vincennes sera d'une compagnie de 200 hommes et ne sera pas relevée pendant l'armistice.

(3.) Sur le front nord la ligne continuera jusqu'à 500 mètres au Sud-Ouest du fort d'Aubervilliers, le long de la lisière sud du village d'Aubervilliers et du canal de St. Denis, traversant le dernier à 500 mètres au Sud de la courbe, gardant une distance égale au Sud des ponts du canal et se prolongeant en droite ligne jusqu'à la Seine.

(4.) Sur le front ouest à partir du point où la ligne indiquée touche à la Seine, elle en longera la rive gauche en amont jusqu'à l'écluse d'Issy.

De légères déviations de cette ligne de démarcation seront permises aux troupes Allemandes, autant qu'elles seront nécessaires pour établir leurs avant-postes de la manière qu'exige la sûreté de l'armée.

Art 2. *Passage de la ligne de Démarcation.*

Les personnes qui ont obtenu la permission de franchir les avant-postes Allemands, ne pourront le faire que par les routes suivantes :

Route de Calais,
 „ de Lille,
 „ de Metz,
 „ de Strasbourg (porte de Fontenay),
 „ de Bâle,
 „ d'Antibes,
 „ de Toulouse,
 „ No. 189,

puis enfin sur les ponts de la Seine, comprenant celui de Sèvres dont la reconstruction est permise.

Art. 3. *Reddition des forts et redoutes.*

La reddition s'opérera dans le courant des journées 29 et 30 Janvier, 1871, à partir de 10 heures du matin le 29 de la manière suivante :

Les troupes Françaises auront à évacuer les forts et le terrain neutre, en laissant dans chacun des forts le commandant de place, le garde du génie, le garde d'artillerie, et le portier-consigne.

Aussitôt après l'évacuation de chaque fort un officier d'état-major Français se présentera aux avant-postes Allemands afin de donner les renseignements qui pourraient être demandés sur ce fort ainsi que l'itinéraire à suivre afin de s'y rendre.

Après la prise de possession de chaque fort et après avoir donné les renseignements qui pourraient leur être demandés, le commandant de place, le garde du génie, le garde d'artillerie, et le portier-consigne rejoindront à Paris la garnison du fort.

Art. 4. *Remise de l'Armement et du Matériel.*

Les armes, pièces de campagne, et la matériel seront remis aux

autorités militaires Allemandes dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la signature de la présente Convention, et déposés par les soins des autorités Françaises à Sévran. Un état d'effectif de l'armement et du matériel sera remis par les autorités Françaises aux autorités Allemandes avant le 4 Février prochain.

Les affûts des pièces qui arment les remparts, devront être également enlevés avant cette époque.

Les présentes ont été vues et approuvées et revêtues de nos signatures pour servir d'annexe à la Convention d'hier 28 Janvier.

Versailles, le 29 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé)

V. BISMARCK.

(Signé)

JULES FAVRE.

Authorised Translation.

THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR,
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Second Part:—History of the War against the Republic.

NINETEENTH SECTION: OCCURRENCES ON THE SOUTH-EAST THEATRE
OF WAR FROM THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY, 1871. PROCEEDINGS IN
REAR OF THE GERMAN ARMY AND IN THE COAST PROVINCES FROM
NOVEMBER, 1870, UNTIL THE ARMISTICE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE
GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

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NOTE.—*The distances are given in English miles. Where paces are mentioned, German paces must be understood.*

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
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OCURRENCES ON THE SOUTH-EAST THEATRE OF WAR FROM
THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY UNTIL THE ARMISTICE FOR
BELFORT, THE CÔTE D'OR, DOUBS, AND JURA DEPARTMENTS.*

ADVANCE OF THE IIND AND VIIITH ARMY CORPS FROM THE LINE
NOYERS—CHÂTILLON-SUR-SEINE TO THE UPPER SAONE VALLEY.

THE Commander-in-Chief of the South Army† had reached Versailles on the night of the 9th—10th January, where Colonel Count v. Wartensleben, who was accompanying him, was appointed Chief of the Staff‡. The instructions given verbally to General v. Manteuffel at the Royal Headquarters could only be of the most general nature.§ It was evident that for the present he could give no immediate support to General v. Werder, who was already in contact with the enemy.|| But as the XIVth Corps was still holding its position in front of Belfort, it could not fail to be of great importance, should General v. Manteuffel succeed in operating upon the enemy's communications. All measures to accomplish this object were left, however, to that officer's unfettered discretion.

When General v. Manteuffel reached Châtillon-sur-Seine on the evening of the 12th January, the troops placed at his disposal were as yet far from being assembled, but were scattered over a tract of country upwards of forty miles in breadth at the following points: the IInd Army Corps from the Armançon to the Serain,¶ at Nuits and Noyers; the VIIth from the Aube to the Seine, at Montigny, Châtillon, and Mussy.**

12th and 13th
January.

* See Plans No. 31, A to F, and General Maps 6 and 9.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 307. App. CLVII contains the Ordre de Bataille of the South Army.

‡ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 255, note †.

§ App. CLVIII gives the composition of the force and a *résumé* of the general situation as handed over by the Royal Headquarters to General Baron v. Manteuffel.

|| See sketch.

¶ The IInd Army Corps had received orders at Montargis on the 6th January to prepare to move eastward (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 307). On the 7th—8th January it proceeded to carry them into effect. The corps marched in several columns in the general direction, by Soigny and Tonnerre, to Nuits-sur-Armançon and Noyers, where it arrived on the 12th January without meeting the enemy.

** The VIIth Army Corps had received news at Auxerre from General v. Werder on the evening of the 6th January, which caused it to prepare for its departure from that place. A cypher telegram received from Versailles on the 7th was mutilated and unintelligible. Early on 8th January orders arrived to move to Châtillon-sur-Seine (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 307). The corps guarded itself towards the south by despatching a flank detachment by way of Lichères-près-Aigremont, and marched through Chablis, Tonnerre, Laignes to the neighbourhood of Châtillon, which it reached on the 11th. Of the 14th Division, the first detachments already commenced to arrive by railway at Châtillon-sur-Seine on the 7th January. The arrangements for the siege of Péronne and the want of rolling-stock delayed the further transport. On the 11th January the Divisional Staff arrived; not until the 13th were the bulk of the troops assembled at Châtillon.

Part of the latter Corps was still in process of transport by rail.*

The great extent over which the forces were for the moment scattered formed no impediment to their further advance. It was a point for some consideration whether the march should be directed upon Dijon, to which town led several good roads over the intervening mountains. The capture of the old capital of Burgundy would have made the more impression, as the French press had been recently attaching undue importance to its re-occupation by their own troops.

But the pressing danger centred at Belfort. The Commander-in-Chief knew from the telegraphic reports of General v. Werder that that general was occupying the position Lure—Héricourt—Montbéliard—Delle, that the enemy was quiet on the 12th, but it was believed that he was on the point of completing his deployment between the Doubs and the Ognon.† Evidently the IInd and VIIth Corps were not in a position to act in that direction for the present. But should the decisive action be delayed by only a few days, their advance would make itself felt. It was therefore of the first importance not to lose time, and the march upon Dijon would have been a détour.

In these circumstances General v. Manteuffel resolved, notwithstanding the many difficulties, to march straight against the enemy's main forces. Should the latter meanwhile succeed in driving back General v. Werder into Upper Alsace, General Manteuffel determined to throw himself with all possible speed upon the enemy's rearmost troops. On the other hand, should the XIVth Corps succeed in repulsing the enemy, and the latter move in retreat, the Commander-in-Chief intended, by a change of front to the right, to move against him and his communications.

The difficulties which remained to be overcome by the IInd and VIIth Corps in their advance were of no slight order. The march on Vesoul led across the southern part of the bleak plateau of Langres by country roads deep in snow and in all probability impracticable.

Numerous streamlets, which take their rise in the plateau, flow towards the Seine and Saône. They intersected the line of march, and their deeply-sunken valleys had to be crossed by steep paths, of which the icy smoothness seriously augmented the difficulties.

The better roads across the plateau lie in the valleys, and

* 74th Regt., Fus., 2nd Light, 3rd and 4th Heavy, 2nd and 3rd Fld. Pion. Cos.
77 VII VII

and the trains. The 1st Reserve Hussars was assigned to the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, by order of His Majesty the King. Only one squadron remained temporarily in rear, in order to be employed later as messengers between Châtillon-sur-Seine and the advancing headquarters of the South Army.

† App. CLIX contains the telegraphic correspondence between General v. Werder and General Baron v. Manteuffel for the period 12th—20th January, 1871.

therefore run in general from north-west to south-east. In consequence they did not lend themselves to the march. At the same time the connection between the columns could not be easily maintained in this mountainous forest-clad country. Each column had to take its independent measures of security in every direction. The country offered little accommodation. Not until the eastern slopes are reached do we meet with signs of prosperity and high cultivation.

The march led midway between Dijon and Langres, both of which points were known to be occupied in force. Serious resistance was therefore expected in the difficult country.

Although the troops after their continuous marching were sorely in need of rest,* none could be allowed them. The same night of the 12th—13th both Corps were ordered to push forward their advanced guards to the line Montbard—St. Marc-sur-Seine—Leuglay—Aubepierre, and to attach pioneers to them. The movement, commencing from the line Montbard—Châtillon, would bring the army into the open Saône country at Selongey and Longeau. For this march, the IInd Army Corps had assigned to it the road through Chanceaux and Is-sur-Tille, the VIIth was to take any roads found suitable to the north of it.

Colonel v. Dannenberg's brigade† assembled in the course of the 13th January in the neighbourhood north-west of Baigneux-les-Juifs. It had up to that time been in observation towards Dijon, protecting the railway through Nuits-sur-Armançon, and also the arrival of the first troops at Châtillon and Nuits. In doing so, it had frequently come into collision with parts of the Vosges Army, which, after assembling round Autun in December, had pushed forward franc-tireurs into the district between Dijon and Châtillon-sur-Seine, whilst Ricciotti Garibaldi, with the 4th Brigade, had been watching the movements of the VIIth Corps, at first from Courson, afterwards from Avallon, and later from Précy-sous-Thil. On the 5th January Ricciotti had advanced to Sémur. Colonel v. Dannenberg occupied at this time Montbard, Nuits-sur-Armançon, and Châtillon-sur-Seine,‡ but contemplated shortly uniting the whole of his force more to the front, between Alise Ste. Reine

* No halting-days could be allowed during the last severe marches, and there was no prospect of any. The men's boots and the horses' shoes were in very bad order.

† See Part II, Vol. II. p. 307, note ¶.

‡ On 4th January the distribution of Colonel v. Dannenberg's troops was as follows:—

Headquarters: Châtillon-sur-Seine.

At Châtillon: 1st and 2nd Battalions 60th Regiment.
3rd Squadron 5th Reserve Lancers.
3rd Light Battery VIIth Corps.

At Montbard: 72nd Regiment.
3rd and 4th Squadrons 1st Reserve Hussars.
4th Light Battery VIIth Corps.

At Nuits and Ravières: Fusilier Battalion 60th Regiment.

and Baigneux-les-Juifs.* The Montbard garrison having been reinforced at the commencement of the movement, Captain v. Hertell advanced on 7th January with a mixed detachment† from this town along the Sémur road, but as soon as he reached Champ d'Oiseau fell in with the enemy. Next morning Major Panse, with a battalion, squadron, and four guns,‡ left Montbard for Sémur. Ricciotti Garibaldi, at the same time, advanced upon Montbard,§ marched unobserved by the west of the Prussian detachment, and attacked the town. He was, however, repulsed, and Major Panse returned in all haste towards evening; Ricciotti, however, succeeded in eluding capture, and by way of the Brenne valley reached Flavigny, where he received support from other detachments of the Vosges Army.

In view of the detrainment taking place at Châtillon, Colonel v. Dannenberg on the 9th assembled his troops on the line Montbard—St. Marc-sur-Seine, but afterwards concentrated them towards the right flank, in order to protect Nuits pending the arrival of the IInd Corps. A company|| engaged on the 11th January in foraging at Baigneux-les-Juifs was driven back thence by Ricciotti Garibaldi. But on the advance of superior forces¶ the franc-tireur leader retired on the 12th to Aignay-le-Duc, and on the 13th took post at Avot-le-Grand.

For the moment Dannenberg's brigade was attached to the IInd Corps, as it was already well forward on the line of advance of the latter. To replace it, the 8th Infantry Brigade, under Major-General v. Kettler, reinforced by two squadrons and two batteries,** was to remain behind, in order to secure the Châtillon—Nuits—Tonnerre railway, which was of so much importance for the troops on the Loire and Sarthe, and upon which the IInd and VIIth Corps must depend as a line of communication during their advance.†† The general received instructions to make such minor offensive movements as might serve to clear up the situation, and, if hard pressed, to retire along the railway to Blesme. In such case, he was to open

* As the occupation of the railway by landwehr troops was in prospect.

† $\frac{9\text{th and } 12\text{th}}{72}$, $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th Light.

‡ 1st, 4th, and $\frac{3}{4}$ 4th Light.

§ The various movements of Ricciotti Garibaldi were chiefly directed to covering the movement of the main body of the Vosges Army from Autun to Dijon.

|| $\frac{4\text{th}}{60}$.

¶ $\frac{1\text{st, } 2\text{nd, } 9\text{th, and } 11\text{th}}{60}$, $\frac{1\text{st, } 3\text{rd, and } 9\text{th}}{72}$, $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd, $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd.

‡ 3rd and $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th Light.

VII
** 1st and 2nd and 5th Light and 6th Heavy.

11th Drag. II

†† It was not until later that they could be moved to Epinal.

communications with the troops of the Government-General of Lorraine* and the etappen troops, and thus reinforced he was to resume the offensive with as little delay as possible.† In spite of the inadequacy of the means, it was hoped that the troops and their leader would fulfil this comprehensive task, a confidence which was amply justified by subsequent events.

As during the next few days it would apparently be impracticable to issue orders with regularity, General v. Manteuffel announced his intentions beforehand.‡ The most important matter for both Corps was to reach and secure the issues from the mountains with the least possible delay. Each column was then to deploy right and left, in order to facilitate the debouch of its neighbour. It was recommended that the men should have an abundant ration on the march, and all responsibility for any extraordinary measures for that object was assumed by the Commander-in-Chief. All details were settled on the 13th at Châtillon-sur-Seine in a verbal conference with the generals commanding Corps.

The forward movement commenced on the 14th January in 14th January. a dense fog, severe frost, and with roads like a looking-glass. The men's strength became speedily taxed; the marching columns lengthened out greatly, and the progress was much retarded. Not until late in the day did the troops reach their quarters: the IInd Corps, the neighbourhood of Lucenay-le-Duc and Montbard; Dannenberg's brigade, Billy-les Chanceaux; the VIIth Corps, Recey-sur-Ource and Arc-en-Barrois. To the east of the last-named place, near Bugnières, the advanced guard of the 14th Division§ met an infantry detachment which had been thrown forward from Langres, and repulsed it after a short skirmish. Night had already set in when the 2nd Battalion 77th Regiment, heading the column, seized with little loss|| the occupied village of Marac, captured a colour, and drove the defenders back on the fortress. The remaining columns had not been molested by the enemy.

The Army Headquarters were established at Boulaine.

On the morning of the 15th January the thermometer fell 15th January. to 14 degrees; the difficulties of the march were even greater than on the previous day. Still the troops reached their appointed destinations: the IInd Army Corps, the neighbour-

* Of these, parts were posted to protect the railway against the strong garrison of Langres, which was estimated at 12,000—15,000 men; and, according to "Langres pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," p. 53, amounted to 15,600 men, and even reached 16,800 on 15th January.

† App. CLX contains the text of the Army Order of 13th January, 1871, 5 p.m., with a marching table and the instructions for General v. Kettler's detachment.

‡ This was done by a letter from the Commander-in-Chief to Generals v. Zastrow and v. Fransecky, dated 14th January, 1871, 4 a.m.

§ $\frac{\text{Ist and II}^{\text{nd}}}{77}$ $\frac{\text{1st}}{15^{\text{th}} \text{ Hus.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$, under Major v. Köppen.

|| App. CLXXI contains a return of casualties of the South Army between the 13th January and the conclusion of the armistice for Belfort and the Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura departments.

hood of Chanceaux; Dannenberg's brigade, Lamargelle; the VIIth, the neighbourhood of Auberive and Chameroi; Army Headquarters, Germaine. General v. Kettler had marched from Noyers in a southerly direction to l'Isle-sur-Serain and Montréal.

6th January. A flank detachment of the VIIth Corps,* under Colonel v. Delitz, occupied Grancey-le-Château, in order to approach the columns of the right wing. The previous advanced guard of the 14th Division bent southwards from Maroc by way of Mardor and undertook at Courcelles-en-Montagne the duties of observation towards Langres. This detachment continued also on the following day to watch the south front of the fortress. It drove some weak hostile patrols before it, but in doing so came under the artillery fire of one of the forts;† it rendered possible, however, in the evening, the destruction of the railway and telegraphs in the neighbourhood of the junction at Chalindrey, as had been ordered by Army Headquarters.

In the night of the 15th—16th a change took place in the weather, and the frost was succeeded by a violent storm. Thawed snow and rain stood in pools on the smooth ice of the roads. With no little difficulty the bulk of the army reached the line Moloy—Praithoy—Longeau; the advanced guards, Diénay, Selongey, Dardenay, Chassigny-le-Bas, and Cohons.

The IInd Army Corps had not as yet come into serious contact with the enemy, but on the right flank, chiefly in the Oze valley, discovered some French detachments, and in its front found traces of the retreat of Ricciotti Garibaldi's brigade to Dijon. The right flank detachment of the VIIth Army Corps also learnt at Selongey that 2,000 Garibaldians had reached this place on the 14th, and had left for Dijon on the 15th. The patrols found Is-sur-Tille clear of the enemy; on the other hand there were weak French detachments at Épagny.

On this same day General v. Kettler moved upon Avallon, the inhabitants of which place had fired on his patrols.

The town was bombarded with shell and the barricaded entrance captured after a brief musketry action. The garrison, consisting of two battalions of Garde Nationale Mobile fled in disorder to the woods on the south, leaving behind some 60 killed and wounded, as also 2 officers and 58 unwounded prisoners. After placing the town under heavy contribution as a punishment, General v. Kettler resumed his march at noon and reached Montbard next day. His detachment had lost only 1 officer and 2 men.

General v. Manteuffel, who transferred his headquarters to Prauthoy,‡ received the news early that morning of the first day's fighting on the Lisaine.§ It was, nevertheless, necessary, at once

* 1st and IInd 1st and $\frac{1}{2}$ 5th Heavy.
15 8th Hus. VIIth

+ Fort de la Bonnelle, situated on a height to the west of St. Geômes.

‡ It remained there on the 17th and 18th January.

§ See Telegram No. 8 in Appendix CLIX.

to bring forward the IInd Corps from the Igon Valley, and give it time to come up abreast of the VIIth Corps, which meanwhile concentrated more closely and pushed forward its advanced guards farther to the east.

On the 17th January, General v. Fransecky caused the mixed brigade leading the IInd Army Corps to bend away to the right and take up to the south of Is-sur-Tille a position of observation towards Dijon. Under its protection the 3rd Division spread out in the more open country and occupied close cantonments in and around Is-sur-Tille. The corps artillery and the 4th Division moved up in rear as far as the issues from the mountainous region. 17th January

On the right flank, a detachment,* under Colonel v. Ferentheil, had advanced partly along the Oze valley, partly in a parallel direction to the eastward, and, not without loss,† had dislodged some franc-tireur bands from Verrey-sous-Salmaise and from the heights east of Bligny-le-Sec. It subsequently marched that same night by way of St. Seine, along difficult roads to Vernot, for the purpose of rejoining its Division.

Of the VIIth Army Corps, the advanced guard of the 13th Division‡ marched to Champlitte, where information was received that there had been recent movements of troops between Dijon and Langres.§ It there destroyed the railway and line of telegraph from Gray to Langres, while at Piémont a company of French infantry marching towards Langres was after a few shots compelled to turn quickly back and disperse.

In other respects the country towards the Saône was found unoccupied.

The advanced guard of the 14th Division|| reached Chaudenay, and also scouted in the direction of Langres. A detachment from the main body¶ reconnoitred from Longeau by way of Bourg towards the fortress. It dislodged one of the enemy's posts from Croix d'Arles** by artillery fire, but fell under the fire of Fort de la Bonnelle, and at noon commenced its return march unmolested.

On the 18th January, in accordance with orders from Army Headquarters the whole of the IInd Corps was assembled at Is-sur-Tille, Thil Châtel, and Selongey. 18th January.

* IInd and Fus. 3rd, and 3rd Field Pion. Co.
9, 11th Drag. II

† 3 officers, 22 men.

‡ IInd and IIIrd, 7th Rifle Batt., 3rd and 4th, 5th Light, and 1st F. Pion. Co.
73 8th Hus. VII VII

under General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken.

§ Colonel Lobbia, with 1,200 men of the 2nd Brigade Vosges Army, had brought ammunition into the fortress. (See "Langres pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," pp. 65-71.)

|| 1st 1st and IInd, 1st, and 2nd Heavy, under Colonel v. Pannwitz.
39, 77, 15th Hus. VII

¶ 1st 4th, and 2nd Light, under Lieut.-Colonel v. Grabow.
53, 15th Hus. VII

** 1½ miles north of Bourg.

A newly-formed advanced guard* reached Bouhans, on the Fontaine Française—Gray road, and, in spite of its long march, sent away that same evening a detachment† towards Gray. The detachment pressed onward as far as the bridges‡ of the town, which lies on the further bank of the Saône. The inhabitants were in consternation. After the railway and telegraph had been destroyed in the manner ordered, the detachment passed the night in Nantilly, a village situated to the west of Gray.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 13th Division moved up to Champlitte and Neuville-les-Champlitte. The advanced guard was despatched by General v. Bothmer as far as Pierrecourt, whence the Saône bridge at Savoyeux was reconnoitred.

General v. Senden moved with the 14th Division as far as Trettes, the advanced guard to Poinson-les-Fayl; the corps artillery§ marched to Leffond. A weak detachment charged with observing Langres|| repulsed at Brennes and Bourg, to the north of Longeau, a feeble attack directed from the fortress.

Although on the 18th January the IIud Corps was still one march to the rear in the movement eastward, yet the main difficulties were now overcome, and it was even probable that the passage of the Saône would not be contested. In spite of the unfavourable season of the year and the bad state of the roads, the passage of the mountains had been accomplished in a comparatively short time, without incident and with only slight loss. The enemy had made no serious attempt to interrupt the march, either from Dijon or from Langres. The rearward communications were alone the subject of anxiety.

Of the troops still absent at the commencement of the movement, the majority had during the last few days been detrained at Vauxaules, north-east of Châtillon-sur-Seine, in order to follow the army by road.¶ But before they overtook the rest, a column of general transport had been captured on the 17th at Perrogney, south-west of Langres. In a further advance of the army this condition of things could only become

* 5th Inf. Brig., $\frac{1st \text{ and } 4th \text{ 2nd Heavy and 2nd Light}}{3rd \text{ Drag.}}$, and $\frac{2nd \text{ F. Pion. Co.}}{II}$, with entrenching tool column and light field bridge train, under Major-General v. Koblinski.

† $\frac{1st \text{ } \frac{1}{2} 1st \text{ } 2nd \text{ F. Pion. Co.}}{42' \text{ 3rd Drag.}}$, under Major v. Normann.

‡ The railway bridge had been blown up on the departure of the XIVth Corps. But two other passable bridges were found, one of which, built of stone, had been mined.

§ This was rejoined by the two batteries hitherto attached to Dannenberg's mixed brigade.

|| $\frac{Fus. \text{ } \frac{1}{2} 1st \text{ Light}}{63' \text{ VII}}$, and 26 hussars of the 3rd Squadron 15th Hussars, under Captain Senckel.

¶ In succession: $\frac{3rd \text{ Heavy}}{VII}$, $\frac{2nd \text{ Light}}{VII}$, $\frac{2nd \text{ F. Pion. Co.}}{VII}$, $\frac{Fus. \text{ IIud and Fus.}}{77'}$, $\frac{4th \text{ Heavy}}{VII}$, and $\frac{3rd \text{ Field Pion. Co.}}{VII}$, and part of the trains.

aggravated. General v. Manteuffel resolved in consequence not to allow future detachments to be sent by the roads across the Langres plateau, but to move them by way of Epinal.* In this way the permanent transfer of the lines of communication to Epinal, which was in contemplation, would at the same time be initiated. The Government-General of Lorraine was requested to co-operate in this matter.†

During the last few days a brisk exchange of correspondence had taken place between Generals v. Werder and v. Manteuffel.‡ The messenger-posts established between Châtillon-sur-Seine and the headquarters of the South Army enabled the news from the Lisaine to reach the Commander-in-Chief on the following day.

Thus General v. Manteuffel had in his hands on the morning of the 18th the report of the third day's fighting, from which he could infer that the retreat of the French army was probable. This assumption was confirmed that same evening by a further telegram.§

The victory of General v. Werder had brought about a marked change in the military situation. The danger to the communications of the German armies with home territory was for the present averted.

The distance was still far too great to deal a blow at once from the side of the Saône upon the vanquished enemy, yet the junction of all three corps might be effected in the direction of Rioz and Montbozon. From the point of view of their own security, this course appeared the most advisable; but in so acting no really decisive result would have been achieved. It is true that considerable losses might probably be inflicted on the enemy in a series of rear guard actions; but he would only be weakened, not annihilated, as he would be thrown back on his natural line of retreat. With the restless energy which was characteristic of the French preparations, the same army, newly reinforced, would before many days have to be again encountered.

A very different condition of things would result were General v. Manteuffel to act up to his original intention and throw himself with the IInd and VIIth Corps upon the lines of communication of the East Army. The latter could then only effect its retreat through the narrow zone between the Saône and the Swiss frontier, the practicability of which is much hampered by the parallel ridges of the Jura Mountains. General Bourbaki was obliged to follow with the mass of his army the roads along the Doubs. Besançon offered him the first point of support,

* This arrangement applied to the 1st Battalion 74th Regiment, as well as to the greater part of the trains and columns attached to the 14th Division. The battalion did not join its corps until 5th February.

† On the motion of the Commander-in-Chief, General v. Zastrow ordered the 14th Division to detach a flying column towards St. Loup.

‡ See Appendix CLIX.

§ See Telegrams Nos. 11 and 13 in Appendix CLIX.

and this direction brought him at once into collision with General v. Manteuffel. Should the Germans succeed in barring the valley of the Saône below Besançon and repulse a last attack, waged probably with the energy of despair, the only mode of egress left to the enemy would be the difficult defiles of the Jura.

In regard to the distances, it was possible to bar the adversary's march, but the enterprise was replete with danger.

Although the French corps would probably be found in a shattered state, in point of numbers they were far superior to the two Prussian corps. The communications of these latter with the rest of the army and with home territory were even now insecure, and they must be entirely severed when the Saône, the Ognon, and the Doubs were crossed. Besançon would be in front, the fortress of Langres, the strongly occupied and intrenched Dijon, and the small fortress of Auxonne in flank and rear, and they must be prepared to accept decisive battle with their front facing their base of operations.

The march of the Corps would lie through a comparatively thinly-populated and inhospitable district, in which the daily quartering of the troops, a necessity at this inclement season, and their rationing, in the absence of supplies from the rear, would be difficult, while the practicability of the defiles was doubtful; so that they could not but look forward with absolute certainty to the greatest privations and hardships. Nevertheless, General v. Manteuffel resolved upon the bolder course, as promising the greater results.*

How far the adversary had progressed in his retreat, and whether he had taken the right or left bank of the Doubs, was not known; it therefore appeared necessary to secure the passages of the river below Besançon, so as to be able to encounter him in good time on both banks.

CHANGE OF FRONT TO THE RIGHT OF THE IIND AND VIIITH ARMY CORPS, AND THEIR ADVANCE TO THE DOUBS.


The orders issued, before the arrival of the latest intelligence, by General v. Manteuffel for the 19th January, had still kept in view the continuation of the movement eastward, while at the same time initiating the change of front to the right which had become probable.


19th January.

On the 19th January† the advanced guard of the IInd Corps found that Gray, which had been occupied up to the previous day, was now clear of the enemy. The troops crossed the two

* General Count v. Moltke reported to the following effect to His Majesty :—
"General v. Manteuffel's movement is extremely bold, but it may lead to the greatest results. Should he suffer a check he ought not to be blamed, for in order to gain great successes something must be risked."

† See Sketch.





remaining intact bridges over the Saône, and occupied quarters in the town. The 3rd Division reached Autrey and its environs; Dannenberg's mixed brigade, Fontaine Française; the corps artillery, St. Seine l'Eglise; whilst half of the 4th Division remained at Thil Châtel, in order to observe the enemy at Dijon, whose outposts were some nine miles distant.*

The advanced guard of the 13th Division reached Savoyeux, where the railway bridge had been found quite passable;† an additional means of passage had been commenced at Seveux with the aid of the light field bridge train.‡ For this purpose, the 2nd Field Pioneer Company was transferred from the 14th to the 13th Division. Major Treumann superintended the work. About 8 o'clock that evening a military bridge, 62 yards long, was in readiness immediately above the place.§

The main body followed as far as Dampierre-sur-Salon; the right flank detachment proceeded to Vereux, with the object of forming a link with the IInd Corps. The 14th Division, on the left of the 13th, marched with the advanced guard to Lavoncourt, with the main body to Vaite, and sent forward a flying column|| towards St. Loup-les-Luxeuil in order to endeavour to establish connection with the troops on the new etappen line through Epinal and with Colonel v. Willisen. The corps artillery VIIth Corps moved to the neighbourhood of Champlitte. General v. Manteuffel transferred his headquarters from Prauthoy to Fontaine Française; he here received a telegraphic report from General v. Werder that he intended following the retreating foe on the 19th with the advanced guards, and on the 20th with the main body, and that he would advance in the direction of Lure, by way of Béverne, as also upon Saulnot and upon Arcey. A later despatch supplemented this news to the effect that the line Noroy-le-Bourg—Villersexel—Onans would be reached on the 20th.¶

On the 20th January** the decisive change in the previous 20th January. direction of march took place.

* At Arceau, Norges-la-Ville, and Savigny-le-Sec.

† A destroyed arch had been repaired by the French.

‡ A wire suspension bridge at Seveux was destroyed and could not easily be repaired.

§ The great depth of water necessitated five floating supports, so that five half-pontoons had to be formed into rafts, and the bridge was only fit for infantry and cavalry. The ice drift necessitated the bridge being displaced after completion. In the night it became necessary to remove the bridge altogether, so that on the 20th the reconstruction had to be commenced afresh.

|| $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd and 50 men of the 39th Fusiliers, under 1st Lieutenant v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff.

This officer, moving through the district which French raiding parties had made anything but secure, reached St. Loup on the 21st January, whence a garde mobile battalion was just retiring in the direction of Conflans. He then opened connection with the etappen troops and with Colonel Baron v. Willisen, and subsequently escorted some trains and reservists of the VIIth Corps to the South Army. After taking part on his way in operations against Auxonne, he rejoined his corps on 4th February.

¶ See Telegrams Nos. 16 and 17 in Appendix CLIX.

** See Sketch.

By order from the army headquarters,* which this day moved to Gray, the IInd Corps, forming the pivot of the change of front to the right, was to assemble in the course of the day with its main forces at Gray, chiefly on the left bank of the Saône, while the advanced guard was to be pushed forward to Pesmes. The VIIth Corps was likewise ordered to cross the river, and then move up abreast of the IInd at Sauvigney-les-Angirey and Citey. The advanced guard was to move upon Besançon, and to reconnoitre and watch in the direction of Rioz. General v. Kettler was entrusted with the operations against Dijon, while a detachment of the 7th Infantry Brigade was ordered to maintain connection with him for the time being.

In carrying out these movements the advanced guard of the IInd Corps came into collision with the enemy† at Pesmes. Some 200 mobile guards had established themselves on the south bank of the Ognon, and endeavoured to prevent the Prussian pioneers from constructing the bridge which they had taken in hand on reaching the river.

The adversary was, however, quickly driven off by artillery fire, and the bridge completed. The main body of the 3rd Division and the corps artillery passed to the left bank of the Saône, Dannenberg's brigade followed to Gray, whilst half the 4th Division marched on Essertenne and Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, leaving a detachment in Thil-Châtel.‡

The 13th Division, after crossing the Saône at Savoyeux, marched with its advanced guard to Choye and Gy; the main body assembled in rear. The 14th Division used the two bridges at Savoyeux and Seveux,§ despatched its newly-formed advanced guard|| to Mont-les-Etrelles and Frasne-le-Château, and followed with the main body to the neighbourhood of St. Gand. The corps artillery reached the same point. The detachment¶ which had been temporarily left at Bourg for the purpose of observing Langres was brought up to Vaite with part of the remaining trains and the 3rd Field Pioneer Company.** The weak French forces retired before the Corps upon Besançon.

* Appendix CLXI gives the text of the Army Order, 19th January, 1871, 6 p.m.

† See ante, p. 8, note *.

‡ Fus. and $\frac{1}{2}$ 5th 49 and 11th Drag., under Major v. Schon. This detachment was charged with maintaining communications with General v. Kettler.


§ Military bridge.

|| 39th Fusiliers, $\frac{4\text{th}}{15\text{th Hus.}}$, $\frac{2\text{nd Light}}{\text{VII}}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd Field Pion. Co.}}{\text{VII}}$, under Colonel


v. Pannwitz.

¶ See ante, p. 8.

** This detachment had on the previous day marched from Bourg through Longeau to Frettes, and had despatched the $\frac{10\text{th}}{53}$ to St. Michel (south of Longeau), in order to lead the troops, &c., on their way to join the VIIth Corps from Châtillon-sur-Seine, in the directions indicated by the corps headquarters.



erman T
rench T



Connection with the XIVth Corps was also sought for on this day.*

The orders issued by General v. Manteuffel for the 21st January† directed in general terms the advance of the IInd Corps upon Dôle, that of the VIIth Corps upon Dampierre, on the Doubs. In this movement every effort was to be made to guard themselves in the directions of Auxonne, Besançon, and Riez, and to endeavour to open communications with General v. Kettler on the one side, and with the XIVth Corps on the other, while the railway and telegraph were to be destroyed at Dôle.

The advanced guard of the IInd Corps, under General v. Koblinski, reached Dôle at 2.30 p.m., found the town occupied by the enemy's infantry,‡ and at once proceeded to attack it.§ The 2nd Grenadiers deployed, supported by the two batteries, and rapidly pushed forward into the outskirts of the town. The enemy was evidently taken by surprise. In the streets, however, a struggle continued, the inhabitants also taking part, until ultimately the resistance was overcome, and the adversary dispersed in all directions. The Doubs bridge was fortunately found untouched, and was at once used for pushing the outposts to the left bank.¶ Forty-five prisoners were brought in. The strength of the enemy was estimated at some 1,000 men. A welcome booty fell into the German hands. 230 wagons, loaded chiefly with food and army requisites, had been left behind on the railway by the French, so that the South Army now reaped the benefit of large supplies apparently intended for Besançon.

The main body of the 3rd Division reached Moissey and the neighbourhood; Dannenberg's brigade, La Grande Rézie.¶

A battalion was left to garrison Gray and secure the Saône bridges.** The 4th Division crossed the river at Apremont,

* 30 troopers of the 15th Hussars and 20 men of the 53rd Regiment, under Lieutenant Count v. Bochoitz-Asseburg.

† Appendix CLXII contains the text of the Army Order of 20th January, 1871, 5 p.m., and of a despatch sent from General Baron v. Manteuffel to General v. Werder, early on the 21st January.

‡ Lieutenant v. Quast, 3rd Dragoons, had previously reached Dôle with his division, occupied the nearest houses with dismounted men, and held his position until dearth of ammunition compelled him to retire.

§ Order of March of the Advanced Guard IInd Army Corps. (21st January.)

Commander: Major-General v. Koblinski.

Vanguard: Colonel v. Ziemietzky.

1st and 4th Squadrons 3rd Dragoons.

2nd Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.

2nd Light Battery.

Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.

1st Battalion

Main Body: 42nd Regiment.

2nd Heavy Battery.

¶ The losses of the advanced guard IInd Army Corps amounted to 1 officer and 33 men.

¶ The brigade passed henceforth under the command of Colonel v. dem Knesebeck. The artillery and cavalry had already rejoined their corps.

** IInd.

where there was a practicable bridge, and occupied quarters in and round Aubigney. The connecting detachment at Thil Châtel followed as far as Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, the corps artillery to the neighbourhood of Pesmes.

Engagements
on the Ognon.

Whilst the IInd Corps was experiencing some resistance on the Doubs, the VIIth Corps, which was moving nearer to Besançon, fell in with the enemy on reaching the Ognon. The advanced guard of the 13th Division, reinforced for the day,* and under the orders of General v. d. Osten Sacken, had to dislodge from Marnay a garde mobile battalion detached thither from the fortress; in its retreat, the battalion destroyed the Ognon bridge, although not effectually. The restoration was at once commenced, and on its completion the march was continued; Vertière and Andeux were reached towards 10 p.m. Some 50 prisoners had fallen into the hands of the advanced guard. The main body followed to Marnay.

The advanced guard of the 14th Division, under Colonel v. Pannwitz, drove across the Ognon at Etuz some 800 gardes mobiles, who likewise retired on Besançon and made an attempt to destroy the bridge behind them. But as it remained passable for infantry in single file, a detachment† occupied Cussey-sur-Ognon.

Whilst the bridge was being repaired under cover of this detachment, the main body of the advanced guard moved to the right upon Pin, where two companies of the 13th Division were already engaged.‡ The adversary retired at once on Emagny, and disappeared in the darkness; but the bridge was also destroyed. The advanced guard and the main body of the 14th Division, which likewise arrived, had in consequence to pass the night on the right bank of the Ognon.§ The corps artillery followed to Avriigny. Whilst a hussar patrol of the 14th Division, which was seeking connection with the XIVth Corps by way of Rioz, made some prisoners close in front of Montbozon, and learnt from them that a French corps, said to be 30,000 strong, was in the neighbourhood,|| a patrol of Baden dragoons from Noroy-le-Bourg arrived in the evening at

* With $\frac{\text{II}^{\text{nd}} \text{ and Fus.}}{13}$ and $\frac{6^{\text{th}} \text{ Light}}{\text{VII}}$.

† $\frac{5^{\text{th}} \text{ and } 6^{\text{th}}}{39}$ and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 2^{\text{nd}} \text{ Field Pion. Co.}}{\text{VII}}$.

‡ $\frac{1^{\text{st}} \text{ and } 3^{\text{rd}}}{55}$.

§ The restoration of the Emagny bridge was completed next morning by $\frac{1}{2}$ 2nd Field Pion. Co.

VII

|| It is difficult to determine what troops of the French army were at Montbozon on the 21st January. According to the orders issued for this day by General Bourbaki, extensive positions were to be occupied on the right bank of the Doubs from Bois-la-Ville through La Bretenière and Luzans to Châtillon-le-Duc and Miserey, with outposts pushed forward to the passages of the Ognon. (See Poulet, "La Campagne de l'Est," pp. 441-3.)

Marnay. It had found Vesoul clear of the enemy. The first connection between the two fractions of the South Army was now established.*

PROCEEDINGS AT DIJON.

On the 21st January General v. Manteuffel had transferred his headquarters to Pesmes. Since 3.30 p.m. heavy firing had been audible there from the direction of Dijon, upon which place General v. Kettler had meanwhile advanced.

Precise information was still wanting as to the strength of the hostile forces assembled near that town, and their proximity might shortly become of great importance. Some earlier intelligence had mentioned 12,000 men; on the other hand, a reconnaissance undertaken on the 18th January furnished a very different estimate. According to the statements of the inhabitants the adversary might number 30,000 men.† In apparent contradiction, however, to this report was the circumstance that these troops were totally inactive, that they had not only permitted the advance across the Langres plateau without molestation, but the Saône bridges were also abandoned to the advancing columns without any real resistance.

As a matter of fact the French Government were on the point of concentrating very considerable forces at the old Burgundian capital, with the intention of making it a strong pivot of support for further enterprises in Eastern France.

After the departure of Crémér's Division the forces left in Dijon consisted of some 20,000 men, under General Pelissier, and the Vosges Army, under General Garibaldi, of about the same strength.‡ Of the latter force, Ricciotti's brigade of some 2,000 to 3,000 men was still posted on the 13th January at Avot-le-Grand. It had, however, on the approach of the German Army Corps retired through Is-sur-Tille on Dijon, without having attempted any resistance. Colonel Lobbia, who was posted on the 13th January with parts of the 2nd Brigade of the Vosges Army on the line of march of the IInd Corps at Billy-les-Chanceaux, retired through Selongey to Fontaine Française, in order, as we have already seen,§ to

* On the same day Lieutenant Count v. Bochoitz-Asseburg, 15th Hussars, reached (*see ante*, p. 13) Noroy-le-Bourg, where he found Colonel Baron v. Willisen's Cavalry Brigade.

† Generals Garibaldi and Pelissier, and erroneously Crémér, were named as being present at Dijon.

‡ The Vosges Army had left Autun on 5th January in a strength of some 20,000 men, and reached Dijon and the neighbourhood after 7th January. (*See ante*, p. 4, Note §.)

Appendix CLXIII contains the *ordre de bataille* of the Vosges Army in the middle of January, 1871, and a return of the composition and strength of the Division under General Pelissier assembled at Dijon on 17th January, 1871.

§ *See ante*, p. 7, Note §.

escort an ammunition train to the fortress of Langres by a détour to the eastward.

In place of Ricciotti's brigade, parts of the 3rd Brigade, under the command of Menotti Garibaldi, as also other franc-tireurs, were pushed forward from Dijon to St. Seine, in order to observe the march of the Germans. These were the same who, on the 17th January, had offered a slight resistance to the right flank detachment of the IInd Corps, under Colonel v. Ferentheil.* From this period General Garibaldi, who was in chief command, limited himself solely to holding Dijon and its immediate neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, part of his troops were insufficiently armed and equipped. It was not until the 18th that 12 position guns reached Dijon. In the subsequent days, however, the forces were considerably augmented, and the French War Ministry computed Garibaldi's strength at the end of the month at 50,000 men and 90 guns.

Although this number may probably have been over-estimated, yet, in any case, the General had such considerable means at his disposal that he might perfectly well have attempted to check General v. Manteuffel's march and deployment from the mountain defiles. Such was also the intention of the Government of the National Defence.† General Pelissier was to secure Dijon, while Garibaldi was to employ his troops for enterprises in the open field and in the neighbouring mountains.

Colonel Bombonnel occupied Gray with a weak detachment. Informed as early as the 15th January, by advices from Langres, of the advance of the Germans, he had made constant appeals to Dijon for reinforcements, but had always been refused, under the pretext that the town itself was believed to be threatened. In consequence, and against his better judgment, he was forced to abandon the entirely unprotected line of the Saône. In order to do his best under the circumstances he assembled on his retirement from Gray all the detachments he could lay his hands upon for the defence of Dôle, where he opposed General v. Kobinski on the 21st January.

In fact, it was not until the 19th January that General Garibaldi started with the Vosges Army, at the time when the Prussian Corps had already crossed the Saône. He led his troops in three columns to a distance of four or five miles to the north of Dijon. Had this movement been continued even as far as Is-sur-Tille,‡ it must have led to engagements with parts of the 4th Infantry Division, and might have probably caused the Germans some delay. But the entire business remained an

* See *ante*, p. 7.

† See "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. 2, and "Dépositions des Témoins," Versailles, 1873, Vol. 3.

‡ The movement of the expedition as far as that place had been originally intended. See Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 440, and Janin, "Journal de la Guerre de 1870-71 à Dijon et dans le Département de la Côte d'Or," Part II, p. 158.

ineffective demonstration. The General contented himself with observing from a height near Messigny some movements of the 4th Division,* and then returned to Dijon with his troops playing the Marseillaise.

Although, in this wise, not only the mountain defiles, but also the passages of the Saône, had been left open to the Germans, yet the defensibility of Dijon had meanwhile been very materially increased by working diligently at the defences.

The town, as is well-known,† lies at a short distance from the foot of the Côte d'Or, at the confluence of the Ouche and the Suzon. Between these two streams, above the town and about two miles distant from its centre, stand out two rugged conical hills, on which are built the villages of Talant and Fontaine-les-Dijon. They had been arranged for a stubborn defence, and provided with heavy field artillery, so that they formed, as it were, two forts protecting the town on this side, and presented a very strong position, commanding the high road from St. Seine. The northernmost village dominated at the same time the country towards the east, and the road leading from Langres. On this side, also, St. Martin was arranged for defence, and a large earthwork thrown up, which had been connected by shelter-trenches with La Fillotte on the west, and with the fortified border of the town, at La Maladière and La Boudronnée, on the east. The road leading from Gray to Dijon was barred by the position at St. Apollinaire. This position had been strengthened with earthworks, and was connected by way of Mirande with the works on the south side, which had been commenced by the Germans and completed by the French. In rear of this front line of defence, numerous large buildings offered another line of defence, so that the defenders could have held the town even against a far greater number of troops than those at General v. Kettler's disposal.

The preparations made for strengthening Dijon were very incompletely known by the Germans. The difficulties they would present were destined to become apparent during the attack itself.

In pursuance of instructions,‡ General v. Kettler intended reaching Sémur on the 19th January. For this purpose, after leaving behind small detachments for the protection of the railway§ and the trains following the IInd Corps,|| he had already quitted Montbard, when other orders arrived from

* It was making reconnaissances in force from Is-sur-Tille, Thil Châtel, and Lux, as far as Marsunay. (See Part II, p. 11.)

† See Part II, Vol. I, p. 222, and Sketch facing next page.

‡ The order to demonstrate in the direction of Autun and Sombornon, issued from Army Headquarters at Prauthoy on the 16th, reached him at Montbard on the 18th January.

§ 5th and 6th in Montbard.
21

|| Fus. and 1st
61 11th Drag., under Major v. Conta.

Army Headquarters.* In pursuance of these, he marched that same day to the neighbourhood of Dampierre-en-Montagne, and on the 20th January to Turcey and St. Seine. Here he received orders to take steps for the capture of Dijon on the 21st. On the morning of this day General v. Kettler left for that place.

Major v. Conta, who was escorting the train of the IInd Corps, had received instructions to hand them over at Is-sur-Tille to the 4th Division,† and after doing so to advance also on Dijon.

Thus, in the course of the 21st January, the 5½ battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, which were for the moment at General v. Kettler's disposal, were now approaching the town in three columns from the west and north.‡

ENGAGEMENTS AT TALANT—FONTAINE-LES-DIJONS, AND MESSIGNY, 21ST JANUARY.§

Immediately on debouching from St. Seine, the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Weyrach found itself in presence of some franc-tireurs and gardes mobiles, who, however, disappeared after a few shots. The same thing happened at the deeply sunken valley of the Suzon, where some 400 Frenchmen were discovered, and who also retired after a slight skirmish. At 1.30 p.m., the heads of the German columns on reaching the farmstead of Changey were received from Talant and Fontaine-les-Dijon with artillery fire. The 1st Battalion 61st Regiment occupied the heights on either side of the road, the 6th Heavy Battery unlimbered to the south of it, and the

* Namely the order issued at the headquarters in Prauthoy on the 18th, that General v. Kettler was to occupy the line Sombornon—St. Seine with his main forces on the 20th.

† To Major v. Schon's detachment, which on the 21st marched to Mirebeau-sur-Bèze. (*See ante*, p. 14)

‡ Order of March of General v. Kettler's Brigade
on 21st January.

1. Column on the St. Seine—Dijon road.

Lieut.-Colonel Weyrach's Detachment:

½ 2nd Squadron 11th Dragoons.

1st Battalion 61st Regiment.

6th Heavy Battery IInd Army Corps.

7th and 8th Companies 21st Regiment.

Colonel v. Lobenthal's Detachment:

Fusilier Battalion 21st Regiment (except 11th Co. detached to baggage).

5th Light Battery IInd Army Corps.

2. Column on the Turcey—Dijon road, under Major Kroseck.

¾ 2nd Squadron 11th Dragoons.

1st Battalion 21st Regiment.

2nd Battalion 61st Regiment.

3. Column on the Is-sur-Tille—Dijon road, under Major v. Conta.

1st Squadron 11th Dragoons.


Fusilier Battalion 61st Regiment.

§ *See Sketch.*



Scale

1000 500 0 500 1000



two companies of the 21st captured Daix after a brief struggle. Strong hostile bodies of infantry were visible on the position Talant—Fontaine. In consequence, General v. Kettler, who was accompanying the central column, ordered up Colonel v. Lobenthal, caused the 5th Light Battery to come into action next the 6th Heavy Battery, but instructed the infantry to await the result of the artillery fire. Towards 4 p.m., the enemy took the offensive towards Daix, but was repulsed and pursued by the 21st almost up to his entrenchments. An attempt to take in flank our left wing was speedily foiled by the musketry fire from Daix, whither the 10th Company had also been despatched.

Major Kroseck had meanwhile, with little difficulty, defeated the numerous attempts of the franc-tireurs to oppose his march, and made prisoners of 7 officers and 177 men, who, while moving in the Ouche valley along the Sombernon—Dijon road, were surprised by the 2nd Battalion 61st Regiment.* In the afternoon between 4 and 5 o'clock, he carried by storm the village of Plombières, in spite of the vigorous defence of the enemy.

General v. Kettler now caused the fire of his two batteries to be exclusively directed upon Talant, in order to prepare an attack on this strong point. The two fusilier companies of the 21st Regiment, hitherto held in reserve, as also two companies of the 61st belonging to Major Kroseck,† were brought up, and at 5.30 p.m. the whole line dashed with loud cheers upon the enemy. The latter was completely driven from the outlying ground, and thrown back upon his entrenchments, the pursuing detachments, at the same time, seizing the houses at the foot of the conical hill. Any further advance was prevented by the darkness; moreover, a closer acquaintance had manifested the immense strength of the enemy's position. The expenditure of ammunition, which could not be at once replaced, had been considerable. At 6 o'clock the fire ceased on both sides.

General v. Kettler, however, resolved to leave the troops for the night in the positions which they occupied close in front of the superior forces of the enemy. The 1st Battalion 21st Regiment was alone despatched to Hauteville to cover the left flank. It found the place still occupied, and the companies had therefore to capture it before they could go into quarters.

During these proceedings on the west side of Dijon, the

* The prisoners found themselves hemmed in between the steep declivities of the Bois de la Combe au Diable and the Burgundian Canal. Captain Kümme had made their retreat from thence impossible by his fire; 1st Lieutenant v. Zitzewitz, in company with some men, crossed the Ouche in a boat they found, passed the canal by the gates of a sluice, and brought the gardes mobiles across one by one after breaking up their arms and throwing the latter into the water.

† 6th and 7th. The 8th was still engaged in collecting prisoners at the Burgundian Canal, whilst the 5th had been detached to escort a wagon train.

column under Major v. Conta had also carried on a no less vigorous action. Advancing from Is-sur-Tille along the Dijon road, it found the villages of Messigny, Norges-la-Ville, and the country south of these places strongly occupied by the enemy. In order to establish connection as soon as possible with General v. Kettler, in pursuance of his instructions, the major attacked the vineyards and farmstead of Messigny with the 9th and 11th Companies, whilst the 12th Company occupied the Bois de Norges, repulsing an attack made by the enemy from the Asnières heights. The 10th Company posted itself at Sevigny-le-Sec, in order to meet an outflanking movement which threatened from the direction of Norges-la-Ville. Whilst the engagement at Dijon could be distinctly heard in the south, every inch of ground of the strongly-held Massigny had to be gained at the point of the bayonet.* When the defenders at 4.30 p.m. had lost the last farmstead, they retired over the Suzon to Vantoux, breaking down the bridge behind them. But as the enemy was still holding Norges-la-Ville, and was thence threatening the weak detachment in rear, Major v. Conta, carrying off his wounded with him, proceeded for the night to Savigny-le-Sec.†

The losses of Kettler's brigade in the actions of the 21st January amounted to 19 officers and 322 men.‡ The day's fighting had entailed upon the enemy a loss in prisoners alone of 7 officers and 430 men. The strain had been very considerable upon the troops, who on the days immediately preceding had accomplished marches of considerable length, in unfavourable weather and by difficult roads. Neither before nor during the engagements had they been able to cook their food.

General v. Kettler resolved to go into quarters on the 22nd for the purpose of recruiting the men's strength. The enemy, on perceiving movements made with this intention, opened a useless artillery fire, and attempted to assume the offensive from his strong position; but was at once repulsed. In contravention of the Geneva Convention, he broke up a field hospital established at Changey l'arm. Otherwise the day passed without incident. The brigade resting in quarters was able to replenish its ammunition from an ammunition column which had arrived.

* Here fell 1st Lieutenant Count v. Schwerin, commanding the 11th Company 61st Regiment; Captain Baudach was wounded.

† He did not succeed in establishing communication with General v. Kettler.

‡ Staff Surgeon Major Dr. Born, 61st Regiment, fell mortally wounded in the head by a ball.

Major Fribsch of the same regiment died after a few days in consequence of a wound received in the skirmishing line. Captain v. Pirch had also been mortally wounded, as also 1st Lieutenant Count Prebentow v. Przebendowski, 21st Regiment.

ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY ON 23RD JANUARY.*

On the 23rd January, General v. Kettler came to the determination to transfer his troops by a movement to the left from the hills to the plain, where the more prosperous villages offered greater resources in respect of food. The enemy remained perfectly quiet, and the flank march was executed close in front of him.

The 1st Battalion 21st Regiment belonging to the advanced guard had surprised a detachment of garde mobile on the road from Hauteville to Ahuy, dispersed it, and captured a number of prisoners. The brigade† afterwards reached, without molestation, at 11 a.m., Valmy Farm, to the north of which it first took up a position, and pushed forward detachments of cavalry towards Ruffey. The country people and prisoners affirmed that on the previous day considerable forces had moved from Dijon in a south-easterly direction to Auxonne, and that this movement was still proceeding. The conspicuous inactivity of so large a hostile force tended to confirm these statements, no less than the circumstance that the villages of Bellefond and Ruffey, which were strongly occupied on the previous day, were now evacuated by the enemy.

In consequence of the importance of holding fast the troops opposed to him, General v. Kettler determined to clear up the situation by resuming the offensive.

At 1.30 p.m. the fusilier battalion 21st Regiment received orders to dislodge the franc-tireurs from the heights north of Pouilly. After a brief engagement, they were driven down into the village which was strongly occupied by the enemy, and which was now briskly cannonaded from the heights by the two batteries. On the report that the enemy was deploying against Ruffey in considerable force from St. Apollinaire and Varois, six companies and a squadron‡ advanced upon Epirey Farm. But the enemy made no serious attack, and returned after a short time to St. Apollinaire, so that a battalion§ could be recalled to Pouilly, against which village the fusiliers had meanwhile deployed. The 21st|| now dashed towards the outer wall of the village, but had to carry each separate house by storm. The enemy defended the château with especial tenacity. It was not until the place was set on fire that the numerous garrison, which had taken refuge in the upper storey, surrendered. The French artillery now opened fire from Fontaine

* See Sketch facing page 18.

† Major v. Conta had rejoined it on the march.

‡ $\frac{\text{1st, 7th, and 8th}}{21}$ and $\frac{\text{2nd}}{11\text{th Drag.}}$, a division of which was despatched to the line Bellefond—Ruffey in order to cover the flank.

§ $\frac{\text{1st}}{21}$

|| Parts of $\frac{\text{1st and Fus.}}{21}$

upon Pouilly. To the north also of the town, on the high road, two hostile field-guns came into action, but were speedily compelled to retire.

Between Pouilly and St. Martin, on the west side of the high road, lies a substantially built factory entered from an open courtyard. This, as also La Fillotte at the foot of the Talant heights, and the connecting shelter-trenches across the intermediate ground, appeared to be strongly occupied by the enemy. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the fusiliers and parts of the 1st Battalion 21st Regiment advanced from Pouilly and, supported by the fire of the batteries which had followed as far as this village, approached within 500 paces of the hostile lines. Here, however, after the adversary had also succeeded in deploying some artillery to the east of the Langres road, they were forced to halt by the converging fire to which they were exposed.

General v. Kettler now brought forward two more battalions of the 61st Regiment from Valmy Farm. The 1st Battalion deployed between the Suzon Valley and the high road; the 2nd* moved along the valley,† drove the enemy from his positions between the factory and La Fillotte and threw him back towards the suburbs. To cover the right flank from the French skirmishers which were advancing to the east of Fontaine, a division of the 6th Company ensconced itself at the Suzon brook. With the 7th Company 1st Lieutenant Luchs, in spite of considerable loss, pressed forward at once along the newly laid line of rails, which terminated in an excavation to the north-west of the factory, and scarcely 200 paces from it. The 5th Company and two divisions of the 6th followed in the same direction. The flanking fire from the factory impeded, however, the subsequent advance, and several attempts to effect an entrance failed.

A heavy fire from three sides was now directed upon the 61st. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Captain Kumme, as also the commander of the 6th Company, Lieutenant Straube, were speedily placed *hors de combat* from wounds. 1st Lieutenant Luchs‡ assumed the command of the battalion. The 7th Company was reduced to some seventy bayonets, and only the 5th Company, brought up from the reserve, was still to a certain extent intact; the evening was closing in, fog and powder smoke concealed the view; the enemy, as the firing showed, was receiving reinforcements. In spite of that, Lieutenant Luchs decided to renew the attack. Whilst maintaining his front towards St. Martin with the 6th and 7th Companies in order to guard against a hostile attack from that direction, he ordered 1st Lieutenant Weise with the 5th Company to advance once more against the factory.

* Exclusive of the 8th Company, despatched to Ruffey to cover the left flank.

† 6th and 7th Companies in first, 5th in second line.

‡ 1st Lieutenant Luchs was also wounded, and his horse killed.

This officer, after explaining to his company the task they had before them, at once led the way into the shower of bullets. By his side, carrying the colour of the battalion, was Sergeant Pionke, who fell dead before he had proceeded many yards. Lieutenant Weise, also wounded, had to be carried to the rear. As the edge of the excavation was steeply scarped in the direction of the attack, and at the time was very slippery, only some forty men were able to follow at first. 2nd Lieutenant Schulze, raising the colour aloft, led them forward, but likewise sank to the earth pierced by two bullets. Several musketeers,* who in succession bore the colour, met a glorious death, as also did the adjutant of the battalion, Lieutenant v. Puttkamer, who, pressing forward, fell immediately in front of the factory.

The fact that there was no entrance to the building on the west side could not be perceived from the excavation.† The men who, in spite of the murderous fire, charged close up to it, could in consequence do nothing, and most of them succumbed to the enemy's fire. The sergeant-major of the company led back the few survivors to the excavation. Here, for the first time, the colour was found to be missing, but in spite of the darkness and the continuous heavy fire, many volunteers went in search of it. But only one‡ of them returned, and he was wounded; the others lost their lives in the vain attempt. As the men fighting near Lieutenant v. Puttkamer had all been killed, there was still doubt as to whether the last bearer of the colour had not fallen in with another body of troops.

As a matter of fact, the only colour which the Germans lost in this war was discovered by some men of Ricciotti Garibaldi's brigade,§ under a heap of dead bodies not far from the factory, riddled with bullets and steeped in blood.

When it was quite dark General v. Kettler, who was convinced from the strength of the resistance that the enemy was in full force in and near Dijon, gave orders for the fighting to be discontinued. Under a continuous but fruitless fire from the adversary, he assembled his troops to the south of Pouilly, whither the 2nd Battalion 61st Regiment had already been obliged to cut their way through. Up to 8 p.m. the troops remained at the rendezvous, and then, leaving two companies||

* Who they were could not be noted, as all the men near the colours were killed.

† The main building of the factory forms the west face of the premises, which are surrounded by massive buildings and high walls. As the lower windows of the double-storied building were about twice as high as a man from the ground, the west side presented no means of ingress. This circumstance, however, could not be ascertained from the excavation, as a fold of the ground concealed the lower part of the building. On the enemy's side preparations had been made for producing the greatest effect of fire by turning to account the numerous windows and making loopholes in the surrounding walls.

‡ Musketeer Schumacher.

§ This brigade had defended the factory and its neighbourhood.

|| 11th and 12th. The wounded that could be moved were transferred to Is-sur-Tille.

behind to protect those in search of the wounded, moved into quarters behind the line Vantoux—Asnières.*

The struggle on the 23rd January had, however, entailed a loss of 16 officers and 362 men on Kettler's brigade.† Eight officers and some 150 prisoners were captured from the enemy.

General v. Kettler with 4,000 infantry, 260 cavalry, and 12 guns had been unable to wrest the fortified town of Dijon from the enemy, who was very much superior in force. But his energetic attacks on the 21st and 23rd, and the boldness with which the small detachment maintained itself afterwards close in front of the enemy,‡ led General Garibaldi to believe that a considerable part of the German Army of the South was opposed to him, and that he must confine himself to a careful defence of his position. The attacks were so far successful that a French Corps was chained to the spot, thereby ensuring to General v. Manteuffel full liberty of action, without fear of molestation from that quarter.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE IIND AND VIIITH ARMY CORPS ON THE DOUBS.

Whilst these events were taking place in front of Dijon, General v. Manteuffel had continued his march without interruption.

On the day of the fight at Pouilly he was already on the direct line from Besançon to Lyons, thus barring to the enemy the shortest line of retreat to the south of France.

22nd January.

The leading troops of the IInd Corps having reached the Doubs on the 21st, the Commander-in-Chief gave orders for the VIIth Corps to advance as far as the river on the 22nd, and gain possession of the bridges in the neighbourhood of Dampierre.

In consequence of this, the advanced guard of the 13th Division§ marched from the neighbourhood of Lantenne, Vertière and Audeux, to the right as far as St. Vit, which village it reached at noon without meeting the enemy. It destroyed the railway and telegraph at that place, captured a

* Two companies of the 49th had, by order of Major v. Schon, moved from Mirebeau-sur-Béze by way of Arc-sur-Tille to open communication with General v. Kettler. But, in spite of the thunder of the guns causing them to hasten their march, they did not reach Varois until it was dark and the fight over. They afterwards returned to Mirebeau.

† Among them 20 missing.

‡ General v. Kettler at the same time extended the quarters occupied on the evening of the 23rd January somewhat to the eastward.

§ $\frac{\text{IInd and IIInd}}{73}$, 7th Rifle Battalion, $\frac{2\text{nd, 3rd, and 4th}}{8\text{th Hussars}}$, $\frac{5\text{th Light}}{\text{VII}}$, and 1st Field Pion. Co., under Major-General v. d. Osten or Sacken. The advanced

guard was further strengthened that evening by $\frac{\text{Ist and IInd}}{13}$ and $\frac{5\text{th Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$.

large number of wagons—among these were thirteen full of provisions—and then continued its march to Dampierre. The nearest bridges over the Doubs* had been found intact by the scouts, a circumstance which was the more important as the pontoon column of the VIIth Corps had not yet arrived; it was only expected by way of Epinal. In any case, the material of a light field bridge train would not have sufficed to bridge the Doubs, which was some 80 to 120 mètres in breadth at this point.† The four bridges were quickly occupied; nowhere did the advanced guard meet with resistance, and apparently the enemy after his defeat on the previous day had entirely withdrawn to Besançon.‡

Meanwhile, in order to observe Besançon, the 14th Division had pushed its advanced guard§ across the river by the restored bridge over the Ognon near Emagny.

Whilst the main body of the IIInd Corps halted for the most part on this day, the advanced guard, which was assembled at Dôle, reconnoitred south of the Doubs as far as Le Deschaux. The bridges over the Clauge, the Loue, and the Orain were found intact. It is true that in the numerous passes there were barricades of every description, which, properly occupied, might have presented a serious obstacle. But the enemy did not attempt to defend them, and had either not provided them generally with guards or had withdrawn these in consequence of the sudden appearance of the Prussian columns at Dôle. The neighbourhood of Auxonne, where a regiment *de marche* was said to be posted, was clear of the enemy. Only towards the left, on the south bank of the Loue, was Villers Farlay apparently occupied.

The detachment|| despatched on the 20th to open communication with General v. Werder arrived at Pin on the 22nd. It had found Colonel v. Willisen's troops at Noroy-le-Bourg, and, without coming across the enemy, had returned by way of Vesoul and Rioz.

General v. Manteuffel received intelligence of the present position of the XIVth Army Corps¶ and of the movements of the French army, which, bearing away southwards in its retreat, might be partly expected between the Doubs and Ognon in the direction of Besançon, while part might have retired behind the Doubs. The already reported presence of considerable hostile forces at Montbozon** appeared to indicate the defence of the passage against the two advancing corps.

* One at Fraisans, two at Rans, and one at Orchamps.

† Steps had already been taken to secure the help of the IIInd Army Corps, but this was now unnecessary.

‡ It was not until Torpes and Osselle that the patrols discovered strong bodies of the enemy. Opposite Audeux the French occupied Pouilley-les-Vignes.

§ Its composition is given in *ante*, p. 12, note ||.

|| See *ante*, p. 13, note *.

¶ See subsequent description.

** See *ante*, p. 14.

It was to be presumed that the whole of the French army would endeavour to reach Lons-le-Saunier, and thus secure the communications with the south.

General v. Werder was now recommended to delay the enemy's retreat by a vigorous offensive, and in any case to prevent the Corps supposed to be at Montbozon from advancing to Gray, so that the IInd and VIIth Corps united could bar the roads leading to the south.

To these last-named Corps had been assigned as their first destination the road and railway from Besançon to Lons-le-Saunier, while the attention of the VIIth Corps had been specially directed to the importance of the railway bridge at Abbans Dessous and the Loue bridge at Quingey. Both points were to be reached in force by the 23rd at the latest.*

23rd January.

The orders issued for this day regulated the advance of the main forces up to and across the Doubs. The VIIth Corps, with one Division in the neighbourhood of Dampierre, and the other at Quingey, had to show front towards Besançon, and, by means of scouting parties despatched towards Amancey and Ornans, watch for any movements between Besançon and the Swiss frontier. Only a small detachment† was to be left on the Ognon, for the purpose of guarding the passage at Pin, maintaining communications with the XIVth Corps, and reconnoitring along the Besançon road, as also towards Rioz. The IInd Corps was ordered to push forward its advanced guard as far as Mont-sous-Vaudrey for the purpose of reconnoitring the three roads leading from thence to Salins, Arbois, and Poligny, as also of destroying the railway and telegraph between Besançon and Lons-le-Saunier. With a view to employment on either bank of the Doubs, the main body of the Corps was to remain provisionally at Dôle, to which place Army Headquarters were transferred this day; one of its brigades was to take post in rear as far as Pesmes, and keep up communication with Gray. This point was to remain occupied until the arrival of the etappen troops expected from the Government-General of Lorraine.

Action at
Quingey.

The advanced guard of the 13th Division first dislodged some hostile detachments from Byans and then occupied Quingey after a slight skirmish. The enemy, who was in no small force, retired in disorder behind the Loue as well as towards Besançon, leaving not less than 800 prisoners in the hands of the rapidly advancing Prussian vanguard. The railway bridge at Abbans Dessous was destroyed and a train of 400 convalescents was captured on the line.

The main body of the 13th Division followed as far as Byans. The corps artillery in rear of it crossed the Doubs by

* The Army Headquarters had remained on the 22nd at Pesmes.

† For this duty were appointed $\frac{1}{77}$ Ist, $\frac{1}{15}$ 3rd Hus., and $\frac{1}{VII}$ Ist Light, under Major v. Brederlow.

the bridges at Rans and endeavoured to find quarters on the left bank.

The 14th Division assembled at St. Vit and pushed forward an advanced guard* on the right bank of the Doubs to Dannemarie, where its outposts were attacked in the afternoon from Besançon as well as from the north. But the affair was limited to an artillery engagement, which lasted until dark.

Artillery
cannonade at
Dannemarie.

After a slight skirmish at Parrecey, the advanced guard of the IInd Corps reached Vaudrey. The country, which had been prepared at all points for defence, appeared at first to be entirely free of any enemy; but at Villars Farlay the scouting detachments met with opposition and were unable to reach Mouchard. The patrols also which were despatched from Mont-sous-Vaudrey towards Arbois and Poligny came under fire from the woods, and failed to make headway. The main body of the 3rd Division reached Dôle. Knesbeck's brigade occupied quarters along the Pesmes road, with the object of watching Auxonne and protecting the rearward communications.†

Hitherto only franc-tireurs, gardes mobiles, and garrison troops from Besançon had been met with, but to-day we had to deal with detachments of the field army, thereby throwing a clearer light on the military situation.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIVTH CORPS AFTER THE ENGAGEMENTS ON THE LISAINÉ.

General v. Werder, as already stated,‡ had set apart the 19th January for reorganising the regiments and corps belonging to his command and for commencing a pursuit with advanced guards.

Before Colonel v. Willisen received the orders on this subject, he had already taken the offensive,§ had met with weak French infantry detachments at Roye and Lure, and, after a few rounds of shell, had forced them to retire. He then went into quarters at Lure and caused reconnaissances to be made in the direction of Vesoul and Villersexel. Strong French columns were seen retreating to the south of the Scey brook, while Villersexel was found to be occupied in force. At La

19th January

* 53rd Regiment, $\frac{4\text{th}}{15\text{th Hus.}}$, $\frac{2\text{nd Light}}{\text{VII}}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd F. Pion. Co.}}{\text{VII}}$, under Colonel v. Cosel.

† The small detachment under Major v. Schon remained at Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, and, as already mentioned, took the offensive this day towards Dijon with part of its forces. (See ante, p. 24, note *.)

‡ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 361.

§ With the Eupen battalion, $\frac{1\text{st and } 4\text{th}}{1\text{st Res. Rif.}}$, 2nd Reserve Dragoons, 1st Reserve Lancers, 1st Baden Body Guard Dragoons, $\frac{\text{H. A. B. Light Reserve}}{\text{Baden}}$, $\frac{\text{Heavy Reserve}}{\text{XII}}$, $\frac{\text{VII}}$, besides $\frac{5\text{th and } 8\text{th}}{6\text{th Baden}}$, $\frac{1}{2}$ 2nd Bad. Drag. Total—10 companies, 12½ squadrons, 3 batteries.

Vergenne and Athesans collisions occurred with hostile detachments, which were speedily overthrown. The attempt to communicate by way of Saulx and Port-sur-Saône with the troops advancing under General v. Manteuffel had not at present met with success.

The Baden Division had sent forward its advanced guard* from Chenebier across the Rognon to Frotey-les-Lure, while the rest of its troops extended their quarters in front of Frahier as far as Etobon.

General v. d. Goltz occupied Champey; the 4th Reserve Division moved with the advanced guard as far as Aibre, throwing forward outposts to and across the Rupt brook. The main body remained at Héricourt.

At all points prisoners were captured, and numerous sick and wounded men, besides stragglers, were met with.†

Action at Ste.
Marie.

Colonel v. Zimmermann, who was charged with the duty of reconnoitring from Montbéliard along the right bank of the Doubs, advanced with 3½ battalions, 1 squadron, and 2 batteries in two columns,‡ by way of Allondans and Dung. After surprising and making prisoners of 100 Frenchmen at Mont Chevis Farm,§ both columns appeared about the same time before Ste. Marie, brought their batteries into action, and drove the enemy|| from the village, as also from the copse in rear. Upwards of 400 prisoners fell into the hands of the landwehr. The lancers pursued the fugitives. Bavans and Voujaucourt, on the Doubs, were found to be still occupied.

As the whole of Colonel v. Zimmermann's detachment¶ had been transferred to the siege corps before Belfort, and part of it was at once to be employed before the fortress, it returned in the evening to Bussurel and Montbéliard.

Although the main body of the XIVth Army Corps was still on the Lisaine on the evening of the 19th January,** this

* 2nd Baden Infantry Brigade, $\frac{1st\ and\ 5th}{3rd\ Bad.\ Drag.}$, and $\frac{2nd\ Light\ and\ 5th\ Heavy}{Baden}$, under Major-General Baron v. Degenfeld.

† For instance, 300 unwounded prisoners, 700 sick and wounded men, fell into the hands of Colonel Baron v. Willisen. The latter were given medical assistance and proper shelter. Much the same happened to the remaining troops of the XIVth Army Corps.

‡ Through Allondans: Insterburg battalion, $\frac{6th\ and\ 7th}{Goldap}$, $\frac{3rd}{3rd\ Res.\ Lan.}$, and $\frac{4th\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$; through Dung: the Loetzen battalion, $\frac{6th\ and\ 7th}{Wehlau}$, $\frac{4th}{Breslau\ IInd'}$ and $\frac{2nd\ Heavy}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$.

§ By the $\frac{3rd}{Insterburg}$. That same morning $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 8th}{Goldap}$ had already surprised Mont Chevis Farm and captured therein two officers and 60 men, but subsequently being hotly fired upon from the westward and, night falling, they evacuated it. The French re-occupied the farm.

|| Estimated at two battalions.

¶ East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, $\frac{1st\ and\ 3rd}{3rd\ Res.\ Lan.}$ and $\frac{4th\ Lt.\ and\ 2nd\ Hvy.}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$.

** See Sketch facing page 11.

day would have removed all doubts as to the retreat of the enemy. His feeble resistance, the large number of prisoners, who for the most part voluntarily surrendered themselves, and the abandoned arms and stores of every kind distinctly showed the adversary's condition.

In the course of the day General v. Werder had received instructions from the Royal Headquarters to resume with vigour the siege of Belfort, and personally to take the offensive vigorously against the retreating hostile army. To the last operation he was also urged by General v. Manteuffel, who added that he would be with his main forces at Gray and in front of the town on the 20th January, ready either to advance against the enemy's flank or bar his retreat to the southward.*

General v. Werder accordingly gave orders that only four battalions of Colonel v. Zimmermann's troops were to be employed for the siege,† while the rest were to form part of the left column under General v. Schmeling.

From the reports of the advanced troops, but more especially from the circumstance that the enemy was still on the Doubs close in front of Montbéliard and had offered some resistance at Ste. Marie, General v. Werder inferred that the French army contemplated retreating to and across the Doubs above Besançon. He, therefore, decided to wheel his corps to the left towards the river during the two following days. For this purpose Colonel v. Willisen was to advance as far as possible with his cavalry along the Vesoul road and spread out on the 21st as far as Frotey and Valleriois-le-Bois, while the Baden Division was to move to the line Lure—Villersexel on the Upper Ognon, and to concentrate on the 21st at Villersexel and Esprels. General v. d. Goltz was first to gain Secenans and St. Ferjeux on the 20th, while General v. Schmeling was as soon as possible to reach Onans with the advanced guard and Arcey with the main body, and to reconnoitre towards l'Isle-sur-le-Doubs. During this time, Colonel v. Zimmermann's 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries,‡ once more withdrawn from the siege corps, would cover the left wing. General v. Werder made no further arrangement with regard to the troops of his left wing, as they would soonest come into contact with the enemy.

Colonel v. Willisen's patrols, in their advance next morning, 20th January.§

* See Telegram No. 14 in Appendix CLIX.

† It was assumed at the Royal Headquarters that a reinforcement of the 1st Reserve Division by General v. Debschitz' troops would suffice for this purpose. General v. Werder hereupon reported that he considered it necessary to leave parts of the 4th Reserve Division for the present before Belfort.

‡ The following moved under Colonel v. Zimmermann:—The Tilsit, Wehlau, Insterburg, and Danzig battalions, 1st and 3rd, and 4th Light and 2nd Heavy 3rd Res. Lan. 4th Res Division
The following remained in front of Belfort:—The Gumbinnen, Loetzen, Goldap, and Marienburg battalions.

§ See Sketch facing page 12.

found the entire country to the north clear of the enemy, and on the Vesoul road only fell in with stragglers.

Villersexel was also evacuated by the enemy and a few shells sufficed to cause him to abandon Marat and Esprels. The reconnoitring troops were not checked until they reached the Ognon below Villersexel, where the enemy held Pont-sur-l'Ognon and Bonnal in force, on the opposite bank. A column of French troops which advanced from Villargent towards Villersexel, finding itself fired upon from the height east of the latter place,* brought into action twelve guns and several battalions near Villers-la-Ville, whilst the remaining troops bent away towards the south. The enemy likewise disappeared from Villers-la-Ville in a southerly direction, just as the advanced guard of the Baden Division from Moffans appeared on the Scey brook. The advanced guard crossed the brook and took post on the Villersexel heights. Le Petit Magny was not abandoned by the enemy until evening. The outposts of the Baden Division remained at Villersexel and Bevenge, whilst the rest of the advanced guard went into quarters north of the Scey brook. The quarters of the main body of the Division extended rearwards as far as Lure. Generals v. d. Goltz and v. Schmeling, as also Colonel v. Zimmermann, after a slight encounter with hostile detachments, reached their appointed destinations; their advanced troops gained the line St. Ferjeux—Faimbe—Beutal. The French evacuated all the villages as far as the Doubs, where, however, they held l'Isle in strong force.

The headquarters were transferred on the 20th to Saulnot.

The instructions from Army Headquarters, which reached headquarters at Bréville by telegraph during the last night,† necessitated operations which would probably lead to serious collisions with the enemy. General v. Werder was to hold him in check, in order to gain time for the movements of the IInd and VIIth Corps. The general resolved, in consequence, to concentrate the mass of his forces on the line Villersexel—Melecey—Courchaton. The movements to this end were executed on the 21st without any opposition, and outposts placed on the line Cubrial—Geney—Onans. Colonel v. Willisen proceeded to Noroy-le-Bourg.‡ The patrols sent on in advance found

* By two guns under Captain Rayle, who had proceeded from Vouhenans with the 5th and 6th ¹/₂ 2nd, and ¹/₃ Light Res., and who, in view of the superior 6th Bad., 2nd Bad. Drag., and XII hostile forces advancing against him, withdrew through St. Sulpice.

† They were dispatched at 9.30 a.m. on 19th January from Army Headquarters at Prauthoy.

‡ The Eupen Battalion remained with the two *étappen* batteries at Lure and Ronchamp, in order to proceed from thence to Epinal. The two reserve rifle companies also returned shortly (23rd January) to the command of the Governor-General of Lorraine, whilst ^{5th and 8th}/_{6th Bad.} reached their regiment, and the

1st Reserve Lancers rejoined the 4th Reserve Division. After the 23rd, therefore, Colonel Baron v. Willisen had only at his disposal the 2nd Reserve Dragoons, the Baden (1st) Body Guard Dragoons and the Baden Horse Artillery Battery. As already mentioned, the first officer's patrol of the VIIth Army Corps reached Colonel v. Willisen on the 21st. (See ante p. 15, note *.)

Montbozon, Rougemont, and the whole country as far as the Doubs unoccupied; the enemy had even abandoned L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs that morning, blowing up the bridge behind him.

However desirable it might now be that the enemy should be pursued without delay, General v. Werder considered it essential for the mass of his troops to rest on the 22nd of January.

Although the distances accomplished in the last few days by the XIVth Corps had not been great, yet they had entailed considerable effort, owing to the badness of the roads, severe cold, insufficiency of food, and the close quarters, which were but little removed from bivouacs in respect to the accommodation they offered. The searching of villages and woods delayed the march, and the maintenance of a constant state of readiness for fighting was very trying. It was also necessary to await the arrival of the ammunition and commissariat train. 22nd January

The detachments sent forward to reconnoitre found Clerval and Baume-les-Dames on the Doubs still strongly occupied by the enemy.

For the next day, the 4th Reserve Division was ordered to move upon Soye, west of L'Isle,* in order to cover this point of passage, whilst General v. d. Goltz was to advance to Mésandans and cause Baume to be watched by his advanced guard. The Baden Division was instructed to march with two brigades left and right of the Ognon to Avilley and Montbozon, and with the third† to Rougemont, while Lure and Villersexel‡ were to be held by weak detachments.

After these orders had been issued, more detailed written communications, dated 21st January, arrived from the Army Headquarters at Gray. General v. Manteuffel expressed his intention of making a movement to the right and placing himself on the enemy's communications, and, at the same time, hoped that General v. Werder would remain within striking distance of the adversary and follow his main forces whithersoever they might retire.

In order to compensate for the deficiency of cavalry with the IInd and VIIth Corps, it was further ordered that Colonel v. Willisen should move by forced marches to Pesmes with the two regiments and horse artillery battery still left to him, passing for a time from the command of the XIVth Corps.§

This officer, accordingly, moved next day by way of Vesoul, where he met with some French stragglers and franc-tireurs, who, after a few rounds from the horse artillery battery, were easily 23rd January

* A reconnaissance of the passage there had shown that, by utilising the whole of the material of the Corps, a bridge could be constructed in four or five hours, while the restoration of the permanent bridge would require 36 hours.

† With the corps artillery.

‡ The following were appointed for the purpose:— $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{5\text{th Bad.}}$ and $\frac{4\text{th}}{2\text{nd Bad. Drag.}}$

§ See Appendix CLXII.

dislodged by some dragoons dismounted for the purpose. In the evening, after a march of 25 miles, he reached Frasnelle-Château.

Of the Baden Division, the head of the 1st Brigade was entering Cognières towards noon, when the squadron trotting in advance reported that it had been fired upon from Montbozon, and that the nearest villages and woods were also occupied by the enemy. The latter, after receiving a few shells whilst the column was deploying, retired, but it was then too late to carry out the intention of pushing forward the advanced guard to Loulans.

The remaining troops of the Division, without meeting with the enemy, moved into the prescribed cantonments and placed their outposts. Two squadrons proceeded to Vellefaux, in order to maintain communication from that place with the VIIth Corps, in lieu of Colonel v. Willisen's cavalry.*

Engagement
at Autechaux.

On reaching Mésandans, General v. d. Goltz received verbal orders from General v. Werder to seize this day, if possible, the town of Baume-les-Dames. In consequence, Colonel Wahlert with two battalions, a squadron, and two batteries,† moved off for that place at 3.30 p.m. He found the enemy in a strong position on the steep heights south of Autechaux. Received with artillery fire from the hill south-west of La Bréville, he deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 34th in the direction of the heights, on and to the west of the high road, and, so far as the advantageous position of the enemy would allow, caused the guns to play upon it from various points; he then sent the 8th Company by way of La Bréville to support the right, and the other three companies of the 2nd Battalion by way of Autechaux to support the left wing. The French guns speedily disappeared, and after a short but somewhat brisk fight the companies of the right wing‡ captured the Montagne de la Boussenotte; those of the left§ gained possession of an extensive barricade of stones, which had been made on the road abreast of the enemy's fighting line.|| The adversary retired in disorder to the Aigle Heights.

It was now dark, and the barricade prevented the guns from being brought forward; the further advance was therefore postponed until next day. The troops occupied scanty quarters in Autechaux. Some prisoners stated that there

* That same day Lieutenant Brandeis rode from Vellefaux through Montbozon and Rioz to Pin, in order to open communication with the VIIth Corps. In spite of many détours, which he was forced to make in order to avoid franc-tireurs, he attained his object, and rejoined his regiment on the following day after a ride of 75 miles.

† $\frac{\text{IInd and IIInd}}{34}$, $\frac{3rd}{2nd \text{ Res. Hus.}}$, $\frac{2nd \text{ Light Res.}}{III}$, and $\frac{\text{Heavy Reserve}}{I}$.
‡ $\frac{9th \text{ and } 11th}{34}$, followed by $\frac{8th}{34}$.
§ $\frac{10th, 12th, \text{ and } 5th}{34}$.

|| Captain Sintenis and Lieutenant Baron v. Wolzogen were killed in the attack.

were still two Divisions of the 15th French Corps at Baume-les-Dames.*

A detachment of the 4th Reserve Division,† while advancing to reconnoitre towards Clerval, also came into collision with the enemy. French infantry were holding the shelter-trenches north-west of the town, but abandoned them after a brief skirmish, and blew up the Doubs bridge in their rear. The advanced guard of the 4th Reserve Division meanwhile proceeded beyond Soye as far as Fontaine.

Colonel v. Zimmerman's column entered l'Isle-sur-les-Doubs without resistance. It then, partly by a ford and partly by pontoons, passed to the left bank an advanced guard, which established its outposts on the line Rang—Blussans. But when the patrols were proceeding onward, they found themselves in presence of hostile forces drawn up to receive them. The two pioneer companies‡ at once repaired the destroyed bridge.

From the various reports which reached him, General v. Werder was led to believe that the enemy must have left a strong rearguard at Baume-les-Dames in order to check the pursuit, and to give the beaten army time for further movements. He therefore made arrangements for a serious attack on this point.

In the event of the XIVth Army Corps crossing the Doubs above Besançon, it would become necessary to take measures of precaution as well against that part of the French Army which was left at Blamont. Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow IInd had therefore been requested to attack the town with those troops which were not indispensable for carrying on the siege. On the evening of the 23rd, General v. Debschitz left, in pursuance of this plan, with 3 battalions, 1½ squadron, and 2½ batteries, formed in three columns.§

Engagements
at Roches and
Glav.

* Compare subsequent narrative of the proceedings of the French Army after the Battle on the Lisaine.

† Fus. 25th, 2nd 3rd Res. Lan., and 1st Light 4th Res. Div., under Major v. Spangenberg.

‡ 2nd Fort. Pion. and Baden Pontooneer Company. The material on the spot VII

was not sufficient to make a military bridge.

§ Left Column: Captain Count v. d. Schulenburg.

Apenrade Battalion.

¾ 3rd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers.

¾ 2nd Light Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.

Central Column: Captain v. Schmidt.

IInd Breslau Battalion.

¾ 2nd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers.

1st Light Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.

¾ 2nd Light Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.

Right Column: Major Kierstein.

Lauban Battalion.

¾ 2nd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers.

¾ 1st Light Reserve Battery Ind Army Corps.

These latter were placed at General v. Debschitz' disposal for the enterprise. The Liegnitz Battalion with 3½ divisions of 3rd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers maintained during the night of 23rd—24th January the position previously held by General v. Debschitz.

Two of these advanced through Bondeval and Herimoncourt upon Roches, which place was occupied after a few rounds. The enemy was already in retreat. There were signs of numerous abandoned bivouacs, and upwards of 300 prisoners were captured.

The third column which was advancing further on the left upon Glay through the deeply sunken Meslières Valley was less fortunate. The column was attacked in flank and rear in the complete darkness. Its leaders having been wounded* it was obliged to retire to Croix.

General v. Debschitz learned at Roches that strong bodies of the 24th French Corps were still in his front, and at the same time received information of the check sustained by the detachment dispatched towards Glay. He therefore abandoned the attack on Blamont contemplated for that night, and returned to his previous positions. His losses amounted to 3 officers and 53 men.†

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH ARMY AFTER THE BATTLE ON THE LISAINE.

18th, 19th,
and 20th
January.

On the 18th January General Bourbaki had transferred his headquarters to Arcey. The army‡ had remained at first in its positions in front of the Lisaine, where it endeavoured as far possible to find quarters. The left wing, which was most threatened, was alone withdrawn and placed nearer to the 20th Corps. Crémier's Division, which was subsequently to cover the retreat, was posted in the evening between Etobon and Athesans. Even at this stage the Commander-in-Chief directed his attention chiefly to a movement of the Germans against his communications. He had asked the War Ministry whether their march was directed upon Vesoul, Gray, or Dijon. General Roland, Commandant of Besançon, received orders on the approach of the Germans to destroy the bridges across the Saône and Ognon, to occupy the line of the latter river from Voray to Marnay, and to bring up to Besançon the 3rd Rhone Legion of the 24th Corps, which was supposed to be at Baume-les-Dames. On the other hand, the bridges of the line of the Doubs from Clerval to the fortress, were to be maintained in good order. Lastly, he was ordered to strengthen his post at Blamont on the Upper Doubs; in consequence, all the garde mobile battalions§, which could be dispensed with at Besançon, with nine mountain guns, proceeded to this place.

* Captain Count v. Schulenburg was mortally, 1st Lieutenant Zabeler severely wounded.

† Details are given in Appendix CLXXXIII.

‡ See Appendix CXXXIV.

§ So far as can be gathered, six in number. (See "Enquête Parlementaire Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, p. 715.)

General Pelissier, at Dijon, had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce the garrison of Auxonne with two battalions, and the commandant of this fortress received instructions to destroy the bridge at Pesmes.

After making these preparations, which, as we have seen, were carried out very imperfectly, General Bourbaki organised his retreat.*

It was to be covered on the left bank of the Doubs by the whole of the 24th Corps, which had to occupy the defiles of the Montagnes du Lomont, a rugged ridge, which, south of the Clerval—Pont de Roide road, forms a complete chord to the bend made by the river towards Montbéliard. The corps finished its deployment on the line in question on the 19th,† and on the following night. On the right bank, the 15th Corps this day‡ gained on the further side of L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs a position behind the Soye brook, north of Clerval; the 20th reached the neighbourhood south of Rougemont; the Army Reserve arrived at Avilley, whence it observed the Ognon down-stream. The 18th Corps, with Crémier's Division attached, occupied the road through Rougemont, as far as Servigney. In its retreat, this latter Division, as already described, came frequently into contact, at Villers-la-Ville, and south of Villersexel, with the detachments which Colonel v. Willisen had despatched to that neighbourhood.§

On the 21st the retreat of the army was continued. The 15th Corps reached Baume-les-Dames, the 20th the neighbourhood west of this town. Further on the left the 18th Corps, with Crémier's Division, halted at Chaude Fontaine and Marchaux, whilst the Army Reserve posted itself at Châtillon-le-Duc, facing the Ognon. The headquarters were established at Baume-les-Dames. 21st January.

General Bourbaki had received the approval of the War Ministry for the measures which he had hitherto adopted, but they expressed the hope that the army, after its reorganisation under the walls of Besançon, would once more resume the offensive. They indicated the possibility of concerted action with Garibaldi, and suggested an offensive movement upon Troyes and Chaumont of the 25th Corps left in the Loire district, the precise moment for which was left to his discretion. With nearly the whole of his forces closely concentrated between the Doubs and the Ognon, and with the fortress of Besançon close in rear, General Bourbaki also wished to remain stationary for the present and await further instructions from Bordeaux. He

* The movements of the 18th and 19th January were ordered by the Army Order of 17th from Aibre; as regards the 19th, other counter-orders were sent, but their nature is not known. (Compare Poulet, "La Campagne de l'Est," 1870-1.)

Appendix CLXIV contains the wording of the order of march for the 18th and 19th January from Headquarters, Aibre, 17th January, 1871.

† See Sketch facing page 11.

‡ See Sketch facing page 12.

§ See ante, pp. 29-30.

issued orders to Army Intendant Friant to collect eight days' provisions, at Clerval for the 24th Corps, and at Baume-les-Dames for the rest of the army. But as there was a deficiency of the necessary supplies at Besançon, this measure could not have been carried into effect, even had the Commander-in-Chief been able to persevere in his resolution. That same day, however, his plan had been frustrated by the news that the line of the Ognon was lost, and that the adversary had even crossed the Doubs.

In such circumstances, General Bourbaki resolved to resume his advance without delay to Besançon; he informed the War Ministry thereof, shortly before midnight, adding that he would lose no favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy. Should no such opportunity, however, offer, he would cross to the left bank of the Doubs, in order not to expose himself to the dilemma of being obliged to fight with a river at his back. That same evening, the 1st Division of the 15th Corps received orders to move off to Quingey, in order to secure this important point; the infantry was to be forwarded by rail, the remainder to march. That night, also, the trains of the army left for Besançon; the troops followed during the 22nd January. The Army Reserve posted itself in the evening at Pouilley-les-Vignes on the Besançon—Gray road; the 18th Corps and Crémier's Division occupied the ground between Marchaux, Auxon Dessus, and Besançon; the 20th followed the movement to Corcelle and Marchaux; the main body of the 15th Corps* marched to Roulans-le-Grand and Luzans, whilst the 3rd Division of this corps remained at Baume-les-Dames, and the 24th Corps on the Lomont. The trains of the 15th and 20th Corps were parked at Besançon on the left bank of the Doubs, those of the 18th and of the Army Reserve on the right, but on the glacis of the fortress. The headquarters proceeded to Roche.†

On the 23rd January certain movements were made, which concentrated the corps round the fortress. But it had already become necessary to show front in two directions.

Whilst to the north side of the fortress the 20th Corps was deployed on the right bank of the Doubs on the line Chalèze—Miserey, the position of the 18th Corps to the west side bent back southward from Miserey to Franois, towards the Dôle road. On this latter, at St. Ferjeux, was posted the Army Reserve.

The infantry of the 2nd Division, 15th Corps, crossed the Doubs at Chalèze and, passing round the east of the fortress, reached the neighbourhood of Larnod. Cavalry, artillery, and train traversed the town and moved as far as Beure; the cavalry pushed forward detachments to Thoraise in order to watch the bridges there. The 24th Corps was also ordered up to Besançon. Only certain detachments of it were to remain

* 2nd Infantry Division, cavalry, artillery of the Corps, &c.

† About 4½ miles from Besançon.

behind at the passages of the Doubs and at the Lomont, in support of the mobile guard battalions, which had been sent away from the fortress to Blamont, and to which the defence of the mountain passes had now been confided. At the same time General de Bresolles received orders to relieve the 3rd Division 15th Corps with the least possible delay, at Baume-les-Dames, so that it might join the main body of the army.

But the whole of the movement could not be carried into effect. The detachment of the 24th Corps at Blamont was, as already mentioned,* attacked on the evening of the 23rd by part of General v. Debschitz's force. The news that the Germans had crossed the Doubs increased the confusion.† Comagny's Division, part of which had been severely handled in the actions at Roches and Glay, moved to St. Hippolyte and continued its march next morning to Le Russey, following in consequence the Pontarlier road. The other two Divisions of the 24th Corps likewise abandoned the Lomont ridge and the Doubs, and retired to Sancey-le-Grand and Servin. The garrisons mobiles,‡ which had also arrived at various points to relieve the 24th Corps, joined the general retreat, on finding that the defiles of the Doubs and Lomont were already abandoned.

The Division at Baume-les-Dames continued to hold the Autechaux heights on the right bank of the river on the 23rd January with nine companies and two guns. These were the troops which Colonel Wahlert repulsed in the afternoon upon l'Aigle; as the result of this engagement the Division moved off towards Besançon. Two battalions, which remained for the night at Baume, followed in the morning, after destroying the bridges. The 3rd Rhone Legion, arriving at Baume on the 24th January to relieve the troops there, and permanently occupy the place, found the town in the occupation of Prussian troops, and returned with its mission unaccomplished.

Whilst the line of the Doubs above Besançon was lost on the 23rd January and the following night, Quingey, which was of still greater importance, also fell into the adversary's hands.

We have already seen that on the evening of the 21st the French Commander-in-Chief, upon receipt of the first bad news from the Ognon and from Dôle, ordered the 1st Division 15th Corps to occupy Quingey. When on the morning of the 23rd January other orders followed to secure Arc-et-Senans, and to prevent the destruction of the railway bridge over the Loue, the Division was already in retreat. For want of rolling stock Minot's Brigade could alone be forwarded by rail; it reached the railway station at Byans, near Quingey, partly on the 22nd January and partly on the night of the 22nd—23rd. But the troops were in such bad order that it was not possible even to place outposts. A train which followed early on the 23rd was

* See ante, p. 33.

† See ante, p. 33.

‡ Under Colonels de Vezet and Bousson.

received with Prussian shells. Shortly after, the heads of the German columns advanced upon Quingey, and this place which was to be defended to the last, was abandoned without any real resistance.

The flight-like retreat upon Busy blocked the way for the guns, and produced so bad an impression upon the reinforcements which were arriving, that General Dastugue abandoned all attempts to re-occupy Quingey.

On the right bank of the Doubs, General Bourbaki had in the afternoon sent forward Bonnet's Division, from the position of the 18th Corps, a short distance towards Dôle, and reinforced it with Crémér's Division. This enterprise, which brought on the artillery engagement at Dannemarie, also failed, and General Crémér was recalled to St. Ferjeux just as he was preparing a night attack.

Between the 15th and 17th January nine more battalions of Garde Nationale Mobile with a detachment of lancers had reached Besançon, in order to replace the troops given up by the garrison to the 15th Corps. But the mobiles were armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no ammunition in the fortress, so that the men merely augmented the number of mouths to be fed. General Rolland, therefore, sent them away to the south without further delay.*

CONCENTRATION OF THE IIND AND VIIITH ARMY CORPS SOUTH-WEST OF BESANÇON.


The country, into which the first operations of the IInd and VIIth Corps were about to lead, is intersected by spurs from the Jura Mountains. Along the line from Bourg† by way of Lons-le-Saunier to Besançon, these spurs fall in steep slopes towards the plains of the Lower Doubs and Saône. East of this line, the country bears the character of a plateau, over which stretch the numerous mountain chains running from north-east to south-west, that are only furrowed at certain spots by deeply sunken cross valleys. In these latter are found defiles extending often for miles, and enclosed by precipitous walls of rock. In spite of the numerous longitudinal valleys, enclosed by parallel chains, the number of roads leading to the south, following the general direction of the mountains, is limited. For the French Army in its present circumstances those leading from Besançon by Arbois, and from Ornans by Salins, to Lons-

* Moving by way of Nozeroy and Champagnole, they subsequently reached the command of the French General at Lons-le-Saunier.

The narrative of events as regards the French rests chiefly on the statements contained in the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry. (See "Enquête Parlementaire sur les Actes du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale," Versailles, 1873-4-5.)

† Between Lyons and Lons-le-Saunier.





le-Saunier were of chief importance; next, that from St. Hippolyte by way of Pontarlier and Champagnole; and lastly the eastern roads through Mouthe and Fonceine-le-Bas upon St. Laurent. The transverse communications unite radially at Pontarlier; they traverse the well-known "Cluses," which present to an army moving from west to east, or *vice versa*, the greater difficulties, as the enclosing wooded heights are but sparsely populated and are difficult of access. At this time they were, moreover, covered with a foot deep of snow.

The most direct road from Besançon to the south was already barred by the Prussians at Quingey, while that from Ornans through Salins and Pont d'Héry was seriously threatened. The only prospect of escape for the French Army was for it to make a *détour* by Pontarlier. It was the duty of the South Army to intercept all these roads, while at the same time not losing sight of the possibility that the adversary might attempt to cut his way from Besançon towards the west.

The dispositions of General v. Manteuffel for the 24th January were therefore drawn up with the object of meeting with the VIIth Corps, in the first instance, any sorties of the enemy from Besançon on either bank of the Doubs. On the other hand, the IInd Corps was to advance at once along the Dôle-Salins road south of the Loue, pushing the leading troops to Mouchard.

24th
January.*

The 14th Division despatched a reinforced brigade† to the south bank of the Doubs; this brigade took up its quarters in the angle of the river between Dampierre and Villars St. Georges; the rest of the Division‡ alone remained in front of Dampierre, under cover of the outposts at St. Vit. A detachment despatched by the 13th Division to reconnoitre on the left bank of the Doubs, advanced in the direction of Besançon as far as Busy, and, from the numbers of watchfires, drew the inference that a considerable body of troops was assembled in that vicinity. To the right of Quingey the line of the Upper Loue was found in the enemy's occupation.

After expelling a French detachment from Port Lesney, connection was established at Mouchard with the IInd Corps. The head of this Corps, in accordance with orders, had already reached Mouchard at noon, and brought up its rearmost troops to Nevy-les-Dôle.§

Occupation of
Mouchard.

Colonel v. Willisen reached Mottey, whence, next morning, he

* See Sketch.

† 28th Infantry Brigade (except $\frac{1st}{77}$, which was still detached to Pin),
‡ 3rd and 4th $\frac{15th Hus.}{VII}$, and 2nd Heavy and 2nd Light $\frac{VII}{VII}$, under Major-General v. Woyna.

‡ 27th Infantry Brigade (except $\frac{1st}{74}$, which had not yet rejoined), $\frac{1st and 2nd}{15th Hus.}$,
1st Heavy and 1st Light $\frac{VII}{VII}$, and 2nd Field Pion. $\frac{VII}{VII}$.

§ Exclusive of Knesebeck's Brigade, left on the Dôle—Pesmes road.

marched to Pesmes, and at the same time assumed command of Knesbeck's Brigade.

It was a favourable circumstance at this time for the South Army that the old line of communications of General v. Werder was occupied by troops belonging to the Government-General of Lorraine, and the line of messenger posts through Châtillon could therefore be dispensed with.

Army Headquarters had moved on the 24th January to La Barre not far from Dampierre, in order to be nearer to the events which were occurring at Besançon.

The situation of the French Army had now become such that rapid and vigorous action could alone save it.

General Bourbaki might possibly still have attempted to cut through in the direction of Auxonne towards Dijon. But, in such event, he would in the first place have had to encounter the resistance of the 27th Infantry Brigade, and afterwards of that of the strong detachment under Colonel v. Willisen. Meanwhile, the remainder of the two Corps could also re-cross to the right bank of the Doubs. The army, which, hurriedly put together, had not a sufficient train for the transport of its food, would thereby have increased its distance from the line of railway that had hitherto been the chief means of its subsistence. It was scarcely possible to contemplate concerted action with General Garibaldi's force, which, held in check by a few Prussian battalions at Dijon, had up to the present time remained wholly inactive.

Of still less promise would be a movement in a more northerly direction, as commissariat difficulties would have been further increased.

On the other hand it was impossible to remain long at Besançon. The fortress was neither suited to receive a large army, nor were its supplies adequate to feed one.

The most probable line of action for the French was to make the attempt to force their way southward, and regain the railway communication which was so vital a matter to them.

On the German side it was of great importance not to allow themselves to be deceived by any weak forces thrown out in advance, but to discover in time the real intentions of the adversary. The Commander-in-Chief therefore empowered his Generals, in the event of time not admitting of orders being awaited, to act independently on their own judgment, but communicated to them beforehand his wishes in regard to those cases which might most probably happen. Should the enemy attempt to escape by the roads leading southward between Villers Farlay and Pontarlier, the IInd and VIIth Corps were at once to throw themselves on his flank or cut him off; should he attempt to break through by way of Dampierre and Quingey, the VIIth Corps was to oppose him on both banks of the Doubs, the IInd was to take part by an attack in rear, whilst the XIVth was in all cases to press

vigorously the French rear-guards. Should the enemy endeavour to break through in the direction of Gray, the 14th and the Baden Divisions were to operate against his flanks, in order to hold him fast,* while the troops further in rear were to anticipate him on the right and on the left. Should he once more show front to the XIVth Corps, it only remained for the IIInd and VIIth Corps again to advance from the south. Should he move towards the Swiss frontier, all these Corps were to follow at once, in order to force him to accept battle or to cross the frontier. In the event of the enemy remaining under the walls of Besançon, there was no necessity to attack him, as hunger would speedily compel him to make desperate attempts to get free.†

Further, the 28th Brigade, in view of more complete security against hostile enterprises between the Ognon and Doubs, was again withdrawn on the 25th January to Dampierre and Orchamps on the right bank of the Doubs; it was thus at the immediate disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. At the same time the 27th closed towards its outposts at St. Vit.

This day reconnaissances in force were made by order of General v. Manteuffel.

Detachments of the IIInd Corps advanced towards Salins and Arbois, as well as towards Poligny. Whilst no enemy was met with at the last-named village, at Arbois the Germans came across some 400 infantry soldiers, who, after being driven back on Salins, were there supported by strong reinforcements. Although the two forts of St. André and Belin, situated on high ground near the town, have, it is true, their main fronts towards the Swiss frontier, they at the same time command the ground towards the west and south, and cannot be attacked without some strength in artillery. They were armed. The town itself was said to be occupied by a garrison of some 2,000 men.

The three infantry brigades of the Corps, which had already crossed the Doubs, drew closer together between Mouchard and Villers Farlay.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 13th Division sent detachments forward on the right towards the Loue, and also to the front in the direction of Besançon. They encountered the enemy at all points, and two companies‡ in particular became vigorously engaged at Vorges. The enemy brought field artillery into action, and took the offensive with three or four battalions, so that these two companies had to be supported by bringing up

Action at
Vorges.

* As also Colonel Baron v. Willisen's troops.

† Appendix CLXV gives the text of the despatch addressed by the Commander-in-Chief to Generals v. Zastrow, v. Fransecky, and v. Werder from La Barre on the 24th January.

‡ 10th and 11th.

strong detachments.* No inconsiderable losses were sustained.†

On the right bank of the Doubs, an officer's patrol of the 14th Division advanced to within $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Besançon without meeting the enemy in any force. Some prisoners were, however, made, who stated that the 15th, 18th, and 24th French Corps were still near the fortress, whilst the 20th had already moved away to the southward. From Pin, Major v. Brederlow reported that the enemy had entirely disappeared from the Ognon, and that on the preceding night nothing had been seen of the numerous watchfires which had previously been visible there.

During the night, and in the forenoon of the 25th, fresh intelligence from the XIVth Corps had reached Army Headquarters.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIVTH ARMY CORPS ON 24TH AND 25TH JANUARY. JUNCTION OF THE SOUTH ARMY ON THE 26TH JANUARY.

24th January.

We have followed the movements of the XIVth Corps up to the 23rd, on which day General v. Werder had made arrangements for taking the offensive in force towards Baume.

For this purpose, General v. d. Goltz's detachment was ordered to be at Verne by 10 a.m. on the 24th, and the 4th Reserve Division at Voillans. The latter, however, was to leave its rearguard at L'Isle and Soye.

Further, the Baden Division was to hold part of its troops‡ in readiness at Mésandans; besides this, it was to reconnoitre on either side of the Ognon towards Rioz and Corcelle. No fight occurred, for the enemy had already evacuated Baume at 4 a.m., and had blown up the bridge over the Doubs to the southward.

General v. d. Goltz occupied the town at noon, but, shortly after, received orders from General v. Werder to move away to the westward, whilst in his place General v. Schmeling was to proceed to Baume, and with the aid of the Baden Pontoon Column to throw a bridge across the Doubs.

But before this latter operation could be carried into effect a company of the Thorn Landwehr Battalion had crossed the destroyed bridge at Cour by means of ladders, and found the defile of Pont-les-Moulins on the further bank abandoned by the enemy. It was ascertained that the 15th and 20th Corps had been in the neighbourhood of Baume on the 22nd, that strong

* IInd 5th, 9th, and 12th 3rd and 4th
13 73 7th Rif.

† 4 officers, 68 men. Captain Baron v. Bülow was killed.

‡ Ist and IInd Fus. ½ 4th and 1st Heavy and 2nd Light
5th Bad. 6th Bad. 3rd Bad. Drag. Baden

forces were still there on the 23rd, but that all had then withdrawn to Besançon. Thirty stragglers belonging to all the French Corps, which had taken part in the recent struggles, were captured.

An advance of the bulk of the XIVth Corps across the Doubs appeared no longer desirable after the rapid retirement of the enemy. There were also prospective difficulties in respect of marching and of food. General v. Werder resolved to make his further action dependent on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.* About noon two letters dated the 22nd arrived from headquarters at Pesmes,† particularly enjoining General v. Werder to prevent the advance of hostile forces upon Gray.‡ He resolved, in consequence, to move off at once to the right with the Baden Division and Goltz' Brigade, but in doing so to quit the very wooded and mountainous ground between the Ognon and the Doubs, for the defence of which it was known that the enemy had made considerable preparations.§

On the evening of the 24th General v. d. Goltz marched to Loulans. The Baden Division likewise extended its quarters as far as this place and to Avelley. The 1st Baden Brigade moved up close to Rioz. Some cavalry reached this town.|| The 4th Reserve Division remained at Baume-les-Dames, and occupied Soye and L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs.¶

On the 25th January General v. Werder marched with the Baden Division and Goltz' Brigade to the district north of Voray and Etuz. The quarters extended to the rear as far as Rioz. Two squadrons** advanced as far as Gy; their patrols found the country about the Ognon free of the enemy, and most of the bridges destroyed. On the right, the 1st Baden Brigade established connection with Major v. Brederlow's Detachment at Pin,†† whilst the 2nd remained in contact with the 4th Reserve Division. The detachments‡‡ left behind at Villersexel and Lure could be called in, as the communications of the corps could now be transferred to Epinal by way of Vesoul.

25th January.

At L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs and Baume-les-Dames the military bridges were established. At the latter place the main body of

* On the 23rd General v. Werder had been advised by telegram from Army Headquarters of detailed written instructions of the 22nd being on their way, but these had not yet arrived.

† See ante, p. 26.

‡ The enemy as we know was in considerable force at Montbozon on the 21st. See ante, p. 14.

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 230.

|| 2nd and 3rd
2nd Bad. Drag., under Major Stöcklern v. Grünholsegg.

¶ The former by the Danzig Battalion, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st 3rd Res. Lan., the latter by Colonel v. Zimmermann's Detachment. (See Sketch facing page 39.)

** 2nd and 3rd
2nd Bad. Drag.

†† See ante, p. 26.

‡‡ See ante, p. 31.

the 4th Reserve Division, driving, after a slight skirmish, the enemy's rear guard beyond St. Juan d'Adam, passed to the south bank of the Doubs.*

General v. Werder had expressed his belief to the commander of the siege corps before Belfort that the enemy's evacuation of Baume would be succeeded by that of Blamont. In order to throw light on this matter General v. Debschitz again advanced on the 25th January, occupied the town after a feeble resistance, but afterwards returned to his previous position at Exincourt-Croix.†

General v. Manteuffel was informed of these movements. Although executed on the basis of the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements of the 22nd‡ they were no longer in conformity with the general instructions, which had meanwhile been given to the Generals commanding Corps on the 24th.§ The Commander-in-Chief had in issuing these instructions presumed that the XIVth Corps would have followed closely after the enemy on the Doubs, and in this way he hoped to receive the earliest information of the French army commencing its movement to Pontarlier. The weak forces of the 4th Reserve Division, which were still left between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier, did not appear sufficient for the purpose. On the other hand, the approach of the XIVth Corps offered the advantage of a closer co-operation of all the fractions of the army, so that, for instance, not merely the IIInd Corps, but the VIIth Corps as well could launch forward in the Jura to the south and south-east of Besançon, and bar the way to the enemy.

General v. Manteuffel hastened, therefore, on the afternoon of the 25th to request General v. Werder to direct his subsequent march on the 26th by way of Marnay, in order to effect a junction with the VIIth Corps. Until this was accomplished the latter must continue to remain in the position which it was holding close in front of Besançon. The IIInd Corps had, however, already received orders to advance to Salins, and to reconnoitre towards Pontarlier.

In executing these movements the advanced guard of the IIInd Corps,¶ on the 26th January, fell in with the enemy to the

26th January.
Action at
Salins.

* Colonel v. Zimmermann remained at L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs.

† Pont-de-Roide was still held by the enemy.

‡ See ante, p. 26.

§ General v. Werder did not receive these until the afternoon of the 25th

|| Order of March of the Advanced Guard of the IIInd Army Corps (26th January).

Commander: Major-General v. Koblinski.

Vanguard: Colonel v. Ziemietzky.

Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.

1st Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.

2nd Light Battery.

2nd Field Pioneer Company.


2nd Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.


1st and 4th Squadrons 3rd Dragoons.

Main Body: 42nd Regiment.

2nd Heavy Battery.

¶ See Sketch.





south-east of Pagnoz, where a direct mountain path to Salins leaves the main road. Both batteries came into action at the cross roads, and opened fire upon Fort St. André; in consequence, however, of the elevated position of this work and of its armament of heavy guns, the fire produced but slight effect. The struggle, therefore, speedily devolved upon the infantry alone.*

Whilst the 10th Company Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers followed the mountain road, the other three advanced along the main road. The latter lies in a deep rocky valley, and was raked by a brisk fire from the forts and by the enemy's skirmishers. It was only possible for small bodies to advance by rushes, and the losses were by no means inconsiderable. Gradually, however, the steep mountain slopes on either side of the road were scaled.

It was not until the entire Grenadier Regiment was deployed for the attack, that at 2.15 p.m. a successful entry was made from the north and along the railway into the station, and also along the road into the suburb of St. Pierre.†

To facilitate this attack General v. Koblinski had, meanwhile, advanced with the 42nd Regiment and a squadron‡ by way of St. Thiébaud. He left a battalion§ at Saisenay to observe Ornans, and reached Salins a short time after the grenadiers had entered the town.

A white flag was hoisted over the town, and the resistance shortly came to an end. In consequence of a request from the mayor, the commandant of the forts agreed not to bombard the town. The advanced guard|| took up its quarters therein, and placed outposts on the roads to Pontarlier and Champagnole.

The engagement at Salins had entailed a loss of 3 officers and 109 men.

The main body of the 3rd Division had advanced to Pagnoz, but as the advanced guard no longer required support, and as Fort St. André recommenced shelling the outskirts of the town, it withdrew beyond range of the fortress artillery,¶ towards Mouchard and Villers Farlay.

Further to the south, the 4th Division had marched to

* The artillery remained in position for the rest of the action at the cross-roads in front of Pagnoz.

† The companies of the regiment entered in the following order, commencing from the left wing:—1st, 2nd, and 12th from the north against the station, 8th along the railway to the same place; the 9th followed on the railway; the 11th, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th on the high road; the 4th had been despatched to the mountain path, in support of the 10th.

‡ $\frac{4th}{3rd\ Drag.}$

§ $\frac{IIInd}{42}$

|| $\frac{Ist\ and\ IIInd}{42}$

¶ General v. Hartmann, commanding the Division, had proceeded to Salins.

Arbois. Its patrols made incursions as far as Poligny and Champagnole without finding any trace of the enemy. A strong column,* which was despatched to Pont d'Héry, fell in with a French requisitioning party at Ivory, and drove it back upon Salins. The snow which covered the plateau a foot in depth prevented, however, any pursuit in this direction. The troops went into quarters between Ivory and Pont d'Héry.†

The reconnaissances which had been ordered on the part of the VIIth Corps also led to an action and to several encounters with the adversary. From the 13th Division, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Langen again advanced on the Lône, and found the river opposite Charnay and Rouhe, as also the Château of Châtillon-sur-Lison, in the enemy's occupation.

Action at
Busy and
Vorges.

Four battalions,‡ under General v. d. Osten-Sacken, had advanced against the place by the two roads leading from Quingey to Besançon. They found the enemy firmly posted at Busy and Vorges, and the long musketry action which ensued cost them an officer and 32 men. On the other hand, they captured 50 men belonging to the 15th French Corps.

On the north bank of the Doubs the 14th Division was carrying its reconnaissances towards Besançon. A number of prisoners were made at Franois.

At the XIVth Corps, Colonel v. Zimmermann received orders from General v. Schmeling to move from L'Isle-sur-les-Doubs to Baume-les-Dames, but too late to carry out this march on the 26th. His patrols found Pont-de-Roide evacuated by the enemy.

General v. Schmeling had advanced with the main body to the south of Baume, as far as St. Juan d'Adam. He had occupied Aissey and Passavant with advanced guards. The detachments, which were at once sent on ahead to reconnoitre, pressed forward in the direction of Besançon, as far as Bouclans and Etalans. It was not until they reached these points that they fell in with the enemy.§ At Orsans and Ouvans some slight skirmishes also occurred. In all 200 prisoners were captured. A mixed detachment established the connection with the rest of the XIVth Corps.||

When the struggle was already at an end, an inhabitant, dashing forward from one of the houses, endeavoured to shoot the General at close quarters; but, before his carbine could go off, he was knocked down by the aide-de-camp and killed by some soldiers who came to the rescue.

* 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th, $\frac{3rd}{9}$, $\frac{6th\ Light}{11th\ Drag.}$, and $\frac{1st\ Field\ Pion.\ Co.}{11}$, under

General du Trossel. $\frac{7th}{9}$ was with the baggage.

† With $\frac{IInd}{73}$, $\frac{2nd}{8th\ Hus.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 5th\ Light}{VII}$.

‡ $\frac{IInd}{13}$, $\frac{1st}{15}$, $\frac{IInd}{55}$, and 7th Rifle Battalion.

§ See subsequent narrative.

|| The Danzig Battalion, $\frac{2nd}{3rd\ Res.\ Lan.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 2nd\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$, under Major Du-

General v. d. Goltz, who had been pushed forward to Voray and Etuz, in order to secure the further movement to the right of the XIVth Corps, made reconnaissances from these places towards Besançon. Châtillon-le-Duc was found strongly occupied, and it was also discovered that the villages nearer the fortress, especially St. Claude, were crowded with troops.

The Baden Division extended itself past Rioz, leaving a weak detachment there, as far as the neighbourhood of Marnay; at the same time it pushed forward smaller detachments to the Ognon, and also charged them with observing the fortress. The troops under Major v. Brederlow, which were thereby set free, moved by way of Audeux to Corcelle Ferrière, on the left wing of the 14th Division; during the march strong bodies of the enemy were observed in rear of Pouilley-les-Vignes.

In the course of the day the detailed reports of the engagements at Dijon reached Army Headquarters. The entire VIIth Corps having now become available for the advance south of the Doubs, General v. Manteuffel felt himself strong enough for an enterprise which he had hitherto only contemplated undertaking after the decisive battle with the enemy's main forces should have taken place. He ordered General Hann v. Weyhern to renew the attack upon Dijon, for which purpose the troops under General v. Kettler, Colonel v. Willisen, Degenfeld's Baden Brigade, and the small detachment of Major v. Schon were placed at his disposal.

MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY BETWEEN THE 24TH AND 27TH JANUARY.

The results of the numerous reconnaissances made from different quarters tended to show with certainty that by far the largest part of the French Army was crowded together in a comparatively small area, on both banks of the Doubs, round Besançon.

After the unexpected loss of Quingey, and the failure of the attempt to take the offensive towards Dannemarie, the French Commander-in-Chief could no longer be blind to the danger of his position.

Besides the embarrassments from without, there came reports from all sides showing the internal disorder of the troops. General Bourbaki could not have failed to become personally convinced of the fact on reaching Besançon on the 23rd January, when the picture of the prevailing disorder unfolded itself before his eyes. Army Intendant Friant brought the news that the supplies of food were not as they ought to be.

treux, moved to Larians, Ollans, and Rougemont, where they remained for the present.

They would only last for five days, or, with the help of the fortress magazines, for fifteen to eighteen days.

In order to come to some decision in these difficult circumstances, General Bourbaki had called together a council of war on the 24th January at Château Farine on the Dôle road. The chief commanders were present, with the exception of General Martineau Deschenez, commanding the 15th Corps, and General de Bressolles, commanding the 24th Corps. General Borel, Chief of the Staff, had gone to General Martineau Deschenez for a verbal conference.

General Bourbaki explained to those present the critical state of the army, which was not only cut off from its line of retreat on the south, but must also be considered seriously threatened on the north.

General Martineau reported that of his 30,000 men scarcely 15,000 were effective, and even these would in the event of a collision with the enemy run away instead of fight.*

The opinions of the other corps commanders were to the like effect. General Billot declared that of his 25,000 men, only some 16,000 were really effective; General Clinchant 10,000 out of 22,000. How matters stood with General de Bressolles could be gathered from the events on the Upper Doubs. General Pallu de la Barrière, on the other hand, believed that he could answer for the Army Reserve in the event of a fight.

In these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief considered that the only possible choice lay between an attempt to break through in the direction of Auxonne or a retreat to Pontarlier. He himself proposed this latter course, affirming that no good result could be expected from an offensive movement in the exhausted condition of the troops and the growing state of indiscipline. The only spokesman in favour of the bolder course was General Billot, who thought it possible to break through to Auxonne. General Bourbaki pledged himself to follow with the army, should the 18th Corps succeed in re-occupying the lower course of the Doubs. General Billot having remarked that the whole army must be launched in the enterprise, General Bourbaki declared himself ready to give up the chief command to him, but that he himself would not resolve upon the attempt. General Billot, on his part, declined the offer made to him, saying that only a commander like Bourbaki could carry through so difficult a task.

Ultimately the retreat upon Pontarlier was decided.

After a telegram to this effect had been sent to the War Ministry,† which had just been advising prompt decision and

* "Je reçus une lettre du Général Martineau-Deschenez, Commandant le 15^e Corps, lettre dans laquelle il me disait que je ne devais pas me faire d'illusion, qu'on s'organisait pour fuir et non pour combattre, et cette lettre était accompagnée de pièces à l'appui." (Statement of General Bourbaki. See "Enquête Parlementaire, Dépôts des Témoins," Versailles, 1873, Vol. III, p. 353.)

† Appendix CLXVI gives the telegraphic correspondence between the French War Ministry and General Bourbaki on the afternoon of 24th January, 1871. (See "Enquête Parlementaire Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, pp. 744 and 747.)

impracticable sorties, the Commander-in-Chief first took the necessary steps to protect the flanks of the army, which would be seriously menaced during the march to Pontarlier. In the forenoon of the 24th January General de Bressolles had received orders to re-occupy the Lomont passes and the passages of the Doubs. The 18th Corps, with Cr  mer's Division, and the 20th Corps were brought up close to the gates of Besan  on; the Army Reserve crossed the Doubs within the walls of the fortress, and advanced to Beure in order to serve as support to the 15th Corps.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions 15th Corps were to stand fast at Busy, and thence up-stream behind the Loue, and entrench themselves; the 3rd Division was to move by the 26th to Epeugney and Scey-en-Varais, while the cavalry of the Corps was to press forward in the district between the Loue and the Lison, to the south and south-east of Ornans. The 18th and 20th Corps were instructed to remain fast on the 25th January in their positions on the right bank of the Doubs, but to hold themselves ready to move on the evening of that day or the following night.

Lastly, the difficult task of protecting the retreat of the army on the most endangered wing towards the south,* devolved upon General Cr  mer, who had for this purpose the 3rd Division 20th Corps, the Army Reserve, and his own Division.†

All these detachments, after crossing the Doubs above and below Besan  on, reached Cl  ron, Ornans, and   talans on the 25th. On the 26th the Army Reserve posted itself in readiness at Ornans, and sent forward its cavalry to the   talans plateau.

The other two Divisions moved off in a south-westerly direction, in order to reach the mountains at Salins, and thus secure the roads to Champagnole and Pontarlier.

Colonel Poulet had commenced his march to Salins at 7 a.m., but on reaching Nans-sous-Sainte Anne received the news that Salins was occupied.‡ His scouts were fired upon at Saisenay,§ and the inhabitants stated that General Mantuffel, with 20,000 Prussian troops, had arrived at Arbois, and with 15,000 at Salins. He, therefore, left only some franc-tireurs at Nans, and retreated south to Villeneuve d'Amont, on the Salins—Pontarlier road.|| The 3rd Division 20th Corps had followed Colonel Poulet's movement as far as D  servillers.¶

* Appendix CLXVII contains the orders for the march on the 25th January. 1871.

† The latter passed under the orders of Colonel Poulet, hitherto his Chief of the Staff.

‡ At the time this was premature, but, as we know, became soon after the case.

§ This could only have been from the patrols of the 2nd Batta'ion 42nd Regiment, which was posted at Saisenay.

|| Salins was not defended by Colonel Poulet's troops, but by the local Garde Nationale and certain detachments of infantry and artillery previously posted there.

¶ See Sketch facing page 44.

The Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps formed a veil from Levier as far Nozeroy,* for the purpose of watching in the direction of Salins and Lons-le-Saunier. The gardes mobiles, who had been sent away from Besançon, passed along its front.†

The intention of General Bourbaki to gain more freedom of movement came to nought in the north, as in the south.

General de Bressolles, in accordance with the orders recently received to re-occupy the passages of the Doubs and the Lomont passes, proceeded on the 24th January in the direction of Baume-les-Dames, and instructed d'Aries' Division of his Corps to advance on Pont-les-Moulins. But only the van of the Division made a weak attempt to dislodge the Prussian outposts, and then abstained from any further enterprises. The Division with the reserve artillery of the Corps retired upon Vercel. The bulk of the 3rd Division 24th Corps, under General Carré de Busserolle, had meanwhile once more advanced into the passes of the Lomont, had found them free, and occupied them. In consequence, however, of the ill-success at Pont-les-Moulins, he withdrew early on the 26th January to Landresse and Pierre Fontaine, whilst the rest of the Division had already moved away on the 24th by way of Fuans in the direction of Morteau.

General Bourbaki was extremely disturbed at the retreat of the 24th Corps; he ordered it to renew its attack on the 26th upon the Prussian force visible to the south of Baume, and resolved to support it by bringing up the 18th Corps from Besançon. This Corps, however, in consequence of the ice-bound roads, occupied the whole day appointed for the attack in merely passing from the north to the south bank of the Doubs.‡ It was not until nightfall that it reached Bouclans; it found General v. Schmeling's patrols in its front and, in consequence of the lateness of the hour, abstained from any further enterprise. Meanwhile, General de Bressolles, who, by General Bourbaki's orders, had on this day again led forward against Passavant the troops standing at Vercel, had in vain awaited the arrival of the Corps. His officers were unanimous in deprecating any attempt at taking the offensive, which must inevitably lead to the break-up of his force; he that same evening retreated by way of Vercel to the Pontarlier road. That part also of Busserolle's Division which had only returned from the Lomont on the 26th, had made another forward movement towards the Doubs, but, hearing no action in that direction, abstained from any further advance. The entire Division now likewise took the direction of Pontarlier, whither also Comagny's Division had meanwhile continued its march, utterly indifferent to

* This, however, was not entirely accomplished until the 27th January.

† See ante, p. 38.

‡ On this occasion General Billot made another attempt, but in vain, to induce the Commander-in-Chief to make an attack on Auxonne.

what was happening elsewhere. It was evident that all the commanders of the army hesitated to bring their troops in any form in contact with the adversary.

Meanwhile the War Ministry had definitely refused its consent to the general retreat of the army to Pontarlier, and in lieu thereof merely reiterated impracticable proposals for the transfer of the army to another theatre of war,* thereby only aggravating the want of confidence of the Commander-in-Chief. The appearance of the 18th Corps as it toiled painfully across the Doubs under his eyes, robbed him of his last hope. General Bourbaki despaired of accomplishing his task.

A telegram, superseding him in the chief command by General Clinchant, a measure he had conditionally requested, was already on its way. The same telegram brought also the supersession of General de Bressoles in the command of the 24th Corps by General Comagny.

The new Commander-in-Chief took over the direction of the army in circumstances which scarcely permitted the hope of even a fairly successful issue. He had, it is true, at his disposal between Besançon and the Swiss frontier some 100,000 combatants, but, owing to the condition of the troops, scarcely half could be considered effective, whilst the others were more a hindrance than a gain. After a consideration of all the possible courses still open to him, General Clinchant saw that a concentration of the whole army under the walls of Besançon must lead to its dissolution within a brief period from mere want of food. But such concentration must precede any attempt to break through, whether by way of Auxonne in order to gain Dijon, or by way of Quingey in order to reach Lons-le-Saunier, while such concentration could not be hidden from the Germans. Moreover, the small offensive power of the troops must also be taken into consideration. So that the only course open to the new Commander-in-Chief was to continue what his predecessor had commenced, and carry out the march to Pontarlier.

In spite of the gloomy prospect, he considered that he ought not to refuse the chief command. On the morning of the 27th he entered upon the duties, but held generally to the arrangements already made.

* See "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, p. 756. The end of the telegram (Bordeaux, 25th January, 1871, 2.30 p.m.) ran:—"Ma conviction bien arrêtée, c'est qu'en réunissant tous vos corps et en vous concertant au besoin avec Garibaldi, vous serez pleinement en force pour passer soit par Dôle, soit par Mouchard, soit par Gray, soit par Pontailler; vous laisseriez en suite le 24^e Corps et le Corps Crémier en relation avec Garibaldi et vous continueriez votre mouvement en prenant, autant que possible, pour objectif les points indiqués dans mes dépêches précédentes (Nevers or the neighbourhood of Joigny, Tonnerre, and Auxerre), et si l'état de votre armée ne permettait réellement pas une marche aussi longue, vous vous dirigeriez vers Chagny pour y stationner ou pour vous y embarquer.—C. de Freycinet."

OCCUPATION OF THE ROADS LEADING FROM PONTARLIER TO THE SOUTH OF FRANCE BY THE SOUTH ARMY, AND RETREAT OF THE FRENCH EAST ARMY TOWARDS THE SWISS FRONTIER BETWEEN THE 27TH AND 29TH JANUARY.

On the 25th the Germans were in a position to assume that there were at least two French Corps on the right bank of the Doubs. On the 26th the assembly of large masses between the Loue and the Doubs became evident, and at the same time there could be no mistake that the batteries, which had been hitherto seen at Busy, had disappeared.

In general the Army Headquarters believed that even now the retreat of the adversary on Pontarlier was, if not certain, at any rate very probable. The prisoners were under the impression that their army was already completely surrounded and lost beyond hope of recovery. They exhibited every appearance of deep discouragement.


The orders issued for the 27th January contemplated the holding in readiness of sufficient means to obtain, if necessary by force, the desired information. The XIVth Corps was to advance to the Doubs in relief of the 14th Division, in order to render the whole of the VIIth Corps available for employment against the line of the Loue which was occupied by the enemy; while the IIInd Corps was to hold itself in readiness at Mouchard and Salins, either, if required, to move up to Quingey, or to advance in the directions of Ornans and Pontarlier. The orders were, in part, anticipated by events. A squadron* belonging to the advanced guard of the IIInd Corps, which had proceeded on the evening of the 26th January, after the action at Salins, by way of Ornans, fell in with strong bodies of the enemy† near Villeneuve d'Amont, and ascertained that they belonged to two different Corps.


When this news reached General v. Fransecky in the course of the night, he had no doubt that the adversary contemplated reaching the roads leading from Pontarlier to Southern France. In the sense of the instructions issued by General v. Manteuffel on the 24th January, he resolved to act at once independently and to reach without delay the cross roads in the mountains before the enemy, or, failing this, to attack the flank of the columns while on the march.

As the deeply sunken passes leading through Salins, notwithstanding the capture of the town, were barred by the fire of the two forts on the heights, he resolved to take in preference the roads leading through Arbois. Consequently, Major-General du Trossel received orders to assemble the 7th Infantry Brigade

* 1st
3rd Drag.

† General Crémier's troops.





on the 27th January at Pont d'Héry, and to bring up thither as well the battalions which had been pushed forward by General Koblinski along the roads to Pontarlier and Champagnole, as also the cavalry from Salins. With the troops still remaining to him, the last-named general was to take up a position to the north-west of Salins, at the point of bifurcation of the roads to Quingey and Mouchard, in order to protect the movements of the Corps against any attack from Salins.

Such an attack was in reality considered by the general commanding as far less likely than that the enemy discovered at Villeneuve d'Amont would endeavour to reach Champagnole by way of Pont d'Héry. All the rest of the Corps were ordered to Arbois.

The concentration at Pont d'Héry† took place without molestation from the enemy, and the troops in the evening occupied quarters in this locality and the neighbourhood. The dragoons in advance reported that strong hostile detachments were said to have passed near Censeau, on the Pontarlier—Lons-le-Saunier road, and this was confirmed by the tracks in the deep snow.‡ French cavalry were reported at Champagnole.

27th
January.*

The main body of the IInd Corps had assembled near Arbois, and General v. Koblinski had again concentrated his troops§ in the morning from Salins in the direction of Pagnoz; during the march they suffered little loss. The Commander-in-Chief,|| entirely approving the measures taken by General v. Fransecky, ordered the immediate relief of General v. Koblinski by troops of the 13th Division.¶ The latter arrived in Mouchard on the night of the 27th—28th. The remaining detachments of the 13th Division had extended themselves to the eastward towards the Loue, which had been abandoned by the enemy; the bridges over the river were found to be destroyed.** The

* See Sketch.

† 7th Infantry Brigade (except Fus., at Mirebeau-sur-Bèze), $\frac{1st\ and\ II\ Ind}{42}$, and $\frac{1st\ and\ 4th}{3rd\ Drag.}$ (of General v. Koblinski's advanced guard), $\frac{3rd}{11th\ Drag.}$, 5th Heavy and 6th Light, and $\frac{1st\ Field\ Pion.}{II}$. The command of all troops of the 4th Division not assigned to Lieut.-General Hann v. Weyhern was confided to Major-General du Trossel.

‡ As troops of the French field army had not reached so far, this news could only refer to the march of the gardes mobiles sent away from Besançon by General Rolland, and which certainly must have passed here in considerable strength.

§ 2nd Grenadiers, $\frac{Fus.}{42}$, $\frac{2nd\ Light\ and\ 2nd\ Heavy}{II}$, $\frac{2nd\ Field\ Pion.}{II}$, entrenching tool column, and light field bridge train.

|| Army Headquarters remained at La Barre, near Dampierre.

¶ $\frac{1st\ 13',\ 1st\ 55',\ II\ Ind\ and\ Fus.}{15}$, $\frac{3rd\ Light\ and\ 6th\ Heavy}{VII}$, and $\frac{3rd}{8th\ Hus.}$, under Colonel v. Barby.

** According to the statements of the inhabitants the enemy had already retired in the morning in the direction of Amancey. Only Chenecey was still occupied by him.

14th Division, on relief by the XIVth Corps, crossed the Doubs and the Lower Loue, and established itself on the Quingey—La Chapelle road; the troops previously on outpost duty followed as far as Courtefontaine and Fourg. The corps artillery gained the right bank of the Loue at Liesle.

The XIVth Corps reached with the Baden Division the positions hitherto occupied by the 14th Division at St. Vit, and Lantenne Vertière, facing towards Besançon. General v. d. Goltz, who, in position on the Ognon, had covered the flank movement, marched to Marnay, whither also the corps headquarters were transferred; the detachments on the Ognon* maintained the connection with General v. Schmeling.

This officer had remained at St. Juan d'Adam, as news had reached him of a renewed advance of the French upon Belfort.

General v. Werder, who did not consider such an enterprise at all probable, left him unfettered to act in conjunction with Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow IIInd, and if necessary to withdraw again to Montbéliard. Colonel v. Zimmermann received orders to reconnoitre towards Maiche and St. Hippolyte.† General v. Debschitz, induced to renew his advance, occupied in the evening Blamont and Pont-de-Roide;‡ whilst General v. Schmeling, in consequence of further disquieting rumours of the march of strong French forces upon St. Hippolyte,§ had resolved on the following day to move to the left to Sancey-le-Grand.

On the evening of the 27th January, the XIVth Corps was thus guarding the entire right bank of the Doubs, and at the same time watching the ground between the Upper Doubs and the Swiss frontier; the VIIth Corps was posted at that part of the Loue which the enemy had abandoned, with the object of

* At Pin: $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{34}$, $\frac{2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 1st Light Res.}}{1}$, under Major v. Runstedt. This detachment remained in the same position for the next few days.

In Etuz: $\frac{3\text{rd}}{6\text{th Bad.}}$, $\frac{10\text{th}}{5\text{th Bad.}}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 4th}}{2\text{nd Bad. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 1st Heavy}}{\text{Bad.}}$, under Captain v. Weinzierl.

In Voray: $\frac{2\text{nd and 4th}}{6\text{th Bad.}}$ and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 4th}}{2\text{nd Bad. Drag.}}$, under Captain Baron Schilling v. Canstadt.

These two last detachments, which had been drawn forward from Rioz, also stood fast for the present on the Ognon.

† Colonel v. Zimmermann left in consequence the Insterburg battalion, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 3rd}}{3\text{rd Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd Heavy}}{4\text{th Res. Div.}}$, at Isle-sur-le-Doubs, and advanced with the rest of his troops by way of Glainans to Chasot.

‡ With the Lauban, Breslau IIInd, and Liegnitz battalion, $\frac{3\text{rd}}{6\text{th Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{1\text{st and 2nd Light Reserve}}{\text{VIII}}$, whilst the Apenrade battalion and $\frac{2\text{nd}}{6\text{th Res. Lan.}}$ followed to Roches.

§ The constant reports of a fresh offensive movement on the part of the enemy to the Upper Doubs were no doubt occasioned by the movements of the 18th and 24th French Corps.

subsequently advancing across it or of moving upon Ornans; while the IInd Corps was holding itself in readiness at Arbois and Pont d'Héry to prevent the enemy moving through Pontarlier and Champagnole on Lons-le-Saunier.

Although the despatch of General Hann v. Weyhern towards Dijon had removed all danger which from that direction might have compromised the advance, the Army Headquarters had received reports which showed that the adversary, indefatigable in organising new forces, was bringing up reinforcements from Lyons. The IInd Corps, which in spite of the return of General v. Koblinski's force, only numbered three brigades, was consequently charged with the duty of covering on the south the march of the army. The cavalry, making a wide sweep, was to reconnoitre in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier, and compel any troops that might possibly arrive by rail to detrain as far off as possible.

General v. Fransecky had become convinced by the events of the 27th January that the enemy was already in retreat on Lons-le-Saunier. He therefore ordered General du Trossel with all his troops* to reach Champagnole at 10 a.m. on the 28th, and in the event of his finding the enemy there to attack him vigorously. 28th Januar

For his support, the main body of the corps under General v. Hartmann was to advance from Arbois to the Montrond defile, the Corps Artillery to Arbois, while General v. Koblinski with his detachment was to reach Poligny by 11 a.m. A squadron was specially detailed to advance in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier until it met with resistance.

These movements were completed without coming into serious collision with the adversary.

General du Trossel occupied Champagnole without a struggle, and sent forward his cavalry at once in the direction of Pontarlier. In spite of the fire directed upon it by the enemy occupying the hills, a squadron,† under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Guretzky, reached Nozeroy. They found the place strongly occupied by the French, but captured near Onglières 56 commissariat wagons with a treasure chest, taking the escort, 1 officer and 70 men, prisoners. At Le Magasin they fell in with hostile cavalry in retreat, belonging, according to the prisoners, to the 15th Corps.

By order of the general commanding, General du Trossel remained at Champagnole; General v. Hartmann on the other hand, after letting his men cook their dinners at Montrond, continued his march in a southerly direction to Pont-du-Navoy. General v. Koblinski's column and the corps artillery advanced to Poligny. The cavalry which had been sent towards Lons-le-Saunier advanced to within a distance of 4 or 5 miles of this

* See ante, p. 53, note †.

† ^{3rd}
11th Drag., Captain v. Flemming.

town, and found the neighbourhood in the enemy's occupation.

The decisive action, which General v. Fransecky expected this day, did not take place, but the IInd Corps was only a day's march distant from the adversary's last lines of retreat.

Of the VIIth Corps, General v. Zastrow caused the 14th Division to advance south of the Loue. Any columns of the enemy which might be found on the march, were to be attacked and compelled to deploy; a struggle with superior forces was, however, to be avoided. The Division only fell in with stragglers; it reached Déservillers without a struggle, and placed outposts at Bolandoz. The 13th Division meanwhile remained at the Quingey position. Towards Besançon, Vorges was found to be evacuated by the French, while Busy was only weakly occupied.

As all the bridges over the Loue were destroyed, a detachment of 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 1 battery* joined the 14th Division south of the river. Some patrols which had succeeded in crossing by means of the meagre material found on the spot, learnt that about 6,000 men of the 15th Corps had only the day before marched away from the vicinity of Rurey for Ornans.

When the news of General v. Fransecky's advance reached Army Headquarters in the early morning, General v. Manteuffel ordered the XIVth Corps to relieve the 13th Division at Quingey, and the VIIth to move in a southerly direction nearer to the IInd Corps. This order reached General v. Zastrow in the afternoon, and, the relief having been carried out, the 13th Division concentrated that same evening at La Chapelle and Saisenay.† The 14th Division at Déservillers received orders to push forward its advanced troops to Levier and Silley; while engaged in so doing, they captured some 100 stragglers of the 15th, 18th, and 20th French Corps, who stated that their corps had marched from Besançon for Pontarlier. The last échelons of the French army were said to have only quitted early in the morning the district reached by the 14th Division. In point of fact the burning embers found in several of the bivouacs confirmed this statement.

The corps artillery had followed the movement of the other troops along the Arbois road as far as Sainson; it had to push forward the horse artillery batteries as far as Myon and Alaise, in view to a subsequent junction with the 14th Division. The general commanding took up his headquarters at Montfort, and, as he contemplated uniting his Corps at Villeneuve d'Amont

* 7th Rifle Battalion, $\frac{\text{II}^{\text{nd}} \text{ and III}^{\text{rd}}}{73}$, $\frac{2^{\text{nd}} \text{ and } 4^{\text{th}}}{8^{\text{th}} \text{ Hus.}}$, and $\frac{5^{\text{th}} \text{ Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$, under

General Baron v. d. Osten-Sacken.

† General Baron v. d. Osten-Sacken's detachment was brought up to Saisenay, and from this point it kept up communication both with Colonel v. Barby at Salins and also with the 14th Division.

and Levier, he caused the roads leading to these places to be reconnoitred.

On the morning of this day General v. Werder had reached in person the Army Headquarters at La Barre. On being informed of the state of affairs, he decided to replace at St. Vit the 1st Baden Brigade, which had left for Quingey, by the 3rd, which should continue to occupy at the same time Corcondray and Recologne. General v. d. Goltz marched to Orchamp. General v. Schmeling reached Sancey-le-Grand by a movement to the left and effected a junction with Colonel v. Zimmermann, while General v. Debschitz occupied St. Hippolyte with his advanced troops.* Patrols found the enemy at Maiche. The headquarters of the XIVth Corps remained at La Barre, those of General v. Manteuffel proceeded to Château-de-Roche near Arc-et-Senans.

The intelligence which reached the Commander-in-Chief during the day had indicated with tolerable certainty that up to the present time only inconsiderable hostile forces could have passed beyond Champagnole, and also that the bulk of the French army was now in full retreat to Pontarlier. Further, the reports from the advanced parties of the XIVth Corps, which had discovered French troops at St. Ferjeux, showed that the 20th Corps, or at any rate parts of it, had still remained at Besançon. Lastly, it could be gathered from the information received from General v. Schmeling that a considerable body of troops of the 24th Corps had likewise taken the direction of Pontarlier.

In consequence, General v. Manteuffel ordered for the 29th a general advance upon Pontarlier.

The 14th Division, which had already pressed forward in this direction, without awaiting the concentration of the entire VIIth Corps, was to resume its march at early dawn in order to reach the enemy as soon as possible. The rest of the corps was to follow.† The IIInd Corps was instructed to occupy Les Planches-en-Montagne with a detachment, while the bulk of its forces was likewise to advance upon Pontarlier. Of the XIVth Corps the troops under General v. d. Goltz‡ were to march to Arc-et-Senans, in order to serve as army reserve in the movement eastward. With the Baden Division§ General v. Werder had to watch Besançon, towards which place strong reinforcements were to be pushed, on both banks of the Doubs.

* With two companies each from the Breslau IIInd, Striegau and Apenrade battalions, half a pioneer company, and a division of lancers.

† The barricade in the valley north-west of Salins remained occupied.

‡ Of these the following were despatched:— $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{34}$, $\frac{2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Res. to Pin and Chambornay-les-Pin; $\frac{11\text{th and } 12\text{th}}{30}$, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th III to La Barre. $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th 2nd Res. Hus. was on messenger duties.

§ Except Degenfeld's Brigade, assigned to General Hann v. Weyhern.

General v. Schmeling was summoned to join from the north the general advance on Pontarlier, and to participate in the engagement which might take place.

On the evening of the 28th General v. Fransecky had become convinced that the enemy had given up the idea of escaping by way of Champagnole, and that instead of doing so would retreat through Nozeroy and Les Planches-en-Montagne to St. Laurent. Accordingly, he had already taken steps to advance next morning, not merely with a detachment, but with his main forces against Les Planches. The officer despatched with the necessary orders from the headquarters at Poligny was, however, wounded on the way by franc-tireurs. The Corps orders never reached the hands of the troops, and those from Army Headquarters could be carried out the more completely.

29th
January.*

Against Les Planches advanced only Colonel v. Wedell from Pont-du-Navoy with four battalions, half a squadron, and a battery,† taking the road by Loulle and La Billaude.

After having dispersed some dismounted French cavalry on the Champagnole—St. Laurent road, he reached Les Planches without molestation, and found here also only dismounted cavalry. After a slight skirmish, the riflemen captured the village, and detachments were at once pushed forward on the Champagnole and Nozeroy roads and also towards Mouthe and St. Laurent. Those movements led to frequent collisions with French detachments. The prisoners stated that cavalry belonging to the 15th Corps, and some 8,000 newly organised infantry had passed on the previous day through this district to St. Laurent, and on the 29th had continued their march to Lons-le-Saunier.‡

General v. Koblinski had started in the night from Poligny, and reached Champagnole at so early an hour that the battalions belonging to the 5th Brigade, which since the action at Salins had been attached to the 7th, could rejoin their own command. At 7 o'clock General du Trossel commenced his advance for Pontarlier, and reached Censeau without meeting the enemy. General v. Hartmann also arrived at Champagnole with those troops left to him after detaching Colonel v. Wedell; with the forces assembled here,§ which now constituted the main body of the corps, he advanced to Nozeroy

* See Sketch.

† 2nd Rifle Battalion, $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{54}$, $\frac{\text{IInd and Fus.}}{14}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd}}{3\text{rd Drag.}}$, and $\frac{1\text{st Heavy}}{11}$.

‡ See ante pp. 38 and 53, note †.

§ 5th Inf. Brigade, $\frac{3\text{rd and 4th Light}}{14}$, $\frac{1\text{st and IInd}}{54}$, $\frac{1\text{st}, \frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd, 3rd, and 4th}}{3\text{rd Dragoons}}$,
1st and 2nd Light, 2nd Heavy, 3rd Light, 3rd and 4th Heavy, 2nd and 3rd H. A. B.,
11

and $\frac{2\text{nd Field Pion.}}{11}$; $\frac{1\text{st}}{14}$ was with the baggage, $\frac{2\text{nd}}{14}$ was at Champagnole,

$\frac{3\text{rd Field Pion.}}{11}$ was at Dôle, which place it was to prepare for defence.





and Onglières in the course of the afternoon.* The corps artillery also followed to the same place.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 14th Division did not receive its orders to advance upon Pontarlier until late. It started from Déservillers at noon; † its march was much delayed in consequence of the deep snow on the roads. The last troops of the Division did not reach Levier until 3 p.m., just as the leading troops of the 13th Division, coming from Villeneuve d'Amont, entered the place ‡ after experiencing great difficulties.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the 14th Infantry Division under Colonel v. Cosel § had resumed its march from Levier towards Pontarlier, and at first only fell in with stragglers. General v. Zastrow gave orders to General Schuler v. Senden to gain the line of the Dugeon at Houtaud.

Near Le Souillot, however, the advanced guard met with some 4,000 to 5,000 French infantry, which continued their retreat on Pontarlier after a few rounds of shell.

In its further advance it again fell in with the enemy at the wood south of Sombacourt, and detached a battalion, a division of hussars, and two guns || under Major v. Brederlow towards the village which lay on the flank.

As the darkness and mist rendered the employment of artillery impossible, and the adversary was dislodged from the wood, Major v. Brederlow sent back the two guns to the main body, and advanced with the rest of his troops. The march of the small column was repeatedly molested from the ridge on the south-east of the road, but the enemy was always repulsed and lost some 40 prisoners. The 2nd Company 47th Regiment had already been sent forward from Levier, by way of Sept Fontaines, and after driving in some stragglers, and pursuing a weak rear-guard of cavalry and infantry, now arrived before Sombacourt. Without a moment's hesitation Captain v. Vietinghoff, with his men, dashed with a cheer into the strongly-occupied village, but, although the enemy was at first completely surprised, soon found himself surrounded by superior forces. Major v. Brederlow, with the three other companies, however, speedily arrived, and without delay forced his way into the village. Fifty officers, including 2 generals, and 2,700 men,

Engagement
at Chaffois
and Sombacourt.

* Part of Koblinski's Brigade, which after a rest of a few hours at Poligny, was called to arms by order of the general commanding the corps, accomplished this day some 33 miles, in spite of the slippery and snowed-up roads.

† Reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery.

‡ The guns and trains, in order to follow had to make the *détour* by Myon.

There remained to the north-west of Salins: $\frac{\text{IInd Ist } \frac{1}{2} \text{ 3rd}}{15' 13' \text{ 8th Hus.}}$, and $\frac{6\text{th Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$, under Lieut.-Colonel v. Pannewitz; Colonel v. Barby joined the Division with the rest of the troops.

§ $\frac{\text{Ist and Fus. Ist}}{53}$, $\frac{1\text{st Heavy}}{77' 15\text{th Hus.}}$, $\frac{\text{VII}}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd F. Pion. Co.}}{\text{VII}}$.

|| $\frac{\text{Ist } \frac{1}{2} \text{ 1st}}{77' 15\text{th Hus.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 1st Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$.

besides 10 guns, 7 mitrailleuses, 48 wagons, 319 horses, and 3,500 stand of arms, here fell into the hands of the Hanoverians, who suffered but slight loss.* The battalion remained for the night at Sombacourt guarding its numerous prisoners.

At night-fall the rest of the advanced guard of the 14th Division drew near to Chaffois, but found the village strongly occupied by the enemy. The 1st Heavy and shortly afterwards the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, which was brought forward from the main body of the Division, came into action on either side of the road against the village, and opened a vigorous fire. Notwithstanding that the mist and twilight prevented the effect of the shot from being estimated, the two battalions still left to the advanced guard deployed at once for the attack. Colonel v. Cosel ordered the 3rd Company of the 53rd to straightway storm Chaffois; after surprising the picquet in front of the village, it succeeded in capturing the nearest houses. The three other companies of the 1st Battalion followed with the object of turning the village on both flanks and taking part in the action as might be required. The further advance of the musketeers was now however so vigorously opposed, that the 10th Company of the fusilier battalion, held in reserve, had to be sent forward in support on the right, and the 9th Company on the left flank. The 2nd Battalion 77th Regiment was further brought forward as reserve from the main body of the Division. After a brisk action which lasted for an hour and a half, the enemy suddenly ceased firing, and voluntarily laid down their arms. Many officers, 1,800 men, and 2 guns, fell into the Prussian hands.

The enemy claimed an armistice as already concluded, and shortly after an officer of the French Staff arrived, bearing a letter from General Clinchant to General Thornton. According to its contents, the French Commander-in-Chief had received official notice of a twenty-one days' armistice,† signed on the 27th January, and had therefore ordered the firing to cease, and suitable communications to be made to the Germans.

On the German side, nothing had been heard of an armistice, and, in consequence, only a provisional suspension of hostilities was granted on the basis of the present situation. Chaffois, with the exception of three farms on the eastern outskirt, in each of which was posted a weak French company, remained to the victors. The prisoners, without their arms, were given up on the authority of the general commanding.

The Germans sustained a loss in this action of 6 officers and 46 men, all belonging to the 53rd Regiment.

That evening the main body of the 14th Division endeavoured to find quarters in and near Chaffois, so far as the

* 2 killed, 5 wounded.

† The signatures were appended, as is known, on the 28th (*see* App. CLVI). There was probably an error in the date of the letter from General Clinchant to General Thornton. Appendix CLXVIII contains the text of this letter, as also the telegram which formed the basis of the letter.

accommodation permitted. The 13th Division followed with its head as far as Sept Fontaines, whilst its rearmost troops remained at Villeneuve d'Amont.

The corps artillery,* in consequence of the difficulties of the ground, only reached Déservillers.†

The Army Reserve, under General v. d. Goltz, had continued its march in the morning past Arc-et-Senans; its leading troops, after considerable effort, reached Arbois, whither General v. Manteuffel transferred his headquarters this day. General v. Werder watched Besançon with the Baden Division, and caused some slight enterprises to be made from St. Vit and Marnay, with the object of reconnoitring towards the fortress. The detachments sent forward with this object‡ came speedily, however, across the adversary's fortified and strongly occupied positions, the defence of which could, moreover, be aided by the guns of the outworks. The detachments left on the Ognon also limited themselves to the duty of observation. The troops which were at Pin also occupied Marnay.§

General v. Schmeling had remained in the neighbourhood of Sancey-le-Grand, as General v. Debschitz was obliged to decline cooperation in an attack on Maiche. Lieut.-General v. Tresckow IIInd had recalled him to Belfort.||

In the course of the 29th, Maiche was, however, occupied by Colonel v. Zimmermann,¶ after dislodging some hostile stragglers; part of the main body of the 4th Reserve Division followed his movement as far as Belleherbe. Reconnaissances were pushed towards Besançon, without meeting with the enemy.

In order to obtain speedy and precise intelligence of the proceedings of the widely separated columns, General v. Manteuffel had during the course of the day sent away staff officers to the different parts of the army; the columns, on the

* For the present only 3 batteries strong. Besides the two horse artillery batteries attached to the 14th Division, the 3rd Heavy Battery had also been detached. It had been, since the 28th January, with the 13th Division, with which it had served as reinforcement to the troops despatched to hold the Quingey position (*see ante*, p. 56). It joined the corps artillery on the 30th.

† A small detachment had been sent from the Upper Loue in order to seek connection towards Pierre Fontaine, with General v. Schmeling, who was supposed to be in the neighbourhood. It, however, fell in with a hostile column, moving from Ornans to Pontarlier, and could make no headway.

‡ $\frac{\text{IIInd}}{6\text{th Bad.}}$ $\frac{1\text{st}}{3\text{rd Bad. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd Light}}{\text{Bad.}}$, under Lieut.-Colonel Arnold;
 $\frac{\text{IIInd}}{5\text{th Bad.}}$ $\frac{1\text{st}}{3\text{rd Bad. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{4\text{th Light}}{\text{Bad.}}$, under Major Baron Roeder v. Diersburg.

§ By the $\frac{11\text{th}}{34\text{th}}$ and $\frac{1}{2} \frac{2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$.

|| This order was the consequence of the instructions given by General v. Werder to attach once more to General v. Schmeling the four battalions of Zimmermann's Brigade which had remained before Belfort on the 20th January. Lieut.-General v. Tresckow IIInd desired to bring up Debschitz's detachment to the fortress, in order to relieve those four battalions.

¶ This officer had been reinforced by the Thorn Battalion, arrived from Belfort.

basis of the general instructions communicated to them, were left to act on their own independent judgment.

At 5 p.m., General v. Manteuffel received at his new headquarters at Arbois, a telegram from the Royal Headquarters that an armistice had indeed been concluded, but that the whole district comprised in the Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura Departments, was expressly excepted; therefore, the South Army would have to press its operations to a decisive conclusion. An army order communicated this information to the troops, and that same evening the Army Headquarters ordered, for the 30th, the continuation of the advance on Pontarlier by the IInd and VIIth Corps. Both were to maintain connection with each other.

General v. d. Goltz received orders to march with the Army Reserve by way of Pont d'Héry to Villeneuve d'Amont. General v. Werder was instructed to continue the offensive towards Besançon with the Baden Division, and to cause General v. Schmeling to drive with his troops towards the two Corps in the south any French detachments which might still be left on the Upper Doubs.

Reports had not yet reached Arbois of the success gained at Sombacourt and Chaffois.*

In order to secure Besançon, General Clinchant had, on his withdrawal, left at that place the 1st Division of the 20th Corps, which was the most familiar with the district, and also the 2nd of the 15th Corps.

27th January.

On the evening of the 27th, the 18th Corps gained Nods and Fallerans; the 2nd Division of the 20th, Ornans, the 15th, Sept Fontaines, Evillers, and Bolandoz; while the leading troops of the 24th Corps, coming from the north, had already reached Pontarlier, but in a most pitiable condition. General Crémier had arrived at Sombacourt with the 3rd Division of the 20th Corps, and with Pouillet's Division at Levier; the Army Reserve was still to the rear at Chantrans.†

The Commander-in-Chief had hastened, in person, to Pontarlier, having sent on in advance some engineer troops and staff officers for the purpose of summoning the inhabitants to clear the roads of the snow. He ventured to hope that the tactically strong position of Pontarlier would give rest to his troops, at any rate for a time. If the defiles at Vaux, Les Planches, and Morillon could be held, a communication, even if extremely difficult, would always remain open to the south, through St. Laurent and through La Chapelle-des-Bois. Up

* They did not arrive till the next morning.

† See sketch facing p. 53.

to the present time no large bodies of the adversary had been met with on the march, the ammunition columns had been safely brought through, and the Army Intendant had guaranteed at Pontarlier sufficient supplies of food, which could be further augmented by convoys from Switzerland.

But on arrival it was found that the existing supplies would only suffice for a few days, and General Clinchant therefore resolved to continue his march along the frontier so soon as his Corps were concentrated.

That same night, 27th-28th, General Cr  mer received orders to advance forthwith upon Les Planches, St. Laurent, and Morez,* with three cavalry regiments of the 15th and 24th Corps, which were posted on the Mouthe road; these points were to be reached before the Germans. The general executed this difficult task, and after a toilsome march along snow-blocked mountain roads, reached, with the cavalry, the prescribed destinations on the afternoon of the 28th.

The 24th Corps and Millot's Brigade of Pouillet's Division ^{28th and 29th} were to follow at once. The rest of the army, with the excep- ^{January.} tion of the two Divisions left at Besan  on, was concentrated round Pontarlier by General Clinchant on the 28th and 29th January.

On the evening of this last date, the 18th Corps was in and to the north of Houtaud; the 2nd Division of the 20th at Chaffois and Bulle; the 3rd of the same Corps was at Dompierre and Frasn  , with the rest of Pouillet's Division, of which two more battalions were pushed forward to Bonnevaux for the protection of the important Vaux defile. In and near Pontarlier was the 3rd, at Sombacourt the 1st Division of the 15th Corps.† The latter, as we have seen, was completely dispersed there by the attack of Brederlow's battalion and for the most part taken prisoners, before the Army Reserve, which was close by at Goux and Bians, could give it any assistance.‡ Similarly, as we know, Chaffois was lost that same evening. During the 29th, the main forces of the 24th Corps and Millot's brigade continued their advance to and beyond Mouthe, in order not to lose connection with General Cr  mer. But at Foncinele-Bas they fell in with detachments of Wedell's column which, as already mentioned, had driven off the cavalry posted there by General Cr  mer. Thus the last road open to the army for large bodies of troops was already intercepted, and General Comagny determined to attack Les Planches on the 30th January, in order to force a passage. Meanwhile the news of the armistice also reached him; he therefore gave up the attack and merely issued orders for the infantry of the 1st Division to continue its march along the mountain road

* Morez lies 5½ miles south-east of St. Laurent and 7 miles south-west of La Chapelle-des-Bois.

† See sketch facing p. 58.

‡ The Army Reserve retired to Pontarlier.

through La Chapelle-des-Bois on Morez, so as to enable the 24th Corps to maintain connection with General Cr mer in St. Laurent, when the line of demarcation should be fixed. The source of the armistice news had been in this case also the telegram addressed by Jules Favre to the Government Delegation and which had reached the hands of the civil authorities at Pontarlier, by way of Bordeaux; it made no mention of the clause excepting the Departments of C te d'Or, Doubs, and Jura. There was the same deficiency in the official communication, which had been dispatched at 3.30 p.m. on the 29th, from the French War Ministry to the Generals Commanding Army Corps.*

General Clinchant had, consequently, in perfect good faith, demanded the cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of negotiations for the determination of a line of demarcation.

* See Appendix CLXVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE MARCH OF THE SOUTH ARMY ON
PONTARLIER. PASSAGE OF THE FRENCH INTO SWISS
TERRITORY 30TH JANUARY—2ND FEBRUARY.

Better informed from Versailles than the French Commander-in-Chief from Bordeaux, General v. Manteuffel had ordered the immediate resumption of hostilities. But the instructions on this head could not reach the Corps early enough to prevent altogether the false news from causing an interruption in their movements.

30th January.

General v. Zastrow supposed that the enemy, in his own country, would have earlier news than that reaching the South Army by circuitous routes; he, therefore, modified the orders for the advance to Pontarlier on the 30th, by instructing the VIIth Corps to remain in general stationary for the present. The batteries of the corps artillery were to concentrate at Levier, while the trains were to close up to Déservillers and Eternoz. A wider distribution of the troops in quarters, which was urgently necessary, was also kept in view.

These instructions were in process of execution when, at 10.30 a.m., the orders arrived from Army Headquarters. At the time of their issue, the reports of the VIIth Corps of the previous evening could not have been received. It was known that French staff officers were on the road to Army Headquarters with a view to negotiations, and General v. Zastrow deemed it desirable to await supplementary or explanatory orders from the same quarter. Moreover, the VIIth Corps stood close in front of Pontarlier, and it appeared a proper course to cause the IIInd also to come up with it.

Before very long, fresh instructions, issued at 9 a.m., arrived from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. They repeated that the news of an armistice concluded for the South Army was untrue. The advance on Pontarlier was therefore to be continued, every attempt on the part of the enemy to retreat to the south or north was to be prevented, and any partial attack avoided; in other respects, negotiations with the enemy were only to be entertained on the basis of an unconditional surrender.

General v. Zastrow now caused the French troops in his front to be informed of the resumption of hostilities, and demanded the complete evacuation of Chaffois, which was complied with. The 14th Division in consequence entered into possession of the remaining farmsteads during the night.

During the latter part of the afternoon the noise of a weak cannonade had been heard in the direction of Frasne. General v. Fransecky had ordered the advanced guard of the IIInd Corps, while guarding its right flank towards Bonnevaux, to

Action at
Frasne.

their arms, demanded a supreme effort. In order to have at his disposal sufficient means to meet this eventuality, the Commander-in-Chief ordered all the forces to close up to the front on the following day.

The VIIth Corps was to concentrate in its entirety in the space between the roads leading from St. Gorgon and Levier to Pontarlier, to watch also the road from Morteau, and seek connection with General v. Schmeling; this general officer had to continue his advance towards the Ornans—Pontarlier road, whilst General v. Debschitz was still to keep the direction of Morteau. The IIInd Corps was to post itself along the Frasné road, and at the same time to bar to the enemy the last issues in the Upper Jura.

31st January.

On the 31st January,* the heads of the advanced guard of the IIInd Corps proceeded as far as St. Colombe and Bulle; they captured nearly 500 prisoners, and found the Frasné high road strewn with arms and stores of every kind. The 3rd Company Kolberg Grenadiers, under 1st Lieutenant Protzen, moving from La Rivière surprised that same evening the village of La Planée, and made 22 officers and 500 men prisoners. A right flank detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe, consisting of two battalions, a division of dragoons, and a battery,† fell in with the enemy at Vaux, after it had crossed without incident the first high chain of the Jura by the narrow Bonnevaux ravine. The leading battalion at once deployed against the village, surrounding it from the north and west, forced their way in, capturing 2 officers and 886 men,‡ and drove out the defenders on Les Granges Ste. Marie. Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe followed them up, heedless of the protest of a parlementaire. The enemy abandoned this defile as well, and retired upon St. Antoine. The main body of the Corps reached the neighbourhood of Dompierre.§

Action at
Vaux.

The resumption of hostilities having been again made known to the adversary, the 14th Division of the VIIth Corps occupied without a struggle the villages of Dommartin and Vuillecin, on the Dugeon, as also Goux and the defile of La Vrigne.|| During this movement some more officers and 130 men fell into its hands. At nightfall, a weak hostile column, which was marching from Arçon to Pontarlier, fell back in consequence of artillery fire. The 13th Division moved to Sept Fontaines, its advanced guard to Amathay and Reugney, the corps artillery

* See sketch.


† $\frac{1}{2}$ Ist and IIInd, $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd, and $\frac{3}{4}$ 3rd Heavy.
54, 3rd Drag., 11

‡ Altogether some 4,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the IIInd Corps this day.

§ Poligny and Champagnole remained in the occupation of detached companies; the garrison of Poligny was reinforced on the 31st January to two companies.

|| $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Pontarlier. La Vrigne was occupied by $\frac{6}{74}$ th and 7th

$\frac{1}{2}$ 4th, $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Heavy,
15th Hus. VII



■ German Troops.
 □ French Troops.



to Levier.* A mixed detachment,† which had to sweep the country as far as the Lône of hostile troops, advanced to Chantrans, but only met with some stragglers. Ornans was said to be still weakly occupied.

Another detachment of all arms, which was despatched to Onhans, opened communication in the evening at St. Gorgon with the troops of General v. Schmeling, so that now the 4th Reserve Division was also in immediate connection with the main body of the South Army.

General v. d. Goltz reached Villeneuve d'Amont and the neighbourhood; the 4th Reserve Division, from Vercel and Pierre Fontaine, moved forward to Nods; its advanced guard to St. Gorgon. It was only at Nods that slight collisions occurred with small hostile detachments. General v. Debschitz proceeded along the Morteau road as far as Le Russey, his advanced guard to La Chenalotte.‡

The Baden Division in position before Besançon, where the French remained entirely inactive, had been instructed to secure the important etappen station at Dôle, which was only weakly occupied by Kneesebeck's Brigade, and was threatened from the side of Auxonne. For this purpose two battalions, reinforced by artillery and cavalry, were sent thither on the 31st.§ The mere threat of hostilities, however, sufficed to cause the commandant of the small fortress to withdraw the detachments which he had pushed forward.

At an early hour that morning a French *parlementaire* had presented himself before General v. Manteuffel, for the purpose of requesting a suspension of hostilities on the basis of a despatch from the War Minister, but was turned back with a refusal. About 9 a.m. the French Colonel Varaigne arrived with the proposition that there should be a thirty-six hours' armistice for the purpose of clearing up the doubts with regard to the differences of opinion which prevailed. Colonel v. Wartensleben, who conducted the negotiations, declined also this suggestion, as on the part of the Germans there was no doubt as to the correct state of the case. He consented, however, to send a report to Versailles, but at the same time declared that there would be no cessation in the movements of the South Army,

* Part of the trains of the VIIth Corps in search of quarters at Bolandoz, met there a French detachment; the latter, however, in the belief that the armistice was in force, made no attempt to molest them. The train then found shelter at Déservillers.

† $\frac{\text{1st and Fus.}}{15}$, $\frac{\text{IInd}}{73}$, $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{8th Hus.}}$, $\frac{\text{5th Light}}{\text{VII}}$, under Colonel v. Delitz.

‡ Its march had been frequently delayed by hostile stragglers, who claimed the armistice, and in some cases had to be driven away by force.

§ $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{2nd Bad.}}$, $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{3rd Bad. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{\text{3rd Light}}{\text{Baden}}$, under Major Bleibtreu, to Orchamps, whence on the 1st February they moved towards Auxonne; $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{\text{Bad. B. G. Regt.}}$, $\frac{\text{2nd}}{\text{3rd Bad. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{\text{4th Heavy}}{\text{Baden}}$, under Major v. Vogel, to Raynans.

pending the arrival of the answer from the Royal Headquarters. In the cypher telegram on this subject, which the French Colonel agreed to forward by the more certain route through Bordeaux, General v. Manteuffel, at the same time, reported that he would attack Pontarlier next day.

At 4 p.m., he issued the necessary orders to this effect. In pursuance of these, the VIIth Corps was to close up in the space already assigned to it between the roads leading from St. Gorgon and Levier to Pontarlier, the IInd on both sides of the Frasnè—Pontarlier road. Each was to form its independent reserve, and at noon to pass to the attack. A suitable co-operation of Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe's detachment was to be ensured by the IInd Corps. General v. d. Goltz's troops were to form up at the same time to the east of Levier as a general reserve. General v. Schmeling also received orders to march on Pontarlier. For the expected battle General v. Manteuffel drew particular attention to the necessity of mutual support and to an effective employment of the artillery.

General Clinchant, acting on the belief that the armistice also applied to the Army of the Jura, had stopped the movements of his troops on the 30th. He limited himself to posting cavalry detachments along the Ornans—Pontarlier road, in order to maintain the connection with the fortress of Besançon in view of the expected tracing of a line of demarcation. After the loss of Sombacourt, Chaffois, Dompierre, and Frasnè, the army concentrated entirely on the right bank of the Dugeon; Vaux and Bonnevaux were occupied for the security of the mountain road, along which Crémier's Division was continuing its march to Mouthe.

The Commander-in-Chief had meanwhile commenced to have doubts whether the armistice applied to his troops; the defiles of Vaux and Les Granges Ste. Marie were lost, and the prospect was very small of getting even the infantry through to the south. He therefore assembled the army in position at Pontarlier on the 31st January for the purpose of making a last and serious stand, and caused the baggage, the ammunition columns, with the sick and the exhausted men, to be sent back to the protection offered by the Château de Joux. In the last resource, he contemplated the passage into Swiss territory.

News having arrived in the afternoon from Bordeaux that the East Army was in reality excluded from the armistice, General Clinchant summoned a council of war. The assembled Generals declared that they could no longer answer for their troops. Negotiations had already been commenced with the Swiss authorities for their passage, which was to take place on the following day by the three roads through Les Verrières de Joux, Les Fourgs, and Hôpitaux. In the evening General Clinchant

proceeded in person to Les Verrières in order to sign the convention. The Army Reserve was to hold Pontarlier until all the trains should have passed along the road through La Cluse, while General Billot, with the 18th Corps, was to take post between Fort Neuv and Château de Joux, in order to cover the retreat of the army. Works for strengthening this position were at once taken in hand. Full power was given to the 24th Corps and to General Crémier to escape with the most advanced detachments to Morez; with the rearmost, if necessary, to pass into Swiss territory. As a matter of fact, the bulk of the Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps had already proceeded so far that it was beyond reach of the advancing Prussian columns.

ENGAGEMENT AT PONTARLIER—LA CLUSE.

At 11 a.m. on the 1st February, when the advanced guard of the IInd Army Corps* was leaving Ste. Colombe, the scouts reported that Les Granges Narboz were no longer occupied by the enemy. At the Pontarlier railway station General du Trossel met with but slight resistance, which the advance of the 1st Battalion 9th Regiment sufficed speedily to overcome.† The town was occupied without further opposition, and a large number of men of the French Army were made prisoners. 1st February.

General v. Fransecky, who was with the advanced guard, gave orders to follow up the French at once in their further retreat towards the Swiss frontier. The road leading to La Cluse was found to be blocked by French vehicles of every description, and the neighbouring ground being deep in snow, it was only with great difficulty that the 1st Battalion 9th Grenadiers managed to force a passage, driving at the same time some hostile detachments in front of it. The pioneers, assisted by infantry, set about removing the obstacles, but it

* 9th Kolberg Grenadiers,	1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th	1st and 4th	3rd and parts 5th
	49	3rd Drag.	11th Drag.
5th Heavy and 6th Light	and 1st Field Pion.	The 7th	was with the baggage.
II	II	49	

† Order of March of Advanced Guard IInd Army Corps.

Commander: Major-General du Trossel.

Vanguard: Colonel v. Ferentheil u. Gruppenberg.

¼ 4th Squadron 3rd Dragoons.

1st Battalion 9th Grenadiers.

6th Light and 5th Heavy Batteries.

5th, 6th, and 8th Companies 49th Regiment.

¼ 1st Field Pioneer Company.

¼ 4th and 1st Squadron 3rd Dragoons.

3rd and ¼ 5th Squadron 11th Dragoons.

Main body of Advanced Guard:

Fusilier Battalion 9th Grenadiers (passed shortly to vanguard).

1st and 2nd Battalions 49th Regiment.

¼ 1st Field Pioneer Company.

was some considerable time before the fusilier battalion with the artillery could follow the 1st Battalion.* Meanwhile the latter had reached the point where the road, passing between steep walls of rock, turns east towards the entrance of La Cluse. At this point the Doubs Valley widens into a basin, which is completely commanded by the strong Château de Joux situated on an isolated peak. When the leading grenadier companies emerged from the defile, they were received by a brisk musketry fire; four guns of the 5th Heavy Battery which were brought forward with the greatest difficulty had speedily to give way before the heavy guns of the fort. French infantry of the line now advanced with great resolution, and pressed back the grenadiers to the bend of the road. Meanwhile, however, three fusilier companies† had scaled the heights on the east, and opposed the flanking attack of the enemy.

The main body of the advanced guard had meanwhile reached the Pontarlier railway station, and was now brought up by General du Trossel in order to outflank the enemy's right on the Larmont heights. The 1st Battalion 49th Regiment,‡ followed by the 2nd Kolberg,§ deployed on the fissured plateau to the left of the fusiliers; they repulsed the enemy with the bayonet, and gained possession of the farms on the plateau.

At the wayside inn, in reserve, stood the 2nd Battalion 49th Regiment,|| and later on the 2nd Grenadiers also arrived there.¶ But the configuration of the ground, so eminently favourable to the enemy, prevented the deployment of large masses for the attack.

At the right wing, on the other hand, the 2nd Company 49th Regiment, and somewhat later the 12th of the 9th Grenadiers, had, with a great effort, scaled the steep mountain side west of the railway. The fire from this commanding height drove back two hostile battalions in disorder upon La Cluse, and defeated all further sorties from that direction, whilst in the centre of the fighting line the 1st and Fusilier Battalions of the 9th Grenadiers held their own against the enemy's efforts.

On the left wing, Colonel Laurin had driven the adversary from the wood. Ultimately the 49th overcame with the bayonet the vigorous resistance of some French skirmishers ensconced behind a wall on the high ground above the defile,

* The 2nd Battalion was engaged in collecting the prisoners at Pontarlier.

† 9th, 10th, and 11th. The 12th assisted at first the pioneers in removing the obstacles on the high road.

‡ Except the 2nd Company, which turned to the right.

§ This regiment had meanwhile finished collecting the prisoners at Pontarlier.

|| $\frac{5th}{49}$ followed at once the $\frac{IInd}{9}$ to the plateau.

¶ In consequence of this the $\frac{6th \text{ and } 8th}{49}$ advanced into the fighting line, in order to fill a gap between the $\frac{Ist}{49}$ and $\frac{IInd}{9}$.

and followed the retreating foe with a brisk fire. Several skirmishing divisions scrambled down the steep slopes towards La Cluse,* and the 9th Grenadiers advanced close up to Fort Neuve. Nothing more could be done, and the troops remained during the night on the ground which they had won. Their loss, which chiefly fell on the 9th Grenadiers, amounted to 19 officers and 365 men. The enemy sustained a loss of 23 officers and 1,600 men taken prisoners,† besides some 400 wagons mostly laden with food.

General v. Fransecky, who was present at the action in front of La Cluse, ordered the main body of the Corps, which could find no employment here, to advance from Les Granges Narboz to Oye and Les Granges Ste. Marie.

In consequence of the almost insuperable difficulties presented by the intervening mountains covered foot-deep in snow, General v. Hartmann contented himself with sending in the first instance only two companies by the direct road to Oye, as he hoped to reach his goal with the rest of the troops along the better road through Pontarlier. But as the action in front of La Cluse had grown to an extent quite unexpected, he was detained at Pontarlier,‡ in order to support General du Trossel in case of need. The corps artillery also followed to Pontarlier.

Towards the end of the day, Captain v. Keyserlingk, on the other hand, had with the 10th and 11th Companies 2nd Grenadiers ascended with great difficulty the steep slopes of the Jura, but in his further advance upon Oye met with the enemy in the wood. Several French columns§ returning along the road from Pontarlier to Les Granges Ste. Marie deployed such large forces that the small band had to retire upon Granges-de-dessus; here it was supported by the 39th Regiment,|| which General v. Mantouff, who was at Pontarlier, had ordered in that direction.

Action at
Oye.

The VIIth Corps assembled this day, in accordance with orders, on the Drueon: the 14th Division and corps artillery at Houtaud, the 13th at Pont Rouge.¶ The latter had been already anticipated at Doubs** by the 4th Reserve Division, General v. Debschitz reached Morteau, and General v. d. Goltz had posted his troops in reserve about two miles in front of Levier. But as a general engagement was no longer probable,

* Some hostile battalions withdrew at once from the village; this latter was not however, occupied by the Prussians.

† Besides numerous prisoners brought in before the fight.

‡ The 2nd Grenadiers had also been brought forward from this town.

§ The cavalry of the 18th Corps and a regiment of African light infantry.

|| 10th and 11th then rejoined their regiment.

2

¶ Detachments thereof were despatched to Arçon and Grange Maillot.

** General v. Schmeling had received orders to march on Pontarlier early in the morning; he had assembled his troops, and reached Doubs at noon, whence he moved on to Pontarlier without finding use for his services. A detachment of the 4th Reserve Division had also been at Ornans, and found it unoccupied.

General v. Manteuffel ordered the latter to place his troops in quarters. It was clear that the affair at La Cluse was merely an action with the rearguard of the retiring adversary. The remaining troops were also placed for the night, so far as possible, under some sort of cover in and near Pontarlier.

Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe had found on all the roads evident signs of great disorder in the adversary's ranks, and had captured several hundred prisoners; finding, however, St. Antoine and Rochejean strongly occupied, he halted at Les Granges Ste. Marie.

The enemy, who had been opposed to Colonel v. Wedell at Foncine-le-Bas, had disappeared, and there were no more traces of him on this side of La Chaux Neuve and St. Laurent.*

No intelligence of these events having as yet reached Army Headquarters, they were in doubt there as to the size of the French force which might still be posted on the southern mountain road; and in consequence General v. Manteuffel ordered the IInd Corps to advance next day in sufficient strength by way of Les Granges Ste. Marie and Mouthe, and to use the rest of the troops as a flanking force along the road through Frasné. The 4th Reserve Division was to relieve General du Trossel as early as possible, and to continue in observation towards Les Verrières.

At the same time the Commander-in-Chief had in view a decisive action with General Garibaldi, whom he supposed to be still at Dijon. To this end he proposed to assemble the VIIth Corps at Arbois, the IInd at Lons-le-Saunier, and General v. d. Goltz's troops at Poligny. The duty of completing the success achieved at Pontarlier, and the removal of the mass of captured war material and prisoners, was to be entrusted to the 4th Reserve Division and General v. Debschitz's detachment.

That same night of the 1st—2nd February, General v. Manteuffel received news at Pontarlier, by way of Berlin, that a convention concerning the passage of the East Army into Switzerland had been concluded between General Herzog of the Confederation and General Clinchant.† The whole of the 1st February had been employed by the French columns in passing the frontier. General Pallu de la Barrière, who intended defending the foremost chain of the Jura at Pontarlier, saw his troops carried away almost at the outset by the disorderly stream of drivers of the long columns of train. Not until they reached La Cluse did he succeed in halting them.

At that place the 18th Corps had also deployed, and the resistance of both these bodies of troops had brought on the

* He had retreated on the preceding night to Morez.

† The forts impeded by their fire not only this relief, but also the search for wounded. A parlementaire sent for the purpose was fired upon.

‡ App. CLXIX contains the text of this convention.

somewhat obstinate fight. In the night the 18th Corps, and latter on the Army Reserve, followed by way of Les Verrières-de-Joux* the mass of the East Army which had retired into Swiss territory.

As a matter of fact, the following troops had escaped to the Ain Department, which lies on the south frontier:—General Crémier's cavalry, the Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps, some other regiments of cavalry; further the 1st Division 24th Corps, with an effective, it is true, of only some hundreds, and lastly a number of officers of rank.† 80,000 men laid down their arms in Switzerland.

The East Army had disappeared from the theatre of war, the issue of the siege of Belfort could no longer be doubtful, and no danger henceforth threatened the communications of the German army.

On the 2nd February when General v. Kobinski was advancing with the 42nd Regiment and the 3rd Squadron 3rd Dragoons by way of Les Granges Ste. Marie, he found the district entirely deserted by the enemy. The detachments, some thousands strong, which Colonel v. Wedell had had in front of him at Les Planches, had, on the night of the 31st January—1st February, retired into neutral territory at Morbier, with a protest against the non-recognition of the armistice.‡

2nd
February.

The IInd Corps took up quarters to the east of the Pontarlier—Champagnole road as far as Les Granges Ste. Marie. The VIIth Corps remained at Pontarlier, and General v. Debschitz at Morteau, while General v. d. Goltz marched to Andelot-en-Montagne. Ornans was occupied by the 4th Reserve Division, in order to maintain the connection with the Baden Division. Army Headquarters remained at Pontarlier.§ Here the news had arrived that General Hann v. Weyhern had occupied Dijon. A further enterprise in this direction would have therefore been useless, and the only matter still remaining to be done by General v. Manteuffel was to occupy the whole of the departments excluded from the armistice.

* General Pallu and Colonel Pouillet, with a few resolute men, reached the Ain Department along bye-paths.

† Among these were Generals Billot, de Bressolles and Carré de Busserolle, Colonels Goury, Pouillet, and Bourras, the latter of whom had succeeded in escaping from St. Hippolyte with some 1,000 men.

‡ Here also all the roads were blocked with war material.

§ General Baron v. Manteuffel caused 1,000 stand of arms, which had been surrendered at Chaffois in the belief of an armistice, to be handed over to the Swiss authorities with a view to their restoration to General Clinchant.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL HANN V. WEYHERN AGAINST DIJON.

Although the French War Ministry had never ceased in their endeavours to reinforce General Garibaldi's troops, and had put an end to the differences between him and General Pellissier commanding at Dijon, by recalling the latter on the 25th and giving the former the command of all forces in the Côte d'Or, Garibaldi considered that he ought to limit his efforts to holding Dijon. On the arrival of the news announcing that General v. Manteuffel was moving with considerable forces against the communications of the East Army, General Garibaldi was urged to undertake an energetic expedition against Dôle and Mouchard. He, however, satisfied himself with despatching 700 franc-tireurs against Dôle, but they made little attempt to make their presence felt.

To co-operate in Garibaldi's enterprises, the War Ministry had on the 26th January appointed 15,000 gardes mobiles, whom General Crouzat was ordered to push forward with the available field artillery from Lyons to Lons-le-Saunier. With the same object, a brigade of the 26th Corps, then in process of formation, was to be sent by rail from Châtellerault to Beaune. On 27th January, Garibaldi received a second intimation to hold Dijon with only some 8,000 to 10,000 men, and to lead forward the mass of his army at once beyond Dôle. Instead of this, he despatched a part of the 3rd Brigade to St. Jean de Losne; another part of it, as also the 1st Brigade, he assembled at Bourg* by the 29th January, utilizing the railway for the purpose, and occupied the main points on the slopes of the Côte d'Or. The Chief of the Staff Bordone conducted the defence of Dijon, where, on the 29th January, twelve position guns arrived.

Garibaldi's inactivity had permitted General v. Kettler to remain with his brigade in position to the south of Marsannay;† the patrols despatched towards Dijon always found the enemy quiet there. On the 25th January a mixed detachment‡ had been sent to Prauthoy, where a raiding party belonging to the Langres garrison had captured the messenger-post.

On the 28th, General v. Kettler, hearing that Châtillon-sur-Seine and Nuits-sur-Armançon were threatened from Langres and Avallon, marched away without impediment towards Is-sur-Tille and Thil Châtel.§ This information proved to be exaggerated.

* On the railway between Lyons and Lons-le-Saunier.

† See *ante*, p. 24.

‡ 5th, 7th and 8th, with some dragoons, under Captain Kriess. The 6th was despatched to Is-sur-Tille to guard the hospital there.

§ It is supposed that the movements of General de Pointe de Grévigny had given the ground for these reports. (See later narrative.)

The line of cavalry messenger-posts through Châtillon having been broken up by order from Army Headquarters, the detachment sent to Prauthoy was on the point of quitting the place, when it was surprised in the morning by troops from Langres. The three companies, which were attacked by greatly superior forces, succeeded by a movement eastward in cutting their way through to General v. Kettler, but they sustained a loss of 5 officers, 77 men killed and wounded, and had to abandon their wagons, the horses of which had been killed.* Kettler's Brigade returned the next day to the line Savigny le Sec—St. Julien, in front of Dijon.

Surprise of
Prauthoy.

The other forces at General Hann v. Weyhern's disposal, Colonel v. Willisen's cavalry, besides Kneesebeck's and Degenfeld's brigades, had meanwhile crossed the Saône at Apremont, and were assembling in the neighbourhood of Essertenne and Mirabeau-sur-Bèze. At the latter place had been hitherto posted Major v. Schon with the fusiliers of the 49th Regiment, in order to cover the concentration.† He was now pushed forward as far as the Tille.§ Some troops were left behind for the protection of the etappen line between Gray and Dôle.||

29th
January.†

General v. Manteuffel had recommended an advance against the south and south-east side of Dijon, as, by so doing, the adversary's communications would be threatened, and it would be also possible to destroy the railways to Auxonne and Châlons-sur-Saône. The previous attacks of General v. Kettler had also shown that Dijon was very strongly fortified on the west and north sides.¶ General Hann v. Weyhern therefore

* Captain Kriess and 1st Lieutenants Luchs and v. Zitzewitz were among the wounded.

† See sketch facing p. 58.

‡ On 27th January, on which day General Hann v. Weyhern assumed at Dôle the command of the troops appointed to advance against Dijon, Kneesebeck's mixed brigade with the $\frac{4\text{th Light}}{11}$, as also Colonel Baron v. Willisen's cavalry with the

Baden Horse Artillery Battery, were posted on the Gray—Dôle road, for the purpose of protecting the communications of the South Army. Of the XIVth Army Corps the 2nd Baden Infantry Brigade, with the 1st Heavy Battery, were appointed to the enterprise, and set in movement for Pesmes. General Hann v. Weyhern established his headquarters at Dôle on the 27th. As a reconnaissance had shown that the Saône bridge at St. Jean de Losne was destroyed, the advance originally contemplated by the south of Auxonne had to be abandoned, and concentration at Mirabeau was chosen, using the bridge at Apremont for the purpose.

§ Major v. Schon had meanwhile, after the arrival of Willisen's brigade on the Etappen line Dôle—Gray, been reinforced by the $\frac{2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Drag.}}$; the detachments of the 11th Dragoons assigned to him, as well as to Kneesebeck's Brigade, rejoined the regiment. Shortly after, the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{2\text{nd Res. Drag.}}$, which in consequence of the surprise of Prauthoy had made a reconnaissance from Gray, in that direction, joined Major v. Schon.

|| $\frac{1\text{st}}{60}$, $\frac{1\text{Ind}}{72}$, and $\frac{1\text{st and } 4\text{th}}{2\text{nd Res. Drag.}}$, as also two battalions formed of new levies for the IInd and VIIth Corps.

¶ General Baron v. Manteuffel moreover was of opinion that the capture of Dijon was not absolutely necessary; on the contrary, if it should entail great sacri-

resolved, by a movement down the Tille, to proceed to the district between Auxonne and Dijon, either for the purpose of attacking this place, or from the Burgundy Canal to sever its communications with the south.

30th January. On the evening of the 29th parlementaires appeared at the outposts. Early on the 30th, General Bordone arrived in person, requesting that a line of demarcation might be fixed on the basis of the armistice. General Hann v. Weyhern rejected the proposal. The concentration of Kettler's Brigade on the left wing and an advance of the bulk of the remaining forces to the Tille were ordered; it was not until behind the Norges that the enemy's outposts were met with.

31st January. On the 31st January,* Kettler's Brigade established itself at St. Julien, the remaining troops at Arc-sur-Tille. Major v. Schon received orders to sever the communications between Dijon and Auxonne. Early in the morning the Chief of the Staff of the Vosges Army came to Mirebeau, but his proposals were again rejected, the more so as that same night positive orders to continue the movements arrived from Army Headquarters.

At 10 a.m. Kettler's Brigade advanced upon Varois, whilst Col. v. d. Kneesebeck's Brigade marched by way of Couternon upon Quetigny. The enemy, after receiving a few rounds of shell, retired upon his strongly entrenched main position on the line St. Apollinaire—Mirande, which, on account of the late hour of the day, could not be attacked. Degenfeld's and Willisen's Brigades were left as reserve at Arc, on the left bank of the Tille. Major v. Schon, who had pressed on towards the Ouche, seized the Fauverney Bridge, the enemy retiring partly to Dijon and partly to Auxonne. He further assisted a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kraus, despatched to observe Auxonne, in driving the adversary from Genlis.

General Bordone, finding all his attempts useless to bring about a cessation of hostilities, determined to evacuate Dijon on the following night and retire to the district actually included in the armistice. Under cover of Ricciotti Garibaldi's Brigade, he caused his troops, so far as they could not use the railway, to march by the roads to Autun, Beaune, and Seurre.

1st February. Accordingly, early on the 1st February, General Hann v. Weyhern found the position St. Apollinaire—Mirande abandoned. Kettler's Brigade entered Dijon without opposition; it was followed by the Baden troops, whilst some dismounted men of the 1st Squadron 11th Dragoons, after a few shots, gained possession of the railway station just as the last railway train was moving away. Several ammunition wagons and other

fices, the isolation of the adversary would suffice until a decisive action had been fought with the French East Army, when the enterprise could be resumed with perfect certainty.

* See sketch facing p. 68.

† Fus. 5th
3rd Bad. Bad. B. G. Drag. and ½ 2nd Heavy Bad.

material fell into their hands. Knesebeck's mixed brigade had meanwhile moved off by way of Mirande and Longvic towards the Beaune road. Major v. Schon had at an early hour crossed the Ouche at Fauverney, and afterwards the Burgundy Canal at Ouges. A squadron sent in advance, aided by some pioneers carried in wagons, destroyed the railway at Perrigny-les-Dijon, but the last train coming from Dijon had already passed this place.

Colonel v. Lobenthal was detached with the 21st Regiment, a squadron, and a battery,* to Plombières. General v. Kettler,† under whose orders were also placed Knesebeck's mixed brigade and Major v. Schon's detachment, advanced as far as Gevrey.

On the 2nd February, Sombornon and Nuits were occupied, but the enemy was no longer seen. Patrols also established the fact that Beaune was free of French troops. The Army of the Vosges had this day abandoned the Côte d'Or Department.

Willisen's and Degenfeld's Brigades remained at Dijon.

By his enterprising activity General v. Manteuffel had succeeded in a three weeks' campaign in crushing, with unimportant exceptions, the hostile forces which had been forced to retreat by the obstinate resistance of the XIVth Corps.

The resolute action of his generals and the unsurpassed endurance of the troops‡ had, despite the most unfavourable conditions of ground and weather, overcome all difficulties. Once again in this war France found herself deprived of a numerous army.

* 9 companies of 21st Regiment (2 left at Nuits, 1 at Is-sur-Lille), $\frac{1st}{11th Drag.}$, and $\frac{5th Light}{II}$.

† With 11 companies 61st Regiment (1 in Thil Châtel), $\frac{2nd}{11th Drag.}$, and $\frac{4th Heavy}{II}$.

‡ The IIad Corps had accomplished the long distance from Paris to the Swiss frontier in almost one continuous march: the 5th Brigade, for instance, had only had two halting days in thirty-four, and had marched 400 miles, exclusive of the marches to and from the places of assembly. In the expedition to Avallon the 8th Brigade marched on the 16th January nearly 25 miles. Major v. Normann's detachment, which on the 18th January pressed forward to the bridges at Gray, had marched that day 31 miles. The VIth Corps, especially during the movements for the assembly of the South Army from Auxerre to Châtillon-sur-Seine, also made very severe marches. But it was not so much the distances to be contended with, as the circumstance that in the mountains the marching had to be mostly done along roads frozen like glass, or deep in snow. Neither, in consequence of the sudden commencement and the unbroken continuance of the operations, was it possible to look after the clothing and food so carefully as otherwise would have been the case. The men's boots especially fell into bad order. On entering the Jura the baggage—even that of some of the higher staffs—had to be left behind.

OCCUPATION OF THE JURA AND COTE D'OR DEPARTMENTS BY
THE SOUTH ARMY.—3RD TO 14TH FEBRUARY.

The corps of 15,000 men,* which at the end of January had been despatched by order of the French War Ministry from Lyons to Lons-le-Saunier, had there joined, under the command of General Pelissier, the mobilized national guards sent away from Besançon by General Rolland.†

These forces, though considerable in point of numbers, had, however, made so little progress in their military organization that they were manifestly unsuited for employment in the open field,‡ while as regards the insignificant remnant saved from the East Army,§ it could not be looked upon as a reinforcement of any value. General Pelissier could in these circumstances have attempted nothing more in support of the East Army, but confined himself to endeavouring to obtain a line of demarcation which would leave him in possession of his positions. General v. Manteuffel rejected this proposal, as also those meanwhile tendered by the Commandant of Salins, and suggested to General Pelissier a voluntary abandonment of the Jura Department with a view to avoiding further bloodshed. Meanwhile, the South Army had already commenced its prescribed march in the direction of Arbois—Lons-le-Saunier, whilst at the same time parts of it were moving southwards in the Jura, and parts had been left behind in the direction of the Swiss frontier.

3rd February.

On the 3rd February, General v. Koblinski, supported from the side of Les Planches by Colonel v. Wedell,¶ had moved with the advanced guard IInd Army Corps|| without opposition, from Les Granges Ste. Marie as far as Mouthe; 6 guns and 20 limbers, which had been abandoned by the French, were found during the march.

General v. Hartmann** had followed as far as the neighbourhood of Fraroz, at the foot of the Haut Joux Forest, General du

* See ante, p. 76.

† See ante, p. 38.

‡ See Enquête parlementaire, Dépositions, Vol. III, Versailles, 1873, p. 509, and Rapports, Vol. II, Versailles, 1874, p. 784.

§ See ante, p. 75.

|| By $\frac{9\text{th and } 10\text{th}}{14}$, $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{54}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd}}{3\text{rd Drag.}}$, under Major v. Renouard.

¶ 42nd Regiment, $\frac{1\text{st and II}^{\text{nd}}}{54}$, $\frac{3\text{rd}}{3\text{rd Drag.}}$, and $\frac{3\text{rd Heavy}}{11}$.

** With 2nd Grenadiers, $\frac{1\text{st}, \frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd, and } 4\text{th}}{3\text{rd Drag.}}$, $\frac{1\text{st and } 2\text{nd Light}}{11}$, $\frac{2\text{nd Heavy}}{11}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd Field Pion.}}{11}$, $\frac{3\text{rd and } 4\text{th}}{14}$, were with the corps artillery, $\frac{1\text{st}}{14}$ was with the baggage, $\frac{2\text{nd}}{14}$ at Champagnole.

Trossel* to Bonnevaux, while the corps artillery had remained at Frasne.

The VIIth Corps had moved the 14th Division to the neighbourhood of Pont d'Héry, the 13th to Levier and the villages to the south-west, the corps artillery to Thésy, Lemuy, and Villeneuve d'Amont. Small parties remained in observation in front of Salins.†

General v. d. Goltz had arrived at Poligny, and remained stationary for the time, watching in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier; the 4th Reserve Division had by orders from Army Headquarters been again reinforced by the four battalions which had been assigned to General v. Debschitz.‡ General v. Schmeling had detached Major-General v. Tresckow with 8 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 3 batteries,§ to watch the Swiss frontier between Les Allemands and the Les Granges St. Marie—Ballaigue road; while Colonel v. Knappe with 5 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 3 batteries,|| was to observe the east side of Besançon. Headquarters remained at Pontarlier. At Les Allemands, Captain Jouanne, of the 3rd Reserve Lancers, found three guns which had been abandoned by the enemy in his flight. The total number of field guns taken from the East Army now amounted to twenty-eight.

On the 3rd February the Army Headquarters were at Frasne.

The 4th February was employed by the IInd Corps in re-organizing the units which had become much disjointed during the recent operations; the 6th Infantry Brigade, with two batteries and half a squadron,¶ was despatched to St. Laurent, the rest of the 3rd Infantry Division to Le François, Moulin-du-Haut, and Les Planches en Montagne. General du Trossel moved with the troops of the 4th Division under his orders to Pont-du-Navoy and Champagnole. The corps artillery reached its quarters at Champagnole on the left bank

4th February.

* With 9th Grenadiers, $\frac{\text{1st and IInd}}{49}$, $\frac{\text{3rd and 5th}}{11\text{th Drag.}}$, $\frac{\text{6th Light and 5th Heavy}}{11}$,
and $\frac{\text{1st Field Pion.}}{11}$.

† $\frac{\text{IInd}}{15}$, $\frac{\text{1st}}{13}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\text{ 3rd}}{8\text{th Hus.}}$, and $\frac{\text{6th Heavy}}{\text{VII}}$, under Lieut.-Colonel v. Pannewitz.

‡ The Division was thus united in its entirety, with the exception of the small detachments at Larians, L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs, and Baume-les-Dames, under the command of General v. Schmeling.

§ $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{25}$, Ortelsburg, Tilsit, Wehlau, Gumbinnen, Loetzen, Goldap, and Marienburg Battalions, $\frac{\text{1st, 2nd, and 3rd, 1st and 3rd Light, 2nd Heavy}}{3\text{rd Res. Lan.}}$, $\frac{\text{4th Res. Div.}}$.

|| $\frac{\text{1st and IInd}}{25}$, Osterode, Graudenz, and Thorn Battalions, 1st Res. Lancers, and $\frac{\text{1st Heavy, 2nd and 4th Light}}{4\text{th Res. Div.}}$.

¶ $\frac{\text{1st and 3rd Heavy}}{11}$ and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\text{ 2nd}}{3\text{rd Drag.}}$.

of the Ain. General Hann v. Weyhern completed the occupation of the Côte d'Or Department.

The patrols of the 3rd Division found no further trace of the enemy. On the other hand, a squadron* despatched by General du Trossel met with French cavalry in front of Mirebel, repulsed them, and found the village occupied by infantry.

Of the VIIth Corps the 14th Division reached Arbois, the 13th Andelot-en-Montagne, whilst the corps artillery took up its quarters on the Pont d'Héry—Arbois road. The trains which had been despatched in good time by way of Epinal, also arrived under escort of the 1st Battalion 74th Regiment.†

The Army Headquarters proceeded to Champagnole.

General v. Manteuffel did not contemplate seeking a tactical decision with the hostile forces still present in the Jura Department, which in any case had lost their importance since the defeat of the East Army; he proposed to give his troops every possible rest after the excessive efforts of the last few days, and not to expose them to further losses. He therefore ordered the IInd Army Corps to reconnoitre next day in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier, but to avoid a serious action. The day was to be employed in arranging the supplies, and, so far as possible, placing the clothing and equipment in good order.

5th February.

The orders from His Majesty the Emperor and King, which arrived by telegraph at Army Headquarters on the 5th February, likewise left it optional to grant the troops the rest to which they were entitled after such great successes; at the same time the siege of Belfort was to be vigorously prosecuted. The transport of the prisoners and the removal of the captured stores having been completed at Pontarlier, six battalions of the East Prussian Landwehr Brigade with two batteries,‡ all belonging to the 4th Reserve Division, were sent away in the next two days to join the siege corps, whilst General v. Schmeling took up other positions with the troops remaining under his orders.§

* $\frac{5th}{11th\ Drag.}$

† See ante, p. 9.

‡ The Tilsit, Wehlau, Gumbinnen, Loetzen, Goldap, and Marienburg Battalions, with $\frac{2nd\ Heavy\ and\ 3rd\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$.

§ There remained at Pontarlier: $\frac{Fus.}{25}$, Ortelsburg and Osterode Battalions, 1st, 3rd, and 4th, and $\frac{1st\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$; at Ornans: $\frac{1st\ and\ IInd}{25}$, Graudenz and Thorn Battalions, 1st Reserve Lancers, and $\frac{1st\ Heavy, \frac{1}{2}\ 2nd, and\ 4th\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$. The

Insterburg Battalion was at L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs, the Danzig Battalion, $\frac{2nd}{3rd\ Res.\ Lan.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 2nd\ Light}{4th\ Res.\ Div.}$ at Larians.

A small detachment,* which General du Trossel sent to Mirebel, found the village free of the enemy, and saw only some wagons with a cavalry escort moving from Crançot to Lons-le-Saunier.

Meanwhile, General Pelissier, seeing the approach of the heads of the German columns, determined to retire to the district included in the armistice; he abandoned Lons-le-Saunier, in order, on the following night, to reach Beaurepaire, and afterwards to move to Bourg. 6th February.

In consequence General du Trossel found Lons-le-Saunier clear of the enemy on 6th February, and occupied it.† The 3rd Division followed to the line Châtillon—Clairvaux, the Corps Artillery to Pont-du-Navoy.

The VIIth Army Corps pushed forward the 14th Division to the neighbourhood of Vaudrey, brought up the 13th to Arbois, and cantoned the Corps Artillery at Mathenay and Molamboz.

General Hann v. Weyhern had meanwhile caused his troops to occupy Précy-sous-Thil, Saulieu and Pouilly-en-Auxois on the west, Beaune and Seurre on the south; and made arrangements for the investment of Auxonne.‡ The commandant of this fortress had meanwhile pushed forward detachments of the garrison to Frasné and Peintre. By order of General v. Manteuffel, Colonel v. Knessebeck in consequence left Seurre for the fortress with some troops§ on the 6th, but found that the enemy had returned to the positions which he had held prior to the 28th January; no encounter therefore took place even at this point.

On the 6th February both Arnay-le-Duc and Sémur were occupied, and from thence connection was established with the Etappen troops which had to guard the railway passing through Nuits-sur-Armançon.

The Army Headquarters remained on the 6th February at Poligny.

The Departments of the Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or, which had been excluded from the armistice, being on the 7th February entirely in the hands of the South Army, General v. Manteuffel could spread his troops over a wider area with a view to better accommodation, while preserving their readiness for action; at the same time the necessary measures of security were taken in the direction of the region occupied by the enemy. To the IInd Corps was assigned the Jura, to the VIIth the Côte 7th February.

* $\frac{4\text{th}}{49}$, and $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{5\text{th}}{11\text{th Drag.}}$.

† The $\frac{1\text{st}}{9}$ remained in the Mirebel Pass.

‡ To this were appointed: $\frac{\text{IInd and Fus.}}{3\text{rd Bad.}}$, $\frac{5\text{th}}{\text{Baden B. G. Drag.}}$, and $\frac{2\text{nd Heavy}}{\text{Bad.}}$,
under Lieut.-Colonel Kraus.

§ $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{72}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{4\text{th Light}}{11}$.

d'Or, and to the XIVth the Doubs Department. An army reserve was constituted under General v. d. Goltz, consisting of his former command, the 1st Baden Infantry Brigade, and Willisen's Cavalry Brigade, and was assembled in the neighbourhood of Dôle. Its function was to maintain the connection between the VIIth and XIVth Corps, and watch Auxonne and Salins. It was the duty of the XIVth Corps to keep watching Besançon, to push the siege of Belfort with vigour, and provisionally to continue in occupation of Pontarlier.

The Army Headquarters proceeded on 7th February to Mont-sous-Vaudrey.

8th—14th
February.

These orders had in general been put into execution by the 10th February.* Meanwhile General v. Manteuffel had been also entrusted with the supreme direction of the investment, and, if necessary, of the siege of the fortress of Langres, the Commandant of which had at first refused to recognise the armistice, although the fortress was not situated within the area of the three Departments excluded from its provisions. Colonel v. Krenski's troops, now on the march from Longwy, consisting of 6 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, as also the siege park to be brought from that place, and 10 landwehr battalions of the Government-General of Lorraine were also to co-operate. General v. Manteuffel moved off Knesbeck's Brigade to the vicinity of Gray, for the same purpose. On the 8th, however, news arrived from the Government-General that the Commandant had recognised the armistice, and His Majesty the Emperor and King had thereupon ordered that the present distribution of the forces should not be disturbed, unless a general recommencement of hostilities rendered it necessary. In order to be able in this event to act at once with vigour against the fortress, Goltz's Brigade had moved off through Gray to the neighbourhood of Champlitte, Prauthoy, and Fontaine Française. It was still in those positions when, on the 14th, news arrived of the armistice concluded on the previous day for South-east France.†


From this time forth complete tranquillity prevailed also in this region; after the winter campaign, so full of hardships, repose was very acceptable to the troops. General v. Manteuffel had on the 10th February transferred his headquarters by way of Dôle and St. Jean de Losne to Dijon, where since the 9th had also been those of the VIIth Corps; on this later date the headquarters of the IIInd Corps had proceeded to Poligny, those of the XIVth to Dôle.

* The relief of the troops under General Hann v. Weyhern by the VIIth Corps was delayed for several days.

† On 6th February.

‡ App. CLXX gives the text of the protocol drawn up at Versailles on the 15th February, with reference to the armistice concluded on the 13th for the south-east of France.

In an Army Order of the 14th February, General v. Mantuffel expressed to the soldiers of the South Army his satisfaction with their services, and recommended that gentleness and forbearance should be shown to the enemy who had been so completely vanquished.



CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE OF BELFORT AFTER THE BATTLE
ON THE LISAINE. SURRENDER OF THE FORTRESS ON 18TH
FEBRUARY, 1871.*

After the termination of the engagements on the Lisaine, Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow IInd had resumed the attack upon Belfort with renewed vigour. By the addition of the Loetzen, Goldap, Marienburg, and Gumbinnen Battalions,† the strength of the siege corps was raised to 27 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 6 field batteries,‡ besides 24 fortress artillery and 6 fortress pioneer companies.§ On 21st January, the combatant strength of these troops numbered 17,602 infantry, 707 horses, and 34 field guns. The ration list of the fortress pioneers amounted to 1,166 men, that of the fortress artillery to 4,699 men.

To the north of the fortress, Colonel Gericke, with 2 battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and 2 guns,|| now occupied the line Forêt d'Arsot—Valdoye—Cravanche, whilst on the west side between the Haut-du-Mont and the Savoureuse the fortress was invested by Colonel v. Ostrowski with 4 battalions and $\frac{3}{4}$ squadron¶ and on the south and east by General v. Buddenbrock with 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 3 batteries.** To carry out the works of attack, 3 battalions of the 4th Reserve Division†† were, in addition placed at disposal at Trétudans, and 6 battalions of General Debschitz,‡‡ at Bourogne. The latter

* See Plans 31b and No. 37.

† In the first instance, as we know, the whole reinforced brigade of Colonel v. Zimmermann had been attached to the siege corps; but on the 19th January a change occurred, four battalions only being left in front of the fortress (*see ante*, p. 29).

‡ (1) 1st Reserve Division, including the

Bavarian Sortie Battery	15 bns., 4 sqns., 4 batts.
(2) General v. Debschitz's troops	8 " 2 " 2 "
(3) Of the 4th Reserve Division	4 " — " — "

Total.....	27 " 6 " 6 "
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§ See App. CXXXI. The Bavarian fortress batteries are included in the number of companies.

|| The Neuholdensleben and Pr. Stargardt Battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd
2nd Res. Lan. and
 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Light Res.

¶ $\frac{1}{2}$ Fus., Gnesen, Deutsch-Crone and Inowrazlaw battalions, and $\frac{1}{2}$ 3rd
67 2nd Res. Lan.

** 1st and IInd, Konitz, Schneidemühl, Bromberg, Neustadt, Burg, Stendal and
67

Halberstadt battalions, $\frac{2nd \text{ and } 4th}{2nd \text{ Res. Lan.}}$, $\frac{1st \text{ and } 2nd \text{ Light Res.}}{IX}$, and Bavarian
Sortie Battery (4 guns).

†† Goldap, Marienburg, and Loetzen battalions.

‡‡ Lauban, Breslau IInd, Striegau, Oels, Jauer, and Hirschberg battalions.

with 2 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries* had remained in his position between Exincourt and Croix, whilst Colonel v. Bredow, with a battalion, a squadron, and four guns† guarded the Lisaine between Héricourt and Montbéliard.

The siege guns, which had been employed on the Lisaine, as also the guns of two batteries established on the Allaine,‡ were brought back to the parks at Moval and Banvillard.

As soon as the new batteries§, constructed at the Grand Bois should have produced sufficient effect, General v. Tresckow intended to open the first parallel against the Hautes Perches and Basses Perches forts. But before anything could be done, it was necessary to capture Le Haut Taillis and the village of Pérouse, which were still in the hands of the French.

CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS, AND STORMING OF PÉROUSE, IN THE NIGHT OF THE 20TH—21ST JANUARY.

After the batteries at the Grand Bois had been completed and armed by the evening of the 20th January, and a vigorous preparatory fire had been maintained during the course of the day from Batteries Nos. 13, 14, and 20,|| General v. Tresckow ordered the positions in question to be stormed. At midnight Colonel v. Zglinicki¶ caused the 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment** to advance from Chèvremont against the east and south-east side of Le Haut Taillis, and the 1st to follow in support, whilst two landwehr battalions from Bessoncourt were to attack Les Fourches and the Morveaux wood an hour later.

Colonel Denfert, rightly conjecturing from the brisk fire directed upon the Pérouse position that a night attack was impending, occupied strongly the village and the neighbouring woods with the best troops from the fortress,†† and had arranged

* Liegnitz and Apenrade battalions, $\frac{2\text{nd and 3rd}}{6\text{th Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{1\text{st and 2nd Light Res.}}{\text{VIII}}$

† Gumbinnen Battalion, $\frac{1\text{st}}{2\text{nd Res. Lan.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 1\text{st Light Res.}}{\text{II}}$

‡ At Bourogne and Joncherey.

§ See Part II, Vol. 2, p. 360.

|| Fire was opened from Battery No. 21 on the 29th, from Batteries 22, 23, 24, and 25 on the 21st January.

¶ Colonel v. Zglinicki directed the attack, for which the $\frac{1\text{st and IIInd}}{67}$, the Burg and Halberstadt battalions, and the Württemberg Fortress Pioneer Company, had been placed at his disposal.

** With the Württemberg Fortress Engineer Company.

†† By the 3rd Battalion 57th Gardes Mobiles (Haute Saône), 7 companies of the 84th, 1 of the 45th Line Regiments, 3 companies Gardes Mobiles of the Rhône, besides "Franc tireurs of Altkirch," not found in the "Ordre de Bataille" (App. CXXX), as also a company of Gardes Mobiles of the Saône and Loire, which did duty as engineers (*see* Thiers et De La Laurencie, "La Défense de Belfort," p. 315, *et seq.*).

these localities for a stubborn defence. The quarries north of Pérouse in particular had been transformed into a very strong position for infantry and guns.

In spite of the adversary's extensive preparations, Major Schramm succeeded with the 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment in capturing, without firing a shot, the border of Le Haut Taillis.* In the interior of the wood, a brisk fight ensued, but the adversary was speedily repulsed upon Pérouse. The 1st Battalion had meanwhile followed, and with three companies† occupied the wood, which was at once arranged for defence by the pioneers; one company‡ remained as reserve at Chêvre-mont. From the Forts Hautes Perches, de la Justice, and de la Miotte, now opened a brisk artillery fire, and from Pérouse a vigorous musketry fire, upon the advanced posts which had been lost.

The landwehr battalions, under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Schütz,§ had been received from the copses north of Pérouse with a heavy fire. Notwithstanding this circumstance, they succeeded in forcing their way in, but in the interior the opposition aided by obstacles, consisting of ditches, abattis, and wire entanglements, could only be gradually overcome, and not without considerable losses. The 5th Company Burg Battalion, followed by the 6th, advanced with great difficulty along the road leading from Roppe to Pérouse, eventually reaching the south border of the wood. The 8th Company, and behind it the 7th, had as their object the Morveaux wood. These two companies, supported by the 1st Company of the Halberstadt Battalion which had likewise reached the wood, threw back the stubborn enemy upon the quarry entrenchment. A brisk stationary musketry action now ensued against this entrenchment. An advance from Les Fourches, whither two more companies of the Halberstadt Battalion|| had followed, failed against the gallant resistance; another attack, made by the landwehr, who had gained a firm footing in Morveaux wood, was held fast under a heavy fire from the enemy.

Meanwhile Major Schramm, perceiving the fight at the quarry intrenchment, had renewed his advance, and, in spite of the brisk fire from the earthworks at the south-east angle of Pérouse, penetrated into the village.¶ The French continued

* He had sent forward $\frac{7\text{th and } 8\text{th}}{67}$, in first line. The $\frac{5\text{th}}{67}$, and the Württem-

berg Engineer Company followed in second line; $\frac{6\text{th}}{67}$ took a separate road to the right along an open valley.

† 1st, 2nd and 4th.

‡ 3rd.

§ The Burg battalion in first, the Halberstadt in second line.

|| 2nd and 3rd.

¶ With $\frac{6\text{th and } 7\text{th}}{67}$, which were supported at the right time by the $\frac{5\text{th}}{67}$ following in second line. General v. Mertens had issued special instructions for the surprise, which served as a basis for the movements of the assailants.

their defence in the interior, house by house, but they began to field more quickly when the 8th Company 67th Regiment, which had cleared the Bois des Perches of the enemy, penetrated into Pérouse from the south. By 2.30 a.m., the eastern half of the large village had fallen into the hands of the 67th, a circumstance which was so threatening to the flank and rear of the defenders of the quarry intrenchment, that this hitherto stubbornly defended point was abandoned by the French. Towards 5 a.m., Colonel Denfert caused the western part of Pérouse to be evacuated. The 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment completely occupied the place, and threw forward pickets towards Belfort.* The copses north of Pérouse were, it is true, evacuated at this time by the recall of the landwehr to Bessoncourt, but were again occupied on the 24th January.

On the French side 5 officers, 93 men became prisoners of war. The German loss amounted to 8 officers† and 178 men.‡

On the 21st January and the succeeding night, the new batteries at the Grand Bois,§ in conjunction with the other siege batteries, maintained a regular fire upon the Château, the town fronts, and the forts de la Justice and de la Miotte.

General v. Tresckow now proceeded to establish the first parallel, which stretched from the railway north of Danjoutin to near Le Haut Taillis, a length of 1,900 yards, through a very rocky and deeply frozen soil. Five battalions and two pioneer companies had to complete this heavy piece of work.|| But as the advance of the working party from Moval¶ across the Bosmont was delayed in consequence of the icy and steep roads, it was impossible, notwithstanding the circumstance that the enemy did not disturb the works,** to make the parallels everywhere of the prescribed breadth in the allotted time.

Opening of
first parallel
against
Hautes and
Basses
Perches on
the night of
21-22
January.

* $\frac{1st}{67}$, of which one division had taken part in the struggle, remained at Haut Taillis wood, the $\frac{2nd}{67}$ at Bois Bailly.

† Captain Baron Schenck zu Schweinsberg was killed, Captain Hellmuth was wounded.

‡ App. CLXXIII contains a return of the losses among the troops besieging Belfort between 19th January and 19th February, 1871.

§ See ante, p. 87, note ||.

|| Altogether some 3,575 yards of trenches, inclusive of communications, were thrown up. As guards—a company was posted on the flanks of the parallel, while in addition a chain of posts was pushed forward some 40 or 50 yards beyond the trace, and intrenched themselves.

¶ There was an engineer dépôt here.

The artillery parks were at the time at the following points:—

- (1) Prussian Park at Moval and Banvillard.
- (2) Bavarian Park at Rechotte.
- (3) Baden Park at Charmois, Méroux, and Vezelois.

** At 5 a.m. on the 22nd January, the workmen were relieved by three battalions and two pioneer companies; later on, a battalion was sent as working party every day, and two battalions as guard of the trenches. The widening of the parallel was continued for some days longer.

General v. Tresckow, inferring from the defender's inactivity that he was beginning to flag, believed that he could comply with General v. Werder's request by not only employing General v. Debschitz with 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 16 guns,* for an advance upon Pont du Roide and Blamont,† but could hasten the progress of the siege by assaulting the Perches Forts. It was reported that their profile was weak, that the works were considerably damaged already by the fire of the siege batteries, and that the troops occupying them were not only insufficient, but were untrustworthy. The reconnaissances of the ditches and gorges made on the nights of the 23rd—24th, and 24th—25th January could not be repeated, as the garrison had become vigilant, and the success of the attack depended mainly on surprising the adversary.

ATTEMPT TO STORM THE PERCHES FORTS ON THE NIGHT OF 26TH—27TH JANUARY.

The forts of Hautes and Basses Perches were constructed as demi-redoubts, with a front of 185 yards‡; their ditches, 13' to 19' 6" in breadth, were excavated perpendicularly to a depth of 9' 9" in the rocky soil; their parapets were 11' 4" in height, and 16' 3" in thickness.§ At the gorge of each work were two bomb-proof block-houses, 44 yards long. At the Hautes Perches, these block-houses were connected by a palisade, whilst the gorge of Basses Perches was closed by a ditch. Hollow traverses gave a certain amount of protection to the interior. The armament of each work consisted of seven 12-cm guns. Basses Perches lay a little withdrawn from the crest of the hill. The south slope, with the exception of the railway cutting, was swept by a cross-fire from both forts. The wood, extending towards the Hautes Perches, had been cleared away for a distance of 650 yards along the ridge, and on its south slope for a distance of 325 yards. The pointed stumps of trees, 1 or 2 feet high, had been connected by wire entanglements, forming an

* Breslau II, Lauban and Apenrade battalions,	2nd
1st and 2nd Light Res., and ‡ 1st Light Res.	6th Res. Lan.
VIII	II

† The advance undertaken on the evening of the 23rd January led to the actions at Glay and Roches; (see *ante*, p. 33). The Lauban and Breslau II battalions returned to General v. Debschitz's command after the opening of the first parallel.

‡ The front line consisted in the case of Hautes Perches of a flat salient, with small redans to flank the ditch at the shoulders; in the case of Basses Perches of two bastions, connected by a flat curtain broken outwards.

§ The parapet was formed of stone rubble, covered with earth. As the earth required for this purpose had been taken from the immediate vicinity of the works, the naked rock at those spots showed on the surface.

excellent obstacle in the western part of the wooded plateau.* Both forts were supported by trenches. Colonel Denfert transferred to Le Fourneau a battalion which had become available after the fall of Pérouse. This battalion reinforced the garrison of Basses Perches with two companies. Two guns of the sortie battery placed at Le Fourneau prevented any movement for turning the Perches ridge along the Savoureuse. At night two companies occupied the ground between the two works, which was protected by numerous entrenchments. In rear of the works, reserves were also held in readiness.

On the evening of the 26th January, the construction of the first parallel was so far advanced that it could receive large bodies of troops. Without further delay, General v. Tresckow commenced the attack. Each of the storming columns consisted of a battalion with a pioneer company, and a division of artillery.†

After the batteries of attack had ceased their fire on the Perches Forts,‡ Captain v. Manstein caused, at 7 o'clock, the 5th and 7th Companies of the Schneidemühl Battalion, each accompanied by a detachment of pioneers,§ to advance from the parallel against the flanks and gorge of Basses Perches.

Five minutes later, the 8th Company, appointed to attack in front, moved forward with the rest of the pioneers and artillerymen, whilst the 6th followed in reserve.

The enemy received with a brisk musketry fire the approaching landwehr, who had to traverse a distance of more than 550 yards up the open slope; the 8th Company was forced to lie down when within 65 to 110 yards from the Basses Perches, and to carry on a stationary action. Only its skirmishing division, under Lieutenant Schick, and part of the pioneers, under 1st Lieutenant v. Richthofen, reached the ditch, and jumped into it without a moment's hesitation. The 6th Company, following the 8th, had halted about 50 paces behind the latter. Meanwhile, the companies destined to turn the position had, under a brisk flanking fire from the defenders, arrived abreast of the gorge of the fort, and had carried the trenches at the first rush. Parts of the skirmisher divisions of both companies reached the rear of the work, and jumped into the ditch at the gorge.

* See Wolff, "Geschichte der Belagerung von Belfort im Jahre 1870-71," pp. 25, 316, *et seq.*, as also Thiers et De la Laurencie, "La Défense de Belfort," Paris, 1871, pp. 83-84.

† (1) Against Fort Basses Perches, under Captain v. Manstein: Schneidemühl Battalion, 2nd Fort. Pion., and a detachment of the 1st Co. 6th Fortress Art. Regiment.
X

(2) Against Fort Hautes Perches, under Major v. Laue: Fus. 1st Fort. Pion.
67, 11
and a detachment of 15th Co. 4th Fortress Art. Regiment.

Besides these the Striegau, Bromberg, Goldap, and Loetzen battalions held themselves in readiness to connect the works by a trench after they were captured.

‡ Battery No. 12, which swept the valley behind the two Perches forts, continued its fire.

§ Each of one officer and 22 men.

But the remaining works of the fortress now opened a heavy artillery fire upon the south slope of the Perches, and prevented the advance of fresh troops.* A renewal of the attack in front, attempted by the two companies, was at once checked.

Meanwhile, the French detachments driven from the trenches had re-assembled, and, in conjunction with a battalion held in readiness in rear, had advanced against the west side of the work. They there surprised the 7th Company of the Schneidemühl Battalion, surrounded it, and took most of the men prisoners, after a brave resistance. Of those who had jumped into the ditches, the greater part, led by 1st Lieutenant Michaelis, succeeded in escaping. The 6th and 8th Companies now also retired to the parallel before the pressure of the detachments moving round the west side of the fort.

Major v. Laue had deployed his fusiliers for an enveloping attack† upon Hautes Perches, whilst the 6th Company of the Marienburg Battalion‡ advanced against the ruined house between the two works.

The 9th Company 67th, which moved through the Bois des Perches, was unable to pass the obstacles under the musketry and artillery fire; it posted itself under cover in the wood, whilst its skirmisher division remained under fire opposite the left flank of the fort.

The 12th Company, which had taken the direction of the west side, and afterwards, driving the adversary from several trenches, had moved against the gorge, found itself also detained by entanglements and by the murderous fire of the garrison. After losing its officers,§ and being also attacked by the French reserves* which took part on this side, it retired. The landwehr company abandoned the ruined house, in order to join in the retirement. In front of the work, the skirmishers of the 11th Company and the pioneers who had advanced with them, were detained by the obstacles on the glacis. Major v. Laue, informed moreover of the failure of the attack on Basses Perches, withdrew all the detachments to the deep railway cutting.

* Captain v. Manstein had given orders to the $\frac{5th}{Marienburg}$, which although belonging to the guard of the trenches was under him, to follow the $\frac{7th}{Schneidemühl}$ towards the right flank of the Basses Perches; at the same time, he asked General Baron v. Buddenbrock, whom he knew to be in the first parallel, for further reinforcements. Neither the one nor the other could be complied with.

† $\frac{9th}{67}$ against the left, $\frac{12th}{67}$ against the right flank, $\frac{11th}{67}$, followed by the $\frac{10th}{27}$, against the front. The pioneers and artillerymen were distributed among the companies. The advance commenced here from the railway cutting; there were some 1,080 yards before the fort was reached.

‡ Belonging to the guard of the trenches.

§ 1st Lieutenant v. den Brincken and 2nd Lieutenant Pfannkuch were killed.

No further attempts to storm the works were made. The failure to carry the position had entailed a loss of 10 officers and 427 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

After the engagements at Roches and Glay,* and after a renewed advance on Blamont,† where no enemy could be found, General v. Debschitz had again returned to his original position at Exincourt—Croix. On the news of the advance of strong French forces along the Morteau—St. Hippolyte road,‡ however, he was pushed forward on the 27th January, for the third time, to Pont de Roide and Blamont, for the purpose of destroying the Doubs bridges between St. Hippolyte and Pont de Roide, and of rendering impassable the roads leading from the south-west.§ Thence, he advanced upon Pontarlier|| with 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries,¶ whilst the rest of his troops** remained in front of Belfort. Meanwhile the four battalions of the 4th Reserve Division, which had also been employed in front of the fortress, had rejoined their command,†† so that the siege corps now numbered only 20 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 4 field batteries.‡‡

Although the political importance of the capture of Belfort had been pointed out by the Royal Headquarters, General v. Tresckow, owing to the considerable diminution of his forces, found himself restricted to the engineer attack.

Since the night of the 27th—28th January the approaches against the Perches forts had been resumed by constructing trenches, without any material hindrance on the part of the enemy.§§ Consequently, in the course of the next few days, the work was carried on almost exclusively by flying sap, the sap-heads making an average progress each night of some 325 yards.

In consequence of the difficulty of the ground, these works required so large a working party that the eight battalions available for this service did not suffice owing to their weak effective, and the guard of the trenches had to be utilised to supplement them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the construction of the batteries was also continued. On the 31st

Advance to
the second
parallel.

* See ante, p. 34.

† On 25th January.

‡ See ante, p. 54.

§ Striegau Battalion rejoined him. $\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Fort. Pion. was attached to him.
II

|| See ante, pp. 57, 61, 67—68.

¶ Lauban, Breslau IInd and Striegau, 2nd and 3rd, and 1st and 2nd Lt. Res.
6th Res. Lan. VIII

** Jauer, Liegnitz, Hirschberg, Oels, and Apenrade battalions.

†† Loetzen, Goldap, Marienburg, and Gumbinnen battalions (see ante, p. 61, note ||).

‡‡ Including the Bavarian Sortie Battery.

§§ The latter on the night in question pushed forward his outposts to the south border of the Bois des Perches, but when $\frac{10\text{th and } 11\text{th}}{67}$ advanced towards the wood on the following night, they were able to occupy it without meeting any resistance from the enemy.

January and 1st February two new mortar batteries* opened fire upon the Perches Forts from the flanks of the first parallel; at Taillis Wood, a gun battery† came into action against Hautes Perches. At the eastern edge of Bavilliers Wood the construction of a new battery‡ to fire upon the town fortifications was commenced. Further, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Scheliha had on a previous occasion discovered on the ridge in the Bois-des-Perches a very favourable site for the construction of three batteries§ to fire upon the Château, as also upon Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte. But as Fort des Hautes Perches was only 550 yards distant from the place of construction, and Fort de la Justice was firing vigorously in this direction, the works progressed but slowly and with many interruptions. To engage the last-named work two new batteries|| were commenced at the end of the month in the cutting of the road from Pérouse to Bessoncourt, south of Morveaux Wood.¶

On the night of the 31st January—1st February the second parallel, half way between the first parallel and the forts, of which portions had already been opened, was completed. A commencement was even made of the approaches beyond.** The construction of two batteries for light mortars,†† to fire against the Perches Forts, was also taken in hand.

During the further progress of the works, the difficulties materially increased. A brilliant moon, which threw its light over the snowfields, rendering them visible to a considerable distance, made it easy for the defenders to disturb the works by their fire. This was more particularly the case on the night of the 1st—2nd February, during which the French were expecting a renewal of the assault. The works had to be pushed on as if using the sap-roller, the sap-heads protected by sand-bags, and the flanks by gabions; while the earth to fill them had frequently to be brought up from far in rear.‡‡ After the thaw on the 3rd February, the water flowing down the slopes filled the trenches, time and labour being sometimes fruitlessly expended in attempting to drain away the

* Battery No. 26, north of Danjoutin: 4 S.B. 28-cm. mortars.

" " 28, on extreme right flank near Le Haut Taillis: 4 S.B. 60-pr mortars.

On 31st January, Battery No. 11 ceased fire owing to excessive scoring of the guns, which was also the case with Battery No. 15 on the 1st February. Battery No. 7, the last battery in action in front of Éssert, ceased firing temporarily.

† Battery No. 27: four 12-cm. guns.

‡ Battery No. 33: four 12-cm. guns.

§ Batteries Nos. 37, 38, and 39: each of four 15-cm. guns.

|| Battery No. 31: 2 S.B. 60-prs. and 2 S.B. 27-cm. mortars; later, 6 S.B. 60-pr. mortars. Battery No. 32: 4 S.B. 12-cm. guns.

¶ The works which the enemy was throwing up between the two Perches had been disturbed or at any rate molested by minor infantry attacks by day, and at night by artillery fire.

** Blastings were frequently necessary in the rocky soil.

†† Battery No. 29, 8 S.B. 15-cm. mortars; Battery No. 30, 4 S.B. 15-cm. mortars.

‡‡ As the summit was approached, the ground became always stony.

water. Moreover, the rain damaged those works which were completed. The parapet of the first parallel collapsed completely in places, the banquette gradually disappeared, and the connecting trenches became so impassable that communication had to be carried on across the open. To what extent the health of the troops suffered in these circumstances may be easily imagined.

From Fort des Hautes Perches, the enemy, moreover, endeavoured, by bringing single guns into action and as suddenly withdrawing them, to hinder in many ways the progress of the works. In order to keep the garrison in check, it was not only necessary to continue the bombardment of the Hautes Perches Fort by night, but, before and during the commencement of the night works, a vigorous musketry fire had to be maintained against the parapets and embrasures. The want of pioneers was much felt.* Notwithstanding that on 3rd February two fresh companies† arrived from Strassburg, this arm was much overworked. On the 4th February the guns from Fort Bellevue and the railway entrenchments commenced to batter the western approaches directed on Basses Perches, so that next day epaulements had to be thrown up as protection against this fire. Later on, different parts of the approaches‡ were cannonaded from those two works and from Fort de la Justice, and the works, in spite of the self-sacrificing devotion of the senior officers of engineers,§ and the untiring zeal of the men, could make each day but little progress. Seldom was it possible, as in the case of the right wing on the night of the 3rd—4th February, to complete a considerable length by means of flying sap.||

Since the departure of General v. Debschitz and the troops of the 4th Reserve Division, 7 battalions had maintained the investment in the east, north,¶ and west; 13 were engaged in the attack on the south front, so that only 9 battalions were disposable for the arduous duty of the trenches.**

* On the 2nd and the following night six pioneers were wounded before Fort des Hautes Perches alone. Many men and officers fell sick in consequence of the arduous work.

† 1st and 2nd Fort. Pion.

VIII

‡ Even those in front of Fort des Hautes Perches.

§ Captain Koch, while urging on his men in the works under a heavy fire, had been wounded on the night of the 1st—2nd February by a case shot. In the night of the 5th—6th February Lieutenant Müller, while conducting the attack in front of Basses Perches with great intrepidity, was mortally wounded.

|| At this point, Lieutenant Adam completed this night 148 yards of approaches, but he as well as 4 pioneers and 11 infantry soldiers were wounded.

¶ The two field guns of 1st Light Res. in position on the north side were

II

employed in cannonading La Forge, which could not be reached from the siege batteries. Offemont had been cannonaded on 30th January by two 9 c.m. guns, which had been transferred from Roppe to a new position 200 metres north-west of this village.

** The following were the positions:—(1.) In the east, at Bessoncourt and Roppe, the Neustadt and Halberstadt battalions; (2.) In the north, the Prussian Stargardt and Neuhaldeleben battalions; (3.) In the west, the Inowrazlaw,

Since the commencement of this period, some 1,500 rounds were fired each day at the fortress, whilst the enemy's artillery hardly answered any but the batteries at the Grand Bois, but vigorously cannonaded the trenches. On 2nd February, fire had been opened from Battery No. 30, and on the 3rd from Batteries Nos. 29, 31, 32, and 33. At the same time, a new emplacement for mortars to act against the enemy's position between the two Perches Forts* had been commenced in the second parallel, and also one for a gun battery† on the highest point of the first parallel.

On the 4th February this battery was able to open fire, and at times to reduce to silence the guns in Fort Hautes Perches, which were cannonading the sap-heads. But as fresh guns were always appearing at that point, Battery No. 35,‡ in the western approaches between the parallel, was completed by next morning, and at once commenced to bombard the right flank of Hautes Perches. On 6th February, besides, Battery No. 19, three guns of Battery No. 25, hitherto in action against the Esperance Hornwork, directed their fire against Fort de Bellevue, which had been such an impediment to the works in front of Basses Perches. In the following night, on the extreme left wing of the second parallel, another gun from Battery No. 35§ was mounted against the same work, so that the latter was twice reduced to silence on the 7th February. The attention of Fort des Barres, which was able to act against the approaching works of attack on the left wing, had again to be diverted from this point. Battery No. 7 was actively directed against this fort after the 8th February.

Meanwhile, on the 6th, Battery No. 34 had been also enlarged for the reception of two heavy mortars, because Battery No. 28 was obliged to cease firing at Fort Hautes Perches owing to the proximity of the works of attack. At the same time the construction of two batteries|| for heavy mortars was commenced in the second parallel.¶

The superiority of the artillery of the attack was now placed beyond question. The Perches front was completely subdued and remained silent.** Only the works to the rear and flanks continued in action against the attack.

Deutsch-Crone, and Bromberg battalions; (4.) On the front of attack:—At Pérouse and the abutting woods, the 67th Regiment; in Danjoutin, the Konitz Battalion; besides these the Burg, Stendal, Schneidemühl, Gnesen, Jauer, Liegnitz, Hirschberg, Oels, and Apenrade battalions, as also the fortress artillery and pioneer companies, were quartered in rear of the front of attack as far as Dambenois and Bourogne.

* Battery No. 30 for four 15-cm. S.B. mortars.

† Battery No. 34 for two 9-cm. guns.

‡ For two 9-cm. guns.

§ One 9-cm. gun, as Battery No. 36.

|| Batteries No. 40 and 41.

¶ Like the communications, the batteries suffered very considerably from the thaw, and it was only with extreme effort that they could be maintained in serviceable condition.

** Except the separate guns engaged against the saps.

During the night of the 5th—6th February, in spite of the enemy's heavy fire, the works of attack in front of Basses Perches had been pushed forward up to the ditch,* and in the course of the day they reached also at Fort Hautes Perches the line appointed for the last entrenchments in front of this work.†

The supply of the two Perches Forts with ammunition and food had become exceedingly difficult for the defenders. Water could only be procured from the Vernier pond under the assailant's fire.

All circulation, and especially cooking inside the works, became almost impossible. In consequence of the proximity of the works of attack, the artillery of the town enceinte could no longer give any assistance. Fort de la Justice was fully occupied with the German batteries at Morveaux Wood. Moreover, whilst in the fortress discouraging reports were in circulation, on the German side the news of the fall of the enemy's capital gave impetus to fresh efforts.‡

On the 3rd February, Colonel Denfert had given orders to commence the removal of the material from the Perches Forts. Openings were made in the gorges; on the 4th, the projectiles were removed, and on the 6th those guns, the carriages of which were suited for the purpose. As garrison to each fort there remained one company, which, in the event of an attack, was to withdraw firing. The configuration of the heights hid from the assailant's view the movements necessary to carry out these measures; moreover, the Germans believed that the noise behind the works indicated the arrival of fresh reinforcements.

OCCUPATION OF FORTS HAUTES AND BASSES PERCHES ON 8TH FEBRUARY.

On the 8th February, perfect silence reigned in Fort Hautes Perches;§ about 1 o'clock Captain Roesé threw some gabions into the ditch; in company with five pioneers he descended and scaled the rampart by means of steps rapidly cut in the escarp wall. Not until the traverses were reached did they suddenly light upon some twenty Frenchmen, the majority of whom escaped. A detachment of infantry|| also penetrated

* The escarps cut out of the solid rock were still untouched.

† The approaches were at this time so heavily punished by the artillery of the station works, Forts Bellevue and de la Justice, that on the left wing an entirely new trench had to be made more withdrawn from fire.

‡ With the permission of Lieut.-General v. Tresckow IInd, Colonel Denfert had despatched an officer to Switzerland in order to obtain clear information as to the state of affairs in France. He did not, however, return for some time.

§ The pioneers were able without danger to advance by flying sap.

|| Thirty men, led by Lieutenant Klos, commanding Battery No. 29, who had already that morning made an accurate reconnaissance of the work.

into the work. It was immediately followed by some men of the guard of the trenches. Shortly after, two companies* occupied the fort, two others† with the pioneers‡ commenced to arrange it for defence and to open communications to the rear. Four damaged guns, several broken carriages, and other material lay in the devastated work, of which only the blockhouses in the gorge and the hollow traverses were tolerably intact. From Battery No. 29 were now brought up four 15-cm. S.B. mortars, which opened against the ground between Basses Perches and the Château. It was not until 3 p.m. that the enemy directed a brisk fire from the fortress against the fort, disturbed the work, and compelled the garrison to seek shelter for the most part in the front ditch.

The news of the successful occupation of Fort Hautes Perches led to a like enterprise against Basses Perches. From the left bastion of the work the enemy, it is true, offered some resistance to the entrance of the pioneers and landwehr, but when Lieutenant v. Weltzien and Vice-Sergeant-Major Liebeskind at the head of 50 or 60 men§ dashed with a cheer into the interior, the fort guard retired upon a company left in support at the gorge. Both bodies at once withdrew, firing, in the direction of Le Fourneau, and abandoned to the assailant the half-destroyed work with five guns and some damaged material. In this case also the face towards Belfort was at once entrenched, and the gorge occupied|| The enemy at first compelled by his fire the cessation of this work. Here likewise the men were partly obliged to take shelter in the ditches, but by 5 o'clock fire was opened upon Le Fourneau from four 15-cm. S.B. mortars brought up to the works from Battery No. 30. To batter Fort de Bellevue, and especially as protection against sorties, two 9-cm. guns were transported with great difficulty from Batteries Nos. 36 and 35 to the elevated spur west of Fort des Basses Perches.¶

The Konitz Battalion advanced to the railway and pushed forward along the trenches a company to each fort, whilst the Schneidemühl Battalion held itself in readiness at Danjoutin and the 67th Regiment on the right wing of the works of attack; the Gnesen Battalion protected the flanks of the second

* 1st and 2nd
Hirschberg
† 1st and 2nd
Oels

‡ Captain Roese had brought up his company, the 1st Fort. Pion.
II

§ Belonging to the Oels and Hirschberg battalions, and to 1st Fort. Pion.
X

|| By the 4th
Hirschberg

¶ During the transport the carriage of one of the guns was hit. Both were mounted in an easily made emplacement (Battery No. 36a), where during the night of the 8th—9th they remained to oppose any sortie. In the day time they were withdrawn.

parallel. The garrisons of the forts, each consisting of two companies of the Hirschberg Battalion and an artillery detachment,* were each reinforced later by a company of the Schneidemühl Battalion.

The besieger was now able under the most favourable conditions, to continue the attack direct upon the Château.

The negotiations for an armistice which Colonel Denfert had entered into with General v. Tresckow before the return of the officer sent by him to Switzerland, had been abortive of result, the surrender of the fortress having been refused. In the forenoon of the 9th February, Batteries Nos. 37, 38, 39 in the Bois des Perches opened fire upon the Château as well as upon Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte. On the day after, Battery No. 40† from the second parallel commenced to shell the Château, and was supported on and after the 12th February by Battery No. 41,‡ whilst a battery newly erected not far from La Tuilerie§ had, on the 11th, taken up the cannonade with the ever active Fort de Bellevue.||

Meanwhile, the restoration of the two forts was complete, and, on the night of the 9th—10th February, the connecting trenches for a distance of 680 yards were converted into a third parallel.¶

On the Perches ridge only seven new batteries with** a total armament of 28 guns were originally to have been erected, but later on three more heavy batteries were added.††

Close on the west side of Fort des Hautes Perches an artillery position to meet sorties had also been taken in hand.‡‡

* One officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 24 men.

† With two, later with four 27-cm. S.B. mortars, and two 22-cm. S.B. mortars.

‡ Six 60-pr. S.B. mortars.

§ Battery No. 42, four 15-cm. S.B. mortars.

|| Batteries Nos. 26, 28, 29, 30, 30a, 34, and 35 erected against the Perches forts were silent from the 8th February, also Battery No. 23. Battery No. 13 had already ceased firing on 2nd February; Battery No. 12 was obliged to cease firing on the 9th as its guns were very heavily scored.

¶ Each of the Perches forts had received 150 men, the second parallel 500 men as guard. For the works a daily working party of 500 men was employed. Owing to the weak effective, these duties claimed six battalions every twenty-four hours.

** Battery No. 43 for four 12-cm. guns.

"	44	"	"
"	45	"	long 15-cm. guns.
"	47	"	short "
"	49	"	12-cm. guns.
"	51	"	long 15-cm. guns.
"	52	"	short " (French).

†† Battery No. 46 for four S.B. heavy mortars.

"	48	"	12-cm. guns.
"	50	"	"

‡‡ Battery No. 34a for two 9-cm. guns. The officer constructing the battery, Lieutenant Schirmer, was killed.

On this account Batteries Nos. 14, 17, 18, and 27 ceased to be used on the 10th February, so that 55 guns remained in action,* which on an average threw from 1,300 to 1,400 shell each day into the fortress. Fort de la Justice and the Château suffered more particularly† from the fire of the Bavarian Batteries Nos. 37, 38, and 39.‡

In order to be able to employ, almost entirely against the Château, the group of batteries at the Bois des Perches, the construction of a new battery§ in the connecting trench south of Pérouse to act against Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte was commenced.

The construction and arming, however, of all the new batteries were most seriously impeded by the state of the communications, in spite of the efforts of detachments of pioneers to improve the worst places. Field batteries and ammunition columns had to give up their teams to bring up ammunition for the siege artillery.

Meanwhile General v. Debschitz, after the removal of the prisoners, had again returned to Belfort on 8th February. He was followed on the 10th and 11th by the 6 battalions and 2 batteries of the 4th Reserve Division,|| under Colonel v. Zimmermann, so that 29 battalions were available against the fortress. Of these, 4 guarded the line of investment on the west between the Savoureuse and Le Haut du Mont, 3 in the north between the Haut du Mont and Vétrigne, and 6 in the east and south from Vétrigne to Danjoutin; whilst 15½ battalions were available to prosecute the siege.¶ Owing to the wet weather, the health of the men was so indifferent that the battalions frequently had but 300 men fit for duty.**

Not until frost set in again on the night of the 11th—12th February did matters mend, and by the employment of all available strength, Battery No. 34a, with 2 guns, No. 44 with 3,†† and Batteries Nos. 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 with 4 guns each, were by the morning of the 13th February placed in readiness to open fire. Battery No. 53 was to be completed in the following night, and only Battery No. 46 remained in an unfinished state.

On the 12th February General v. Tresckow had been empowered by telegram from Versailles to guarantee unimpeded withdrawal from Belfort, should the commandant offer to surrender the fortress upon these conditions.

* In the Batteries Nos. 7, 9, 21, 22, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40.

† The ramp leading down from the cavalier of the château to the town had also been rendered impassable by destroying the bridges.

‡ They had been connected with the south end of Pérouse by a trench.

§ Battery No. 53 for four long 15-cm. guns.

|| See ante, p. 82.

¶ Two companies were still at Montbéliard and Morteau.

** One of the Fortress Pioneer Companies had 94 sick and wounded on 10th February.

†† The fourth gun intended for Battery No. 44 became imbedded in the ground during the removal.

After overcoming all difficulties, there were by the 13th 97 guns,* each provided with 80 rounds, ready to open an annihilating fire on the following morning, whilst the engineer attack was to continue its progress. But, before doing so, Colonel Denfert was summoned, after such a glorious defence, to open the gates under the favourable conditions now offered to him. The French Government itself empowered him shortly after to take this step, by means of a telegram† sent through the Chancellor Count v. Bismarck to General v. Tresckow.

But Colonel Denfert required a summons from his Government addressed to himself personally, and to seek this an officer was sent to Basle. A provisional suspension of arms was agreed upon.

On the 15th the Convention was signed at Versailles, which extended the armistice of the 28th January to the three departments which had been hitherto excepted therefrom and to Belfort. Article I. stipulated the surrender of the fortress.

Colonel Denfert having now received his instructions in the desired form, while meanwhile the engineer attack from the Basses Perches had progressed another 110 yards, the final negotiations commenced on the evening of the 15th and terminated on the following afternoon.‡

In the course of the 17th and 18th February, the garrison, with arms and trains, quitted the fortress by the roads through L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs and through St. Hippolyte, intending to reach the territory occupied by French troops at Bletterans and Beaurepaire. The withdrawal was effected in échelons of some 1,000 men each, which followed at 5 kilomètres intervals, and carried with them their supplies drawn from the stores of the fortress.§ Colonel Denfert left with the last échelon the fortress which he had so stubbornly defended|| At 10 a.m. on 18th February it was taken over on the part of the Germans by a special commission, and two hours later was occupied by 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and the requisite detachments of fortress artillery and pioneers.¶ At 3 p.m. Lieutenant-General

* Batteries Nos. 7, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34a, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52. The total number of guns in these batteries now amounted to 105, but part were so damaged that firing was stopped, or, at any rate, ordered to be only occasionally resumed.

† The telegram which was to be transmitted to Colonel Denfert ran as follows:—

“Le commandant de Belfort est autorisé, vu les circonstances, à consentir à la reddition de la place. La garnison sortira avec les honneurs de la guerre et emportera les archives de la place. Elle ralliera le poste Français le plus voisin.

“Pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,

“ERNEST PICARD.”

‡ The request of the commandant to withdraw with all the fortress artillery could not be acceded to by the Germans. Appendix CLXXII contains the text of the Convention for the surrender of the fortress.

§ The supplies were carried by 150 German commissariat wagons.

|| The Garde Nationale Sédentaire was disarmed and remained in Belfort.

¶ The Hirschberg, Jauer, Oels, ^{2nd} 6th Res. Lan., combined detachment of 6th Fort. Art. Regiment, ^{2nd Fort. Pion.} VIII, and ^{2nd Fort. Pion.} Bad.

v. Tresckow had made a formal entry at the head of detachments from all the troops of the siege corps. 341 guns, of which 56 were dismounted by fire, 356 carriages, of which 119 were likewise broken, 22,000 stand of arms, numerous stores, and a comparatively large quantity of ammunition and food were found in the place. The garrison originally had* a strength of 372 officers, 17,322 men, but from death, wounds, sickness, and losses from prisoners, other casualties, &c., had suffered a diminution of 32 officers and 4,713 men.† On the other hand, the total loss of the siege corps was limited to 88 officers and 2,049 men.‡

The town presented a picture of desolation, especially in the south part and the suburbs of Montbéliard and Le Fourneau; 34 houses had been destroyed by fire, and most of the others damaged.§ Of the works of the fortress the Château had more especially suffered, the only access to its upper tier of guns being by means of ladders. The cut-stone facing of its front walls had mostly fallen into the ditches, half of the iron-plated embrasures in the cavalier were broken down, the expense powder magazine in the middle enceinte blown up, and a number of hollow traverses pierced. The same appearance was presented by Fort de la Justice. There could be no doubt that the continuance of the siege would, in a very short time, have led to complete success.

On the 23rd February the 1st Reserve Division, reinforced from the siege corps to an effective of 3 line and 12 landwehr battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 batteries, and 1 pioneer company, moved away through Rioz to Dôle, the troops under Colonel v. Zimmermann having previously joined their headquarters.

The troops of General v. Debschitz remained at Belfort. They passed later on under the Government-General of Alsace, upon which now devolved the occupation of the fortress. Preparations were at once made for restoring and arming the fortifications, and levelling to the ground the works of attack.

* According to the report handed over by Colonel Denfert to General v. Tresckow.

† Besides 336 civilians killed, of whom 50 died of wounds.

‡ Including 5 officers and 245 men who were freed by the capitulation. App. CLXXXIIIa contains a statement of the total losses in the siege corps between 2nd November, 1870, and 19th February, 1871.

§ In the neighbouring villages 164 houses had been set on fire, chiefly from the fortress.

PROCEEDINGS IN REAR OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, 1870, UNTIL THE ARMISTICE.

The advance of the 1st and 2nd Armies, which commenced after the fall of Metz, had occasioned radical changes in the rearward communications of the German Army.*

For instance, the appropriation of the railways, to which, after the capture of Soissons, was to be added the line Rheims—Soissons—Paris, was re-adjusted on 9th November as follows by the Royal Headquarters:—

To the 1st Army was assigned the line of rail leading from Saarbrücken by way of Metz, Frouard, Epernay, and Rheims.

To the Army of the Meuse was appointed the same line with the use of its continuation, the line Rheims—Soissons—Paris.

The 3rd Army was to use the line Weissenburg—Vendenheim—Frouard—Épernay—Château Thierry—Paris. The South German Corps, after the re-establishment of communication between Kehl and Strassburg,† were to use the same line, joining in at Vendenheim.

To the 2nd Army was assigned the railway Weissenburg—Frouard—Blesme—Chaumont-en-Bassigny, and, in conjunction with the road from Nancy to Neufchâteau, the line Neufchâteau—Chaumont.

The circumstance that all the railways leading to Germany united along the portion from Frouard to Blesme, greatly limited, as before, their carrying capabilities. Consequently it required at the outset considerable efforts on the part of the field railway divisions‡ before the railways could be effectively used for the increased work now demanded of them.

The line Epernay—Rheims—Soissons had been made practicable by No. 1 Field Railway Division before the end of October, whilst the 1st Section of No. 4 Field Railway Division§ had carried out the necessary repairs on the line Vierzy—Crépy-en-Valois—Sévrans by the 27th October. The

* See Map, No. 38.

With regard to the previous communications of the German Armies, see Part I, Vol. II, pp. 456—469. Part II, Vol. I, pp. 135—7, 179—180, 212, 248, 260, Vol. II, pp. 33 and 101.

† The line Kehl—Strassburg could be used for troop trains from 12th November.

‡ As it became evident shortly after the commencement of the war that the railway network to be used in common by all the armies required unity of administration, the railway troops received their orders, as a rule, direct from the Executive Commission of the Royal Headquarters. Only in those cases where the lines served for a single army was the management left in its hands.

§ Whilst the division was moving on the 30th to the line Soissons—Rheims, it was attacked by franc-tireurs in the wood north of Villers Cotterêts.

railway Crépy—Chantilly—Gonesse had also been placed in working order during October with the aid of French *matériel* and *personnel*.

The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division had, on the 9th October, commenced to clear the tunnel at Vierzy which had been blown up in two places. To assist them, part of No. 1 Field Railway Division had also been employed for a short time. But in spite of the greatest exertions continued day and night, the tunnel could not be re-opened for traffic until the 18th November. From the 20th the trains of the Meuse Army were brought up to Mitry and Gonesse.*

The 1st Army, in its advance from Metz to the Champagne, had arranged as *étappen* lines the roads leading through Briey—Damvillers—Dun-sur-Meuse—Vouziers to Réthel, and through Etain—Verdun to Rheims. Whilst the army was advancing, in the latter half of November, to cover the investment of Paris, it maintained its rearward communication by railway to Soissons, and from thence by the roads leading through Noyon and Compiègne.

The branches leading from the Crépy—Chantilly line past Creil to Compiègne, Clermont, and Beauvais, had been already restored during October.† During its march against Amiens and Rouen, the 1st Army re-opened for traffic, in the first half of December, the slightly damaged railways Clermont—Amiens and Amiens—Rouen; the former by part of No. 1 Field Railway Division, the latter by a detachment of the 1st Field Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps. In this way it opened for itself a line of railway leading from home territory to its theatre of operations, and at the same time considerably facilitated the important communication between the troops operating on the Somme and the Seine.

In order, as much as possible, to relieve the part of the line used in common by the 1st and Meuse Armies as far as Chantilly, the restoration of the railway leading from Rheims to Laon had been commenced in the middle of November. After the fall of La Fère, it was put in working order as far as this fortress, but the communication with Amiens was not completed until the 3rd January, as the work of the 3rd Field Railway Division, employed in the operation, had been interrupted, on the 9th December, by the surprise of Ham.‡

The line of railway assigned to the IIIrd Army likewise required extensive works between Nogent l'Artaud§ and the army investing Paris. The two broken bridges over the Marne below and above Esbly, as also the bridge at Trilport, were again made passable by parts of Nos. 2 and 3 Field

* By the middle of December, the traffic to Sévran was opened for the siege guns of the Meuse Army.

† At first only a temporary bridge could be made over the Oise. No permanent bridge was available until the 22nd December.

‡ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 26.

§ It had been made practicable as far as this place after the fall of Toul.

Railway Divisions, the Bavarian Field Railway Division, the 3rd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps, and the Bavarian Etappen Engineer Company. The restoration of the blown-up tunnel at Armentières was completed on the 11th November by part of No. 3 Field Railway Division. Meanwhile, the 1st Section No. 2 Field Railway Division was endeavouring to repair the Nanteuil tunnel, which was completely destroyed at its northern entrance. As this tunnel subsequently fell in again on the 6th November, it was avoided by a new line which had been commenced on the 19th October.* On the 18th November, this line was available for traffic, and on the 23rd the whole line was opened.

Lagny became the advanced dépôt of the IIIrd Army. Esbly and Meaux served as detraining stations.† In lieu of the etappen road hitherto used, Epernay—Montmirail—Coulommiers—Tournan, with its continuations towards Corbeil and Villeneuve St. Georges, the roads leading from Meaux and Lagny to Corbeil and Villeneuve were employed shortly after by the troops located on the south side of Paris.‡

The rearward communications of the IInd Army were less favourable than those of the IIIrd Army. In order as soon as possible to open a line of rail in lieu of the etappen road from Nancy by way of Chaumont-en-Bassigny, the Army Headquarters had as early as the 6th November caused the Blesme—Chaumont railway to be restored at the same time that the army was marching to the line Troyes—Chaumont. On the line Joinville—Chaumont, the bridges above and below Villiers-sur-Marne were destroyed, as also to the north of Froncles. The repairs were executed by the 1st Section No. 4 Field Railway Division, assisted by the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps, and were completed by the 7th December. For want of escort these troops found themselves compelled at first to take independent measures of security against the raids of franc-tireurs.

The army having meanwhile advanced to Pithiviers, the next step contemplated was the continuation of the railway communication to the westward by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine and Troyes to Montereau. On the 9th December, this was carried into effect as far as Troyes by the 1st Section No. 4 Field Railway Division. But its restoration beyond this town had to be abandoned, owing to the extensive damage to the bridges over the Seine at Nogent and Montereau.§ In conse-

* To help in these works the 1st Fortress Pion. Company XIth Corps had arrived from Strassburg, and the 2nd of the VIth, as well as the 2nd and 3rd of the XIth, from Germany.

† A detraining place for the siege guns of the Meuse Army had been made at Vaires.

‡ With regard to the passages of the Seine above Paris, see Part II, Vol. I, p. 99, Note †, Vol. II, p. 138, Note †, and Vol. II, p. 363, Note ††.

§ The permanent bridge at Corbeil had been restored by the 28th December, by order of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army.

§ The Bavarian Field Railway Division, together with part of the Bavarian Etappen Engineer Company, had worked at restoring the bridge over the Seine at Montereau from 20th November till 22nd December.

quence, all the available hands found employment on the railway leading from Chaumont through Châtillon, Nuits-sur-Armançon, Moret, Montargis, and Juvisy to Orléans. But as at this place also there were considerable difficulties to be surmounted, Joinville at first, and Troyes from the middle of December, became the most westerly railway station of the IInd Army. From the last-named point, the *etappen* road led by way of Sens and Nemours to Pithiviers. In consequence of its length and insecurity, the Royal Headquarters allowed the IInd Army, at the end of November, to draw its food and ammunition from the magazines of the IIIrd Army and its railway trains to proceed as far as Lagny. But even from that place the wagons of the army, which was advancing towards Orléans, had still upwards of 80 miles of road before them.

The restoration of the branch from Juvisy had been commenced by part of the Bavarian Field Railway Division* immediately after the first occupation of Orléans. But as it was not until the 7th November that a locomotive could be placed in working order, this portion of the line was only ready for slight traffic by horse draught up to the date of the engagement at Coulmiers. Nevertheless, on the occasion of the evacuation of Orléans, two long provision trains standing in the station there were saved by means of this engine. By the 20th November, the traffic from Corbeil through Juvisy to Etampes was in working order.

Meanwhile the 1st Bavarian Corps in its further operations had extended its line of communication to Chartres; since the beginning of November, the 2nd Section of the Bavarian Field Railway Division had already opened as far as Chartres, for horse traffic, the line Rambouillet—Versailles for the troops despatched to the west of Paris.†

After the recapture of Orléans, the headquarters of the IInd Army organised a regular service, partly by horses, partly by steam power, along the line Corbeil—Juvisy—Orléans. In this way, at any rate, better communication was maintained with the IIIrd Army, and more particularly with its advanced *depôt* at Lagny, although the arrangement did not compensate for the want of a through railway. Moreover, there was a deficiency of rolling stock.‡ Only two indifferent locomotives and 80 wagons were available.

By the advance of the IInd Army upon Le Mans, the rearward communications became more and more extended. Consequently it was no small advantage that on the 13th January, the railway from Chaumont to Juvisy could be opened.§ Its

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 164-5.

† The traffic was extended to Courville on the 24th November.

‡ Some material was captured by the 6th Cavalry Division in Vierzon, and conveyed by road to Orléans (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 52). In the beginning of January, another engine was brought from Chaumont to the line Juvisy—Orléans.

§ In consequence of the extensive destruction, the intended restoration of the line Brétigny—Vendôme was not undertaken.

restoration had been much delayed by numerous hostile enterprises and unfavourable weather. The line Corbeil—Montargis—Moret, on which the bridge at Souppes was destroyed, and the line Moret—Brienon, were at the end of December and beginning of January placed in order by the 1st Section of the Bavarian Field Railway Division.* The Armançon bridge, east of Brienon, which had been likewise destroyed,† was also restored between the 5th and 10th January by No. 2 Field Railway Division and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps. The task of repairing the Armançon bridge at Nuits, which had been made impassable in nearly its whole extent by blowing it up in two places, had been committed to the 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division, after completion of the tunnel at Vierzy; the main works, however, could not be commenced until the 10th December, in consequence of the insecurity of that neighbourhood.‡ This duty was also shared in from the 18th by the 1st Section.§ On the 12th January, the bridge was completed, and thus an unbroken communication established between Orléans and Germany. True, that the distance by this route amounted to double that by the direct route Nancy—Orléans, that is to say, some 450 miles.

Meanwhile, a second through line of rail had become available by the fall of Mézières. Prior to the surrender of Metz, the Royal Headquarters had contemplated the restoration of the line Metz—Thionville—Mézières—Rheims, and in the middle of November, while Thionville and Montmédy were besieged, had caused the work to be commenced between the respective fortresses by No. 1 Field Railway Division. After making the line Metz—Longuyon practicable, the division reached Longuyon on the 17th November; but, in consideration of the weakness of the troops pushed forward towards Longwy, and the activity of the garrison of that fortress, found itself compelled to limit its procedure until the 26th to securing the material and the railway. Whilst part of the division went away on the 30th to the 1st Army, the part remaining behind continued the work until the 20th January, and restored the bridge over the Chiers at Colmey, as well as the tunnel near Montmédy. The section Longuyon—Cons Lagrandville, which became of importance for the siege of Longwy, was also made

* On the line Corbeil—Montargis, No. 2 Field Railway Division and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Corps, which had previously been employed for a short time on the line Juvisy—Orléans, also carried out some works.

† Two miles east of Brienon, near Crécy.

‡ The section which had reached Chaumont on the 25th November destroyed, on the 27th, the line leading to Langres on the other side of Foulain. When General Baron v. d. Goltz took post before the fortress at the end of December, the line was restored, but on his departure again made impassable.

§ Part of the 1st Section and the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps were employed for some time longer at a bridge near Villiers-sur-Marne, which had been damaged by floods.

practicable by the aid of some pioneers.* Montmédy and Mézières furnished serviceable rolling stock.

The opening of a new line being probable about the middle of January both in the north and in the south of the theatre of war, a new distribution of the French railways was made by the Royal Headquarters on the 11th January.

To the 1st Army and the Army of the Meuse was exclusively assigned the *northern* line, Saarbrücken—Metz—Thionville—Mézières—Rheims—La Fère—Amiens—Rouen, with the branches leading by way of Soissons and Compiègne to Mitry and Gonesse.† The *central* line leading from Strassburg and Weissenburg by way of Vendenheim, Nancy to Lagny, including also the section Blainville-la-Grande—Épinal, was to serve generally for the IIIrd Army, and, at the same time, as far as Blesme for the IIInd Army, and for the Southern Army under General v. Manteuffel. From Blesme the IIInd Army had to use for its communications the *southern* line Blesme—Nuits—Juvisy—Orléans, a railway which was at the same time utilised by the IIInd and VIIIth Corps.

The northern line having been opened to traffic on the 21st January, the condition of the communications could be regarded as much more favourable, the more so as the restoration of the branches immediately affecting the theatre of operations was making considerable progress.

On the railway Compiègne—La Fère, a detachment of No. 1 Field Railway Division restored one line of way by the 10th January, and the other by the 18th, thus establishing a shorter line of communication between the troops of the 1st Army on the Upper Somme and the Army investing Paris.‡

By the end of December the IIIrd Army had, by means of the 2nd Section Bavarian Field Railway Division caused the Versailles—Houdan railway to be made available for horse draught, in order to serve the purposes of the 5th Cavalry Division detached to the west of Paris.§ By the 21st January the same section had opened to traffic the bridge over the Eure east of Dreux.

After the occupation of Le Mans by the IIInd Army, the restoration of the line Chartres—Le Mans was actively taken in hand. No. 2 Field Railway Division, brought up for the purpose, and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIth Army Corps placed the section Nogent-le-Rotrou—Le Mans in work.

* 3rd Fort Pioneer.

IX

† To the northern line belonged also the sections Metz—Frouard—Rheims—Épernay, Rheims—Clermont-en-Argonne, and the railways from Amiens and Beauvais, which join in at Creil.

‡ The 16th Infantry Brigade, which was sent to Tergnier for the decisive action expected at St. Quentin (see Part II, Vol. II, pp. 259 and Note *, p. 264), had been obliged to take the road through Rheims.

§ Lieut. Riegel had succeeded with great difficulty in transporting two engines from Marcilly-sur-Eure through Dreux to Houdan, but they could not be placed in working order until the end of January.

ing order by the 17th January, and afterwards its branch to Conlie by the 19th. The Eure bridge at Courville, for which the preparatory works had been already commenced at the end of November, by the 2nd Section Bavarian Field Railway Division, was completed by the 24th January. The entire line from Versailles could be handed over to traffic on 29th January with the plant captured at Le Mans.

The regular traffic between the Nuits—Juvisy and Versailles—Le Mans railway along the Versailles—Juvisy road had to be kept up by general transport. This *etappen* line was to serve as a line of communication for the troops in the neighbourhood of Le Mans, while for the troops on the Loire was left the line Nuits—Juvisy—Orléans, which was placed in working order as far as Blois, on the 24th January by the 1st Section Bavarian Field Railway Division.

Whilst the railway network used by the German Army was thus gradually extended to the west, some further important interruptions had recently taken place upon two lines in the east. On 22nd January the bridge on the central line at Fontenoy-sur-Moselle* was blown up by franc-tireurs, so that all trains of the IInd and IIIrd Army had to be brought by way of Metz and Rheims to Epernay. Three days later, the enemy destroyed on the southern line the bridge at Briennon, which had only just been repaired, and also that near La Roche,† and tore up the rails there in several places. No. 5 Field Railway Division succeeded by the 31st in restoring the Fontenoy bridge sufficiently for wagons to be pushed across it. But it was not completely fit for traffic until the 4th February. The bridge at Briennon, of which the woodwork was damaged and the permanent way destroyed, was repaired on the 5th by the 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division. Of the bridge at La Roche, one arch was entirely blown up. It was restored on the 9th by the 1st Section Bavarian Field Railway Division, and the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps. In consequence, the IInd Army was compelled up to the time of the armistice to share with the IIIrd Army the use of the railway to Lagny.

This line already over-worked had now to serve as well the Corps operating in the south.

In the advance of the XIVth Army Corps to Dijon, its communications had been opened from Blainville-la-Grande by way of Epinal, Vesoul, and Gray. On the branch railway from Blainville, the restoration of the bridges at Bayon and Langley, and of the viaduct north of Epinal by No. 5 Field Railway Division‡ had progressed so rapidly, that the traffic could be

* East of Toul. (See also subsequent narrative.)

† Between Briennon and Joigny. (See also subsequent narrative.)

‡ General v. Werder had at the commencement of October formed, for the service of his corps, a railway-troop out of pioneer detachments—under Superintending Engineer Krohn and 1st Lieutenant Walter—which was transformed at the end of November into No. 5 Field Railway Division.

opened as far as Epinal on the 14th December. The bridge at Aillevillers was also completed by the same division at the beginning of January, but the railway south of Epinal remained for a considerable time closed to traffic in consequence of the great destruction at the Xertigny viaduct.

When in the month of January General v. Werder was compelled, in consequence of his movement to the left, to change his line of communication,* he first used the line from Epinal by way of Plombières and Lure. Whilst most of the columns of the Corps moved by this road, the supplies were sent forward through Lunéville and Strassburg along the communications of the corps besieging Belfort. In the latter part of October, by order of the Government-General of Alsace, the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps, had restored the Strassburg—Colmar railway which had been destroyed in several places, and this now served as the *etappen* line of the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions. At the end of November the service was extended to Mülhausen, and shortly after to Dammerkirch and Sentheim. During his engagements on the Lisaine, General v. Werder caused communications to be opened with these places; but on resuming the offensive, he resolved on re-opening the old *etappen* line through Epinal.

It was to this side also that General v. Manteuffel intended transferring the communications of the IInd and VIIth Army Corps. On the concentration of those corps west of the Langres plateau, they had been assigned by the Royal Headquarters the southern line, which had been appointed for the IInd Army, and had been used by the VIIth Corps since its advance on Châtillon-sur-Seine.† The restoration of the section from Nuits-sur-Armançon to Dijon was also commenced.‡ But as all the communications in proximity to the plateau appeared to be threatened by Garibaldi's troops and the Langres garrison, the headquarters of the South Army abandoned the idea for the present of arranging an *etappen* line starting from the Nuits—Châtillon railway, and directed the troops still on the march, the columns and the trains by way of Epinal.§

The roads running southward from this town having been re-opened after the victory on the Lisaine,|| General v. Manteuffel caused an *etappen* line to be established for the IInd and VIIth Army Corps through St. Loup-les-Luxeuil and Vesoul to Gray, whilst the supplies for the XIVth Corps were directed at first along the Epinal—Xertigny—Bains—St. Loup Lure road, but when the movement to the right was commenced,

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 310.

† See *ante*, p. 108.

‡ The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division commenced this work on the 21st January, made the Armançon bridge at Buffon, of which an arch was blown up, passable by the 25th, but on the 26th was called away to Brienon.

§ See *ante*, p. 9.

|| See *ante*, p. 27, *et seq.*, and also subsequent narrative.

were also sent through Vesoul. Only the 4th Reserve Division retained its communication through Dammerkirch.

Meanwhile, on the 21st January, No. 5 Field Railway Division had resumed the works on the Epinal—Vesoul—Gray railway which had been suspended in consequence of the advance of the East Army, and made such progress that the section south of the Xertigny viaduct was ready for traffic to Vesoul within six days.* But as the viaduct itself was still impassable,† the South Army found itself during the whole duration of its operations against the French East Army limited to the ordinary etappen road leading through Epinal.

It was only a short time before the armistice was extended to this part of the theatre of war, that the communications became rather more favourable on this side. The works on the line Nuits—Dijon, which had to be temporarily suspended,‡ had been actively pushed forward since the 7th February. In the night of the 2nd—3rd February, the bridge near Buffon, which had been repaired at the end of January, was again destroyed by the enemy. The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division now restored the communication for the second time, and so hastened the work that by the 11th February the railway to Dijon was in working order. In this way the South Army also became ultimately possessed of a line of rails leading to the theatre of its operations.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAYS.

The supreme control of the whole of the railways of the German Army was entrusted to an Executive Commission forming part of the Royal Headquarters. From this Commission emanated the general measures in reference to the entire transport, the restoration of the railways and the arrangements for traffic within the enemy's country. For the railways used in France, Field Railway Commissions were appointed, which, like those in Germany, had to look after the military interests on the different lines, and to arrange and control the transport. The special arrangement and maintenance of the traffic on the restored lines, the control and employment of the staff and material, as also all technical matters on the various sections, which in time of peace devolve upon the railway administrations, were confided to Railway Traffic Commissions. These latter were placed under the Prussian Ministry of Commerce.

In January, 1871, each of the three main lines was administered by a Field Railway Commission at Rheims, Epernay, and

* On 12th February, the section Vesoul—Gray became fit for traffic.

† The works at the viaduct were also delayed by the 5th Field Railway Division being called away to repair the Fontenoy bridge.

‡ The section working there had been called away to Briennon. See *ante*, p. 110, note †.

Chaumont-en-Bassigny; later on, during February, a fourth was created at Versailles, for the railways which unite at that place.* Traffic Commissions were established at Rheims for the northern line west of Mézières; at Strassburg, for the railways of Upper Alsace and for the central line as far as Nancy; at Nancy, for the central line from Nancy onward; and at Chaumont-en-Bassigny for the southern line. On the northern line between the frontier and Mézières the Railway Direction at Saarbrücken carried on the work of a Traffic Commission.†

A Field Railway Director was attached to the staff of the Inspectors-General of Etappen of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies.

The duties required of the railway authorities were very important. Supplies, recruits, and equipment, besides enormous quantities of siege material, had to be brought up to the army, while wounded, sick, and prisoners had to be removed to the rear. In the course, also, of the campaign, it was frequently necessary to convey large bodies of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another. For this purpose the capability of the lines was always limited, as in some parts only one line of rails could be placed in working order. Moreover, it was not always practicable to unload the supply trains quickly, and thus the wagons accumulated faster than they could be got rid of, and frequent derangements in the traffic ensued. Further, the slow process of entraining the sick and the care bestowed on the hospital trains not infrequently encumbered the lines in the cramped stations. To this may be added the insecurity of the communication, which, nevertheless, was never interrupted, even when, in consequence of the destruction of the Fontenoy bridge, a complete diversion of the main traffic had to be made for a space of eight days.

Comparatively little French plant had fallen into the hands of the Germans. Of serviceable locomotives, only 50 had come to hand to the end of January. As up to this time no French personnel had been employed except upon a few sections, the German Railway Administrations had to be largely drawn upon for working the French railways. At the end of January the service was carried on by 3,600 German railway officials and a certain number of men lent from the army. Besides the locomotives captured and some 75 purchased, the home administration furnished 280 more.‡ It was not until the conclusion of the armistice that any effective assistance could be rendered in furtherance of the service.

* The railways in Upper Alsace were not placed under a Line Commission.

† In February the Line and Traffic Commissions at Chaumont were transferred to Corbeil. To the latter Commission was left the supreme direction of traffic on the railways belonging to the Line Commission at Versailles.

‡ The number of the wagons furnished cannot be accurately stated in consequence of their constant going and coming, but during the latter half of the campaign there could not have been less than 30,000 axles withdrawn from home traffic.

PROTECTION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS.

The difficulty of protecting the communications augmented in direct proportion with the distance separating the theatre of operations and home territory, and with the spread of the franc-tireur movement.

On the 31st October a fresh distribution of the Government troops and Etappen troops took place.* On the 4th November, an order from His Majesty the King extended the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Lorraine as far as the west border of the Meuse Department, the west, south-west, and south borders of the Haute Marne Department, and the west and south borders of the Haute Saône Department; whilst the Government-General of Rheims was thenceforth to consist of the Departments of the Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Aube, Seine and Marne, and Seine and Oise.† At the same time, the duty of protecting the etappen lines running through their districts was again imposed upon the respective Governments-General. But as the troops newly assigned to them only became by degrees available, etappen troops had in the first instance to be employed for the purpose, and even parts of the field army. It was not until the end of November that the new distribution of the Government and Etappen troops came into real operation.

The Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, following the march of his army to the Loire, was unable until the middle of November to withdraw part of his troops from the etappen line to which they had previously belonged, and push them forward in the direction of Troyes and Châtillon-sur-Seine.‡ Consequently, at first, detachments composed of men with slight ailments had to be employed for the protection

Protection in the south of the theatre of war.

* The new distribution would place the following at disposal:—

Inspector-General of Etappen.	Ist Army	1 battn.,	1 sqn.,	— battery.
	II nd " "	4 " "	2 " "	— " "
	III rd " "	16 " "	9 " "	2 " "
	Meuse " "	4 " "	2 " "	— " "
<hr/>				
25 battns., 14 sqns., 2 batteries.				
Government-General ..	Alsace	23 battns.,	9 sqns.,	2½ batteries.
	Lorraine	20 " "	6 " "	2 " "
	Rheims	17 " "	4 " "	3 " "
<hr/>				
60 battns., 19 sqns., 7½ batteries				

As regards the previous distribution of the Etappen and Government troops, see App. LXXII.

† In addition, the Government-General of Lorraine gave up the Schirmeck and Saales districts of the Vosges Department to the Government-General of Alsace.

‡ Distribution of the etappen troops of the IInd Army on 18th November:—

Troyes: Inspector-General; Bar-sur-Seine: $\frac{3\text{rd}}{\text{Unna}}$; Châtillon-sur-Seine: $\frac{3\text{rd}}{\text{Unna}}$;
 1st, 2nd, and 4th $\frac{\text{Unna}}$ and $\frac{2\text{nd}}{5\text{th Res. Hus.}}$; Château Vilain: $\frac{6\text{th}}{\text{Unna}}$; Chaumont-en-Bas-
 signy: $\frac{5\text{th}}{\text{Unna}}$; on the Bologne—St. Dezier and Bologne—Colombey roads:

of the line of communications. The last field troops of the IInd Army had meanwhile already reached St. Florentin. General v. Kraatz's Detachment was still watching Langres from the north and north-west,* whilst the XIVth Corps was posted at Dijon, three days' march from Châtillon.†

Surprise of
Châtillon-sur-
Seine.

On the French side, Garibaldi, with his volunteers, had been despatched in the first half of November from the neighbourhood of Dôle to Autun, for the purpose of protecting the roads leading to Nevers.‡ On the 11th November he reached Autun, and some days afterwards caused his 4th Brigade§ to advance on Montbard, with orders to push reconnoitring parties well to the front and harass the enemy. Ricciotti Garibaldi reached Montbard on 17th November, and resolved to undertake a *coup-de-main* upon Châtillon-sur-Seine. On the 18th he advanced to Coulmiers-le-Sec, and next morning at five o'clock arrived before Châtillon.

This place had been occupied since the 17th November by three companies of the Unna Battalion and a squadron of the 5th Reserve Hussars, under Colonel Lettgau.||

The infantry pickets and cavalry patrols, pushed forward during the night, had just returned on the morning of the 19th, when, at half-past six o'clock, the volunteers moved forward in two columns upon Châtillon.¶ On the first shots from the guard at the entrance to the town, the alarm was at once sounded, but the landwehr were fired upon from the houses while in the act of assembling, and many were surprised inside. A brisk street fight ensued, in which the Prussian detachment at first held their ground in the Mairie and the Prefecture. On the news, however, that the enemy was threatening the retreat on Château Vilain by a turning movement, Colonel Lettgau commenced evacuating that part of the town which lies on the left bank of the Seine. But as the enemy shortly afterwards broke off the contest and retreated, the whole of the town was re-occupied by the Prussians. The German loss amounted to 8 officers and 186 men.**

Soest Battalion and ^{1st} 5th Res. Hus.; in and near Pont-à-Mousson: Detmold and Paderborn battalions.

The 1st Fortress Pion. Co. Vth Corps was despatched to reinforce the 4th Field Railway Division (*see ante*, p. 105).

* 6 battns., 2 sqns., and 2 batteries (*see* Part II, Vol. I, p. 284, note †).

† *See* Part II, Vol. II, p. 32, *et seq.*

‡ *See* Part II, Vol. I, p. 227, and App. CIV; and also Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," pp. 107 and 155.

§ 600 men and some mounted éclaireurs. (*See* Thiébault, "Ricciotti Garibaldi et la 4^e Brigade," p. 15).

|| *See ante*, p. 113, note †. The 3 companies of the Unna Battalion numbered 460 men; the squadron, 94 horses.

¶ The attacking columns numbered 400 men (*see* Thiébault, p. 21).

** Including 1 officer 13 men killed, and 2 officers 9 men wounded. Among the

On learning that the adversary was preparing to renew the attack with stronger forces,* Colonel Lettgau retired next day to Château Vilain. Here, on the 21st, arrived General v. Kraatz on his way to the Loire,† and ordered the detachment to move with him to Châtillon.‡ On the 23rd, the detachment was further joined by four companies of the Soest Landwehr Battalion and half a squadron;§ the first of these had had a brush at Plaines with a band of franc-tireurs. General v. Kraatz continued his advance to Joigny on the 24th.

After their success at Châtillon the volunteers became emboldened. As the Othe Forest,|| situated to the south-west of Troyes, appeared more particularly to serve as the starting point of their raids, Lieutenant-General v. Tiedemann despatched on the 24th a strong detachment¶ from that town to clear the wood in question.

After a slight skirmish with volunteers at Maraye-en-Othe on the 25th, this detachment proceeded on the 26th to Auxon, where, on the morning of the 25th, the etappen troops had been surprised by a strong band.** The garrison, consisting of some 100 convalescents of the 18th Division, was forced to abandon the place after a stubborn resistance. After being reinforced by a company from Troyes it again advanced to the village, now deserted by the enemy, just as the detachment from Maraye appeared. This latter continued its march by way of Brienon to Sens, and arrived there on the 29th. It had only met with some weak hostile bands, which took to flight after a short skirmish.

The country north of Châtillon-sur-Seine had likewise been again harassed by volunteers. On the 29th, a band several hundred strong succeeded in barring at Autricourt the march of the 3rd Company Soest Battalion on its way from Bar-sur-Aube to Châtillon.

Whilst, for these reasons, the Joinville—Troyes road was only kept open with difficulty, the continuous advance of the

killed was Major v. Alvensleben, 5th Reserve Hussars; among the wounded Captain Bardeleben, Unna Battalion.

App. CLXXIV contains the return of casualties of the troops employed on the communications from the commencement of the campaign until 31st January, 1871, as also of the Field Railway officials.

* Ricciotti Garibaldi's Brigade had meanwhile, as a matter of fact, retired on the 19th to Coulmiers-le-Sec, and on the 20th to Montbard.

† After leaving 2 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery, in front of Langres, under Colonel v. Ehrenberg (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 325, note †).

‡ $\frac{6\text{th}}{\text{Unna}}$ remained at Château Vilain.

§ $\frac{1\text{st}, 2\text{nd}, 5\text{th}, \text{and } 6\text{th}}{\text{Soest}}$ and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 1\text{st}}{5\text{th Res. Hus.}}$. The former had moved to Bar-sur-Seine on the 21st, and from thence been despatched to Châtillon.

|| Situated between the roads leading from Troyes to Sens and St. Florentin.

¶ The Detmold Battalion, besides 316 infantry and 103 sabres of the 25th Division, under Major v. Massow.

** According to Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 175 and 284, 170 Franc-tireurs of the Doubs carried out the surprise.

IInd Army rendered necessary a further movement of the etappen troops to the westward. Moreover, the district further south had now to be protected, so that the railway beyond Châtillon might be restored. The Inspector-General of Etappen, therefore, applied to Army Headquarters for a support to Colonel v. Ehrenberg's detachment* in front of Langres, and also requested reinforcements from the Governments-General of Lorraine and Rheims. In consequence, the Governor-General of Rheims, Lieutenant-General v. Rosenberg-Gruszczyński,† caused Troyes to be occupied by a mixed detachment from Vitry-le-Français.‡

The railway Blesme—Chaumont—Châtillon lay for the most part within the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Lorraine. As the latter could not dispose of a part of the troops assigned to him on the 31st October before the end of November, it was not until during this month that the etappen garrisons of the IInd Army as far as Bologne could be relieved.§

In consequence of the surprises of Châtillon and Auxon, the Governor-General of Lorraine, General v. Bonin, for the better protection of the threatened line of rail, despatched a mixed detachment under Colonel v. Dannenberg|| to Chaumont, where it arrived on the 29th and 30th November.

On hearing of the events at Châtillon, General v. Werder had also moved troops in that direction. They, however, speedily returned, as their support was no longer necessary.¶

Meanwhile the Royal Headquarters despatched so much of the VIIth Army Corps as was present at Metz to Châtillon-sur-Seine, in order to secure the etappen line of the IInd Army.

* The support was sanctioned, but the detachment returned to the army shortly after.

† The Government-General in Rheims had only the 2nd Landwehr Division at its disposal in the middle of November. It was distributed in such wise that 5 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery were posted on the section of the railway Blesme—Epernay; 7½ battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries on the etappen roads of the 1st and Meuse Armies; 3½ battalions, with 1 squadron held Sedan, Laon, and the camp at Chalons. On the 23rd November, the IInd Reserve Rifle Battalion, assigned shortly before to the Government-General, arrived from Germany at Vitry-le-Français. Besides these the 1st Squadron 1st Lancers was at Sedan.

‡ The Prenzlau Battalion, $\frac{3rd}{IInd Res. Rif.}$, $\frac{1st Hy. Res. Cav.}{1st Hy. Res. Cav.}$, and $\frac{1st 2nd Lt. Res.}{X}$.

§ The 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion relieved the Soest Battalion on 16th November. (See ante p. 113, note ‡, and p. 115, note §.)

At the beginning of December the troops of the Government-General of Lorraine were distributed as follows:—On the railway section Avricourt—Nancy—Bar-le-Duc: 30 companies, 2 squadrons; on the etappen road of the XIVth Army Corps: 22 companies, 1½ squadrons, 1 battery; on the etappen line of the IInd Army: 16 companies, 1½ squadrons, 1 battery; on the etappen roads of the 1st and Meuse Armies: 32 companies and 1 squadron. Total, 100 companies, 6 squadrons, and 2 batteries.

|| $\frac{1st and Fus.}{60}$ and $\frac{Heavy Res.}{VIII}$. The 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion was placed

under Colonel v. Dannenberg. On the 5th December the $\frac{4th}{4th Res. Hus.}$ also joined this detachment, while Ehrenberg's Detachment had already left on the 30th November. (See Part II, Vol. II, p. 71, note ‡, and note * above.)

¶ See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 35 and 37.

and to maintain the connection between the IInd Army and the XIVth Army Corps.*

A mixed detachment, under General v. d. Osten-Sacken, was sent in advance of the 13th Division; it reached Donjeux on the 30th,† and thence advanced in two columns towards Tonnerre and Ravières. On the 5th December it occupied Châtillon. The remainder of General v. Zastrow's troops were concentrated on the 9th December in and round Chaumont.

Meanwhile, Garibaldi's troops had been held in check by the XIVth Army Corps. But there now commenced a series of systematic attacks upon the etappen line by the Langres garrison, which at the beginning of November numbered upwards of 12,000 men, one-third being troops of the line. The commandant of the fortress, General Arbellot, who conceived that his chief duty was to harass the German communications, formed special companies for this purpose.‡

On the 6th December, a requisitioning party§ despatched from Chaumont to Nogent-le-Roi was surprised by these troops and was forced to retire with some loss. In consequence, a mixed detachment|| advanced on the 7th towards Nogent, but limited itself to a short cannonade of the town which was full of armed men.

On the evening of the 8th, the garrison of Château Vilain was attacked by superior hostile forces.¶ Captain Hauses, with the 5th and 6th Companies of the Unna Landwehr Battalion, offered such a vigorous resistance that the enemy, after some hours' fighting was forced to retire, leaving 46 killed and wounded on the field. The adversary had only damaged the railway very slightly. Next morning, he renewed his attack, but at once retired when a battalion came up from Chaumont.**

In order to put an end to these attacks on the line of communications, parts of the VIIth Army Corps scoured the country south-east of Château Vilain on the 10th December, and on the 12th, Colonel v. Dannenberg despatched two columns†† by way of Biesles and Lusy towards Nogent-le-Roi. They, however, only fell in with weak bands, which after a slight resistance retired on Montigny-le-Roi. The enemy, who was kept well informed by the peasantry, retired at all points

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 37.

† 4 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery. Of these one battalion did not reach Donjeux until the 1st December.

‡ See "Langres pendant la Guerre," 1870-71, p. 28, *et seq.*

§ One Vice-Sergeant-Major with 63 men of the 60th Regiment.

|| $\frac{2\text{nd and } 11\text{th}}{60}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ 4th, and $\frac{1}{2}$ Heavy Res. VIII

¶ Four companies. (See "Langres pendant la Guerre," 1870-71, p. 33.)

** Fus. $\frac{55}{55}$, which had just arrived by rail from Donjeux.

†† $\frac{2\text{nd, } 3\text{rd, } 9\text{th, and } 11\text{th}}{60}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ 4th, and $\frac{\text{Heavy Res.}}{\text{VIII}}$, under Major Müller;
 $\frac{10\text{th and } 12\text{th}}{60}$, and $\frac{1}{4}$ 4th, under Captain v. Köller.

as soon as he was met by superior forces, and, whilst the VIIth Army Corps was advancing beyond Châtillon,* remained quiet to the west of Langres.

When this corps had taken over the protection of the Chaumont—Nuits—Tonnerre railway,† the Inspector-General of Etappen caused his troops to move forward in order to guard the line of communications by road of the IIInd Army. This measure was urgently necessary in view of the advance meanwhile of the army beyond Orléans, and the more so as some volunteers had appeared in the neighbourhood of Sens.

On the night of the 3rd—4th December, a detachment of 152 men‡ intended for the IIIrd Army Corps, who on the march from Sens to Nemours had taken by mistake the Courtenay road, and were passing the night at Egriselle-le-Bocage, were attacked by a band some 170 strong. Keeping together in the church, the detachment repulsed the enemy with a brisk fire although he had set fire to the building. At daybreak, the fire having attained such proportions as to necessitate the evacuation of the church, the adversary was driven off. The detachment followed him some distance in the direction of Courtenay, and then marched back to Sens.§

On the news that there were also hostile detachments at Beaune-la-Rolande, Captain v. Monbart IIInd, 56th Regiment, who was a convalescent in the hospital at Beaumont-en-Gatenaïs,|| made an expedition to the neighbourhood of Beaune on the 11th, with twenty convalescent wounded men and a few troopers, but only came across some French field hospitals. On the 15th, after putting to flight some franc-tireurs, he released a large number of German prisoners at Montargis, equipped them as well as his resources would admit, and brought back to the Xth Army Corps a detachment of 250 men.

Meanwhile the Inspector-General of Etappen had arrived at Orléans on the 14th December, by way of Nemours and Pithiviers. His troops followed in such wise that by the end of the month they were distributed on the roads leading from Briennon and Estissac to Sens, Nemours, Pithiviers, and Toury.

From this position, a battalion with a squadron¶ was

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 38.

† The corps took over the protection beyond Château Vilain. Its position on the 16th December was as follows:—In and near Ravières: General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken with 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery; in and near Châtillon: General v. Bothmer with 7 battalions, 6 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 1 pioneer company; in Château Vilain: 1 battalion; at Bar-sur-Seine and Troyes: 1 battalion, 4 squadrons.

The troops of the Government-General of Rheims (*see ante*, p. 116) had, in consequence of the communications being threatened in the north, been temporarily called away from Troyes.

‡ They were commanded by 1st Lieutenant v. Bischoffshausen, Depot Battalion 35th Fusiliers.

§ The detachment lost two men missing. The enemy left 1 officer and 12 men dead on the ground.

|| South-west of Nemours.

¶ The Detmold Battalion and 2nd
5th Res. Hus.

despatched on the 24th to Montargis as reinforcement to the garrison,* which had been weakened by the departure of General v. Rantzau's detachment to Briare.

In consideration of the long line of communications of the IInd Army, the Royal Headquarters had on the 7th December ordered the reinforcement of its *etappen* troops by five *landwehr* battalions† belonging to the *etappen* troops of the IIIrd Army, whose duties at this period had been simplified by the transfer of the advanced *dépôt* to Lagny.‡ At the same time, however, the occupation of the district round Melun, Fontainebleau, and Montereau was entrusted to the IInd Army.

At the beginning of November, a mixed detachment, under Major v. Kuylenstierna, had been despatched to this district§ by the *etappen* authorities of the IIIrd Army, at the instance of the Royal Headquarters, for the purpose of depriving the enemy of the Moret—Montereau railway, and of securing it for use in view of the advance of the IInd Army to the Loire. After some slight brushes with volunteers on the 2nd and 3rd November, Major v. Kuylenstierna had occupied the villages of Melun, Fontainebleau, Moret, and Montereau.|| From these points raids on a small scale were undertaken for the purpose of clearing the district.¶ In the middle of December, as already mentioned, part of the detachment was transferred to the Inspector-General of *Etappen* of the IInd Army.

Meanwhile, General v. Werder in pursuance of instructions from the Royal Headquarters had charged General v. d. Goltz with the duty of observing Langres.** But as on the 17th December, General v. Zastrow left with his main forces for Auxerre,†† a complete investment of that fortress with the means available was impracticable. Although, for the present, the garrison did not attempt any enterprises on a large scale, a weak detachment succeeded on the night of the 24th—25th in tearing up the rails at Bricon, derailing a train coming from Chaumont, and attacking it. The 2nd Battalion 72nd Regiment,‡‡ which was in it, however, drove

* See also Part II, Vol. II, pp. 95-96.

† The Aschersleben, Halle, Bitterfeld, Torgau and Mühlhausen battalions. Part of these troops did not pass to the IInd Army until the end of December.

‡ See *ante* p. 105.

§ 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th 1st and 3rd
Aschersleben, Halle, 3rd Bav. Landw.

3rd Res. Dragoons, and 8th 4-Pr. The latter which had been assigned to the
Württ. Inspector-General of *Etappen* for the enterprise, rejoined its Division on the 27th November.

|| The bridge at Montereau had been destroyed by the enemy (see *ante*, p. 105.)

¶ The *franc-tireurs* could not be entirely expelled from that district. In the Valence wood, north-west of Montereau, two small detachments of the Aschersleben Battalion were surprised on the 25th December by a band of upwards of 100 men, and for the most part killed.

** See Part II, Vol. II, p. 99, *et seq.*

†† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 97.

‡‡ With regard to the assignment of this regiment to the VIIth Army Corps (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶).

off the enemy, who sustained a loss of 11 killed and 12 prisoners.

In order to relieve the field troops still employed on etappen duties, the Royal Headquarters had on the 23rd December instructed the Government-General of Lorraine to undertake as well the protection of the railway in the Côte d'Or Department. In consequence of this, the Government pushed forward their troops, so that by the beginning of January, the section between Blesme and Châtillon was protected by $6\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery.*

Beyond Châtillon the immediate control of the railway again came under the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, who distributed three of the newly-assigned battalions along the sections Châtillon—Troyes and Châtillon—Nuits—Tonnerre. On the west he had to occupy Orléans, and about the middle of January, in consequence of the advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans, Beaugency as well. In the same way, to the south of Paris, the etappen stations, Etampes, La Ferté Ales, and Juvisy, which had been previously occupied by troops of the IIIrd Army, came under his jurisdiction.

On the other hand, line troops of the IInd Army had been brought up to protect the Le Mans—Chartres railway, which had been opened for traffic after the engagements at Le Mans; whilst the Chartres—Versailles section was protected by the IIIrd Army.

Between the Loire and the Upper Seine, General v. Rantzau's detachment at Briare, and Colonel v. Dannenberg's troops† to the south of Châtillon, and between these the IInd and VIIth Corps,‡ gave sufficient protection during the first days of January against hostile enterprises on a large scale. On the departure of these two Corps eastward, General v. Manteuffel confided to Kettler's Brigade the protection of his communications and particularly of the Châtillon—Nuits railway. When on the 19th General v. Kettler advanced upon Dijon, only two companies remained behind at Montbard.§ In other respects, from this time forth, the protection of the communications between the Loing and the Upper Seine devolved solely upon the etappen garrisons of the IInd Army. In consequence of their weakness, only the etappen points themselves and the most important railway stations could be permanently occupied; the roads and railways were secured by constant patrolling.

* The Neisse, Beuthen, and Rosenberg battalions (troops of the Government at Metz, assigned to the Government General in lieu of the 60th Regiment, *see* Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶), the Andernach, Deutz (5th Co. at Neufchâteau), 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion, $\frac{1st, 3rd, and 4th,}{Erkelenz}$ $\frac{4th}{4th Res. Hus.}$, and $\frac{Heavy Reserve}{VIII.}$

The command of these troops was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Hensel.

† *See* Part II, Vol. II, p. 307.

‡ *See* Part II, Vol. II, p. 306, *et seq.*

§ 5th and 6th (See *ante*, p. 17.)

After the evacuation of Auxerre by the VIIth Army Corps, General de Pointe de Gévigny, in command at Nevers, pushed forward troops into that neighbourhood. On 19th January, the General, as also General Garibaldi, were requested by the War Delegate, M. de Freycinet, to blow up the bridge over the Armançon at Nuits.* In consequence, General de Pointe caused several attempts to be made, on the 25th January, against the Buffon—Nuits—Sens railway.

A column despatched for the purpose advanced shortly after 6 a.m. upon Briennon, surprised the guard at the railway station, made the majority prisoners, and destroyed the railway bridge east of the place,† as well as the telegraphs. Several attacks made upon the château, which had been arranged as an alarm post, were repulsed by the 3rd Company Paderborn Landwehr Battalion‡ with such vigour that the enemy once more retired to Auxerre.

At the same time, the railway station at La Roche was attacked on three sides by a garde mobile battalion. The garrison, consisting of only 1 officer and 30 men of the Paderborn Landwehr Battalion,§ soon found itself, in consequence of the enemy's superior forces, reduced to the defence of the station building. After a protracted resistance in the lower story, it had to be abandoned. From the upper story, the weak garrison continued the struggle until it was ultimately forced to surrender by the enemy setting fire to the building. The Yonne bridge at La Roche had meanwhile been blown up by the French, after dislodging the guard posted there.||

Some of the enemy's troops had also moved against Joigny, but had halted near Basson on meeting a detachment sent out to reconnoitre from Joigny.¶

On that same evening, a detachment of gardes mobiles moved upon Buffon. The Armançon bridge, which had just been restored at that point,** was occupied by a Prussian guard of 32 men, pushed forward from Montbard. This guard was, it is true, driven off on the night of the 25th—26th by the gardes mobiles, but the bridge was saved from destruction by two companies†† marching as reinforcement from Montbard to Nuits, before whom the enemy quickly retired.‡‡

In order to defeat any further enterprises, the Royal Headquarters ordered an infantry brigade of the VIth Corps, reinforced by cavalry and artillery, to unite with Rantzau's

* See Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 241.

† See ante, p. 109.

‡ Captain v. Ehrenstein.

§ From the 4th Company, under Lieutenant Poelmahn.

|| See ante p. 109.

¶ 4th Paderborn, with 12 hussars.

** See ante, p. 110, note †.

†† See ante, p. 120, note §.

‡‡ See Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 276, and "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Part III, p. 318.



detachment,* and clear the district north of Auxerre of franc-tireurs.

The brigade was placed under General v. Fabeck's orders; one column, under Colonel v. Briesen reached Montargis by rail on the 28th January, another under Colonel v. Bock arrived at Joigny on the 29th.†

As considerable bodies of the enemy were said to be massed about Auxerre,‡ General v. Fabeck contemplated a concentric advance upon the place, and for this purpose entered into communication with General v. Rantzau, who had informed him that he would march on the 28th from Ouzouer-sur-Loire to Châtillon-sur-Loing.

Briesen's detachment was sent forward by way of Château Renard and Aillant-sur-Tholon, Colonel v. Bock to Appoigny, and General v. Rantzau was requested to take the direction of Charny—Toucy. On the 29th the three columns reached Château-Renard, Joigny, and Charny. On the 30th, General v. Fabeck advanced to Sepaux with Briesen's detachment.

On the march thither, the news arrived of an armistice, in consequence of which Colonel v. Bock was left for the 30th at Joigny. General v. Rantzau reached Toucy. During the night of the 31st January—1st February, General v. Fabeck received the official communication of the conclusion of an armistice, by virtue of which the Department of the Yonne was to be occupied by the Germans.§

When General v. Werder, in consequence of the intelligence of the advance of strong hostile bodies to raise the siege of Belfort, was concentrating his forces at Vesoul, General v. d. Goltz was also summoned from Langres.||

Owing to this circumstance, the garrison of the fortress, which at that time had reached a strength of some 16,000 men,¶ was encouraged to fresh enterprises. They continually harassed the German troops of observation, without achieving any special successes. One of the detachments, however, sent from Langres succeeded on the night of the 11th—12th January in removing some rails near Courban,** and causing the derailment of a provision train.

The advance of General v. Manteuffel exercised such a paralysing influence upon the garrison,†† that when, on the 16th

* See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 95 and 226.

† 23rd Regiment, $\frac{3rd}{15th\ Drag.}$, and $\frac{4th\ Light}{6}$, under Colonel v. Briesen; 18th Regiment, $\frac{3rd}{8th\ Drag.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 3rd\ Light}{VI}$, under Colonel Baron v. Bock.

‡ At Auxerre there were some 2,000 men under General du Temple.

§ On 2nd February, the French evacuated Auxerre, which place was occupied by General v. Fabeck (see subsequent narrative).

|| See Part II, Vol. II, p. 104.

¶ See ante, p. 5, note *. General Meyère had become commandant in succession to General Arbellot.

** About 8 miles north-east of Châtillon-sur-Seine.

†† See ante, pp. 7 and 8.

and 17th January, German troops* moved from Chaumont and Foulain towards Rolampont, they encountered but slight resistance. The enemy had retired with his main forces to the fortress. On the 27th, Lieutenant-Colonel Hensel caused two columns to advance upon Nogent-le-Roi and Rolampont,† which dispersed several hostile detachments.

A few days previously an expedition had also been made from Neufchâteau upon Langres. The volunteers, who continued their raids north of the fortress, had gained so much ground to the front that the Government-General of Lorraine decided at the beginning of January to reinforce the weak garrison of Neufchâteau.‡ When General v. Werder, after the battle on the Lisaine, resumed the offensive, General v. Bonin deputed Lieutenant-Colonel v. Dobschütz, commanding at Neufchâteau, to advance upon Langres. This officer marched on the 20th with his detachment, consisting of three companies and half a squadron,§ to Bourmont, and next day to Lamarche. At the wood south-west of Vrécourt, he fell in with a hostile battalion.|| The riflemen, supported by the Landwehr Company, drove it back upon Vrécourt, after a brief skirmish. Those who endeavoured to escape to the southward were driven back or captured by the hussars. Vrécourt having been also captured at the first rush, the enemy fled with serious loss¶ to the mountains on the north. Lieutenant-Colonel v. Dobschütz returned the same day to Neufchâteau. The expeditions made from this place shortly afterwards were unattended with success, as it was an easy matter for the volunteers to evade pursuit in wooded country.

As the fortress of Langres evidently served as the point of support for these bands, the Royal Headquarters, on the 25th January, resolved upon a closer investment and, if possible, to lay siege to the place. The arrangements made to that end were, however, never carried out in their entirety.** The

* Beuthen and Deutz battalions, $\frac{2\text{nd}}{4\text{th Saxon Gar.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 4\text{th}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$.

† Upon Nogent: Rosenberg Battalion, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 4\text{th}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$, under Major Grüner; upon Rolampont: Beuthen Battalion, under Major Geibel, which was further supplemented on the 28th by $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 4\text{th}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ Heavy Res.}}{\text{VIII}}$.

‡ $\frac{5\text{th}}{\text{Deutz}}$, a garrison company formed out of 300 to 400 convalescents of Xth Corps, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 3\text{rd}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$. The reinforcement consisted of $\frac{2\text{nd and 3rd}}{1\text{st Res. Rif.}}$, and

$\frac{\frac{1}{2} 2\text{nd}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$, which troops had been on the etappen line of the XIVth Army Corps.

§ $\frac{2\text{nd and 3rd}}{1\text{st Res. Rif.}}$, $\frac{5\text{th}}{\text{Deutz}}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 2\text{nd and } \frac{1}{2} 3\text{rd}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$.

|| The Gard Battalion of Gardes Mobiles (*see* Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy," p. 20, *et seq.*).

¶ The enemy left behind 1 officer and 40 men killed and wounded, besides 56 unwounded prisoners, whilst our losses amounted to 11 men.

** *See ante*, p. 84, *et seq.*

armistice, meanwhile concluded, put an end also to hostilities before Langres, before the whole of the troops intended for the purpose had arrived before the fortress.

To the east of Langres, the line of communications of the XIVth Army Corps during November was protected as far as St. Loup-les-Luxeuil by troops of the Government-General of Lorraine;* further south, it was protected by the XIVth Corps itself.

At the beginning of December, when General v. Werder had assembled his forces at Dijon, Colonel v. Schmieden, who had been charged by the Government-General of Lorraine with the business of the Etappen Inspection at Epinal, caused Vesoul to be also occupied, as it appeared to be threatened from Besançon.†

At this period the neighbourhood of Lamarche having become far from safe,‡ a mixed detachment§ proceeded on the 6th December from Epinal in that direction. Part of it was attacked at Dombrot on the morning of the 9th by a body of franc-tireurs some 150 strong,|| but one company¶ repulsed the enemy after a brief struggle. On the 11th, the detachment after a slight action reached Lamarche and returned to Epinal on the 14th. Nothing more was attempted by the enemy for some time in this neighbourhood.

* See Part II, Vol. I, pp. 212 and 230.

† The distribution of the Government troops on the etappen line of the XIVth Army Corps on the 9th December was as follows:—

In Blainville-la-Grande and Rosières-aux-Salines: $\frac{5th}{Neuss}$; in Bayon, Charmes, Châtel-sur-Moselle, and Mirecourt: $\frac{1st, 2nd, and 5th}{Düsseldorf}$; in Epinal: 2nd Saxon Garrison Battalion, $\frac{5th}{Eupen}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Gar.}{5th Hus.}$; in Xertigny: $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 2nd}{1st Res. Rif.}$; in St. Loup: 5th, 6th, and 8th; in Vesoul: $\frac{1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th}{Eupen}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Heavy Res.}{VII}$; 4th Württ. pushed forward towards Lamarche: $\frac{1st, \frac{1}{2} 2nd, 3rd, and 4th}{1st Res. Rif.}$, $\frac{4th}{Düsseldorf}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Gar.}{5th Hus.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Heavy Res.}{VII}$.

‡ On 2nd December, a detachment of the Düsseldorf Battalion, consisting of one Vice-Sergeant-Major and fifteen men, sent to gather taxes, was captured near Vittel.

§ Major v. Paczinski-Tenczin, with $\frac{1st, 3rd and 4th}{1st Res. Rif.}$, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Gar.}{5th Hus.}$, and $\frac{\frac{1}{2} Heavy Res.}{VII}$ from Epinal, $\frac{\frac{1}{2} 2nd}{1st Res. Rif.}$ from Xertigny; these troops were joined next day by $\frac{4th}{Düsseldorf}$ from Mirecourt.

|| Belonging to the Chasseurs des Vosges who, under the command of Captain Bernard, had, since the middle of November, been making the neighbourhood of Lamarche the starting point of their raids, and, as it appears were independent of the fortress of Langres (see Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy," pp. 9 and 10).

¶ $\frac{1st}{1st Res. Rif.}$, under Captain Baron v. Wilczeck.

The etappen troops under Colonel v. Schmieden received by the middle of January numerous reinforcements;* on the other hand, the detachment despatched at the end of December from Vesoul to Port-sur-Saône passed in January under the immediate orders of the XIVth Army Corps and, as already described, shared in the operations of this Corps.†

In consequence of the movement to the right of the French East Army, the Royal Headquarters found it necessary on the 6th January to issue special instructions‡ to the Governments-General of Lorraine and Alsace in the possible case of the main lines of communication of the German armies being threatened by General Bourbaki. The Government-General of Lorraine should, in such event, concentrate the troops now scattered at the various etappen points; the Government-General of Alsace was to prevent any attempt at rising in the rear of General v. Werder. The fortresses were to be occupied in good time with sufficient forces, and preparations were to be made for destroying the railways upon the enemy's line of advance.

In consequence the Government-General of Alsace caused the garrisons in the south to be reinforced, and took steps to secure the Vosges passes.§

When the enemy afterwards took the direction of Belfort with his main forces, numerous bands of franc-tireurs advanced at the same time from Vesoul and Langres against the line Luxeuil—St. Loup.

On the evening of the 16th January the company at St.

* 3rd and 6th 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 1st and 2nd, and Light Res. On the
Düsseldorf Neuss 4th Res. Hus. and XII
other hand, 2nd and 3rd, and ½ 2nd were despatched to Neufchâteau on
1st Res. Rif. 4th Res. Hus.
11th January (see ante, p. 123, note †).

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 301, note *, and p. 303, note *.

‡ App. CLXXV contains the text of the order in question.

§ The troops of the Government-General of Alsace were distributed as follows on the 8th January:—

Strassburg.....	6	battns.,	½	sqn.,	1	battery.
Schlettstadt	1	"	—	"	—	"
Neu-Breisach	½	"	—	"	—	"
Upper Alsace (including Mülhausen) ..	5½	"	3	"	1	"
Vosges Passes west of Strassburg and Schlettstadt	1½	"	½	"	—	"
Weissenburg—Vendenheim—Avricourt railway	5	"	2	"	—	"
Hagenau—Saargemünd railway and in front of Bitsch	3½	"	1½	"	—	"
Saarunion, Marsal, and Château Salins etappen stations	½	"	½	"	—	"

Total .. 23½ battns., 8½ sqns., 2 batteries.

The Government-General had, at the end of December and beginning of January, received from home 10 dépôt battalions, on the other hand 8 Landwehr battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, under General v. Debschitz, were handed over for the siege of Belfort (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 299).

By the Royal Cabinet Order of 30th September, 1870, Lieut.-General v. Ollech had been appointed Governor of Strassburg.

Loup* was attacked by superior forces and repulsed upon Plombières; in consequence it was obliged to abandon this place and Luxeuil. On the 17th Colonel v. Schmieden called up two more companies from Epinal to Xertigny, where he assembled 9 companies and $1\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons. Next day he again pushed forward two companies to Aillevillers. On the 19th they were, however, forced by a strong hostile detachment to retire to Xertigny. But when on the 21st the successes of General v. Werder and the advance of the South Army became felt, they succeeded in penetrating on the same day as far as St. Loup,† and on the 22nd as far as Lure, and in opening communication with Colonel v. Willisen‡ now advancing on Vesoul. After Vesoul was reached on the 23rd, the etappen line, which had now to serve not only to the XIVth Army Corps but to the whole of the South Army, could again be occupied as before. The protection of it, south of Fresnes St. Mamès, was entrusted at the beginning of February to parts of the South Army.

At this period only weak detachments of Kettler's Brigade were stationed on the railway Nuits-Dijon.§ On the 2nd the guard at the Buffon Bridge having been recalled to Montbard, a small party of Garibaldians succeeded in blowing up the bridge on the morning of the 3rd.|| But as the opening of the railway in question was contemplated by Army Headquarters, the latter pushed forward stronger forces for its protection.¶

Measures of protection in rear of the centre of the German army.

The protection of the communications in rear of the centre of the German Army was a much easier matter than in the south. The railway running from Weissenburg and Strassburg by way of Nancy and Châlons was guarded on both sides by strong detachments.

Capture of Pfalzburg.

Against attacks from the side of Pfalzburg the railway was secured by troops of the Government-General of Alsace.**

On the night of the 13th—14th September the garrison of this fortress, the bombardment of which on the 31st August

* On the 15th of January, the southernmost part of the etappen line was occupied as follows:—

In Xertigny:	$\frac{2\text{nd and } 3\text{rd}}{2\text{nd Saxon Gar.}}$	and	$\frac{\frac{1}{2}\text{ Gar.}}{5\text{th Hus.}}$; in Luxeuil:	$\frac{6\text{th and } 8\text{th}}{4\text{th Württ.}}$	and
	$\frac{1\text{st}}{4\text{th Res. Hus.}}$; at St. Loup:	$\frac{5\text{th}}{4\text{th Württ.}}$; in Aillevillers:	50 men	2nd Saxon
		Garrison Battalion;	in Plombières:	$\frac{1\text{st and } 4\text{th}}{2\text{nd Saxon Gar.}}$		

† See ante, p. 11, note ||.

‡ See ante, p. 30.

§ See ante, p. 121.

|| See ante, p. 111, and Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 275 et seq.

¶ See ante, p. 83.

** With respect to the occurrences before Pfalzburg up to 3rd September (see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 263, 266, Vol. II, pp. 460–463, and sketch facing p. 461).

had produced no result, made a fresh sortie. A column of 500 men advanced upon Büchelberg, drove back the pickets, and penetrated into the village. The company posted here* concentrated rapidly and forced the enemy to withdraw.

Bands of volunteers, who hung about the neighbourhood, were continually threatening the rear of the investing troops, whilst the fortress maintained a steady fire upon their front. In consequence of this, Major v. Giese caused the fortress to be bombarded on the evening of the 24th November by the three divisions of his field battery† from three separate points, Les Baraques-des-trois-Maisons, Lesquatre-Vents and Vesheim. The enemy's artillery replied to the fire with rapidity and vigour, but caused little loss.

Meanwhile, the fortress began to fall short of food, and small-pox was extending its ravages. The commandant, Major Taillant, who had on the 30th November commenced to negotiate upon terms which could not be accepted, offered on the 12th December to surrender the place unconditionally. On the 14th the German troops made their entry. They found all the supplies of ammunition destroyed, and the greater part of the arms rendered unserviceable by the garrison.

Fifty-two officers and 1,838 men became prisoners of war; 65 spiked guns were captured. The fortress was left to the occupation of two Landwehr companies.‡

During the month of November the protection towards the west of the Weissenburg—Paris railway between Avricourt and Epernay had been undertaken by the Governments-General of Lorraine and Rheims.§

When the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army in the middle of December gave up five battalions|| to that of the IInd Army, the Government-General of Rheims took over in addition the occupation of Dormans and Château Thierry, while to the etappen troops of the IIIrd Army¶ was only left the protection of the short line of rail to Paris, that of the etappen road running to the south of the capital and that of the Versailles—Chartres railway.

* 1st
Sondershausen.

† On the 30th October the 1st Light Res.
II was relieved by 2nd Light Res., and
VIII
on 22nd the 4th by 4th. The latter was replaced on 2nd
3rd Res. Drag. 6th Bav. Chev.
November by the 1st. On 4th December in addition 3 officers and 115
6th Bav. Chev.
men of 3rd and 12th joined the investing troops.
Breslau II 4th Bav.

‡ App. CLXXVI gives a return of the German casualties at the fortresses of Pfalzburg, Bitsch, and Longwy.

§ See ante, p. 116, notes † and §.

|| See ante, p. 119.

¶ They still numbered 11 battalions, 9 squadrons, and 2 batteries.

The extensive forests, stretching between the Marne and Seine in the neighbourhood of Epernay, Montmirail, and Nogent-sur-Seine, rendered the duties of reconnoitring and watching so difficult, that strong bands were able to carry on their raids in that country, and threaten the roads leading to Paris as well as the railway.

The Inspector-General of Etappen had in consequence formed a flying column* under Colonel v. Seubert, which scoured the whole country from Coulommiers as far as Sézanne and Provins.

The Government-General of Rheims also sent frequent expeditions into the forests. On 20th December a detachment† advanced from Epernay and put to flight some franc-tireurs who tried to hold their ground at Mareuil-en-Brie.

At the end of December the same district had been cleared from the side of Dormans by the 1st Company Hind Reserve Rifle Battalion. This company, while levying contributions on 2nd January between Marcilly and Conflans-sur-Seine, came into collision with large forces. After losing their Company-Commander, Captain v. Basedow, Lieutenant Schellwitz held his ground for some hours in and near Marcilly. But as the adversary received further reinforcements and surrounded the company on different sides, the latter cut its way through to St. Quentin-le-Berger,‡ and marched to Vitry-le-François, where it arrived next morning.

On hearing of this action, the etappen commandant at Troyes despatched on the 7th a detachment§ to Conflans. This detachment, however, only came across some small parties, which made no attempt at serious resistance. In order to make a complete clearance of that district, mixed detachments were despatched towards the end of the month from Epernay, Coulommiers, and Troyes, by order of the Government-General of Rheims. They united on the 27th at Nogent-sur-Seine, without having seen the enemy.

In the district under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Lorraine, a band of franc-tireurs,|| several hundred strong, starting from Lamarche, attacked on the morning of the 22nd the garrison of the Fontenoy railway station,¶ who were unable to offer much resistance, and blew up the bridge over

* 6th Württ. Regiment, $\frac{2nd}{2nd\ Württ.\ Cav.}$, and 1st Württ. Depot Battery.

† Fifty men of the Potsdam Battalion and $\frac{\frac{1}{2}\ 4th}{1st\ Heavy\ Res.\ Cav.}$


‡ Captain v. Basedow, who was dying, had to be left on the field with two badly-wounded riflemen. He is said to have been carried off that evening by franc-tireurs.


§ 2nd and 3rd $\frac{12th}{Brandenburg\ and\ Torgau}$, with some cavalry.

|| The Chasseurs of the Vosges already mentioned, *ante* p. 124, note ||. (See Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy," p. 20, *et seq.*)

¶ 1 Vice-Sergeant-Major and 50 men $\frac{6th}{Geldern}$.

proceedings
t. Bitsch.†





the Moselle at that place.* A landwehr man stopped the mail-train from Nancy before any accident could happen. The soldiers travelling† by the train were rapidly assembled, and advanced upon Fontenoy, but only came across a few stragglers. Some troops which had been despatched from Toul and Nancy stated that the adversary had withdrawn rapidly in the direction of Langres.

Since the Weissenburg—Nancy railway had been opened for traffic, the fortress of Bitsch‡ was only of importance so far as it barred the railway from Hagenau to Saargemünd, which otherwise might have served to connect the central and northern lines. On the 4th September the garrison made a sortie with 700 to 800 men against the line Reyerswiller—Schorbach.§ The sortie was repulsed by the 1st Battalion 8th Bavarian Regiment.

Proceedings
at Bitsch.¶

Two days later, two battalions and half a company of fortress engineers arrived from Germersheim to reinforce the investing detachment,¶ so that its commander, Colonel Kohlermann, had now at his disposal 4 battalions, 2 fortress batteries, a company of fortress engineers, and 28 troopers. In order to compel the surrender of the fortress by an energetic bombardment, 20 more heavy guns** had been brought up. On the heights surrounding the fortress on the west, six batteries were constructed. To protect these batteries, the bulk of the infantry took post on this side, whilst a flying column was in observation to the north and east of the fortress.††

* See ante, p. 109.

† Forty men of various regiments, under Captain Rössel, 46th Regiment.

‡ See sketch.

§ With regard to the proceedings before Bitsch up to 3rd September, see Part I, Vol. I, p. 259, and Vol. II, pp. 459-460.

|| See Pradal, "Relation historique du Siège de Bitch," p. 68.

¶ IIIrd, IIIrd, and ½ 2nd Bavarian Fort. Engineer Company.
4th Bav. 8th Bav.

** Four 12-cm. guns were already with the investing detachment.

†† The investing troops were distributed as follows on 6th September:—

On the line Reyersviller—Freudenberg Farm—Susel Farm: $\frac{\text{Ist}}{8\text{th Bav.}}$; $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{4\text{th Bav.}}$
and $\frac{5\text{th, 7th, and 8th}}{4\text{th Bav.}}$

As reserve in Simser Farm: $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{8\text{th Bav.}}$; Artillery and Engineer Park were at the brick-kiln east of Hottweiler; for holding and watching the roads leading to Zweibrücken, Weissenburg and Reichshoffen: $\frac{6\text{th}}{4\text{th Bav.}}$, and four troopers.

The two landwehr companies in observation at Lemberg (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 460) had meanwhile left.

The batteries were constructed at the following points:—

No. 1 Battery with 4 12-cm. guns, north-east of Reyerswiller.

No. 2 " with 4 60-pr. S.B. mortars on the Bitsch—Reyerswiller road.

Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Batteries, each with 4 12-cm. guns between this road and the road to Rohrbach.

The construction of the batteries, and the transport of ammunition, were rendered very difficult by the continuous rain. The bombardment was commenced on the forenoon of 11th September, and was at first directed against the citadel. At the outset the adversary answered vigorously, but already on the 12th his fire had slackened. From this time the town became the mark for the guns; it shortly took fire at several points. The field guns opened upon a camp visible between the town and citadel. On the 14th the line of investment was pushed nearer the fortress.*

Although to all appearance the town had sustained considerable damage by the 17th,† comparatively slight effect had been produced on the works; moreover, as the siege guns had been seriously scored by heavy use, there was little prospect of achieving any success by continuing the fire. In consequence, Colonel Kohlermann gave orders on the 18th for the siege batteries to be dismantled, and this was accomplished by the 21st.

In view of the circumstance that the surrender of the place, of which the bulk of the inhabitants had fled, could not for the present be calculated upon on the ground of want of food, the Governor-General of Alsace, Lieutenant-General Count v. Bismarck Bohlen, caused the fort to be merely observed for the present. The two battalions of the 8th Regiment, under Colonel Schrott, appointed for the purpose, went into huts near Schwangerbach and behind the Pfaffenberg.‡ The north and west sides of Bitsch were watched by patrolling companies.

The garrison, after making some minor sorties on the 29th and 30th, which were easily repulsed, remained perfectly quiescent until the last.

At the end of October the two battalions of the 8th Bavarian Regiment, previously mentioned, were relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th Regiment. At the end of November and end of January, an exchange between the two regiments again took place, so that at the commencement of the armistice, Colonel Kohlermann was again in front of the fortress with his two battalions.

No. 6 Battery, with 4 12-cm. guns north of the latter road.

To man these batteries there were present the men of the 4th Battery of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, and after the 13th September those of the 3rd Battery of the 2nd Bavarian Fortress Artillery Regiment.

Four 6-pr. field-guns which arrived on the 13th were manned by the Sortie Battery from Germersheim.

The command of the siege artillery was assumed on the 12th by Major Zeller.

* The flying column was further reinforced by the ^{7th}
4th Bav.

† 130 houses were reduced to ashes, 100 half-destroyed (*see* Dalsème, "Le Siège de Bitsch," p. 57).

‡ The cavalry detachment also remained before the fortress. The engineer

The raids of the franc-tireurs in the north of France were facilitated by the Ardennes fortresses, so long as they remained uninvested, as well as by the forests of the Argonne and of the Ardennes.* The troops before Mézières undertook repeated expeditions against these bands,† but without entirely exterminating them.‡

Measures of protection in the north of France.

On the 8th October, by order of the Government-General of Rheims, a small expedition was made from Laon against St. Quentin, but it failed, as the town was strongly occupied.§ When, on the 21st, larger forces|| advanced upon St. Quentin, the place was forced to surrender by a few rounds of shell.

In consequence of the advance of the 1st Army upon Amiens, the weak etappen troops¶ of the Meuse Army sufficed to occupy the railways leading from Soissons to Gonesse and Mitry.

After the departure of the 1st Army for the Lower Seine, its Inspector-General of Etappen, who reached Amiens on the 3rd December, occupied, besides the Amiens—Rouen railway, some places where hospitals had been established.**

When, shortly after, the adversary, by his advance towards Ham and La Fère, threatened the communications of the Germans,†† a battalion, a battery,‡‡ and some troopers were sent on 11th December by the Government-General of Rheims to La Fère. These troops having become available at that place in consequence of the arrival of strong detachments of the field army,§§ and of the departure of the French to Amiens, Colonel v. Krohn received orders to use them for a raid upon Vervins before returning to Rheims. While carrying out these instructions, he was met by superior forces, and in consequence never reached the place.

company moved on the 16th October to Germersheim, in order to proceed subsequently to Paris. The two battalions of the 4th Bavarian Regiment and the Sortie Battery found other employment within the district of the Government-General of Alsace.

* See Part II, Vol. I, p. 252, note §, and Vol. II, p. 29, note ‡.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 125, *et seq.*

‡ On the 15th December, a large band attacked, close to Vouziers, the 4th Company Kottbus Battalion marching from Sedan, but after a short fight was repulsed upon Chestres.

§ Colonel v. Kahlden with $\frac{1\text{st and } \frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd}}{\text{Kottbus}}$ and $\frac{2\text{nd, 3rd, and 5th}}{17\text{th Drag.}}$

|| Colonel v. Kahlden, with the Frankfurt, Küstrin, and Woldenberg Battalions, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th and $\frac{1\text{st Light Reserve}}{17\text{th Drag.}}$ X

¶ See Appendix No. LXXII.

** At the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen there were only the St. Wendel Battalion and the $\frac{1\text{st}}{6\text{th Res. Hus.}}$

†† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 25. The losses sustained on this occasion are shown in Appendix CLXXIV.

‡‡ Frankfurt-am-Oder Battalion and $\frac{\text{Heavy Reserve}}{\text{X}}$

§§ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 110.

The headquarters of the 1st Army having, at the end of December, entrusted to field troops the duty of protecting the Rouen—Amiens railway,* there only remained for the Inspector-General of Etappen, who had proceeded to Chantilly† on the 2nd January, to occupy the railways leading from Creil to Amiens and Beauvais.‡

With the fall of Mézières, and after Rocroy had been taken, the traffic on that railway could only be threatened from Givet and Longwy.

Although the small fortress of Givet undoubtedly served as a rallying point for the franc-tireurs of that neighbourhood, still an active service of patrols from the garrisons of Mézières and Rocroy sufficed to hold them in check. A strong band, which showed itself to the north-east of Mézières, was on the 15th January dispersed by a half company§ after a short skirmish near Gespunsart.

The security of the easternmost part of the line of communications of the 1st and Meuse Armies was ensured from the beginning of December by troops belonging to the Government of Metz. After the departure of those parts of the VIIth Corps still left at Metz, the Governor, Lieutenant-General v. Löwenfeld, had received instructions from the Royal Headquarters on the 27th November to occupy Metz, Thionville, and the Metz—Saarbrücken railway with 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 3 batteries, and to defeat the enterprises made by the enemy from Longwy.||

Siege of
Longwy.¶

The fortress of Longwy, although only eight miles distant from the Thionville—Mézières railway, required the more attention as its garrison was very active.

The fortress, numbering some 4,000 inhabitants, consists of an open lower town, situated at the confluence of the Côte

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 120, note §.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 233, note *.

‡ Four of the landwehr battalions, recently assigned to the 1st Army, did not arrive until the second half of January, and had to be employed chiefly as garrisons for Peronne and Amiens (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 280, notes § and **).

§ $\frac{1}{2}$ 8th
Küstrin


|| The following were at first placed under General v. Löwenfeld's orders: 72nd Regiment (of which two battalions were at Thionville, one at Saarlouis) besides the Görlitz, Posen, Neustadt-a-W., Schrimm, Neisse, Beuthen, Kosten, Neutomysl, Rawicz, Ostrowo, Rosenberg, and Oppeln Battalions, the 2nd Heavy Reserve Cavalry Regiment, and the combined Artillery Division XIth Army Corps (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Res. Batteries).

Besides these there were at Metz 9 Fortress Artillery and 1 Fortress Pioneer Companies; at Thionville, 1 Fortress Artillery, and 1 Fortress Pioneer Companies.

General v. Löwenfeld occupied Metz with 8½ battalions, 2 squadrons and 2 battalions, Thionville with 2 battalions, and the Metz—Saarbrücken railway with 1½ battalions. Towards Longwy he pushed 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 1 battery.

At the end of December and beginning of January 8 dépôt battalions were assigned to the Government, whilst the 72nd Regiment passed to the VIth Army Corps, and the Neisse, Beuthen, and Rosenberg Battalions to the Government-General of Lorraine (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶, and ante, p. 120, note *).

¶ See sketch.



Siege of
Longwy. ¶



Rouge brook with the Chiens, and the fortified upper town. This latter is built on the right bank of the river at the north-east extremity of a plateau, which falls in steep slopes to the valley some 300 or 400 feet below it. The other bank rises again quickly to the same height, and overlooks the town and fortress. The wooded nature of the country permits of an approach from several sides under cover. Besides the high roads coming from Luxemburg, Verdun, and Metz, which meet at the fortress, there are several other good approaches. In the valley itself runs the railway from Longuyon to Arlon.

The works of fortification were constructed towards the end of the 17th century by Vauban on his "First System," and form a hexagon with ravelins. Before the north-east front lies a hornwork with a lunette, whilst on the south there is but one advanced lunette. The bomb-proof buildings had been recently augmented and strengthened.* The garrison numbered some 4,000 men,† including the Garde Nationale Sédentaire; among them were a number of line troops and fugitives from Sedan. The armament consisted of 131 guns. The fortress was adequately provisioned. Its Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Massaroli, had expelled from the town all persons incapable of work, and declared his intention to defend the fortress to the last.

Since the end of August, several expeditions had been made by the garrison against part of the troops investing Metz and Thionville. On the morning of the 21st September, a detachment consisting of one company and a division of dragoons,‡ which had marched to Arrancy for requisition purposes, was surprised by a hostile detachment of 450 men coming from Longwy. The company having rallied, it succeeded in repulsing the enemy.§

After the middle of November, Longwy was observed by a mixed detachment of the 14th Division,|| which occupied the line Villers-la-Montagne—Tellancourt. In the middle of December, by orders from the Royal Headquarters,¶ this detachment was relieved by troops of the Government of Metz.**

After some slight collisions in the earlier days, the garrison, on the morning of the 27th December, made a sortie in force

* See Massaroli, "La Défense de Longwy devant le Conseil d'Enquête et l'opinion publique."

† Massaroli estimates the garrison exclusive of Garde Nationale at 1,800 men.

‡ $\frac{12\text{th}}{35}$ and $\frac{4\text{th}}{12\text{th Drag.}}$

§ See also Part II, Vol. II, p. 27.

|| See Part II, Vol. II, p. 30, notes * and †.

¶ See ante, p. 132.

** $\frac{\text{Fus.}}{72}$, Rosenberg and Oppeln Battalions, $\frac{1\text{st and } 2\text{nd}}{2\text{nd Heavy Res. Cav.}}$ and 3rd Light Res. XI, under Major Count v. Schmettow.

against the left flank of the Prussian outpost position. Favoured by the darkness, the adversary penetrated into Tellancourt, but was again driven out by the two companies there present, after about an hour's fighting. A hostile detachment which had proceeded towards Frénois-la-Montagne had been gallantly repulsed at the entrance to the village.*

A reconnaissance ordered by the Royal Headquarters having led to the belief that a bombardment would probably result in the early fall of the fortress, orders were issued on the 30th for the siege to be at once commenced. For this purpose, some more troops, with a siege park to be brought up from Montmédy and Thionville, were assigned to the Government of Metz. Upon the arrival of these reinforcements, the strength of the detachment before Longwy amounted to 10½ battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries, 7 fortress artillery, and 4½ fortress pioneer companies.† The siege park numbered 86 guns.

His Majesty the King appointed Colonel v. Krenski, hitherto Chief of the General Staff of the XIIIth Corps to be commander of the troops before Longwy; this officer arrived at Longuyon on 9th January.

After making a preliminary reconnaissance, he resolved to direct the main attack against Bastions V and VI, whilst they were to be taken in flank and reverse from the heights at Mexy and the Mont du Chat. The artillery siege park was formed at Cons Lagrandville, to which place the railway from Longuyon was restored on the 15th.‡ For the service of the right wing, there was also an auxiliary park at Villers-la-Montagne. Engineer dépôts were formed at Villers-la-Chèvre and Villers-la-Montagne.

On 13th January the adversary, who had probably heard of the German preparations, made a sortie towards Villers-la-Chèvre, but was speedily repulsed by two companies posted there, and by a battery brought up from Tellancourt.§

After the troops had been gradually pushed up nearer to the fortress, during which some slight collisions occurred with

* At Tellancourt: $\frac{2nd}{Oppeln}$ and $\frac{2nd}{Rosenberg}$; in Frénois and Montigny: $\frac{1st}{Oppeln}$.

† Schivelbein, Köslin, Münster, Schrimm, Stettin, Rawicz, Ostrowo and Oppeln
 Battalions, $\frac{3rd \text{ and } 4th}{Neutomysl}$, $\frac{1st \text{ and } 2nd}{2nd \text{ Heav. Res. Cav.}}$, $\frac{1st \text{ and } 3rd \text{ Light Reserve}}{XI}$,
 $\frac{2nd, 4th, 5th, \text{ and } 13th}{Guard \text{ Fort. Art.}}$, $\frac{13th}{4th \text{ Fort. Art.}}$, $\frac{7th}{7th \text{ Fort. Art.}}$, $\frac{14th}{8th \text{ Fort. Art.}}$.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2nd Fort. Pion., $\frac{3rd \text{ Fort. Pion.}}{II}$, $\frac{1st \text{ Fort. Pion.}}{III}$, and $\frac{1st \text{ and } 3rd \text{ Fort. Pion.}}{IX}$, to

which was also added, on 21st January, the $\frac{1}{2}$ 6th 11th Fort. Art. In addition, Colonel v. Krenski brought up the Anklam Battalion and $\frac{2nd, 3rd, \text{ and } 4th}{Glatz}$

‡ See ante, p. 107.

§ $\frac{2nd \text{ and } 4th}{Rawicz}$ and $\frac{3rd \text{ Light Res.}}{XI}$.

the enemy on the 14th at Rehon and Mexy,* the line of investment on the north was likewise closed on the 17th.†

The batteries were commenced on the evening of the 16th under very unfavourable conditions of ground and weather. On the 17th the field batteries opened fire on the fortress, thereby distracting the adversary's attention. The outposts were pushed forward to within 1,000 paces of the works.

By the evening of the 24th twelve batteries and two mitrailleuse emplacements were constructed, of which, however, Batteries Nos. 10, 11, and 12 never opened fire.‡ No. 1 Battery commenced firing on the 19th; Batteries Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 followed by the 21st; No. 7 and 8 on the 22nd; No. 9 Battery early on the 24th.

On the afternoon of the 20th a shelter-trench was constructed in advance of the batteries of the left wing, and on the succeeding nights was widened and extended so as to form the 1st parallel.

In consequence of a dense fog, only a weak cannonade had

* The following took part: $\frac{1\text{st}, 2\text{nd}, \text{and } 3\text{rd}}{\text{Schrimm}}$ and $\frac{1\text{st and } 2\text{nd}}{\text{Ostrowo}}$.

† The position after the arrival of the last troops on 18th January was divided into the three following sections:—

1. *Left Section* (west of the Luxembourg—Longwy road and of the Lower Chiers): Köslin, Münster, and Oppeln Battalions, $\frac{2\text{nd}, 3\text{rd}, \text{and } 4\text{th}}{\text{Glatz}}$, $\frac{3\text{rd and } 4\text{th}}{\text{Neutomysl'}}$,

$\frac{2\text{nd}}{\text{2nd Heav. Cav. Regt.}}$, and $\frac{3\text{rd Light Res.}}{\text{XI}}$.

2. *Central Section* (from the Chiers to the Metz—Longwy road inclusive): Schrimm, Stettin, Rawicz, and Ostrowo Battalions, $\frac{1\text{st}}{\text{2nd Heav. Res. Cav.}}$, and $\frac{1\text{st Light Res.}}{\text{XI}}$.

3. *Right Section* (from the Metz—Longwy road to the Luxembourg—Longwy road inclusive): Anklam and Schivelbein Battalions.

The following places were occupied in first line:—Warnimont, Cosnes, Lexy, Rehon, Mexy, Herserange, Longlaville, and Mont St. Martin. The headquarters of the Investing Corps were at Cons Lagrandville.

‡ Right wing (flank) attack: Captain Weinberger.

No. 1 Battery, with 3 15-cm. and 3 12-cm. guns } north of Mexy.

Left flank (main) attack: Major Hein.

No. 3 Battery, with 4 15-cm. guns } east of Les Maragoles.

" 4 " " 4 12-cm. " }

" 5 " " 4 " " }

" 6 " " 4 " " }

" 7 " " 4 " " }

" 8 " " 4 15-cm. " }

" 9 " " 4 22-cm. mortars—in the parallel south of Romain Farm.

" 10 " " 4 " " } north of Pulventeux Farm.

" 11 " " 4 27-cm. " }

" 12 " " 4 12-cm. guns—on the Mont du Chat.

Two emplacements, each armed with 2 mitrailleuses, at first in the neighbourhood of Nos. 4 and 7 Batteries (M_1 and M_2), but after the 24th in the parallel (M_3 and M_4).

Batteries Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 were not commenced until later. The construction of the latter presented great difficulties, owing to their position in the dense wood, and the steepness of the hill side.

Major Wolf directed the artillery attack, Colonel Schott the engineer works.

been maintained on the 20th, but next day the artillery struggle commenced. The enemy directed a heavy and successful fire at first against the batteries of the right flank, afterwards also against those of the main attack, but especially against Nos. 1 and 6 Batteries. On the 22nd, also, he directed his guns chiefly upon the batteries of the right flank which were doing him much damage, but his fire shortly relaxed under the increasing cross-fire of the attacking batteries. On the evening of the 23rd an extensive conflagration broke out in the fortress. The next day the enemy answered in a desultory fashion: towards evening he sent in a parlementaire and commenced negotiations.

In consequence, the firing ceased at 7.30, and that same evening a capitulation was concluded. The surrender of the fortress took place on the 25th, and next day the besieging troops made their entry.

The town had suffered comparatively little; much more effective had been the cannonade from the heavy artillery upon the works of the fortress and the enemy's artillery. Part of the garrison having succeeded in escaping across the Belgian frontier, which was quite close, only 2,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans. Of material captured, there were some 130 guns, mostly spiked, 2,600 stand of arms, as also large supplies of ammunition and food.

The losses of the siege detachment amounted to 3 officers and 57 men.*

Colonel v. Krenski left on the 27th January with the bulk of his troops† for Commercy, in order to be afterwards employed before Langres.‡ The siege train of 67 guns followed to the same place, one battalion remained as garrison at Longwy; two battalions passed under the orders of the Government-General of Rheims,§ who was thereby enabled to occupy in greater strength the northern line of railway.

* See Appendix CLXXVI. According to Massaroli the French losses amounted to 157 men.

† With 6 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries, 6 fortress artillery and 3 fortress pioneer companies. 1st and 2nd were replaced by 3rd and 4th 2nd Heav. Res. Cav. 2nd Heav. Res. Cav.

‡ See ante, p. 84. Colonel v. Krenski was for a time placed, on 30th January, under the Government-General of Lorraine.

§ The Anklam and Glatz Battalions, which had been already assigned to the Government-General. The rest of the siege troops were otherwise employed by the Metz Government.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

The onward march of the German armies during November and at the commencement of December had necessitated the creation of a fourth Government-General,* and, in consequence, on the 16th of December, Lieutenant-General v. Fabrice, Saxon Minister of War, was appointed Governor-General at Versailles. The Departments of Somme, Seine Inférieure, Eure,† Oise, Seine and Oise,‡ Eure and Loir, Loir and Cher,§ and Loiret,|| were placed under his orders.

In accordance with the instructions¶ for carrying out the administration, the Governors-General had under their orders Civil Commissaries,** who on their part were to make use of the administrative authorities of their districts. This led, however, to great difficulties, as the majority of the French Government officials refused to serve under German direction. The municipal officials were much more willing, and, rightly appreciating the true interests of the country, carried out their duties, even under the most trying conditions.

In these circumstances a large number of German officials had to be summoned to France, who were employed partly as *Préfets* and *Sous-préfets*, and partly as assistants to the different heads of departments. The authority of these gentlemen, however, was not by any means recognised generally by the population, and, in most cases, their orders were only obeyed when there was a military force to back them. But in consequence of the few troops available for these purposes, this was frequently impossible. In many departments the difficulties were increased by the circumstance that the French officials endeavoured to continue their work without reference to German control. Hence the German administrative authorities were in many instances prevented from carrying their well-meaning intentions into effect with regard to the population.

The Governments-General made every effort to revive trade and industry. Where the troops had not already restored the

* Appendix CLXXVII contains the composition of the Staffs of the Governments-General at the end of January, 1871. As regards the first established Governments-General (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 468, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 59, and also Appendix LXVI). Map No. 38 shows the boundaries of the Governments-General.

† So much of it as lies on the right bank of the Seine.

‡ It hitherto belonged to the Government-General of Rheims.

§ So much of it as lies on the right bank of the Loire.

|| No troops were assigned to the Government-General of Versailles, but the field troops were instructed to comply with any requisitions which might be made.

¶ See Appendix LIV.

** The following were appointed Civil Commissaries: for the Government-General of Alsace, Government-President v. Kühlwetter; for the Government-General of Lorraine, Government-Vice-President Count v. Villers; for the Government-General of Rheims, Count v. Tauffkirchen, who was relieved at the beginning of January, 1871, and Landrath Prince Karl Hohenlohe; for the Government-General of Versailles, the Saxon Financial Councillor v. Nostitz-Wallwitz.

railways, canals, and roads, their repair was taken in hand, and their use, so far as military interests permitted, thrown open to the public. A postal service was established.*

On the other hand, the occupied country had to be laid under contribution for the various necessities of the German Army.

As the want of officials often rendered it impossible to levy the indirect taxes, these were replaced, especially at an early period, by a capitation tax, the amount of which was fixed on the basis of the revenues of 1869. Each department had, moreover, to contribute 1,000,000 francs as compensation for the losses sustained by the capture of German merchantmen, and the expulsion of German subjects from France. It was frequently necessary to enforce these contributions by detachments of troops.

With a view to reverting to a state of order, a strict administration of justice and police was especially necessary; the more so as generally throughout the country the French judges had, at the instigation of the Government of National Defence, closed their courts.

In the Government-General of Alsace, permanent military tribunals were established to adjudicate in the case of offences committed by the inhabitants against one another, and, in order that these tribunals might be regularly constituted, Government Procureurs were summoned from Germany. In the other Governments-General the judgments for such offences were given by the *Préfets* whenever application was made to them. For the Government-General of Lorraine a special court of justice was established at Nancy, upon which devolved the prosecution of the inhabitants for crimes, misdemeanours, and offences committed against the Germans.

Very active measures had to be adopted for the punishment of offences perpetrated against the German military operations, or upon individual members of the army. The accused were directed to be tried by military tribunals. More often than not these persons could not be discovered, and it then became unavoidable to throw the responsibility upon the communes in which the offences had been committed. This was the only way of preventing the population from taking an active part in the war.

The conscription ordered by the French Government had to be resisted by preparing lists and keeping a sharp watch over those persons who were eligible as soldiers. This was especially necessary in the districts of Alsace bordering upon Switzerland.

Sanitary police measures had to be adopted, particularly against small-pox and cattle disease.

* German post-offices had existed in the Government-General of Alsace since the beginning of September.

The numerous difficulties which the Governments-General encountered in carrying out their duties diminished directly the armistice was arranged. The population then returned to their ordinary work, and, moreover, a large number of troops were rendered available for enforcing the necessary obedience.



OCURRENCES IN THE LITTORAL PROVINCES AFTER THE MIDDLE
OF NOVEMBER, 1870.*

Although upon the approach of winter the coast provinces did not appear to be seriously threatened, General Vogel v. Falckenstein, in view of occasional cruises of the French fleet in the North Sea,† had ordered about the middle of November a brigade of all arms to hold itself in readiness for the protection of Hamburg,‡ and another for the protection of Bremen.§ These brigades were so placed as to be concentrated if necessary in thirty-six hours.|| Measures for watching and protection were likewise resumed.¶

During December also a hostile fleet cruised in the North Sea, and as late as the 23rd of the same month some men-of-war showed off the mouth of the Elbe.

The German ironclad squadron went for the winter into Wilhelmshaven, in order to undergo necessary repairs in dock.

Meanwhile the garrison and depôt troops, amid tempestuous weather, cold and snow, continued the difficult duties of watching the coast, and, in conjunction with the newly formed garrison battalions and depôt squadrons, guarded some 60,000 prisoners of war.** In proportion, as the approach of winter lessened the danger of a landing, and the want of troops increased in the theatre of war, the force on the coasts was gradually reduced.††

* See Sketch 7 in Part I.

† See Part II, Vol. I, p. 285. A hostile flotilla of eleven vessels appeared between the 6th and 16th November between Heligo and Borkum.

‡ 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 batteries and 1 pioneer company, under Lieut.-General Wittich.

§ 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 10 guns, and 1 pioneer company, under Lieut.-General v. Alvensleben.

|| On the abolition at the end of August of the commands of the field troops in the littoral districts, all the troops left in the districts of the Ist, IInd, IXth, and Xth Army Corps (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 425), passed under the direct orders of the Governor-General of the Littoral Provinces.

¶ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 417 *et seq.*

** As regards the new formations and the guarding of the prisoners, see subsequent narrative.

†† From the beginning of November until the commencement of the armistice, the following troops were transferred from the littoral provinces to France:—

- 2 combined landwehr regiments (Nos. 22/62 and 23/63).
- 9 landwehr battalions (of the 13th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, and 49th Regiments).
- 3 reserve landwehr battalions (Nos. 33, 34, and 35).
- 1 reserve cavalry regiment (1st Res. Hussars).
- 8 depôt battalions (3rd, 5th, 9th, 14th, 17th, 25th, 85th, and 92nd Regiments).
- 13 fortress artillery companies (9 of 1st Regt., 2 of 2nd, and 2 of 9th Regt.).
- 2 fortress pioneer companies (1 of 1st, and 1 of IXth Army Corps).
- 1 torpedo detachment.

In the middle of November, in addition to a considerable number of companies of fortress artillery and pioneers, there were further:—

- 8 field and 20 unmobilized landwehr battalions.
- 38 depôt battalions and 5 depôt rifle companies.
- 30 depôt and reserve squadrons.
- 12 depôt batteries.

This led to numerous changes in the distribution of the troops left in the districts of the 1st, IInd, IXth, and Xth Army Corps.

The corvette "Augusta,"* which had been commissioned during the war, was despatched from Kiel by the Admiralty on the 14th December in order to prevent as much as possible the shipment of arms from America to France.

The vessel cruised until the beginning of January off Brest, and then proceeded to the mouth of the Gironde, where Captain Weickhmann captured two merchantmen and a Government steam transport laden with provisions for the French Army.† The "Augusta" afterwards, proceeded to Vigo harbour, and remained there until the armistice.‡

Of the vessels abroad at the commencement of hostilities,§ the corvettes "Hertha" and "Medusa" remained in Eastern Asia waters, without coming into collision with the enemy.|| The corvette "Arcona" cruised until the beginning of January near the Azores, and afterwards proceeded for repairs to Lisbon, where she remained until the conclusion of peace.

The gunboat "Meteor,"¶ in accordance with orders, lay until the close of the war in Havana harbour.

The armistice brought temporary rest also to the littoral provinces and their garrisons.

With regard to the forces at disposal in the middle of February, *see* subsequent narrative.

* *See* Appendix IV, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 286.

† The two sailing ships were sent to Germany, the steamer was sunk.

‡ A French flotilla, consisting of two ironclad frigates and a despatch boat, lay off Vigo harbour, and prevented the German ship from putting to sea.

§ *See* Appendix IV.

|| The long time occupied in diplomatic negotiations in respect to neutralising the East Asian waters, prevented any operations in this theatre of war.

¶ *See* Part II, Vol. I, p. 286.

APPENDIX CLVII.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the South Army.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: GENERAL BARON V. MANTEUFFEL.

Chief of the Staff: *Colonel Count v. Wartensleben.*Quartermaster-in-Chief: *Major v. Lewinski Ist.*Commanding Artillery: *Lieut.-General v. Decker.*General Staff: (1.) *Major v. Holleben or Normann, Saxon Staff;*
(2.) *Captain v. Rauchhaupt, 79th Regt.;*
(3.) *1st Lieutenant Baron v. Collas, 37th Fusiliers.*Adjutants: (1.) *Captain v. Schütz, 8th Hussars;* (2.) *Captain Baron v. Reisswitz u. Kadersin, 15th Hussars;*
(3.) *1st Lieutenant v. Gaede, 4th Dragoons.*Army Intendant: *Intendant Igel.*Army Surgeon-General: *Surgeon-General Dr. Westphal.*Commandant of Headquarters: *Major v. Strantz, à la suite, 10th Lancers.*Inspector-General of Etappen: *Colonel Jancke.**

SUMMARY OF FORCES.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Guns.
IInd Army Corps - - - - -	25	8	14	84
VIIth " - - - - -	31	12	14	84
XIVth " - - - - -	24	20	13	78
4th Reserve Division - - - - -	15	8	6	36
Siege Corps before Belfort (exclusive of the troops temporarily detached from the 4th Reserve Division, and also exclusive of technical troops) - -	23	6	6	34
Total - - - - -	118	54	53	316

* Did not enter upon his functions until the armistice, owing to his not receiving the order until 6th March, 1871.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
IND ARMY CORPS. (11th January, 1871.) General Commanding: General v. Fransecky. Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Wichmann. Commanding Artillery: Major-General v. Kleist. Commanding Engrs. and Pionrs.: Major Sandkuhl.				
3RD INFANTRY DIVISION. Commander: Major-General v. Hartmann. Officer of General Staff: Major Stockmarr.				
5th Infantry Brigade, Major-General v. Koblinski.				
2nd Grenadiers, Colonel v. Ziemietzky - - -	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment, Colonel v. d. Knesebeck - - -	3	—	—	—
6th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Wedell.				
14th Regiment, Major v. Schorlemmer - - -	3	—	—	—
54th Regiment, Major Liebe - - -	3	—	—	—
2nd Rifle Battalion, Captain Schulz - - -	1	—	—	—
3rd Dragoons, Major v. Wedell - - -	—	4	—	—
1st Foot Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (1st and 2nd Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Battery), Major Baron v. Eynatten - - -	—	—	24	—
1st Field Pioneer Company with Light Field Bridge Train, Captain v. Wissmann - - -	—	—	—	1
Sanitary Detachment No. 1.				
Total of 1st Infantry Division - - -	13	4	24	1
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION. Commander: Lieut.-General Hann v. Weyhern. Officer of General Staff: Captain Boie.				
7th Infantry Brigade, Major-General du Trossel.				
9th Grenadiers, Colonel v. Ferentheil und Gruppenberg - - -	3	—	—	—
49th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Laurin - - -	3	—	—	—
8th Infantry Brigade, Major-General v. Kettler.				
21st Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Lobenthal - - -	3	—	—	—
61st Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Weyrach - - -	3	—	—	—
11th Dragoons, Lieut.-Colonel v. Guretsky-Cornitz - - -	—	4	—	—
3rd Foot Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (5th and 6th Heavy, 5th and 6th Light Battery), Lieut.-Colonel Bauer - - -	—	—	24	—
2nd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool Column, Captain Grethen - - -	—	—	—	1
3rd Field Pioneer Company, 1st Lieutenant Mündel - - -	—	—	—	1
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.				
Total of 4th Infantry Division - - -	12	4	24	2

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
Corps Artillery, Colonel Petzel.				
Horse Artillery Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Lieut.-Colonel Maschke - - - - -	—	—	12	—
2nd Foot Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Hübner - - - - -	—	—	24	—
Total of Corps Artillery - - - - -	—	—	36	—
Columns Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Major Leo. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column.				
2nd Train Battalion, Colonel Schmelzer. Hospital Reserve Depôt. Horse Depôt. Field Bakery Column. Commissariat Column Nos. 1-5. Field Hospitals Nos. 1-12. Train Escort Squadron.				
Vllth Army Corps. (11th January, 1871.)				
General Commanding: General v. Zastrow. Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Salviati. Commanding Artillery: Maj.-Gen. v. Zimmermann. Commanding Engrs. and Pionrs.: Major Treumann.				
13th Infantry Division.				
Commander: Lieut.-General v. Bothmer. Officer of General Staff: Major v. Werder.				
25th Infantry Brigade, Major-General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken.				
13th Regiment, Colonel Baron v. d. Busche-Haddenhausen - - - - -	3	—	—	—
73rd Fusiliers, Colonel v. Loebell - - - - -	3	—	—	—
26th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Barby.				
15th Regiment, Colonel v. Delitz - - - - -	3	—	—	—
55th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Bischofshausen - - - - -	3	—	—	—
7th Rifle Battalion, Major v. Kamecke - - - - -	1	—	—	—
8th Hussars, Lieut.-Colonel Arent - - - - -	—	4	—	—
3rd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (5th and 6th Heavy, 5th and 6th Light Batteries), Major Wilhelmi - - - - -	—	—	24	—
1st Field Pioneer Company with Light Field Bridge Train, Captain Junker - - - - -	—	—	—	1
Sanitary Detachment, No. 1.	—	—	—	—
Total of 13th Infantry Division - - - - -	13	4	24	1
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	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
14TH INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander: Major-General Baron Schuler v. Senden. Officer of General Staff: Major Baron v. Hilgers.				
27th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Pannewitz.				
39th Fusiliers, Major Hermann - - - -	3	—	—	—
74th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Kamecke - - -	3	—	—	—
28th Infantry Brigade: Major-General v. Woyna IIInd.				
53rd Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel v. Grabow - - -	3	—	—	—
77th Regiment, Major v. Köppen - - - -	3	—	—	—
15th Hussars, Colonel v. Cosel - - - -				
1st Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (1st and 2nd Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries), Major Baron v. Eynatten - - - -	—	4	—	—
2nd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool Column, Captain Goetz - - - -	—	—	24	—
3rd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool Column, Captain Cleinow - - - -	—	—	—	1
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.	—	—	—	1
Total 14th Infantry Division - - - -	12	4	24	2
Corps Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel Minameyer.				
Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse - - - -	—	—	12	—
2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass - - - -	—	—	24	—
Total of Corps Artillery - - - -	—	—	36	—
Columns Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column.				
7th Train Battalion, Major Baron v. Bothmer.				
Hospital Reserve Dépôt; Horse Dépôt; Field Bakery Column; Commissariat Columns Nos. 1-5; Field Hospitals Nos. 1-10; Train Escort Squadron.				
Attached to the Corps.				
60th Regiment, Colonel v. Dannenberg - - -	3	—	—	—
72nd Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Löwenberger v. Schönholtz - - - -	3	—	—	—
5th Reserve Lancers,* Colonel v. Bode - - -	—	4	—	—
Hessian Field Hospital No. 3.	—	—	—	—
Total of Attached Troops - - - -	6	4	—	—

* The Regiment was attached to the 13th Division.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
XIVTH ARMY CORPS. (19th January, 1871.)				
General Commanding : General v. Werder.				
Chief of General Staff : Lieut.-Colonel Leszczynski, Baden General Staff.				
Commanding Artillery : General Count v. Sponeck.				
Comding. Engrs. and Pionrs. : Major Albrecht, 2nd Eng.-Insp.				
PRUSSIAN TROOPS.				
Commander : Major-General Baron v. d. Goltz.				
Mixed Infantry Brigade, Colonel Wahlert.				
30th Regiment, Colonel Nachtigall - - - -	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment, Lieut.-Col. Baron v. d. Osten Sacken-	3	—	—	—
Mixed Cavalry Brigade.				
2nd Reserve Dragoons, Lieut.-Colonel v. Walther -	—	4	—	—
2nd Reserve Hussars, Lieut.-Colonel Count v. Dohna	—	4	—	—
Combined Artillery Division, (Heavy Reserve Bat- tery 1st A.C., 1st and 2nd Light Reserve Battery IIIrd A.C.), Major Ulrich - - - -				
	—	—	18	—
Total Prussian troops - -	6	8	18	—
BADEN DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieut.-General v. Glümer.				
Chief of General Staff : Major Baron Taets v. Amer- ongen.				
Commander of Baden Artillery : Colonel v. Freydorf.				
1st Infantry Brigade, Colonel Baron v. Wechmar.				
B.G. Grenadier Regiment, Lieut.-Col. Hoffmann -	3	—	—	—
2nd Grenadiers, Lieut.-Colonel Stölzel - - -	3	—	—	—
2nd Infantry Brigade, Major-General Baron v. Degenfeld.				
3rd Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Kraus - - - -	3	—	—	—
4th Regiment, Colonel Bayer - - - -	3	—	—	—
3rd Infantry Brigade, Major-General Keller.				
5th Regiment, Colonel Sachs - - - -	3	—	—	—
6th Regiment, Colonel Bauer - - - -	3	—	—	—
3rd Dragoons, Lieut.-Colonel Baron v. Gemmingen -				
	—	4	—	—
Divisional Artillery (1st, 2nd, and 5th Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries), Lieut.-Colonel Theobald				
	—	—	30	—
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	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
Pontoon Company with Light Field Bridge Train, Captain Lichtenauer - - - - -	—	—	—	1
Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Baron v. Willisen.				
Body Guard Dragoon Regiment, Major v. Merhart -	—	4	—	—
2nd Dragoons, Colonel Wirth - - - - -	—	4	—	—
Horse Artillery Battery, Captain Baron v. Stetten -	—	—	6	—
Total of Baden Division - - -	18	12	36	—
Corps Artillery, Major Kochlitz.				
Grand Duchy of Baden 3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries - - - - -	—	—	24	—
Prussian Columns Division, Major Groschke.				
Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-4. Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-3.				
Baden Columns Division, Major Engler.				
Artillery Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-3, Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1 and 2. Pontoon Column.				
Train, Major v. Chelius.				
Prussian Sanitary Detachment. Baden Sanitary Detachment. Prussian Horse Depôts Nos. 1 and 2. Baden Horse Depôt. Field Bakery Column. Prussian Provision Columns Nos. 1 and 2. Baden Provision Columns Nos. 1-3. Five Prussian Field Hospitals. Five Baden Field Hospitals. Train Escort Detachment.				
5th Field Railway Detachment.				
Chief: Chief Engineer Krohn. Company Commander: Captain Kaetelhodt, 45th Landwehr Regiment.				
5th Etappen Telegraph Division.				
Director: Telegraph Director Böhnke.				
4TH RESERVE DIVISION. (On 19th January, 1871.)				
Commander: Major-General v. Schmeling. Officer of General Staff: Major Kretschman.				
Combined Infantry Brigade, Colonel Knappe v. Knappstadt.				
25th Regiment, Colonel v. Loos - - - - -	3	—	—	—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
2nd Combined East Prussian Landwehr (Nos. 4 and 5), Colonel v. Krane - - - - - (Osterode, Ortelsburg, Graudenz, and Thorn Battalions).	4	—	—	—
East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, Colonel v. Zimmermann.				
Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiments (Nos. 1-3), Lieut.-Colonel v. Scheurmann - - - (Tilsit, Wehlau, Insterburg, and Gumbinnen Battalions)	4	—	—	—
Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiments (Nos. 43-45), Colonel v. Usedom - - - - - (Loetzen, Goldap, Danzig, and Marienburg Battalions)	4	—	—	—
4th Reserve Cavalry Brigade, Major-General v. Tresckow II.				
1st Reserve Lancers, Lieut.-Colonel v. Wulffen - -	—	4	—	—
3rd Reserve Lancers, Colonel v. Schmidt - - -	—	4	—	—
Combined Artillery Division (1st and 2nd Heavy, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Light Batteries), Major v. Schaper* - - - - -	—	—	36	—
2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIth A.C., Captain Jacob - - - - -	—	—	—	1
Total of 4th Reserve Division - - -	15	8	36	1
SIEGE CORPS BEFORE BELFORT.† (See the Ordre de Bataille in App. CXXXI.)				
4th Field Railway Division.				
Chief: Railway Engineer Vieregge. Company Commander: Captain v. Seidlitz-Kurzbach-Ludwigsdorff, of the 23rd Landwehr Regiment.				
7th Field Telegraph Division.				
Commander: Captain Friedheim, 3rd Engineer Inspection.				

* The Combined Artillery Division was formed of the Reserve Batteries of the 4th and 6th Army Corps.

† Under the Orders of the XIVth Army Corps.

APPENDIX CLVIII.

Headquarters, Versailles, 8th January, 1871.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY UNDER THE CHIEF COMMAND OF
GENERAL BARON V. MANTEUFFEL.

1. VIIth Army Corps :—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.
13th Infantry Division - - - - -	13	4	4
14th " " - - - - -	12	4	4
Corps Artillery - - - - -	—	—	6
Attached .			
60th and 72nd Regiments - - - - -	6	—	—
5th Reserve Lancers - - - - -	—	4	—
1st Reserve Hussars - - - - -	—	4	—
Total - - - - -	31	16	14

On the 8th January their disposition is as follows :—

Headquarters, 13th Division, and Corps Artillery on the march from Auxerre to Châtillon-sur-Seine, which point will probably be reached on the 11th instant.

14th Division moving by rail from Boulzicourt to Châtillon-sur-Seine. The first echelons reached this point on the 7th; the Division will be assembled there on the 12th.

Colonel v. Dannenberg, with 60th and 72nd Regiments, 3 squadrons, and 2 batteries, south of Châtillon-sur-Seine, covering the concentration of the Corps and observing Dijon and Langres.

Towards the last-named place, Lieutenant-Colonel Hensel, stationed with Government troops at Chaumont, has thrown forward 8 companies, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and $\frac{1}{2}$ battery by way of Luzy and Foulain.

The 1st Reserve Hussars is meanwhile attached to the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, and should be left behind at Nuits when the VIIth Corps commences its operations. The Corps, therefore, comprises 31 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 14 batteries.

2. IInd Army Corps :—25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 14 batteries. The Corps is on the march from Montargis to Nuits, where the leading Division will arrive on the 12th.

3. XIVth Army Corps :—

	Battalions,	Squadrons,	Batteries,
Major-General v. d. Goltz's Detachment - - - - -	6	8	3
Baden Field Division - - - - -	18	12	9*
1st Reserve Division - - - - -	15	4	3*
4th Reserve Division - - - - -	15	8	6
General v. Debschitz's Detachment - - - - -	8	2	2
Total - - - - -	62	34	23

The Corps on the morning of 8th is posted as follows :—1st Reserve Division and about $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th Reserve Division is besieging Belfort, Debschitz's Detachment is at Delle, remainder of Corps and Headquarters at Vesoul.

Total strength of the army (exclusive of 1st Reserve Hussars) :—118 battalions, 54 squadrons, 51 batteries.

EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION.

Up to the middle of last month the XIVth Army Corps, which occupied a position commanding the line Châtillon-sur-Seine—Dijon—Gray—Vesoul—Monbéliard, was only opposed to hostile detachments of weak numerical strength; namely, Garibaldi with 12,000 men at Autun, Crémier with 20,000 at Beaune and Dôle. Since that time considerable bodies of hostile troops, brought up from the south, have concentrated at Besançon.

In order to cover the siege of Belfort, General v. Werder abandoned Dijon, and after recalling General v. d. Goltz, who was detached for the purpose of investing Langres, concentrated at Vesoul.

A direct support was afforded to him by General v. Debschitz's Detachment, which was formed in Southern Alsace, and was pushed forward to Delle. Further, on the news that a large part of the enemy's forces, in process of reorganisation at Bourges and Nevers (Bourbaki: 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps), had proceeded by rail to Châlons-sur-Saône, General v. Zastrow, who was with the 13th Division and Corps Artillery, VIIth Corps, at Auxerre, received orders to move to Nuits and Montbard. The 60th and 72nd Regiments, from Metz and Chaumont, were at the same time set in movement in that direction. A few days afterwards, however, the march of stronger hostile forces from Cosne to Briare, coupled with other intelligence, rendered it probable that General Bourbaki was still posted with his main body at Nevers and Bourges, and was preparing to take the offensive in the direction of Paris.

The hostile troops which had reached Besançon maintained at all points a defensive attitude, and even blew up the remaining bridges over the Doubs.

* The 5th Baden Heavy Battery and the Bavarian Sortie Battery which reached the Baden Division and the troops besieging Belfort respectively, early in January, are not included.

General v. Zastrow, in consequence, received orders to return to Auxerre, while at the same time the IInd Army Corps was relieved before Paris, and directed on Montargis; the two Corps united were then to oppose the expected march of Bourbaki's army, while the IInd Army took the offensive against Chanzy's army.

During the execution of these movements, General v. Werder announced in a positive manner that he had in his front troops of the 18th and 20th Army Corps. General Röder telegraphed from Berne that Bourbaki himself had reached Dijon, and was advancing with an army of 60,000 men and 80 guns. A detailed report, of which the data in other respects proved trustworthy, showed that, in accordance with the new French plan of operations, Bourbaki (under whose orders were the 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps, and probably the 19th, at Bourges, &c.) would take the offensive against the XIVth Corps, relieve Belfort, reoccupy Alsace, and permanently sever the German lines of communication. For this purpose, leaving one Corps at Vierzon, his army was to be reinforced by the 24th Corps, newly formed at Besançon under General Bresolles, by Crémér's troops and by Garibaldi's volunteers.

These operations have already been initiated. For the last three days the outposts of the 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps to the south and west of Vesoul and to the south of Belfort, have been directly opposed to General v. Werder's troops; yesterday a concentration was evident towards the road Besançon—Vesoul. Whether the whole of the 18th and 20th Corps are assembled, it is impossible to say; it may be doubted for the present. It is said also that on the 31st December Bourbaki held a review at Bourges of the 15th and 18th Army Corps. This intelligence is not, however, confirmed. The position of the 15th and 19th Corps has not yet been established. Of the 19th Corps, it is not known for certain whether it is with Bourbaki or with Chanzy, or whether it was not disbanded after the action at the beginning of December. If both belong to Bourbaki's army he will have at his disposal for the intended operation one of them in the east, while the other will be at Vierzon. Should the 19th Corps, on the other hand, belong to Chanzy's army or have been disbanded, the 15th Corps probably remains at Vierzon. Bourbaki will then have at his disposal in the east only the 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps, and Garibaldi's bands.

The army thus constituted is deficient in cavalry, but adequately provided with artillery. Commissariat and ammunition trains will be almost entirely wanting, and cannot be altogether replaced by using the railway. The infantry is well armed, but defectively organised. The numerical strength of the different Army Corps may be some 30,000 men, so that, exclusive of the bands of Garibaldi, estimated at 12,000, the total force may be taken at 90,000 to 120,000 men.

General v. Werder has received orders provisionally, before everything else, to cover the siege of Belfort, and to base himself on Southern Alsace. He should not oppose directly a hostile advance west of the Vosges, but, in conjunction with the troops of the Government of Lorraine, observe it. When he finds only weak forces in his front, he should at once take the offensive, and move against the enemy's communications. The advance of the IInd and VIIth Corps will suffice to defeat the enemy's projects.

The IInd Army, employed for the moment in offensive operations against Chanzy's army advancing from Le Mans, has left a Division at Orléans, which has posted a detachment at Briare.

APPENDIX CLIX.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN GENERALS V. MANTEUFFEL
AND V. WERDER.

(12th—20th January, 1871.)

No. 1.

Received at H. Q., South Army, 12.1.71.

Despatched Frahier, 6.15 p.m., 12.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon-sur-Seine.
(Arrived there 12th.)

Position Delle, Montbéliard, Héricourt, Lure, completely occupied this day by my Corps, Schmeling's Division and Debschitz's Detachment. At Delle, Montbéliard, with its casemated castle free from escalade, and at Héricourt, the position is strengthened with fortress artillery. Colonel Willisen with 2 battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, and 2 batteries, is posted at Lure, watching Vesoul and the line of the Ognon, and is covering as far as possible the old etappen line Lure—Epinal. My advanced guard is pushed forward to Arcey; the enemy's outposts are facing ours. The march of hostile columns from the Ognon to the east is watched by Colonel Willisen's cavalry. 1st Reserve Division is posted before Belfort to prosecute the siege and protect the siege artillery against sorties.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 2.

Received H. Q., South Army, 13.1.71.

Despatched Frahier 10.40 p.m., 12.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Enemy quiet. According to report from Colonel Willisen, enemy appears to be completing his concentration between the Ognon and the Doubs. Bourbaki reported to be last night at Villersexel, which was strongly occupied. Colonel Willisen retiring before strong hostile forces upon Ronchamp, and I can therefore do nothing for protection of Epinal.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

15th. Desirable that communication be speedily established by the cavalry between my left and your right wing, somewhere about Luxeuil, or perhaps to the southward. This will now have my attention.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.

H. Q., Prauthoy, 8 a.m.

No. 10.

Received H. Q., South Army, 17.1.71.

Despatched Bréville, 9 p.m., 16.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

Enemy to-day attacked my position at all points with varying force and energy, and was repulsed everywhere. General Degenfeld alone evacuated his position at Chenebier before superior forces, and retired to the position in front of Chalonvillars. I am doing everything to regain the Chenebier position. So far as known at present, our losses insignificant.

v. WERDER.

No. 11.

Received H. Q., South Army, 18.1.71.

Despatched Bréville, 9.55 p.m., 17.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

General Keller with eight battalions despatched to Frahier on the night of the 16th—17th. Enemy, surprised at Chenebier before day-break, lost his baggage and four hundred prisoners. Chagey was attacked in the morning repeatedly and vigorously but in vain; Bethoncourt the same at noon; at Montbéliard and west of Luze, brisk cannonade; but the fighting generally was weak and bears the character of a rear-guard action. At 1 o'clock General Keller was attacked by very superior forces, but held his ground in a strong position at Frahier; should the retreat of the enemy be confirmed, I shall at once take the offensive. Our losses in the engagements of the last three days about 1,200 men, of which the majority belong to 2nd and 3rd Baden Brigades. The 15th Corps were engaged at Montbéliard, next on the left came the 20th Corps, then the 24th, including Crémier's Division, and the 18th Corps at Chenebier.* The enemy opposed to General Debschitz is not herein included. I beg your Excellency to tell me where I may expect you. Colonel Willisen will endeavour to communicate with you by way of Luxeuil and St. Loup.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

* With regard to the actual distribution of the French Corps in front of the German position on the Lisaine, see Part II, Vol. II, p. 328, and App. CXXXIX, p. 173§, *et seq.*

No. 12.

Received H. Q. XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71.

Despatched Châtillon, 12.40 a.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

Your Excellency's telegram on the proceedings of yesterday received, and I congratulate you and your brave troops on the three days' glorious struggle. My advanced troops will reach to-morrow the Saône on the line Gray—Scey-sur-Saône, the main body Fontaine Française and Dampierre, ready to advance from those points on the 20th. The direction of advance will depend on the reports I receive from your Excellency in the morning. The VIIth Corps will seek to-morrow connection with Colonel Willisen in the direction of Luxeuil and St. Loup. Telegrams will reach me to-morrow by messenger-posts from Châtillon.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.

H. Q., Prauthoy, 3.30 p.m., 18.1.71.

No. 13.

Received H. Q., South Army, 18.1.71.

Despatched Brévilliers, 9.3 a.m., 18.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

The retirement of the enemy suspected yesterday was confirmed last night. Supposed that his main body moved away on the 17th. Three Divisions, in my opinion, are in front of me, and have established themselves on the heights for defence. Baden Division will concentrate to-day at Frahier and Chenebier, and will attack, on the 19th, Athesans and Villersexel. With a second Division I will advance either through Béverne or Saulnot. Telegram of 7 a.m., 17th, not received this day until 2 a.m.*

(Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 14.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71.

Despatched Châtillon, 10.5 a.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

Telegram of 18th, 9 a.m., received.

I shall be on the 20th with my main forces at Gray and in front, ready to advance against the flank of the retreating enemy, or to intercept his retreat. I beg your Excellency to take the offensive with all available forces, and only to leave sufficient behind to besiege Belfort, so that decisive results may be secured. Telegrams reach me as before through Châtillon.

General Decker will be instructed to provide for the pushing for-

* No. 9.

ward of reserve ammunition.* Railway Nuits—Dijon undergoing repair, and is already open to Nuits.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.
H. Q., Prauthoy, 11.45 p.m., 18.1.71.

No. 15.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71.
Despatched Châtillon, 9 p.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

General v. Moltke has communicated to me his telegram of yesterday to your Excellency, from which it appears that Belfort is besieged by the 1st Reserve Division and Debschitz's Detachment, whilst the XIVth Corps and the 4th Reserve Division are following the retreating foe, and that I am accordingly to provide your Excellency with instructions. This has been already done yesterday. I would only add that it would be well for your Excellency to hold the retreating enemy to the spot as much as possible, so as to give me sufficient time for my flank movement; also, I beg your Excellency to inform me as soon as possible, by telegram or by the shortest way, on which bank of the Doubs, in your judgment, the enemy is retiring with his main force. My headquarters probably to-morrow at Gray.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.
H. Q., Prauthoy, 9.30 a.m., 19.1.71.

No. 16.

Received H. Q., South Army, 19.1.71.
Despatched Brévilliers, 10.5 p.m., 18.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

Retreat of the enemy along the whole line; only rear-guards in front of us this evening.

My advanced guards follow the enemy's rear-guards on the 19th, the main body on the 20th:—Upon Arcey, Schmeling's Division: 7 battalions, 5 batteries, 3 squadrons; upon Saulnot, General Goltz: 6 battalions, 3 batteries, 4 squadrons; upon Béverne, Athesans, and Villersexel, Baden Division: 18 battalions, 9 batteries, 8 squadrons; upon Lure, Colonel Willisen: 2 battalions, 3 batteries, 12 squadrons, of which the infantry and 2 batteries are etappen troops.

For the siege and covering body there remain Tresckow's Division, Debschitz's Detachment, Zimmermann's Brigade of Schmeling's Division: total, 31 battalions, 7 batteries.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

* General v. Decker had been appointed to the command of the artillery in the South Army by Cabinet Order of 11th January. He was at the time in Strassburg, from which place he reached the headquarters of the South Army on 27th January.

No. 17.

Received H. Q., South Army, 20.1.71.

Despatched Bréville, 8.30 p.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Enemy's loss in the three days' fight about 1,500 killed, 3,000 to 4,000 wounded. Prisoners at present upwards of 1,600. The retreat of considerable forces to L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs is reported. My advanced guards are in contact with the enemy at Arcey, at Saulnot, and Lyoffans; 4th Reserve Division reaches Ornans on 20th. General Goltz, St. Ferjeux; 2 Baden Brigades, Athesans, possibly Villersexel; 1 Baden Brigade, Vy-les-Lure. Colonel Willisen, Frotey and Noroy. Corps headquarters on 20th, Saulnot; 21st, Villersexel. Despatches find me on the 20th *via* Bréville, on the 21st *via* Lure. I intend transferring my line of communications from the 23rd by way of Epinal, as that by Senheim and Dannemarie is unfavourable on account of the bad roads. I beg to know if this falls in with your arrangements. From Zimmermann's Brigade I am taking, in addition, four battalions, a battery, and a squadron.*

(Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 18.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 21.1.71.

Despatched Châtillon, 3.15 p.m., 20.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Bréville. To be forwarded.

Gray has been occupied on 19th without resistance. IInd and VIIth Corps advance to-day, the 20th, on the left bank of the Saône to, and to the east of Gray; advanced guards pushed forward to the south. Headquarters to-day at Gray. Propose to continue advance to-morrow, direction will be determined by reports that may meanwhile come in.

For the Commander-in-Chief,

(Signed) COUNT v. WARTENSLEBEN.

Quartermaster-in-Chief.

Fontaine Française, 20.1.71.

Generals Baron v. Manteuffel and v. Werder received in addition from Versailles a number of communications regarding the intended and the completed movements.

* As regards the actual state of affairs with the XIVth Army Corps, see Part II, Vol. II, p. 323-361.

APPENDIX CLX.

Commander-in-Chief, South Army,
H. Q., Châtillon, 5 p.m., 13.1.71.

ARMY ORDER.

The IInd and VIIth Army Corps will commence to-morrow the advance through the Côte d'Or, in order to debouch with the least delay with their main forces on the line Selongey—Longean.

To this end, the IInd Corps is assigned the road Montbard—Chanceaux—Is-sur-Tille; the VIIth, those roads to the north of it.

Unless modifications are necessitated by events, the marches will be made according to the appended table, in which the destinations assigned are those of the main body. The advanced guards, especially in the case of the VIIth Army Corps, are to be pushed forward in order to reach and secure the debouch from the mountains as early as possible. This measure will also secure the debouch of the IInd Army Corps in the event of hostile attacks from Dijon.

To ensure these results, the troops on issuing from the mountains will take all military precautions.

The Army Headquarters march with the right wing column of the VIIth Army Corps. The VIIth Corps will secure the march of its troops and trains against the fortress of Langres.

For the security of the army, its communications and magazines, and of the railway Châtillon—Nuits against the south, a detachment will remain behind under Major-General v. Kettler, consisting of the 8th Infantry Brigade, 2 batteries, and 2 squadrons IInd Army Corps (6 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns). It will, in the first instance, concentrate in the neighbourhood of Montbard, and shape its proceedings in pursuance of the attached instructions. In so doing, it will remain in communication with the 1st Reserve Hussars, which will be placed by the VIIth Corps at the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, and for this purpose will be sent provisionally to Nuits.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL.

MARCHING TABLE.

Corps.	Destination.			
	14th January.	15th January.	16th January.	17th January.
VII TH ARMY CORPS (with the main- body).				
14th Division -	Arc-en-Barrois	Chameroi	Longeau.	
13th „ -	Recey -	Auberive -	Prauthoy.	
II ND ARMY CORPS (with the Heads).	Lucenay- -	Chanceaux -	Courtivron -	Selongey.
Headquarters -	Leuglay* -	Germaine -	Prauthoy.	

Commander-in-Chief South Army,
H. Q., Châtillon, 13.1.71.

INSTRUCTION FOR MAJOR-GENERAL V. KETTLER'S DETACHMENT.

Whilst the army executes its march through the Côte d'Or, or even after its termination, it is not impossible that the enemy may from the south strike a blow at our right flank and communications. These enterprises may be made either by Garibaldi's Corps raiding from Autun, upon which place according to present information it is pivoted, or by the enemy's troops in the neighbourhood of Dijon.

Major-General v. Kettler's duty will be to repulse such attacks to the extent possible with the force at his disposal; he is not debarred from making short offensive movements, which in certain cases may be advisable. His principal duty will be to keep watch upon Garibaldi's Corps, and by means of reconnaissances discover as far as possible its position, strength, and movements.

The army, moreover, will take care to select its line of communications across the Côte d'Or in such wise that it may be protected both on the side of Langres and towards the south; on the other hand, the magazine at Châtillon and the railway Châtillon—Nuits will be considered as objects of special care for General v. Kettler's detachment. With this object he will open communication with the 1st Reserve Hussars, now at the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army at Nuits, and will, if necessary, co-operate with it.

If, contrary to expectation, the detachment is pressed by very superior forces, it will first hold Châtillon as long as possible; and, if

* As a matter of fact the headquarters proceeded to Boulaire on 14th January.

necessary, retire along the Châtillon—Blesme Railway in order, together with the Government and etappen troops posted on the railway, to protect it. Reinforced by these troops, it will resume the offensive, or re-establish connection with the army through the country north of Langres.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,
Commander-in-Chief.

APPENDIX CLXI.

Commander-in-Chief South Army,
H. Q., Fontaine Française, 6 p.m., 19.1.71.

General v. Werder having in a three days' struggle on the 15th, 16th, and 17th instant, repulsed all attacks directed against his position in front of Belfort by the army of Bourbaki, consisting of the 15th, 18th, 20th, 24th (and probably the 25th) Army Corps, the retreat of the enemy, suspected on the evening of the 17th, has been meanwhile confirmed. Apparently the main bodies of the enemy have already moved off in marching columns on the 17th, whilst in front of General v. Werder there still remained on the 18th about three Divisions as rear guards in defensive positions. No information has been received whether the enemy's retreat has taken place entirely in the district between the Saône and Doubs, or if he has also utilised the ground between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier. General v. Werder reports that he will this day assume the offensive with his advanced guards, and on the 20th will follow with his main body in the main direction of Villersexel, and I have requested him to employ for this operation all the forces available without raising the siege of Belfort.

With the part of the army under my immediate orders I will either advance against the flank of the retreating enemy or meet him directly in front. To this end the following movements will be carried out.

The IInd Corps will concentrate its main body at Gray, chiefly on the left flank of the Saône, and reconnoitre along the roads leading to Besançon; its advanced guard pushed forward to Pesmes. The portion of the Corps remaining at Thil Châtel will be called in by it by way of Mirebeau. A post of suitable strength will be left at Thil Châtel for the purpose of watching Dijon, and for the transmission of orders to General v. Kettler.

The VIIth Corps will, with its left wing, connect itself by way of Vesoul with General v. Werder's troops advancing between the Saône and Ognon. It will cross the Saône in the neighbourhood of Autet and Savoyeux, for which purpose at least one additional means of passage will be constructed; it will move its main body to the district about Sauvigney—Citey, &c., the advanced guard being pushed towards Besançon, thereby guarding and reconnoitring in the direction of Rioz. In order that the movement of the troops may not be impeded, the trains, so far as they can be dispensed with, will remain to-morrow on the right bank of the Saône. The directions of Langres and Dijon will continue to be watched, the former by the VIIth, the latter by the IInd Corps. The road from Gray by way of Choye to Besançon will serve as a line of demarcation between the IInd and VIIth Corps; in the event of the Corps coming here into contact, the villages situated on it will belong to the VIIth Corps. My headquarters will be transferred to-morrow to Gray.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,
Commander-in-Chief.

APPENDIX CLXII.

Commander-in-Chief South Army,
H. Q., Gray, 5 p.m., 20.1.71.

ARMY ORDER.

The army will continue the march to-morrow towards the Doubs, the IInd Army Corps in the general direction of Dôle, the VIIth upon Dampierre.

The IInd Army Corps will concentrate its main body on the Ognon in the neighbourhood of Pesmes and Montmirey. The advanced guard which should be pushed forward upon Dôle will make an attempt upon the railway there, if possible at the junction, and upon the telegraph line, in order to sever the enemy's communications with Lyons, and at the same time secure the debouch across the Doubs for their own troops. General v. Hann's detachment* is to be called in; it will then be charged with the duty, if necessary, of watching towards the fortress of Auxonne. The corps will further keep in view the observation of Dijon, as well as the maintenance of the connection with General v. Kettler, who has been instructed to move to-morrow upon Dijon.

Gray will remain occupied, so as to secure the passage of the Saône at that point.

The VIIth Army Corps will proceed to the neighbourhood of Marnay—Audeux, guard itself towards Besançon, push an advanced guard towards Dampierre, with the van if possible to the Doubs, in order to reconnoitre it more particularly in respect to the bridges, and where possible to secure them. A rear guard will remain facing Rioz, opening communication with Général v. Werder.

The railway Gray—Dampierre will form the line of demarcation between the IInd and VIIth Corps. The disposition of the trains is left to the Corps.

My headquarters proceed to-morrow to Pesmes.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,
Commander-in-Chief.

Commander-in-Chief South Army,
H. Q., Gray, 21.1.71.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL BARON v. MANTEUFFEL TO GENERAL v. WERDER.

Your Excellency will have observed from the copy you have received of my orders to the Generals commanding the IInd and VIIth Corps, that I purpose, with the troops here, to cut off the suspected retreat of the enemy in the direction of Besançon on Lyons, and sever as soon as possible the communications with the last-named

* See text, *ante*, pp. 12 and 16.

fortress, whilst the offensive movement of your Excellency already commenced will at the same time detain the hostile rear guards, and retard thereby the retreat of the main body. It is not at present clear whether the enemy's main forces are to be expected on the right or on the left bank of the Doubs; but I am inclined to think the left, as no report of a collision has at present reached me from my left wing (VIIth Corps), while in a southerly direction the advanced guard of the IInd Corps has, during its march yesterday, fought an action with some gardes mobiles and franc-tireurs at Pesmes, who wished to dispute there the passage of the Ognon. This view is confirmed by your Excellency's telegram of the morning of the 20th.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances of your Excellency's position to be able to give you direct orders. I count upon your Excellency remaining at the heels of the enemy, following him wherever his main forces retire, seeking and maintaining with your right wing connection with me, as I am similarly doing with my left wing as regards you, and sending me frequent reports. Your Excellency will be good enough, so soon as circumstances permit, to send me Colonel v. Willisen's detachment, or, at any rate, his cavalry and artillery, by forced marches through Pesmes, as, in consequence here of the deficiency of available cavalry, I am in urgent need of it in order to operate against the enemy's communications.

From the position Pesmes—Marnay—Dampierre—Dôle occupied on the 21st, and which secures the passages of the Ognon and Doubs, I shall make reconnaissances towards the Lons-le-Saunier road, the shortest line of march between Belfort and Lyons; the result of these may influence my further dispositions.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,
Commander-in-Chief.



APPENDIX CLXIII.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the French Army of the Vosges (some 20,000 men)
(Middle of January, 1871).

Commander: General Garibaldi.
Chief of General Staff: General Bordon.

1ST BRIGADE: General Bossack-Hanke.

Eclaireurs de Gray.
Chasseurs Egyptiens.
Franc tireurs du Midi.
Franc tireurs du Rhône.
1st Garde-Mobile Battalion: Alpes Maritimes.
42nd Garde Mobile Regiment: Aveyron.

2ND BRIGADE: Colonel Lobbia.

1st Battalion Egalité de Marseilles.
2nd Battalion Egalité de Marseilles.
Guerrilla Marseillaise.
Guerrilla Française d'Orient.
One Garde Mobile Battalion.
Eclaireurs à Cheval.

3RD BRIGADE: General Menotti Garibaldi.

2nd Battalion Garde Mobile Alpes Maritimes.
One Battalion Garde Mobile Basses Alpes.
One Battalion Garde Mobile Basses Pyrénées.
Légion de Volontaires Italiens.
Légion de Chasseurs des Alpes.
Bataillon des Franc tireurs réunis.
Compagnie d'Oran.
Compagnie Franc tireurs Franks-comtois.
Compagnie de Vaucluse.
Compagnie d'Alger.

4TH BRIGADE: Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi.

Chasseurs des Alpes.
2 Companies Chasseurs Dauphinois.
Franc tireurs des Vosges.
Franc tireurs de Dôle.
Eclaireurs du Doubs.
Chasseurs du Havre.
Bataillon Nicolaï.
Franc tireurs Toulousains.
Franc tireurs de l'Aveyron.

Chasseurs du Montblanc.
 Chasseurs Republicains de la Loire.
 Compagnie des Eclaireurs de l'Allier.
 Compagnie du Gers.
 Compagnie de la Croix de Nice.
 Volontaires de Loir et Cher.
 Eclaireurs de Caprera.
 Franc tireurs du Croissant.
 Les Enfants perdus de la Montagne.
 Compagnie des petites Mitrailleuses.
 Franc tireurs de la Côte d'Or.

5TH BRIGADE (in formation) : Colonel Canzio.

Carabiniers Génois.
 Légion Italienne, dite de Marsalla.
 Compagnie Espagnole.
 Compagnie Franco-Espagnole.

Separate corps.

Franc tireurs de la Mort.
 Compagnie de la Revanche.
 Bataillon des Enfants perdus de Paris.
 Pontoniers du Rhône.
 Alsaciens de Paris.
 Compagnie de Colmar.
 Recruiting dépôt.

Beside these :—

The Garde Nationale Mobile of the Isère (*see* Pelissier's Division) :

Artillery : 7 batteries with 42 guns.
 Cavalry : Detachment of mounted Chasseurs (7th Chasseurs).
 Hussar squadron.
 Guides squadron.
 Eclaireurs de Rhône.
 Guides de Châtillon.

and, later, 4 squadrons 11th Regiment *de marche*.

STRENGTH OF GENERAL PELISSIER'S DIVISION AT DIJON.*
 (17th January, 1871.)

Garde Nationale Mobile : Jura	7,188 men.
Saône.. ..	8,900 "
Loire†	1,100 "
Ain	2,100 "
Haute Savoie ..	1,144 "
Isère‡	2,300 "
Total	22,732

Total of Garibaldi's Force in the latter half of January, 48,000 men. (*See* Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 412.)

* See Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports, Versailles, 1874. Vol. II, pp. 689, 690, 694, and 754.

† At Auxonne.

‡ Attached to the Vosges Army.

APPENDIX CLXIV

ORDRE GÉNÉRAL DE MOUVEMENT POUR LE 18 ET LE 19 JANVIER.

Aibre, le 17 Janvier, 1871.

1^{re} Armée.

Au Grand Quartier-Général.

Le 18^e Corps d'Armée et la Division Crémer qui jusqu'à nouvel ordre est sous la direction du Général Billot viendront occuper les villages de Coisevaux et de Champey, la droite dans les bois communaux entre Coisevaux et Verlans, et la gauche dans les bois de Saulnot que le Général Billot fera surveiller avec beaucoup de soin.

Le 18^e Corps s'appuiera ainsi par la droite sur le 20^e Corps.

Le 20^e Corps rappellera la Division Polignac qui est à Coisevaux et s'établira à Trémoins et sur le plateau de Tavey, ayant sa droite dans les bois du Chanois. Il est bien entendu que la Division Polignac ne devra exécuter son mouvement que lorsqu'elle aura été relevée par une division du 18^e Corps.

Le 24^e Corps conservera sa position en avant de Laire, sa gauche au bois du Chanois et sa droite occupant fortement le bois de Montévillars.

Le 15^e Corps occupera fortement sur sa gauche, en se reliant avec le 24^e, le Bois Bourgeois, le Mont Chevis, repliera sa droite qui est devant Montbéliard et occupera militairement toute l'arête qui est devant le Mont Chevis du côté de Bart et que traverse la route de Dung à Montbéliard.

Il fera exécuter sur toute cette position des travaux défensifs, de manière à pouvoir garantir au moins son artillerie.

Le commandant du 15^e Corps fera en outre reconnaître avec soin, pour l'occuper au besoin, la position défensive qui se trouve sur la rive droite du ruisseau le Rupt, s'appuyant à droite sur le Mont Bart et à gauche sur les hauteurs qui dominent Allondans. La gauche sur cette position serait sur la rive gauche du Rupt, sur le plateau qui est entre Allondans et Issans, lequel s'appuie lui-même sur le bois dit de Dessus. Cette gauche par laquelle on se relie avec le 24^e Corps devra être défendue à tout prix, en cas d'attaque de l'ennemi.

La réserve générale de l'armée, sous les ordres du Général Pallu, viendra s'établir à Semondans, Désandans, et Echenans.

Demain, dans la journée ou pendant la nuit, si c'est nécessaire, après avoir fait les distributions de vivres et renouvelé autant que possible les munitions, on mettra en route tous les convois et les parcs, les corps d'armée ne gardant avec eux que l'artillerie de combat.

Les convois et les parcs devront toujours être tenus à une journée de marche en arrière. Les commandants des corps d'armée donneront

à leurs intendants les instructions nécessaires pour laisser sur des points désignés à l'avance le nombre de voitures suffisant pour faire les distributions de la journée ; dès que ces distributions seront faites, ces voitures iront rejoindre le reste du convoi.

Après demain, 19, l'armée ira occuper les positions suivantes :—

Le 15^e Corps suivant la route qui longe le Doubs s'établira sur les hauteurs en avant de Beutal, sa droite au Doubs et sa gauche au lieu dit le Compas, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la lisière du bois du Bouloy.

Le 24^e Corps passant par Rainans, St. Julien, Ste. Marie et Montenois, viendra s'établir à Bretigney, Faimbe et la Guinguette, le Mont Tuchot et les bois du Cédrier, du Clochet et du Combollet.

Le 20^e Corps, suivant la grande route jusqu'au delà de Arcey, occupera Onans et Marvelise, c'est-à-dire les positions qui sont à l'est de ces points jusques et y compris les bois communaux qui sont entre Marvelise et Gonvillars.

Le 18^e Corps, passant par Saulnot d'un côté et le Vernois et Chavanne de l'autre, ira s'établir à Crevans, Secenans, et Vellechevreux.

La réserve générale de l'armée ira à Geney.

Il est bien entendu que lorsqu'un village est indiqué pour l'emplacement des troupes d'un corps d'armée, ce n'est pas le village qui doit être occupé, mais la position militaire qui le commande.

Pendant ce mouvement de retraite, le génie militaire marchera aux arrière-gardes pour exécuter les travaux nécessaires.

Le génie civil sera en avant d'une journée de marche pour préparer et pour réunir les ressources des habitants et exécuter des travaux des défense et préparer si c'est nécessaire, les moyens de destruction des ouvrages d'art.

Les commandants des corps d'armée donneront au génie civil et militaire toutes les instructions qu'ils jugeront convenables pour l'accomplissement de leur mission.

Dans les ordres de marche des corps d'armée, on devra indiquer le nombre et la nature des troupes qui seront chargées de faire l'arrière-garde, et le départ des troupes devra être calculé de manière à ce que ces arrière-gardes puissent se mettre en route toute en même temps à 8 heures du matin. Ces arrière-gardes devront chercher à se relier le plus possible et à se soutenir mutuellement. Les commandants de ces arrière-gardes auront avec eux, au moins un peloton de cavalerie, de façon à pouvoir correspondre rapidement avec leur voisin et à s'éclairer sur leurs derrières. Si ces arrière-gardes sont obligées de s'arrêter pour attendre celles des corps voisins, elles devront s'établir dans de bonnes positions militaires.

Afin d'éviter la longueur des colonnes, on profitera de tous les chemins parallèles que présente le pays, et toutes les fois que cela sera possible, on fera marcher l'infanterie sur les flancs de la route, laissant cette dernière à la disposition de l'artillerie.

Les commandants de corps d'armée feront commencer dès cette nuit le mouvement de leurs convois et des parcs ; ils profiteront des voitures vides pour l'évacuation des blessés et ne conserveront que ce qui est nécessaire pour les distributions de semaine.

Les prévôts de divers corps d'armée partiront avec les convois dont ils sont chargés de régler l'ordre et la régularité, service qui a laissé beaucoup à désirer jusqu'à présent.

Par ordre : le Général Chef d'État-Major Général,

(Signé) BOREL.

P.S.—Le Général Commandant-en-Chef recommande de la manière la plus formelle d'exécuter tous les jours sur les positions que les troupes occuperont des travaux de défense sévères.

Par ordre:

(Signé) BOREL.

A counter-order again changed the arrangements made for the 19th. The Army retired that day further to the rear. The order, however, shows in what manner the retreat was devised.

APPENDIX CLXV.

Commander-in-Chief South Army.

H. Q., La Barre, 24.1.71.

According to the reports received, the situation to-day is as follows:—

The XIVth Army Corps (including 11 battalions of the 4th Reserve Division) ought to have reached yesterday the line Montbozon—Glainans, and, according to the intentions communicated, may be expected to-day on both banks of the Doubs abreast of Baume-les-Dames. The Baden Division, advancing on the right wing, is endeavouring to open communication by way of Rioz with the VIIth Corps.

Before Belfort and in that neighbourhood are posted the 1st Reserve Division, Debschitz's detachment, and part of the 4th Reserve Division; the approaches against Fort La Perche are opened along the line Danjoutin—Pérouse.

The VIIth Army Corps, after a brief engagement, captured yesterday the cross-roads at Quingey, and will secure the possession of this point by defensive works, the front of which will be towards Besançon. The Corps is established on the line Quingey—Dampierre; on the right bank of the Doubs its line of outposts Danne-marie—Routelle faces Besançon. A detachment on the Ognon watches the road from Besançon to Gray, and assures the connection with the XIVth Corps.

The IInd Army Corps is marching with three brigades from Dôle to Villers Farlay, and will this day stand echeloned between the latter town and Nevy-les-Dôle. A fourth brigade (Colonel Knesebeck) secures towards Auxonne and Besançon the line Dôle—Gray, on which it stands echeloned.

Willisen's Cavalry Brigade, detached from the XIVth Army Corps, advances also into this neighbourhood; it is this day on the march from Frasnay by way of Bonboillon to Pesmes.

Further in rear stands Major-General v. Kettler's mixed brigade; it has an independent mission to guard the communications between Montbard and Dijon.

Bourbaki's army (15th, 18th, 20th, 24th, and probably the 25th Corps), the losses of which in three days' fighting before Belfort and subsequently are estimated at 10,000 men, has directed its main line of retreat upon Besançon, and has almost entirely passed to the left bank of the Doubs. It still occupied, the day before yesterday, Baume-les-Dames and Clerval in force; comparatively strong bodies of troops have also been left in the neighbourhood of Blamont, and to the north of it (towards Delle and Montbéliard); bodies of stragglers were met with yesterday at Vesoul. It is not yet known how far the heads of the enemy's main army have progressed along the roads between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier.

The actions fought by the IInd and VIIth Army Corps on the

21st, 22nd and 23rd, appear at present to have been chiefly against the Besançon garrison, gardes mobiles and franc-tireurs. In these engagements considerable quantities of stores have been captured, and, by the occupation of Dôle and Quingey, the nearest line of retreat through Lons-le-Saunier to Lyons is barred, while traffic has been stopped by blowing up the bridges along both railways leading from Besançon to Lyons. General v. Kettler's reconnaissance towards Dijon on the 21st has, during a sanguinary contest, in which we captured 500 prisoners, showed the strength of Garibaldi's Corps at not less than 25,000 men, and a position armed with twenty heavy guns.

In the supposition that the XIVth Army Corps will to-morrow (the 25th), after leaving Baume-les-Dames, gain by a short day's march some ground towards Besançon, the following are the main hypotheses that would have to be considered:—

- (1.) The enemy continues his retreat to the southward, and, as the road by Villers Farlay is barred, by the roads leading between Villers Farlay and Pontarlier. The IInd and VIIth Corps will then be ready to strike him in the flank with advanced guards, or bar his road with flying columns.
- (2.) The enemy endeavours to break through by way of Quingey and Dampierre. The VIIth Corps will in that case stand with a Division on each bank of the Doubs ready to resist the first attack, whilst the IInd on both banks of the Doubs would be able to take part from the rear, according to circumstances.

In both eventualities, (1) and (2), the XIVth Corps would press vigorously from the north upon the enemy's rearguards.

- (3.) The enemy debouches from, or by way of, Besançon upon Pesmes and Gray, in order probably to extend a hand to Garibaldi's Corps at Dijon. For this purpose the enemy has at his disposal the three main roads leading from Besançon, through Audeux, Pin, and Etuz. In this case all the nearest troops, 14th Division, Knesebeck's Brigade would advance against the left, the Baden Division against the right flank of the marching columns and hold them fast, whilst the other troops, wholly or partly, according to circumstances, would join this movement or hem them in right and left.
- (4.) The enemy again shows front towards the XIVth Army Corps. In this event the IInd and VIIth Corps will take part in the action from the south.
- (5.) Should the enemy retire to the Swiss frontier, all three Corps would at once follow this movement with advanced guards, and later, with the whole army also if necessary, force the enemy to give battle or to cross the frontier.
- (6.) The enemy concentrates at Besançon and awaits our attack. In this case the subsistence of the South Army must probably be assured for a longer time than is the case under the present circumstances of the enemy, and therefore the army will not be required to attack strong positions situated perhaps under the protection of the fortress; on the contrary it might await the enemy's attack.

In the existing circumstances, where the three Corps cannot well

support one another directly, even if it were not also desirable, I have not thought it well to omit bringing thus to your Excellency's notice my views as to the situation, so that at all times you may be able to make your dispositions in the desired way, before receiving any orders, in case the circumstances may require a prompt decision.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,

Commander-in-Chief.

To Generals v. Zastrow, v. Fransecky, and v. Werder.

APPENDIX CLXVI.

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE WAR MINISTRY
AND GENERAL BOURBAKI.

(Afternoon of 24th January.)

1.

Bordeaux, 24 Janvier, 1871, 1 h. 59 soir.

Guerre de Bordeaux, à Général Bourbaki, Besançon.

Je crois qu'il serait extrêmement dangereux pour vous de demeurer autour de Besançon où le mieux qui pourrait vous arriver serait d'être désormais paralysé. Il faut à tout prix sortir de cette situation et effectuer, par voie de terre, avec le 15^e, 18^e, et 20^e Corps, le trajet que vous deviez effectuer en chemin de fer. Ainsi, il faut, avec les forces que j'indique, gagner le plus vite possible Nevers, ou mieux encore, la région Auxerre, Joigny, Tonnerre. Vous trouverez dans cette région une vingtaine de mille hommes que j'y ai déjà disposé pour vous y recevoir.

Dans quelle direction précise devrez-vous faire ce mouvement? C'est à vous naturellement de la déterminer, d'après la position de l'ennemi et les conditions du théâtre de la guerre. Mais il faudrait faire en sorte que ce mouvement profitât à reprendre Dôle, protéger Dijon et débarrasser nos communications ferrées au-dessus de Besançon.

Quant au corps de Crémier et de Bressolles, vous auriez soin de leur assigner de bonnes positions, pour protéger votre propre mouvement.

Je répète, en terminant, qu'il faut vous hâter et que votre grand intérêt est, si je ne me trompe, de vous retirer, à tout prix, avec les trois corps sus-indiqués.

(Signé) DE FREYCINET.

2.

Besançon, 24 Janvier, 1871, 7 h. 50 soir.

Général Bourbaki, Besançon, à Guerre, Bordeaux.

Quand vous serez mieux informé, vous regretterez le reproche de lenteur que vous me faites. Les hommes sont exténués de fatigue, les chevaux aussi. Je n'ai jamais perdu une heure, ni pour aller, ni pour revenir.

Je viens de voir tous les commandants de corps d'armée; ils sont d'avis que nous prenions les routes de Pontarlier; c'est la seule direction que l'état moral et physique de nos troupes nous permette

de prendre. Vous ne vous faites pas une idée des souffrances que l'armée a endurées depuis le commencement du Décembre. J'avais envoyé une division en chemin de fer, pour s'emparer de Quingey et Mouchard, une autre à Busy, les deux commandées par le Général Martineau. Elles se sont repliées. Pendant que j'ai visité aujourd'hui les troupes de la rive droite du Doubs, le Général Borel est allé placer lui-même à Busy celles du 15^e Corps, pour les maintenir sur les positions et faire occuper les ponts de la Loue les plus voisins. Entre Dôle, Quingey et Mouchard, il y a deux corps d'armée ennemis, le 2^e et 7^e. Demain je compte faire partir le plus vite possible trois divisions pour occuper les positions dont nous avons besoin et l'entrée de Pontarlier. Si ce plan ne vous convient pas, je ne sais vraiment que faire. Soyez sûr que c'est un martyre d'exercer un commandement en ce moment. J'avais prescrit au Général Bressolles de garder le plateau de Blamont et les hanteurs de Lomont ; de laisser un poste à Clerval pour empêcher le rétablissement des ponts et d'affecter une division avec les mobilisés à cette mission. J'apprends à l'instant que ces positions sont abandonnées et j'ordonne de les reprendre.

Si vous croyez qu'un de mes commandants un corps d'armée puisse faire mieux que moi, n'hésitez pas, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, à me remplacer, soit par Billot, soit par Clinchant ou Martineau. Ne comptez pas sur le service des troupes de Bressolles. Je n'y ai jamais compté. La tâche est au-dessus de mes forces.

(Signé) BOURBAKI.



APPENDIX CLXVII.

ORDRE GÉNÉRAL DE MOUVEMENT POUR LE 25 JANVIER, 1871.

Au Grand Quartier Général à Besançon, le 24 Janvier, 1871.

La 1^{re} et la 2^e Division du 15^e Corps conserveront leurs positions à Busy, Chenecey, moulin de Courcelles et aux forges de Châtillon pour garder ces passages.

Le 3^e Division (Peytavin) occupera demain matin Ornans, les hauteurs de Scey en Varais et les hauteurs d'Epeugney près de Cléron pour surveiller et défendre au besoin les passages de la Loue qui existent sur ces points. La rive droite de la rivière sera observée et occupée; l'artillerie sera mise en batterie sur toutes les positions qu'elle jugera convenables à son action. Les travaux défensifs seront exécutés et des reconnaissances poussées sur la rive gauche.

La réserve d'artillerie du 15^e Corps montera à Pugey, pour s'y établir. La cavalerie du 15^e Corps passera la Loue à Cléron et à Ornans, poussera des reconnaissances sur Coulans, Eternoz, Déservillers, Reugney, Amathay et Longeville, prendra, si c'est possible, ses cantonnements dans ces villages, ainsi que dans celui de Bolandoz qui est à peu près au centre des points à reconnaître.

La réserve générale de l'armée, la division Crémier et une des divisions du 20^e Corps se mettront en route dans les conditions suivantes :—

- (1.) La réserve générale passera le Doubs sur le pont de Velotte, montera par Arguel et Pugey sur le plateau, suivra l'ancienne route de Besançon à Pontarlier par Mérey et Villers et se rendra par Ornans à Chantrans, Silley et Flagey où elle se cantonnera.
- (2.) La division Crémier passera le pont de Velotte, suivra la même route que la réserve jusqu'à Pugey et à partir de ce point, elle se dirigera sur Cléron, en passant par Epeugney; elle prendra toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour pouvoir déboucher facilement le lendemain, soit sur Amancey, soit sur Ornans, d'après les renseignements.
- (3.) La division du 20^e Corps désignée par le Général Clinchant, franchira le Doubs sur les ponts de Besançon qu'elle aura soin de faire reconnaître à l'avance; elle s'engagera sur la route d'Étalans, en passant par Morre, Mamirolle et l'Hôpital et couchera à Etalans; ces trois colonnes auront soin de s'éclairer au loin, de se tenir, autant que possible, en relation entre elles. Elles seront placées sous le commandement supérieur du Général Crémier; elles seront suivies à 7 ou 8 kilomètres en arrière par leurs convois légers. Le convoi de la réserve d'abord et celui de la division Crémier ensuite, ne franchiront les ponts de Velotte qu'après le passage de la division Crémier. Toutes les précautions militaires seront prises pour protéger le passage du Doubs et le dissimuler le mieux possible à l'ennemi.

Le 18^e et 20^e Corps l'Armée prendront telles mesures qu'ils jugeront convenables, pour conserver leurs positions actuelles, malgré le départ de ces trois colonnes, sans laisser de points vulnérables dans la ligne occupée par eux. Ils se tiendront prêts à faire mouvement dans l'après-midi ou la soirée.

Le 20^e Corps continuera toujours à garder le pont de Chalèze qui devra être détruit après le passage de ce corps sur la rive gauche.

Le Général Clinchant aura soin d'envoyer à cet effet au Capitaine du Génie Maillard qui est de service sur le point, un ordre écrit qui prescrira la destruction de cet ouvrage.

Les 18^e et 20^e Corps ne feront mouvement que sur un nouvel ordre ; il en sera de même pour les grands convois.

Les colonnes qui se mettent en marche demain devront être précédées par des avant-gardes qui seront chargées de fouiller le terrain, avant de laisser s'engager ces colonnes. On fera des distributions nécessaires pour que les corps soient alignés en vivres, autant que possible jusqu'au 29 inclus. Le 18^e Corps qui a demandé 30 chevaux pour son artillerie ainsi que le 20^e Corps qui en a demandé 40, les feront prendre à Saint-Ferjeux, s'ils ne l'ont déjà fait.

Le Grand Quartier Général reste à Besançon.

Le Général Martineau qui est à Pugey se renseignera sur l'état de l'ancienne route de Besançon à Ornans, qui doit être suivie par la réserve générale. Dans le cas où cette route ne serait pas praticable à l'artillerie et aux convois, il aurait à faire prévenir M. le Général Pallu de faire passer son artillerie et son convoi par Epeugney, Cademène, Scey-en-Varais, et Maisières. Toutefois cette artillerie et son convoi ne doivent s'engager dans la partie du chemin qui se trouve au fond de la Loue, qu'après s'être bien assurés qu'Ornans et Cléron sont occupés par nous. Enfin, dans le cas où cette partie de la route serait jugée dangereuse, l'artillerie et le convoi devront à partir d'Epeugney passer par Montrond, Mérey, Viliers, et Tarcenay pour aller rejoindre la grande route d'Ornans.

Le Général Crémier devra de sa personne se rendre à Ornans, pour décider, d'après les renseignements, des dispositions à prendre et de la possibilité de l'occupation de la rive gauche de la Loue par les troupes de la réserve.

Par ordre :

(Signé) BOREL,

Général Chef d'État-Major Général,
Général Commandant-en-Chef.

APPENDIX CLXVIII.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL CLINCHANT TO GENERAL THORNTON
COMMANDING AT CHAFFOIS.

Un armistice de 21 jours a été signé le 27 ; j'en ai reçu ce soir la nouvelle officielle. En conséquence faites cesser le feu et informez l'ennemi, suivant les formes voulues à la guerre, que l'armistice existe et que vous êtes chargé de le porter à sa connaissance.

Pontarlier, 29 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé) CLINCHANT,
Général Commandant-en-Chef.

This despatch was based on the following telegrams :—

1.

Bordeaux, le 29 Janvier, 1871, 12 h. 30 (midi 30).

Délégation du Gouvernement à Préfets et Sous-Préfets, Circulaire.

La délégation du Gouvernement établie à Bordeaux, qui n'avait jusqu'ici sur les négociations entamées à Versailles, que des renseignements fournis par la presse étrangère, a reçu cette nuit le télégramme suivant qu'elle porte à la connaissance du pays dans sa teneur intégrale :

“ Dépêche télégraphique.

“ Versailles, 28 Janvier, 1871, 11 h. 15 soir.

“ Nous signons aujourd'hui un traité avec Monsieur le Comte de Bismarck. Un armistice de vingt-et-un jours est convenu, une assemblée est convoquée à Bordeaux pour le 15 Février.

“ Faites connaître cette nouvelle à toute la France. Faites exécuter l'armistice et convoquez les électeurs pour le 8 Février.

“ Un membre du Gouvernement va partir pour Bordeaux.

“ JULES FAVRE.”

Un décret qui sera ultérieurement publié fera connaître les mesures prises pour assurer l'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus.

Pour copie conforme :

(Signé) CL. LAURIER.

2.

Circulaire de Bordeaux, le 29 Janvier, 1871, 3 h. 30 soir.

Guerre à Généraux commandant
Divisions et Subdivisions.

Un armistice de vingt-un jours vient d'être conclu par le Gouvernement de Paris. Veuillez, en conséquence, suspendre immé-

diatement les hostilités, en vous concertant avec le chef des forces ennemies, en présence desquelles vous pouvez vous trouver.

Vous vous conformerez aux règles pratiques suivies en pareil cas. Les lignes des avant-postes respectifs des forces en présence, sont déterminées sur-le-champ et avec précision par l'indication des localités, accidents de terrain et autres points de repère. Le procès-verbal constatant cette délimitation est échangé et signé des deux Commandants-en-Chef ou de leurs représentants. Aucun mouvement des armées en avant des lignes ainsi déterminées, ne peut être effectué pendant toute la durée de l'armistice. Il en est de même du ravitaillement et de tout ce qui est nécessaire à la conservation de l'armée, qui ne peut non plus s'effectuer en avant des dites lignes.

Donnez également des instructions aux franc-tireurs. Afin d'éviter toute difficulté ultérieure, je vous invite instamment à faire apporter la plus grande précision dans la rédaction des procès-verbaux et dans la réunion des éléments qui leur servent de bases.

S'il surgissait quelque difficulté imprévue, sur laquelle vous jugeriez bon d'être éclairci, référez-m'en par dépêche *d'extrême urgence* en gagnant le temps nécessaire dans les négociations.

(Signé) C. DE FREYCINET.

APPENDIX CLXIX.

Entre Monsieur le Général Herzog, Général-en-Chef de l'Armée de la Confédération Suisse, et Monsieur le Général de Division Clinchant, Général-en-Chef de la 1^{re} Armée Française, il a été fait les Conventions suivantes :—

- (1.) L'Armée Française demandant à passer sur le territoire Suisse, déposera en y pénétrant, ses armes, équipements, et munitions.
- (2.) Ces armes, équipements, et munitions seront restitués à la France après la paix et après le règlement définitif des dépenses occasionnées à la Suisse par le séjour des troupes Françaises.
- (3.) Il en sera de même pour le matériel d'artillerie et ses munitions.
- (4.) Les chevaux, armes, et effets des officiers seront laissés à leur disposition.
- (5.) Des dispositions ultérieures seront prises à l'égard des chevaux de troupe.
- (6.) Les voitures de vivres et de bagages, après avoir déposé leur contenu, retourneront immédiatement en France avec leurs conducteurs et leurs chevaux.
- (7.) Les voitures du trésor et des postes seront remises avec tout leur contenu à la Confédération Helvétique, qui en tiendra compte lors du règlement des dépenses.
- (8.) L'exécution de ces dispositions aura lieu en présence d'officiers Français et Suisses désignés à cet effet.
- (9.) La Confédération se réserve la désignation des lieux d'internement pour les officiers et pour la troupe.
- (10.) Il appartient au Conseil Fédéral d'indiquer les prescriptions de détail destinées à compléter la présente Convention.

Fait en triple expédition aux Verrières, le 1^{er} Février, 1871.

(Signé) CLINCHANT.
(Signé) HANS HERZOG, Général.

APPENDIX CLXX.

Les Soussignés, munis des pouvoirs en vertu desquels ils ont conclu la Convention du 28 Janvier, considérant que par la dite Convention il était réservé à une entente ultérieure de faire cesser les opérations militaires dans les Départements du Doubs, du Jura, et de la Côte d'Or, et devant Belfort, et de tracer la ligne de démarcation entre l'occupation Allemande et les positions de l'Armée Française à partir de Quarré les Tombes dans le Département de l'Yonne, ont conclu la Convention additionnelle suivante :—

Article I.

La forteresse de Belfort sera rendue au Commandant de l'Armée de Siège avec le matériel de guerre faisant partie de l'armement de la place.

La garnison de Belfort sortira de la place avec les honneurs de la guerre, en conservant les armes, les équipages, et le matériel de guerre appartenant à la troupe ainsi que les archives militaires.

Les Commandants de Belfort et de l'Armée de Siège se mettront d'accord sur l'exécution des stipulations qui précèdent, ainsi que sur les détails qui n'y sont pas prévus, et sur la direction et les étapes dans lesquelles la garnison de Belfort rejoindra l'Armée Française au delà de la ligne de démarcation.

Article II.

Les prisonniers Allemands se trouvant à Belfort, seront mis en liberté.

Article III.

La ligne de démarcation arrêtée jusqu'au point où se touchent les trois Départements de l'Yonne, de la Nièvre, et de la Côte d'Or, sera continuée le long de la limite méridionale du Département de la Côte d'Or, jusqu'au point où le chemin de fer qui de Nevers par Autun et Chagny conduit à Châlon-sur-Saône, franchit la limite du dit département. Ce chemin de fer restera en dehors de l'occupation Allemande de manière que la ligne de démarcation, en se tenant à la distance d'un kilomètre de la ligne ferrée, rejoindra la limite méridionale du Département de la Côte d'Or à l'est de Chagny et suivra la limite qui sépare le Département de Saône et Loire des Départements de la Côte d'Or et du Jura. Après avoir traversé la route qui conduit de Louhans à Lons-le-Saunier, elle quittera la limite départementale à la hauteur du village de Mallerey, d'où elle se continuera de manière à couper le chemin de fer de Lons-le-Saunier à Bourg à une distance de 11 kilomètres sud de Lons-le-Saunier, se dirigeant de là sur le pont de l'Ain sur la route de Clairvaux d'où elle suivra la limite nord de l'arrondissement de St. Claude jusqu'à la frontière Suisse.

Article IV.

La forteresse de Besançon conservera un rayon de 10 kilomètres à la disposition de sa garnison. La place forte d'Auxonne sera entourée d'un terrain neutre de 3 kilomètres à l'intérieur duquel la circulation sur les chemins de fer, qui de Dijon conduisent à Gray et à Dôle, sera libre pour les trains militaires et l'administration Allemande.

Les commandants de troupes de part et d'autre régleront le ravitaillement des deux forteresses et des forts qui dans les Départements du Doubs et du Jura se trouvent en possession des troupes Françaises et la délimitation des rayons de ces forts, qui seront de 3 kilomètres chacun. La circulation sur les routes ou chemins de fer traversant ces rayons sera libre.

Article V.

Les trois Départements du Jura, du Doubs, et de la Côte d'Or seront compris dès-à-présent dans l'armistice conclu le 28 Janvier en y appliquant pour la durée de l'armistice et pour les autres conditions la totalité des stipulations consignées dans la Convention du 28 Janvier dernier.

Approuvé à Versailles, le 15 Février, 1871.

(Signé)

VON BISMARCK.

Approuvé à Versailles, le 15 Février, 1871.

(Signé)

JULES FAVRE.

APPENDIX CLXXI.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH FROM 13TH JANUARY
TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE FOR BELFORT, AND THE CÔTE
D'OR, DOUBS, AND JURA DEPARTMENTS.*

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	14th January.												
IInd -	42nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	11th Dragoons -	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
VIth -	77th Regiment -	-	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	15th January.												
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	16th January.												
IInd -	21st Regiment -	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	-
VIth -	11th Dragoons -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
VIth -	77th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
	17th January.												
IInd -	3rd Dragoons -	-	1	4	5	1	1	-	2	1	1	7	7
	9th Grenadiers -	-	-	4	-	3	17	-	-	-	3	21	-
VIth -	11th Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	7th Rifle Battalion -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	8th Hussars -	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
	3rd Field Pioneer Company -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	53rd Regiment -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	18th January.												
IInd -	3rd Dragoons -	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	1
VIth -	39th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	-
	19th January.												
IInd -	14th Regiment -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	54th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	39th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	15th Hussars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	Goltz's Detachment.												
XIVth -	30th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4th Reserve Div.	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Wehlau Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Insterburg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
	20th January.												
IInd -	11th Dragoons -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIth -	8th Hussars -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
XIVth -	a. Baden Division.												
	3rd Dragoons -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

* With respect to the casualties of the XIVth Army Corps and the 4th Reserve Division between 13th and 18th January see Appendix CXLI.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	b. Goltz's Detachment.												
XIVth -	30th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	21st January.												
	ACTION AT DÔLE.												
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers - - -	-	7	-	1	24	-	-	-	-	1	31	-
	3rd Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	TOTAL FOR ACTION AT DÔLE.	-	7	-	1	26	-	-	-	-	1	33	-
	ENGAGEMENTS AT TALANT, FONTAINE- LES-DIJON, AND MESSIGNY.												
	21st Regiment - - -	1	20	1	4	53	-	-	6	-	5	79	1
	61st Regiment - - -	5	55	3	8	156	-	-	19	-	13	230	1
	and 1 Staff Surgeon-Major.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	11th Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment -	-	2	12	1	10	8	-	-	-	1	12	10
	TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS AT TALANT, FONTAINE-LES-DIJON, AND MESSIGNY.	6	77	16	13	220	9	-	25	-	19	322	23
	and 1 Staff Surgeon-Major.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ENGAGEMENTS ON THE OGNON.												
VIIth -	13th Regiment - - -	-	2	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
	73rd Fusiliers - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	56th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	7th Rifle Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th Hussars - - -	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	1	4
	2nd Field Pioneer Company -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	39th Fusiliers - - -	-	3	-	1	6	1	-	2	-	1	11	1
	15th Hussars - - -	-	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
	5th Reserve Lancers - - -	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	2	1
	TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS ON THE OGNON.	-	6	5	1	24	8	-	3	-	1	33	13
	22nd January.*												
IInd -	21st Regiment - - -	-	3	-	-	10	-	-	8	-	-	21	-
	61st Regiment - - -	-	3	-	1	9	-	-	and 1 Assist. Surgeon.	-	-	and 1 Assist. Surgeon.	-
	11th Dragoons - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	6	-	1	19	-
4th Res. Divn. -	25th Regiment - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	23rd January.												
	ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY.												
IInd -	Staff of 8th Infantry Brigade -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	21st Regiment - - -	1	44	-	3	104	-	-	-	-	4	157	-
	61st Regiment - - -	2	41	1	7	138	-	-	9	-	9	190	1
	11th Dragoons - - -	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment -	-	1	11	2	13	8	-	-	-	2	14	13
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY	3	87	14	13	255	10	-	20	-	16	362	24
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers - - -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	3rd Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
VIIth -	13th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-

* No. 2 Field Hospital IInd Army Corps is not included. It was broken up at Changey, near Dailx, by Garibaldi's Volunteers on 22nd January, in contravention of the Geneva Convention.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
VIIth -	73rd Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	7th Rifle Battalion -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	8th Hussars -	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	2
	15th Hussars -	-	-	2	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	4
	7th Field Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	6th Res. Lancers -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
XIVth -	a. Baden Division.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	H.A. Battery -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	b. Goltz's Detachment.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	34th Fusiliers -	2	3	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	2	11	-
4th Res. Divn. -	25th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Etappen troops -	1st Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	-	-	12	12
	24th January.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	42nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd Field Art. Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIIth -	13th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	7th Rifle Battalion -	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	8th Hussars -	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
Etappen troops -	1st Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	17	19	1	17	19
	25th January.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IInd -	42nd Regiment -	-	2	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
	ENGAGEMENT AT VORGES.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
VIIth -	13th Regiment -	-	10	-	2	23	-	-	-	-	2	33	-
	73rd Fusiliers -	1	6	-	-	25	-	3	-	-	1	34	-
	7th Rifle Battalion -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT VORGES.	1	16	-	3	49	-	3	-	-	4	68	-
	15th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	60th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	72nd Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	25	-	1	27	-
4th Res. Divn. -	25th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Thorn Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	26th January.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ENGAGEMENT AT SALINS.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers -	-	11	-	2	71	-	-	-	-	2	82	-
	42nd Regiment -	-	2	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	20	-
	3rd Dragoons -	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	2nd Field Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	2nd Pioneer Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT SALINS.	-	15	-	3	93	-	1	-	-	3	109	-
	ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
VIIth -	13th Regiment -	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	15th Regiment -	1	13	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	1	19	-
	55th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	7th Rifle Battalion -	-	2	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
	8th Hussars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.	1	19	-	-	14	-	-	4	-	1	33	4
IInd -	21st Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4th Res. Divn. -	1st Res. Lancers -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.	
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.
	27th January.											
IInd -	42nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	9
VIIth -	2nd Field Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	39th Fusiliers -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	60th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
4th Res. Divn. -	25th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Thorn Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	28th January.											
IInd -	3rd Dragoons -	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
	61st Regiment -	-	1	-	6	60	-	-	-	-	5	72
4th Res. Divn. -	3rd Res. Lancers -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	29th January.											
	ENGAGEMENT AT CHAFFOIS AND SOMBACOURT.											
VIIth -	53rd Regiment -	2	7	-	4	39	-	-	-	-	6	48
	77th Regiment -	-	2	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	7
	15th Hussars -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT CHAFFOIS AND SOMBACOURT.	2	9	-	4	45	-	-	-	-	6	54
IInd -	14th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	2nd Rifle Battn. -	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
VIIth -	60th Regiment -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
XIVth -	6th Baden Regiment -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
4th Res. Divn. -	3rd Res. Lancers -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
	30th January.											
IInd -	3rd Dragoons -	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
	11th Dragoons -	-	-	3	-	5	6	-	-	-	-	9
	31st January.											
IInd -	54th Regiment -	-	7	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	29
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	1st February.											
	ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTARLIER, LA CLUSE, AND OYE.											
IInd -	2nd Grenadiers -	-	11	-	3	20	-	-	5	-	3	38
	42nd Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	3rd Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
	9th Grenadiers -	5	93	-	8	179	-	-	52	-	13	324
						and						
	49th Regiment -	1	11	-	3	24	-	-	-	-	1	45
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment -	-	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	1	6
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTARLIER, LA CLUSE, AND OYE.	6	116	-	15	229	3	-	57	-	21	402
						and						
						1 Assist.-Surg.					1 Assist.-Surg.	
	2nd February.											
4th Res. Divn. -	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
	4th February.											
	Graudenz Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	7th February.											
	2nd Heavy Reserve Battery -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	6	-	9
	Total Casualties -	23	433	50	65	1186	44	2	188	42	90	1887
			and			and			and			
		1 Staff Surgeon-Major.				1 Assist.-Surg.			1 Assist.-Surg.		1 Staff Surgeon-Major and 2 Assist.-Surgeons.	

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES BY CORPS.

Staff and Regiments.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Army Corps - - -	17	359	41	56	979	30	-	120	1	73	1458	72
	1 Staff Surgeon-Major.			1 Assist.-Surg.			1 Assist.-Surg.			1 Staff Surgeon-Major and 2 Assist.-Surg.		
- - -	4	62	7	9	165	14	1	37	4	14	264	25
{ Baden Division - - -	-	1	1	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	6	1
{ Goltz's Detachment - - -	2	3	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	2	13	-
serve Division - - -	-	8	1	-	27	-	-	2	6	-	37	7
in Troops - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	29	31	1	29	31
Total- - -	23	433	50	65	1186	44	2	188	42	90	1807	136
	1 Staff Surgeon-Major.			1 Assist.-Surg.			1 Assist.-Surg.			1 Staff Surgeon-Major and 2 Assist.-Surg.		

**NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS, THOSE DOING DUTY AS SUCH, AND
SURGEONS, WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING.**

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	16th January.		
IIInd	21st Regiment -	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Prondzynski	
	11th Dragoons -	-	(1) Cornet v. Kleist.
	17th January.		
IIInd	3rd Dragoons -	2nd Lt. v. Platen -	
	9th Grenadiers -	-	(1) 1st Lt. Steffen. (2) 2nd Lt. Triest. (3) 2nd Lieut. v. Schack.
	21st January.		
	ACTION AT DÔLE.		
IIInd	2nd Grenadiers -	-	(1) 2nd Lt. Gaede.
	ENGAGEMENTS AT TALANT, FONTAINE LES DIJON, AND MESSIGNY.		
IIInd	21st Regiment -	(1) 1st Lt. Count Prebentow v. Przebendowski	(1) 1st Lieut. v. Woldeck - Arneburg. (2) 2nd Lt. Foss. (3) 2nd Lt. Wilke. (4) Vice Sgt.-Maj. Strack.
	61st Regiment -	(1) Major Priebach (2) Capt. v. Pirch - (3) 1st Lt. Count v. Schwerin (4) 2nd Lt. Raschke I. (5) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Brassfelch and Staff-Surg.-Major Dr. Born	(1) Capt. Baudach. (2) 1st Lt. Böhmer. (3) 2nd Lt. Janke II. (4) 2nd Lt. Riedel. (5) 2nd Lt. Aschmann. (6) 2nd Lt. Engler. (7) 2nd Lt. Lange (taken prisoner). (8) Vice Sgt.-Maj. Beschoner.
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment.	-	(1) Capt. Linker.
	ENGAGEMENTS ON THE OGNON.		
VIIth	39th Fusiliers -	-	(1) 2nd Lieutenant Kaemper.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	22nd January.		<i>Missing.</i>
IIInd - -	21st Regiment - -	- - - -	Assist.-Surg. Dr. Paradies.
	61st Regiment - -	- - - -	1st Lieut. Luchs.
	23rd January.		
	ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY.		
	Staff of 8th Infantry Brigade.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lieut. and Brig.-Adj. v. Oertzen of the 20th Regiment.
	21st Regiment - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Richardi	(1) Capt. Baron Gans Edler zu Putlitz. (2) 2nd Lt. Brunner. (3) 2nd Lt. Flohr (taken prisoner).
	61st Regiment - -	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Puttkamer (2) 2nd Lt. Schultze	(1) Capt. Kunne. (2) 1st Lt. Weise. (3) 2nd Lt. Straube. (4) 2nd Lt. v. Falkenhayn. (4) 2nd Lt. Wenzel. (6) Ensign Mersmann. (7) Ensign v. Bornstedt.
	2nd Field Art. Reg.	- - - -	(1) Capt. Rhades. (2) 2nd Lt. Gaedke.
	2nd Grenadiers - -	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Bollmann.
VIth - -	7th Fd. Art. Regt. - -	- - - -	(1) Capt. Goetz.
XIVth - -	Goltz's Detachment. 34th Fusiliers - -	(1) Capt. Sintenis. (2) 2nd Lt. Baron v. Wolzogen.	
	24th January.		<i>Missing.</i>
Etappen Tps. -	1st Res. Hussars - -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Maass.
	25th January.		
	ENGAGEMENT AT VORGES.		
	13th Regiment - -	- - - -	(1) Capt. v. Mayer. (2) 2nd Lt. Weck.
VIIth - -	73rd Fusiliers - -	(1) Capt. Baron v. Bülow	
	7th Rifle Battalion - -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. John.
			<i>Missing.</i>
	72nd Regiment - -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Lüdke.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	26th January.		
IIInd	ENGAGEMENT AS SALINS.		
	2nd Grenadiers	(1) 1st Lt. v. Seltzer.	
		(2) 2nd Lt. Völker.	
	2nd Fld. Art. Reg.	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Döhn.	
VIIth	ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.		
	15th Regiment	(1) 1st Lt. Effmert	
	28th January.		
IIInd	61st Regiment	(1) Capt. Kriess.	
		(2) 1st Lt. Luchs.	
		(3) 1st Lt. v. Zitzewitz.	
		(4) 2nd Lt. v. Schulenburg.	
		(5) 2nd Lt. Freyer.	
	29th January.		
	ENGAGEMENT AT CHAPPOIS AND SOM- BACOURT.		
VIIth	53rd Regiment	(1) 2nd Lt. Baron v. Plettenberg I.	(1) 1st Lt. v. Duisburg I.
		(2) 2nd Lt. Schmidt	(2) 1st Lt. van Gel- lekum.
			(3) 2nd Lt. Edel- brock.
			(4) Vice Sgt.-Maj. Crämer.
	1st February.		
	ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTARLIEU, LA CLUSE, AND OYE.		
IIInd	2nd Grenadiers	(1) 2nd Lieut. Fabricius.	
		(2) Vice-Srgt.-Maj. Lütke.	
		(3) Vice-Srgt.-Maj. Hoffmann.	
	9th Grenadiers	(1) 1st Lt. Regens- purg	(1) Col. v. Feren- theil.
		(2) 2nd Lt. Freundt	(2) 1st Lt. Protzen.
		(3) 2nd Lt. Leon- hardt	(3) 1st Lt. v. Versen.
		(4) 2nd Lt. Brunner	(4) 1st Lt. Sietzen.
		(5) 2nd Lt. Barkow	(5) 2nd Lt. v. Bug- enhagen.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
IInd -	9th Grenadiers- - - - -	- - - - -	(6) 2nd Lt. Kühne. (7) 2nd Lt. Mampe. (8) Vice Sgt.-Maj. Geppert, and Assist.-Surg. Dr. Buchwaldt.
	49th Regiment -	(1) 2nd Lt. Gallhaus	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Puttkamer, (2) 2nd Lt. Venske. (8) 2nd Lt. Noehmer.
	2nd Field Art. Regt. - - - - -	- - - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Abel.

APPENDIX CLXXII.

CONVENTION RESPECTING THE SURRENDER OF BELFORT.

Done at Perouse, 4 p.m., 16.2.71.

The following Convention has been concluded between the Prussian Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow, commanding the Siege Corps before Belfort, and Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, of the French Engineers, Commandant of Belfort:—

1. Colonel Denfert, in virtue of the special authority delegated to him by the French Government in view of the existing circumstances, surrenders the fortress with its forts to Lieut.-General v. Tresckow.

2. In recognition of their brave defence, the garrison are allowed free withdrawal with the honours of war; they will take away the eagles, colours, arms, horses, carriages, and the military telegraph apparatus, as also the baggage of the officers and kits of the men, and the archives of the fortress. The garrison comprise the troops of the line, the Garde Nationale Mobile, the Garde Nationale Mobilisée, the douaniers, and the gendarmes. The Garde Nationale Sédentaire will remain in Belfort, and, before the surrender, will deposit the arms at the Mairie.

3. All war material, as also the remaining provisions and ammunition, so far as they are not absolutely required for the departing garrison, besides the garrison stores of every description, and all State property, will be handed over at 10 a.m. on the 18th February to the German Commissioners, in the same state as at the time of signing this Convention, by a Commission to be appointed by the Commandant.

4. On the 18th February, at 10 a.m., the German artillery and engineer officers will be admitted to the forts and to the château, for the purpose of taking over the powder magazines and the mines; French officers of the same arms will accompany them.

5. The French garrison must finish the evacuation of Belfort by noon on the 18th, at which time the German troops will take possession of the fortress. The mode of departure will form the subject of a special supplement.

6. The sick and wounded left behind in the fortress will on their convalescence be conducted across the nearest line of demarcation, taking their arms with them; while those unfit for further service will be sent to their homes.

7. The departing garrison will leave behind for hospital service the necessary surgeons and assistants, who will be treated according to the stipulations of the Geneva Convention.

8. The German prisoners interned in Belfort, wounded or not, to the number of 7 officers and 243 men, will be handed over to the German troops in their present barracks at 10 a.m. on the 18th.

9. The private property of the officers leaving the fortress, and all other, will be respected.

10. Colonel Denfert will send to Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow,

as soon as possible, a return of the departing troops, so that their withdrawal may be regulated. The Commission, charged with handing over the sick of both nations and the interned, will also be furnished with returns.

11. The German Administration will help as much possible in providing food, surgeons, and other assistance for the inhabitants of the town.

The foregoing Convention has been drawn up and subscribed by the following officers. On the part of the Germans, by Major v. Laue, 67th, and Captain v. Schultzen-dorff, General Staff; on the part of the French, by Commandant Chapelot, 84th Regiment of the Line, and Captain Krafft, Auxiliary Engineers; all provided with full powers from their respective commanders.

Prepared in duplicate in both languages.

(Signed)	v. LAUE.
(Signed)	CHAPELOT.
(Signed)	v. SCHULTZEN-DORFF.
(Signed)	V. KRAFFT.

SUPPLEMENT.

1. The guards and sentries of the fortress will remain posted until relief by the German troops, which will take place immediately after the entry, under the direction of a field officer of each army. They will then be formed into a detachment, and follow the garrison.

2. The departing garrison will march in two columns, each in echelons of 1,000 men, to the Saône and Loire Department, the separate echelons keeping an interval of at least $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

On the 17th February four echelons will move off, two to the neighbourhood of Seloncourt—Audincourt—Exincourt—Etupes, the other two to Arcey—Héricourt. Each echelon will be accompanied by a German officer.

3. The garrison will take the necessary food with it. General v. Tresckow will provide the necessary carriage.

4. During the march through the country occupied by German troops the internal discipline remains in the hands of the officers. All other excesses will be punished according to Prussian regulations. Anyone who is found at a distance exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from his regiment or quarter, or any soldier of the departing garrison discovered in Belfort after a lapse of twelve hours, will be treated as a prisoner of war.

Prepared in duplicate in both languages by the undersigned, provided with full powers.

Perouse, 16.2.71.

(Signed)	v. LAUE.
(Signed)	CHAPELOT.
(Signed)	v. SCHULTZEN-DORFF.
(Signed)	V. KRAFFT.

APPENDIX CLXXIII.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE CORPS* BESIEGING BELFORT, 19TH
JANUARY TO 19TH FEBRUARY, 1871.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	
19th January.													
1st Res. Divn.	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	67th Regiment -	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
4th Res. Divn.	Loetzen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Goldap Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Siege Art.	1st Co. Würt. Art.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
20th January.													
1st Res. Divn.	Schnellmühl Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	
	Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
21st January.													
CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS AND STORM OF PEROUSE.													
1st Res. Divn.	Burg Landw. Battn.	2	19	—	2	55	—	—	—	—	4	71	
	Halberstadt Landw. Battn.	1	5	—	1	27	—	—	—	—	2	33	
	67th Regiment	—	12	—	2	60	—	—	—	—	2	72	
TOTAL FOR CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS AND STORM OF PEROUSE.		3	36	—	5	142	—	—	—	—	8	178	
1st Res. Divn.	Stendal Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	8	1	—	—	—	—	10	
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	
22nd January.													
Debschitz' Ditch.	67th Regiment -	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	
	Liegnitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	
23rd January.													
ENGAGEMENTS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.													
Debschitz' Ditch.	Lauban Landw. Battn.	1	4	—	—	13	—	—	—	—	1	17	
	II Breslau Landw. Battn.	—	5	—	—	12	1	—	—	—	—	17	
	Apenrade Landw. Battn.	1	—	—	1	16	—	—	1	—	2	17	
	6th Reserve Lancers	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	
	1st Light Res. Batty. VIII A.C.	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.		2	10	1	1	41	1	—	2	—	3	53	
1st Res. Divn.	Konitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	
	67th Regiment -	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Siege Art.	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	
24th January.													
Debschitz' Ditch.	Hirschberg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	
	6th Reserve Lancers	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	
Siege Art.	3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	2	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	7	
	2nd Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	

* Inclusive of the troops detached from the 4th Reserve Division.

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	25th January.												
itz' Ditch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
rs of Siege	Württemberg. Fort. Eng. Co. - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
s.	26th January.												
	ATTEMPTED STORM OF FORTS DES HAUTES AND DES BASSES PERCHES.												
Divn. -	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn. - -	1	5	-	19	-	3	229	-	4	253	-	-
	67th Regiment - - -	2	8	-	61	-	-	35	-	2	104	-	-
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C. - - -	-	1	-	7	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-
Divn. -	Marienburg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	15	-	-	-	-	1	17	-	-
Art. -	8th Co. Baden Art. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
rs of Siege	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C. - - -	-	-	-	2	11	-	33	-	2	44	-	-
s.	TOTAL FOR ATTEMPTED STORM OF FORTS DES HAUTES AND DES BASSES PERCHES.	3	16	-	4	113	-	3	298	-	10	427	-
Divn. -	Bromberg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-
	Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Art. -	2nd Res. Lancers - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	Staff of Bav. Art. Division - - -	-	-	-	1 Assist. Surg.	-	-	-	-	1 Assist. Surg.	-	-	-
	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co. - - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
	27th January.												
Divn. -	Konitz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Art. -	3rd Fort. Batt. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
rs of Siege	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Company - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
s.	28th January.												
Artillery -	7th Co. 4th Magdb. Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
	3rd Co. 7th Westp. Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	3rd Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	1st Co. Würtemb. Art. - - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
	29th January.												
Divn. -	Bromberg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
itz' Ditch.	1st Light Res. Batt. IX A.C. - - -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Art. -	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	4th Fort. Batt. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
	30th January.												
Divn. -	Gnesen Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
itz' Ditch.	Oels Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
rs of Siege	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
s.	31st January.												
Divn. -	Halberstadt Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
itz' Ditch.	Oels Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
Art. -	Apenrade Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	7th Co. 4th Magdb. Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	1st February.												
Divn. -	Bromberg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
itz' Ditch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
Art. -	4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. - - -	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
	2nd February.												
Siege Cps.	Engineer Staff - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.	
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.
1st Res. Divn.	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Stendal Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Burg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	2nd Baden Fort. Pioneer Co.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	3rd February.											
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	11
	Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Debschitz' Ditch.	Hirschberg Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Apenrade Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	6th Res. Lancers	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co.	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
	4th February.											
Staff of Siege Cps.	Engineer Staff	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Stendal Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Debschitz' Ditch.	Jauer Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
Siege Art.	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	1st Fort. Pion. Co. VII A.C.	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	2nd Baden Fort. Pion. Co.	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
	5th February.											
1st Res. Divn.	Gnesen Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Burg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Debschitz' Ditch.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Siege Art.	3rd Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	5
	6th February.											
1st Res. Divn.	Burg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
Debschitz' Ditch.	Jauer Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
Siege Art.	3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
	4th Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Staff of Siege Cps.	Engineer Staff	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	1st Fort. Pion. Co. VIII A.C.	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	7th February.											
	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co.	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
	8th February.											
Staff of Siege Cps.	Siege Art. Staff.	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1st Res. Divn.	Könitz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Stendal Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Burg Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C.	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	5
Debschitz' Ditch.	Jauer Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn.	—	1	3	—	16	—	—	—	—	—	19
	Oels Landw. Battn.	—	6	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	15
Siege Art.	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	4
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	6
	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Pioneers of Siege Corps.	1st Fort. Pion. Co. VIII A.C.	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C.	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
	9th February.											
1st Res. Divn.	67th Regiment	—	—	—	2	10	—	—	—	—	—	12
Debschitz' Ditch.	Jauer Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	3	13	—	—	—	—	—	16

Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Art. ers of Siege ps.	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Fort Pion. Co. VII A.C. -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Comp. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	10th February.												
es. Divn. chitz' Ditch. Art.	Gnesen Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Striegau Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	11th February.												
es. Divn. chitz' Ditch. Art. ers of Siege ps.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
	Stendal Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	Neustadt Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	67th Regiment -	-	2	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
chitz' Ditch. Art. ers of Siege ps.	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	5th Fort. Batt'y. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
es. Divn. Art.	1st Fort. Pion. Co. VII A.C. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	12th February.												
	67th Regiment -	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	-	-	5	-
	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
chitz' Ditch. Art.	8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th Co. Württemberg Art. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	13th February.												
es. Divn. es. Divn. chitz' Ditch. Art.	Halbersadt Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Talsit Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Goldap Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Liegnitz Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
chitz' Ditch. Art.	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	19th February.*												
chitz' Ditch.	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. -	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Total Casualties -	-	11	119	4	27	580	3	3	306	-	41	1005
							and 1 Assist. Surgeon.					and 1 Assist. Surgeon.	7

* At an explosion in Belfort.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES BY CORPS.

Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.	
	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.
Staff of Siege Corps - - -	1	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
1st Reserve Division - - -	6	63	—	11	346	2	3	267	—	20	471
4th Reserve Division - - -	—	2	—	2	29	—	—	3	—	2	31
Debschitz's Detachment - - -	3	38	4	4	114	1	—	2	—	7	155
Siege Artillery - - -	1	12	—	3	51	—	—	—	—	4	63
				and							
				1 Assist. Surgeon.						1 Assist. Surgeon.	
Pioneers of Siege Corps - - -	—	4	4	4	40	—	—	33	—	4	77
TOTAL - - -	11	119	4	27	580	3	3	306	—	41	1,000
				and							
				1 Assist. Surgeon.						1 Assist. Surgeon.	

NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS, THOSE DOING DUTY AS SUCH, AND
SURGEONS WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	19th January.		
4th Res. Div. -	Goldap Landw. Btn.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Ebel.
	21st January.		
	CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS AND STORM OF PÉROUSE.		
1st Res. Div. -	Burg Landw. Battn.	(1) Capt. Baron Schenk-zu-Schweins- berg	(1) Capt. Heilmuth. (2) 2nd Lt. v. Huet.
	Halberstadt Landw. Battn.	(2) 2nd Lt. Bunder (1) 1st Lt. Schröder	(1) 2nd Lt. Erbreich.
	67th Regiment -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Kretz- mer. (2) Vice Sergt.-Maj. Theune.
	23rd January.		
	ACTIONS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.		
Debschitz De- tachment	Lauban Landw. Bttn. Apenrade Landw. Battn.	(1) 2nd Lt. Schuster (1) Capt. Count v. d. Schulenburg	(1) 1st Lt. Zabeler.
	26th January.		
	ATTEMPTED STORM OF FORTS DES HAUTES AND BASSES PERCHES.		<i>Missing.</i>
1st Res. Div. -	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	1st Lt. Liborius -	(1) Capt. Heinsius, (2) 2nd Lt. Schick, (3) 2nd Lt. Metzler, [Taken prisoners.]
	67th Regiment -	(1) 1st Lt. v. den Brincken. (1) 2nd Lieutenant Pfannkuch.	
4th Res. Div. -	Marienburg Landw. Battn.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Lorwein.
Siege Art. -	8th Compy. Baden Art.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieut. Rein- hardt.
Pioneers of Siege Corps	2nd Fort. Pioneer Compy. X. A.C.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Richthofen, (2) 2nd Lt. Kraatz, [Taken prisoners.]
1st Res. Div. -	Bromberg Landw. Battn.	- - - -	(1) Capt. Dicht.
Siege Art. -	Staff of Bav. Art. Div.	- - - -	(1) Assist.-Sgn. Dr. Mahler.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	31st January.		
1st Res. Div. -	Halberstadt Landw. Bttn.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Bodungen.
	2nd February.		
Staff of Siege Corps	Engineer Staff - -	- - - -	(1) Capt. Koch.
1st Res. Div. -	Stendal Landw. Btn.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Müller, II.
	4th February.		
Staff of Siege Corps	Engineer Staff - -	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Adam.
	6th February.		
Siege Art. -	3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) Ens. Breiderhoff.
Staff of Siege Corps	Engineer Staff - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Müller.	
Pioneers of Siege Corps	1st Fort. Pion. Com. VIIIth A.C.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Longard.
	8th February.		
Staff of Siege Corps	Siege Art. Staff. -	- - - -	(1) Maj. Neumann.
1st Res. Div. -	Konitz Landw. Bttn.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Reinicke.
Debschitz Detachment	Hirschberg Landw. Bttn.	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Steinkeller.	
Siege Art. -	1st Com. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Klos.
	9th February.		
1st Res. Div. -	67th Regiment - -	- - - -	(1) Capt. Günther. (2) 2nd Lt. Raht.
Debschitz's Detachment	Jauer Landw. Batt.	- - - -	(1) Capt. Angern. (2) 1st Lt. Barchewitz. (3) 2nd Lt. Hoffmann.
Siege Art. -	3rd Com. Grd. Fort. Art. Regt.	(1) 2nd Lt. Schirmer.	
Pioneers of Siege Corps	1st Fort. Pion. Com. VIIth A.C.	- - - -	(1) Capt. v. Oldmann.

APPENDIX CLXXIV.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE 31ST JANUARY, 1871.*

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Open Troops	27th August-												
	5th Reserve Hussars - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd September.												
	27th Bav. Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	35	-	1	36	-
	Bav. Etappen Squadron - - -	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	1	2	-	4	4
Front Troops	4th September.												
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Bochum Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
	6th September.												
	Jüterbogk Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Open Troops	8th September.												
	Jüterbogk Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	16th September.												
	Jüterbogk Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2
	17th September.†												
Open Troops	Borken Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	8	-	1	29	-	1	38	-
	25th September.												
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	26th September.												
	3rd Res. Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	-
Front Troops	6th October.												
	Erkelenz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	8th October.												
	Kottbus Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	1	12	-	6	-	1	20	-	-
	Aschersleben Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Open Troops	3rd Reserve Dragoons - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	11th October.												
	Etappen Command in Stenay - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-
	Borken Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	44	-

* Exclusive of the losses sustained before the fortresses and in the engagements round Belfort.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 29, note †.

Army Corps.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.	
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.
Govrnt. Troops-	Brühl Landw. Battn. - -	-	1	-	-	2	-	1	97	-	1	100
	6th Com. 11th Fort. Art. Div. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	and 1 Comm. Official.	-	1	1
	12th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Garrison Squadron, 5th Hussars	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
Etappen Troops-	15th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Erkelenz Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	8
	17th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	13
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	13
	13th Bav. Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	18th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	19th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Bav. Etappen Squadron -	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	5	10	1	16
Govrnt. Troops -	21st October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1st Heavy Res. Cav. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Etappen Troops-	23rd October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Bochum Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
Govrnt. Troops -	24th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	15th Bav. Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
	29th October.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4th Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Etappen Troops-	2nd November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Bochum Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	3rd November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Govrnt. Troops -	4th November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Sorau Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Etappen Troops-	8th November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	9th November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	10th November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Govrnt. Troops -	12th November.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Garrison Squadron 5th Hussars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Etappen Troops-	19th November.												
	SURPRISE OF CHATILLON-SUB-SEINE.												
	Unna Landw. Battn. - - -	-	12	1	2	8	-	3	120	8	7	140	9
	5th Res. Hussars - - -	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	44	66	1	46	67
	23rd November.												
	Soest Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	25th November.												
	Mixed Etappen Garrn. of Auxon	-	9	-	-	4	-	-	10	-	-	23	-
	28th November.												
	5th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	7	-
Govrnt. Troops-	29th November.												
	Soest Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	1st December.												
	Detmold Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd December.												
	Düsseldorf Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	14	-	1	15	-
	4th December.												
	IIIrd - - - 85th Fusiliers - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
	6th December.												
	Govrnt. Troops - 60th Regiment - - -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	6	-
Etappen Troops-	7th December.												
	60th Regiment - - -	-	2	-	-	6	2	-	2	-	-	10	2
	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Heavy Res. Battn. VIII A.C. - - -	-	-	1	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	4
	5th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	8th December.												
	Unna Landw. Battn. - - -	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	6	-
	9th December.												
	3rd Res. Divn. - 81st Regiment - - -	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	59	-	-	63	-
	S. Army - 3rd Field Railway Divn. - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	139	-	3	139	-
Govrnt. Troops-	9th December.												
	1st Res. Rifle Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
	11th December.												
	3rd Res. Divn. - 81st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	13	-	1	16	-
	Govrnt. Troops - Lübben Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	1st Res. Rifle Battn. - - -	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
	12th December.												
	60th Regiment - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	5	-

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	14th December.												
Etappen Troops -	5th Res. Hussars - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	15th December.												
Govrnt. Troops -	Kottbus Landw. Battn. - -	-	1	1	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	8	1
Etappen Troops -	5th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	19th December.												
VIIth - - -	1st Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	1
	25th December.												
Govrnt. Troops -	60th Regiment - - -	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	-
VIIth - - -	72nd Regiment - - -	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	9	-
Etappen Troops -	Aschersleben Landw. Battn. -	-	6	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	3	-
	27th December.												
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st January.												
Etappen Troops -	Detmold Landw. Battn. - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	2nd January.												
Govrnt. Troops -	II Res. Rifle Battn. - - -	-	1	2	3	16	1	-	2	-	1	20	1
	4th January.												
	Prenzlau Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	6th January.												
	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	8th January.												
IIInd Army -	4th Field Railway Divn. - -	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	9th January.												
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Etappen Troops -	27th Bav. Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	14th January.												
	Halle Landw. Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Govrnt. Troops -	Deutz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	2	-	3	1
	15th January.												
	Küstrin Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	Deutz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
Etappen Troops -	Bav. Etappen Eng. Com. - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	1	-
	16th January.												
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Württ. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	14	-	-	18	-
	17th January.												
XIVth - - -	Deutz Landw. Battn. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	5th Field Railway Divn. - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	18th January.												
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Res. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	1
	Garrison Squadron, 5th Hussars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-

y Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
nt. Troops -	19th January.												
	4th Württ. Inf. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	21st January.												
	Deutz Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	5	-
	1st Res. Rifle Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	4th Res. Hussars -	-	-	2	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	7
	22nd January.												
	Geldern Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	7	-	-	7	-	-	15	-
	23rd January.												
	6th Res. Lancers -	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
	24th January.												
	Jüterbogk Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	25th January.												
	Beuthen Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	6th Res. Lancers -	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Paderborn Landw. Battn. -	-	2	-	-	2	-	1	41	-	1	45	-
	27th January.												
	Beuthen Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
	28th January.												
	Beuthen Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	6th Res. Lancers -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	29th January.												
pen Troops-	Lübben Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Total Casualties -	-	4	81	18	7	157	18	15	753	95	26	991
									and 1 Commt. Official, 1 Sub- Surgeon, and 1 Paymaster.			and 1 Commt. Official, 1 Sub- Surgeon, and 1 Paymaster.	131

**NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS, THOSE ACTING IN THAT CAPACITY,
SURGEONS AND OFFICERS WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND
MISSING.**

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died Wounds.	Wounded.
	3rd September.		<i>Missing.</i>
Etappen Troops	27th Bav. Landw. Bn.	- - - -	(1) Lt. Fuchs.
	17th September.		<i>Missing.</i>
	Berken Landw. Batt.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Willems.
	6th October.		
Govt. Troops -	Erkelens Land. Batt.	- - - -	(1) Capt. Ebray.
	8th October.		
	Kettbus Landw. Batt.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Krause.
	11th October.		<i>Missing.</i>
	Brühl Landw. Batt.	- - - -	(1) Vice Serg.-Maj. Berghausen.
			<i>Missing.</i>
Etappen Troops	Etappen command in Stenay - - -	- - - -	(1) Lieut.-Col. v. Buttlar. (2) Capt. Gnevkow. Also (3) Comm. Official Senft.
			<i>Missing.</i>
Govt. Troops -	6th Com. 11th Fort. Art. Div.	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Brink.
	19th October.		
Etappen Troops	Bav. Etappen Squad.	(1) Lt. Rudolf.	
	23rd October.		
	Bochum Land. Batt.	(1) Capt. Thümmel.	
	19th November.		
	SURPRISE OF CHATIL- LON-SUR-SEINE.		
Etappen Troops	Unna Landw. Battn. -	- - - -	(1) Capt. Bardele- ben. (2) 2nd Lt. de Sa- lengre Drabbe.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
			<i>Missing.</i>
Etappen Troops	Unna Landw. Battn.-	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Werthern. (2) 1st Lt. Kaemper. (3) 2nd Lt. Brinkmann. (4) Vice Serg.-Maj. Thieme. (5) Vice Serg.-Maj. Mellin. (6) Paymr. Schmidt. (7) Sub-Surg. Dr. Hensgen.
	5th Reserve Hussars -	(1) Major v. Alvensleben.	
	2nd December.		<i>Missing.</i>
Govt. Troops -	Düsseldorf Landw. Battn.	- - - -	(1) Vice Serg.-Maj. Steinmetz.
	9th December.		
Ist Army -	3rd Field Railway Div.	- - - -	(1) 1st Lt. Kreutzinger.
			<i>Missing.</i>
			(1) 1s. Lt. Bürger. (2) 2nd Lt. Grapow.
	11th December.		
3rd Res. Div. -	81st Regiment -	- - - -	(1) Ens. v. Wedell.
Govt. Troops -	Ist Res. Rifle Battn. -	- - - -	(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Winterfeld.
	2nd January.		
	IInd Res. Rifle Batt.	(1) Capt. v. Basedow.	
	25th January.		<i>Missing.</i>
Etappen Troops	Paderborn Land. Btn.	- - -	(1) 2nd Lt. Poelmahn.

APPENDIX CLXXIV.

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF TROOPS EMPLOYED ON THE
LINES OF COMMUNICATION, &c., AT THE END OF JANUARY,
1871.

					Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Fort. Art. Cos. or Batteries.	Pioneer Com- panies.
Etappen troops.	Ist Army	-	-	-	5	1	—	—	—
	IIInd Army	-	-	-	9	6	—	—	1
	IIIrd Army	-	-	-	11	9	2	—	4
	Meuse Army	-	-	-	4	2	—	—	—
Govt. troops.	In Alsace	-	-	-	22½	8	2	10	3
	„ Lorraine	-	-	-	31½	7	3	5	—
	Krenski's Detachment	-	-	-	6	2	2	6	3
	For Rheims	-	-	-	20	5	3	8	2
	„ Metz	-	-	-	15	2	1	10	2
Total					124½	42	13	39	15

APPENDIX CLXXV.

H. Q., Versailles, 6.1.71.

To His Excellency General v. Bonin, Governor-General of Lorraine.

According to the reports received here from General v. Werder, it is not improbable that very superior hostile forces are concentrating for an offensive movement against him. Their object may be the relief of Belfort, and a permanent severance of our communications.

In order to defeat such enterprises, the VIIth Corps will shortly be assembled at Châtillon-sur-Seine with thirty-one battalions, and, if necessary, will be still further reinforced by the IIInd Army Corps. It is, however, not impossible that before these forces become effective, the enemy may temporarily gain ground in the direction of our main line of communication. In this event, it would be your Excellency's duty to assemble the Government troops now scattered at various *etappen* points, carefully watch the enemy's possible advance, and take precautions that Toul is sufficiently garrisoned and armed. The defective organisation of the enemy's forces, which are almost entirely destitute of commissariat and ammunition trains, forces them to cling to the railways in their operations. A temporary interruption of these railways would, therefore, entail, if not a complete stoppage, at any rate a considerable delay in the enemy's advance.

Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to take such measures as you may think necessary to cause the Langres—Chaumont and St. Loup—Epinal Railways to be prepared for destruction at various points to such an extent that, if the demolitions be carried out, the repairs would occupy from eight to fourteen days. As regards the line St. Loup—Epinal it might eventually suffice to remove by rail the large timbers which have been brought up to repair the destroyed viaduct at Aillevillers, but have not yet been placed in position.

(Signed) v. MOLTKE.

APPENDIX CLXXVI.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES BEFORE THE FORTRESSES OF PFALZBURG, BITSCHE,
AND LONGWY.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.	
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.
	BEFORE PFALZBURG.											
	BETWEEN 12TH AUGUST AND 14TH DECEMBER, 1870.											
	12th August.											
VIIth	38th Fusiliers - - -	-	5	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	18
	6th Rifle Battn. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	14th August.											
	51st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	6th Field Art. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	16th August.											
	51st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	17th August.											
	51st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	24th August.											
Etappen Troops-	Sondershausen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	26th August.											
	Erfurt Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
	27th August.											
	Erfurt Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Sondershausen Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	2	1
	3rd Res. Dragoons - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	14th September.											
	Erfurt Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	2	-	-	8
	Sondershausen Landw. Battn. -	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	2	-	-	8
24th November.												
Govrnt. Troops -	Sangerhausen Landw. Battn. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Erfurt Landw. Battn. - -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
	25th November.											
	Erfurt Landw. Battn. - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE PFALZ- BURG.	-	8	-	3	36	-	-	5	-	3	49

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	BEFORE BITSCH.												
	BETWEEN 8TH AUGUST, 1870, AND 31ST JANUARY, 1871.												
	8th August.												
nd Bav.	1st H.A. Batty. 2nd Art. Regt.	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
	23rd August.												
appen Troops-	7th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th Bav. Inf. Regt. - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	4th Fort. Sortie Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt.	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
	4th September.												
	4th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	3	-	2	13	-	-	-	-	2	21	-
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	6	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	17	-
	8th September.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	11th September.												
	4th Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	13th September.												
	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	15th September.												
	3rd Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	16th September.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	17th September.												
	3rd Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	4th Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	2	1
	3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt. -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	29th September.												
mnt. Troops -	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	3	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
	30th September.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	5th Bav. Chev. Regt. - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	10th October.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	21st December.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	20th January.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt. - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE BITSCH -	-	19	-	3	59	1	-	-	-	3	78	1

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	
BEFORE LONGWY.											
BETWEEN 15TH NOVEMBER, 1870, AND 25TH JANUARY, 1871.											
1st December.											
VIIIth	53rd Regiment	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
7th December.											
	15th Hussars	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
10th December.											
	53rd Regiment	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	7	—	—
13th December.											
Govt. Troops	72nd Regiment	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
27th December.											
	Oppeln Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	1	4	—	—	2	—	1
	2nd Heavy Res. Cav. Regt.	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1	4	1
12th January.											
	Rawicz Landw. Batt.	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
14th January.											
	Schrimm Landw. Battn.	—	2	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—
	Ostrowo Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
15th January.											
	1st Fort. Pion. Com. III A.C.	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
22nd to 24th January.											
	Anklam Landw. Battn.	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Münster Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
	Glatz Landw. Battn.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
	5th Com. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	—	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—
	13th Com. Guard Fort. Art. Regt.	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
	13th Com. 4th Fort. Art. Regt.	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—
	2nd Fort. Pion. Com. 1st A.C.	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE LONGWY											
		—	15	1	2	31	—	1	11	4	3
TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE PFALZ- BURG, RITSCH, AND LONGWY.											
		—	42	1	8	126	1	1	16	4	9

NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED,
OR MISSING.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded
	BEFORE PFALZBURG. BETWEEN 12TH AUG. AND 14TH DEC., 1870 (INCLUSIVE). 27th August.		
Etappen Troops	Sondershausen Land. Battalion. 24th November.	- - -	(1) 1st Lieut. v. Michaelis. (2) 2nd Lt. Enke.
Govt. Troops -	Erfurt Land. Battn. - BEFORE BITSCH. BETWEEN 8TH AUG., 1870, AND 31ST JAN., 1871 (INCLUSIVE). 23rd August.	- - -	(1) 1st Lt. Boutin.
Etappen Troops	4th Fort. Batty. 2nd - Bav. Art. Regt. 4th September.	- - -	(1) Lt. Beckh.
	4th Bav. Inf. Regt. - BEFORE LONGWY. BETWEEN 15TH NOV., 1870, AND 25TH JAN., 1871 (INCLUSIVE). 27th December.	- - -	(1) Lt. Zeier. (2) Lt. Buchert.
Govt. Troops -	Oppeln Landw. Batt. 2nd Heavy Res. Cav. Regt. 22nd January.	- - -	(1) Capt. Gené. <i>Missing.</i> (1) 2nd Lt. Merrem.
	2nd Fort. Pion. Com. 1st A.C.	- - -	(1) 1st Lieut. Nau- mann.

APPENDIX CLXXVII.

COMPOSITION OF THE STAFFS OF THE GOVERNMENTS-GENERAL.
(End of January, 1871.)

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF ALSACE.

Governor-General: Lieut.-General Count v. Bismarck-Bohlen.
 Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Hartmann, War Ministry.
 General Staff: (1.) Captain Rhein; (2.) Captain Baron v. Richt-
 hofen, Guard Fortress Artillery Regiment.
 Adjutants: (1.) 1st Lieutenant Count v. Kalnein, 3rd Cuirassiers;
 (2.) 2nd Lieutenant Baron v. Welzeck, Guard
 Cuirassiers.

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF LORRAINE.

Governor-General; General v. Bonin.
 Chief of General Staff: Colonel Berger.
 General Staff: Captain v. Brauchitsch, War Ministry.
 Adjutants: (1.) Captain Baron v. Dalwigk-Lichtenfels; (2.) Captain
 v. Donop; (3.) 1st Lieut. Mache, 6th Grenadiers.

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF RHEIMS.

Governor-General: Lieut.-General v. Rosenberg-Gruszczyński.*
 General Staff: Major v. Ploetz, 8th Dragoons.
 Adjutants: (1.) Major Count v. d. Groeben; (2.) Captain Siber;
 (3.) Captain Pedell, 23rd Regiment.

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL IN VERSAILLES.

Governor-General: Lieut.-General v. Fabrice, Saxon War Minister.
 Chief of Staff: Major Krug v. Nidda.
 Adjutants: (1.) Major v. Helldorff, Saxon Army; (2.) Captain v.
 Bülow, 2nd Cuirassiers; (3.) 1st Lieut. v. Voight-
 Rhetz, 8th Cuirassiers; (4.) 1st Lieut. Baron v.
 Hausen, 18th Lancers.



* Acted for H.R.H. the Grand Duke Frederick of Mecklenburg-Schwerin
 22.10.70 to 10.1.71.

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1870-71.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BINDER

The twenty sections should be bound in five volumes, and lettered as follows:—

Part I, Vol. I. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

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GENERAL RETROSPECT OF THE WAR FROM THE BEGINNING OF
SEPTEMBER, 1870, TO THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.*

THE advance to Paris had been interrupted by the operations against Marshal MacMahon, but only for eight days. Immediately after the decisive action had been fought at Sedan on the 1st September, the march was resumed, and on the 19th of the month the French capital was invested on all sides.

One half of the German forces had to be left before Metz, and only 150,000 men held at first the 50 miles of girdle round Paris and her immense resources. After the rapid and victorious course of events of the first months, the two fractions of the German army found themselves constrained to a long and troublesome detention before these two cities.

The French nation, with ardent patriotism, had resolved to fight to the bitter end. By command of the French Government, the officials refused to co-operate with the German authorities in regulating the supply of the troops. The population, urban and rural, fled from their homes or took up arms for irregular warfare. Railways and roads were broken up, and very costly works destroyed, often when there was no necessity to do so. On their arrival before Paris, the Germans found the whole of the immediate neighbourhood completely ruined and pillaged.

This undoubtedly rendered the invasion much more difficult, but also entailed greater hardships on the country itself.

The armies of the Empire had disappeared from the theatre of war, but, under the pressure of a powerful and unscrupulous Dictator, fresh armies were forming in all the unoccupied districts of France. To keep them at a distance was the chief task of the supreme German authorities. The only means at first available for this purpose must come from the line of investment itself. Attempts at relief at one time threatened from the south, at another from the north, whilst, to meet sorties, first one part of the thin investing line, and then the other, had to be reinforced.

The tactics of the troops when again taking the field assumed a change of character. The rawness of the season forced the troops to be placed under shelter, at all events at night. Hence, we find both sides occupying wider cantonments and attacking on a broad front, while the difficulty of exercising unity of command and the more independent action of the subordinate commanders tell in favour of the better trained and hitherto victorious army. The superiority of the German artillery became daily more manifest. On the other hand, the action of the cavalry was much circumscribed by the character of

* See General Map No. 10.

the ground and the bad weather. The shortness of the days required that the engagement be pressed to a speedy decision. Most of the actions were decided by a turning movement, whilst the danger of seeing the weakened centre pierced was removed, owing to the absence of skill of the adversary and the little intrinsic value of his hastily gathered forces. It was almost only in positions prepared for defence that they were capable of a serious and generally lasting resistance.

By the beginning of October the Republic had succeeded in assembling 60,000 men on the Loire. Meanwhile, however, the army before Paris had also been reinforced by two army corps, which had hitherto been employed in guarding and transporting the numerous prisoners captured at Sedan. With the troops that could be best spared from Paris, General v. d. Tann hastened to meet the advancing enemy, defeated him on the 10th October at Artenay, threw him back beyond the Loire, and occupied Orléans.

But before the month had expired, he found himself again opposed by a French army far superior to his own. Weakened by having to detach part of his troops to watch hostile forces on the Eure and Lower Seine, General v. d. Tann was forced at Coulmiers on the 9th November to retire upon St. Péré. The French, however, refrained from any further attack, and contented themselves with occupying an extensive position covering Orléans.

On the eastern theatre of war, General v. Werder, after the fall of Strassburg on 27th September, moved towards the Saône valley, threw back on Besançon the troops under General Cambrils which opposed his march, and occupied Dijon. In Alsace, Schlettstadt and Neu-Breisach were captured, while Belfort was provisionally invested.

Meantime the final blow had been struck at Metz, where Marshal Bazaine had awaited the outcome of political events in France. The attempt at relief by a whole army from without had been as abortive of result as the efforts from within to pierce the girdle of investment. On 29th October Prince Frederic Charles planted his colours on the ramparts of the fortress, which for seventy days had kept immovable before it a considerable part of the German forces. It only now became possible to employ the 1st Army to secure the investment of Paris on the north, and the IInd Army for the same purpose on the south.

The duties of guarding 173,000 prisoners, and the various expeditions against smaller fortresses, occupied so many men, that General v. Manteuffel had at first but a small force at his disposal. Nevertheless, he defeated General Farre at Amiens on the 27th November, entered Rouen eight days later, and drove back General Briand to the sea coast.

Meanwhile, Prince Frederic Charles appeared before Orléans. He was subsequently joined also by the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, which had dispersed some hostile bodies showing in the west.

On the French side, Gambetta, Minister of War, assumed the conduct of the military operations. He desired to advance with the assembled numbers upon Paris by way of Fontainebleau, give the hand to a sortie made at the same time by the garrison of the place, and thereby restore the connection between the capital and the provinces. The movement commenced on the 28th November from the right wing, but the Xth Corps, which was reinforced in good time, repulsed at Beaune-la-Rolande all the attacks of the far superior forces of the enemy.

On 2nd December a fresh attempt was made to press forward with the French left wing, but this also was defeated by the troops on the line Loigny—Poupry. On the 3rd, Prince Frederic Charles moved forward with all his forces concentrically to the attack. After two days' fighting the French army was driven from all its positions with a loss of 20,000 men, and was separated into two fractions. Orléans was once more occupied.

In order to establish connection with the army of the Loire, General Ducrot had simultaneously with its advance made a well-planned but timely observed sortie against the east side of the line of investment. But this attempt failed before the resistance of the Germans at Villiers on the 2nd December.

So many successes of the German arms occurring within the space of a few days could not fail to lessen considerably the adversary's hope of relieving the capital. But, in consequence of the abundant resources of the country, the undaunted Dictator succeeded in a short time in forming a fresh army out of each of the fractions beaten at Orléans. With the western army General Chanzy, supported on the Forest of Marchenoir, at once passed to the attack. For four days the Grand Duke held his own unsupported. When the IInd Army afterwards moved up from Orléans, the enemy was thrown back across the Loir, and the Government Delegation fled from Tours to Bordeaux. The other army, under General Bourbaki, remained for the time motionless at Bourges.

The German supreme authorities now deemed it necessary to grant some repose to the field troops extending from the Moselle to the Loire and even to the sea. The commanders were instructed to allow any fresh offensive movements made for the relief of Paris to approach their lines and then to take the offensive against them.

But General Faidherbe had already led forward the North Army, which had been meanwhile reinforced. General v. Manteuffel, hastening forward with reinforcements from Rouen, succeeded, however, on the 23rd December in wresting from the adversary on the Hallue the villages occupied in front line. Next day the French commenced to retreat. On the 3rd January the French General made an attack on Bapaume, but was unable to prevent the fall of the fortress of Péronne, which had been meanwhile invested.

The Paris Army had, during this period, with the expenditure

of considerable forces, made a fruitless sortie with the object of capturing the German position at Le Bourget, which was causing them much annoyance. Ultimately, by pushing forward earth-works and arming them with heavy artillery, they endeavoured to break gradually the enemy's chain of outposts. Mount Avron, more particularly, formed a wedge driven into the line of investment.

The Germans, on their part, had the greatest difficulty in bringing up from home territory not only the daily supplies for hundreds of thousands of men, but the immense stores of material necessary for the attack of a fortress like Paris. The means held in readiness up to that time were, however, sufficient to force the adversary after two days' bombardment to evacuate the Avron on the 29th.

A week later, on the 5th January, the bombardment of the south front was commenced, and the outlying forts reduced to silence.

Before these events, the concentration of very considerable forces on the Sarthe had not escaped the German supreme authorities. This and the restlessness of the adversary on the Upper Loire led to the belief that General Chanzy and General Bourbaki contemplated advancing simultaneously upon Paris by way of Chartres and Montargis respectively; as was in fact originally the intention. It was, therefore, resolved to take the offensive against the former with the IInd Army, and to ward off the latter for the moment with the IInd and VIIth Corps.

The time of year and the nature of the ground offered the greatest difficulties to the advance upon Le Mans. The neighbourhood of this place was, however, reached on the 10th January after continuous fighting; and, after a three days' battle, the enemy's army was driven behind the Mayenne.

Meanwhile the French authorities, after failing so often in their enterprises, had resolved to move against the communications of the German Army.

Ere long the hostile forces gathered together in greater numbers in front of General v. Werder, but it was not until the 5th January, in an action near Vesoul, that prisoners had been made from the various corps of the 1st Army of the Loire, showing for certain that this latter force had been moved by rail from Bourges to the Doubs. The two Corps which had been concentrated for observation in the neighbourhood of Montargis and Auxerre, under General v. Manteuffel, were ordered at once to march in that direction, but General v. Werder had at first to rely on his own strength to protect the siege of Belfort against upwards of 100,000 men. For three whole days he fought in the position on the Lisaine against the greatly superior force of the enemy, until the latter, on the 17th, abandoned all hope of victory and retired upon Besançon. Not only were the German communications secured, but General v. Manteuffel had now arrived and severed those of the enemy.

During the whole of this period the population of Paris, whose only means of communication with the outer world had been by balloon, had resolutely borne the evils of an investment, in the hope of seeing themselves speedily relieved by the numerous armies of the provinces. To their privations, which increased daily, were now to be added the terrors of a bombardment.

Against their better judgment the military commanders, on the 19th January, were forced to undertake a final great sortie, but the Vth Army Corps, on the German side, held its position against all the masses advancing from Mont Valérien. On the same day, at St. Quentin, a renewed attempt by General Faidherbe ended in failure. On the 21st January the bombardment of the north front of Paris also commenced with extreme activity.

Under the pressure of such circumstances the Government in Paris found itself ultimately compelled, on the 23rd January, to enter into negotiations. A provisional armistice was granted to it, but the south-east departments were excluded from its provisions.

In this region General v. Manteuffel had already reduced the 1st Army of the Loire to the most critical condition. A third French army disappeared from the theatre of war on the 1st February, by passing over into neutral territory; a fourth had laid down its arms only a few days before in Paris, but remained interned in the capital until the conclusion of peace. Belfort, pressed by sorest need, opened its gates by order of the French Government.

THE ARMISTICE AND THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

THE EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE, AND THE RESULTING DISPOSITIONS OF THE OPPOSED ARMIES.*

The Convention of the 28th January, 1871,† had been concluded with the members of the Government of the National Defence present at Paris; the Delegation sitting at Bordeaux, charged hitherto with conducting the war in the provinces, had at first been no party to that agreement.

However much the bulk of the French people were inclined for peace, and were convinced of the uselessness of any further resistance, it was still questionable whether the war party would acknowledge the armistice and whether the national representatives, to be subsequently elected, would ratify the conditions of peace imposed by the conqueror.

The military part of the agreement was carried out in a comparatively short space of time. The line of demarcation fixed therein between the opposed forces ran from the mouth of the Seine southward to the Sarthe, which river it reached between Angers and Le Mans. From this point, turning towards the Loire, it crossed this river close above Saumur, passed round that part of the Indre-et-Loir Department situated south of the river, and then led, chiefly in an easterly direction, by way of Vierzon, as far as the frontier of the Côte d'Or Department. The two northernmost departments of France, as also the peninsula of Le Havre, had special lines of demarcation. The belligerents on both sides had to withdraw their troops, inclusive of the outposts, to a distance of ten kilomètres from the line of demarcation. The fortresses still remaining in French hands—Paris, Givet and Langres—were also surrounded with a neutral zone of corresponding breadth.

At Paris.

At Paris, the occupation of the territory and forts assigned by the convention to the Germans was carried out without any special difficulties.

On 29th January the troops advanced to the neutral zone. To the IIIrd Army was assigned the ground on the left banks of the Marne and Seine, including the bridges at Charenton and Neuilly, as well as the road leading from the latter place to Bezons; to the Meuse Army were appropriated the right banks of the Marne and Seine, and the north part of the Gennevilliers peninsula.

The surrender of the fortresses was arranged as follows:—

* See Plan No. 39.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 390, and the text of the Convention in Appendix CLVI.

The Vth Army Corps occupied Mont Valérien; the XIth, Fort d'Issy; the IInd Bavarian, Forts de Vanves and de Montrouge; the VIth, the redoubt Les Hautes Bruyères and Forts de Bicêtre and d'Ivry; the Ist Bavarian, Fort de Charenton; the Württemberg Field Division, the de Gravelle and de la Faisanderie redoubts; the XIIth, the Forts de Nogent, de Rosny, de Noisy, and de Romainville; the Guard Corps, the Forts d'Aubervilliers and de l'Est; the IVth, the town of St. Denis with the Double Couronne du Nord, Fort de la Briche, and the north part of the Gennevilliers peninsula; lastly, the Guard Landwehr Division, the Neuilly bridge.* The arming of the forts against the city enceinte was at once commenced.

The outposts advanced as far as the line of demarcation. For the purpose of controlling the traffic, examining detachments were posted on the roads opened to the public by virtue of the Convention.†

In order to prevent a famine in the city and to satisfy the most pressing wants of the population until the arrival of French convoys of provisions, the supplies which could be spared from the German magazines were placed at the disposal of the Paris authorities.‡ In order to permit of the capital being provisioned with the least possible delay, all the Commanders-in-Chief, the Governors-General, and the Inspectors-General of Etappen received instructions to put no impediment in the way of repairing the railways and other communications, and to cause the torpedoes to be removed from the rivers.

A special Convention concluded on the 30th January permitted to the French the joint use with the Germans of the lines Dieppe—Rouen—Amiens—Creil—Paris, Vierzon—Orléans—Paris, and Nevers—Montargis—Moret—Paris.§ Telegraphic communication was also regulated by an agreement on the 2nd February; lastly, permission was given to the inhabitants to bring in fuel from the neighbourhood, and to repair the aqueducts which had been much damaged during the siege.

In spite of these measures, it was not until the middle of February that the distress prevailing in the capital was entirely relieved.

The German prisoners in Paris were handed over to the Ist Bavarian Army Corps on the 31st January; the French arms and material of war in Forts d'Ivry, de Bicêtre, d'Aubervilliers, and de Romainville on and after the 6th February. This latter operation was a very slow one, and was not terminated in the main until the 18th February.|| The unserviceable iron guns

* A change took place the next day, in that the Württemberg Field Division also took over the occupation of Fort de Nogent.

† See sketch, and Appendix CLVI.

‡ Passage was only permitted to those who were provided with a pass furnished by the French authorities and countersigned by the German.

§ They were only used to a very small extent. (See subsequent narrative.) On the 3rd February the first French convoy of provisions reached Paris.

|| Later on some other lines were added. (See subsequent narrative.)

|| See Part II, Vol. II, p. 390.

were destroyed; all the rest, except some of the bronze guns mounted in the forts,* were sent to Germany.

The payment of the war contribution of 200,000,000 francs imposed on Paris took place on 12th February. A mixed commission was appointed to regulate all matters of detail. French gendarmes were to perform the police duties in the neutral zone. No serious disputes occurred between the people and the German troops, nor did anything happen to disturb the peace during the whole duration of the armistice.

On the other hand, numerous obstacles interfered with the carrying out of the Convention in the Departments.

The 1st
Army.

On the 29th January General v. Goeben had, on receipt of the news of the impending armistice, ordered the troops of the 1st Army in the Somme district to advance closer up to the line of French fortresses, and also to occupy Dieppe. Meanwhile, the text of the Convention reached Amiens, and had been communicated to General Faidherbe, with inquiry at the same time if he was disposed to submit to the conditions; if so, the prospect was held out that the German troops on the further side of the line of demarcation would be at once withdrawn. The French officers sent to negotiate recognised the armistice generally, but were without instructions in regard to the evacuation of Abbeville and some other places.† In consequence, those places in regard to which doubt prevailed, were not for the present occupied, where they happened to be in French hands. It was not until the 1st February that the Germans entered Dieppe, and on the 6th Abbeville.‡

The carrying out of the armistice met with greater difficulties on the Lower Seine.

On the left bank of the river, the occupation of the district assigned to the German troops was on the whole completed without incident. Only the pickets posted on the Seine at Aizier, and, on the right bank, the garrison of Caudébec were fired at by French war vessels on the 30th. A small detachment advancing against Lillebonne was fired upon from the place. That same day Generals Dargent and Loysel§ proposed a meeting of plenipotentiaries in order to determine a line of demarcation. But as it appeared that both generals were without sufficient instructions, and that they were endeavouring to protract the pourparlers, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin informed them that the negotiations on the basis of the Convention must commence at once, and, if it were not

* At the commencement, 502; after evacuation of the south and west fronts, 146 guns.

† Gambetta had, it is true, accepted the armistice, but, not yet knowing the conditions in detail, he had merely forbidden the continuance of operations, without providing the Generals with more precise orders. (See *ante*, page , and Appendix CLXVIII.)

‡ Abbeville paid no special indemnity. The State property there was allowed to be removed.

§ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 282, *et seq.*

recognised, hostilities would be at once resumed. In these circumstances, he deferred the disbandment of the XIIIth Corps, ordered by the Royal Headquarters, and also the return of the 22nd Division to the XIth Army Corps.*

A resumption of hostilities was, however, no longer necessary, as Jules Favre, at the request of the Chancellor of the Empire, had already provided the French commanders with definite instructions on the 2nd February. That same day General Dargent recognised the Versailles Convention and the line of demarcation claimed by the Germans. General Loysel, in spite of his refusal at the outset, signed on the 4th a special convention concluded on the basis of the Versailles Convention. The armistice having thus been carried out on the Seine, the disbandment of the XIIIth Army Corps could now take place.

In order to reform the units, General v. Goeben had, on 1st February, ordered the return to the Seine of the troops of the 1st Army Corps† posted on the Somme. At the same time, the 17th Infantry Division, the 3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade, and the 5th Cavalry Division, were placed under the orders of the 1st Army Corps, the 3rd Reserve Division, with the combined Guard Cavalry Brigade and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under the orders of the VIIIth Army Corps; the 12th Cavalry Division passed under the orders of the XIIth Army Corps at Compiègne on the 5th February.

The movements ordered in consequence by the respective Corps headquarters were completed by the middle of February.

The following were the positions:—On the Somme, on the right wing the 16th Division, on the left the 15th, in the centre the 3rd Reserve Division and the Corps Artillery round Amiens; in rear, as far as Beauvais, the 3rd Cavalry Division. On the Seine, on the right bank along the line of demarcation and on the coast, the 2nd Infantry Division, and Corps Artillery from the 1st Army Corps, and the 3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade; in rear, at Rouen, the 1st Infantry Division. On the left bank the 17th Division had relieved the 22nd, and had extended as far as the line Evreux—Orbec—Bellou, whilst south of it as far as Gacé remained the 5th Cavalry Division.

Opposed to these, the French troops were distributed as follows:—North of the Somme district the army of General Faidherbe, numbering some 25,000 men and 16 batteries, had taken post in the quadrilateral Lille—Arras—Cambrai—Valenciennes, for the purpose of reforming there; in addition to these, some 55,000 garrison troops were occupying the fortresses. On the Seine, as extreme left wing of the 2nd Army of the Loire, was posted Saussier's Division‡ and a number of franc-tireurs on

* The 17th Infantry and 5th Cavalry Division were, until further notice, to pass to the 1st Army.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 279, and Appendix CXXV.

‡ Of the 19th Corps, General Dargent.

The IInd
Army.

the left bank; on the right bank of the river, in and near Le Havre, stood Loysel's Corps, consisting of some 30,000 gardes mobiles, badly armed and little drilled.

In the zone occupied by the IInd Army, the carrying into effect of the convention met with no hindrances of importance. The Army Headquarters had received a copy of the Convention on the 29th January, and communicated its provisions to the French generals, asking the latter at the same time if they were disposed to recognize them. It then appeared that these officers had merely received orders to stay hostilities. Notwithstanding this, General Chanzy and, after some negotiations, General Pourcet, declared themselves ready to retire behind the line fixed by the Convention;* so that on the 5th February the armistice had completely come into force in this region.

On the French side, General Chanzy had moved his army to the left on the 28th January, as a preliminary to taking the offensive later from the neighbourhood of Caen. This movement, however, speedily ceased, and the army,† the total strength of which was some 156,000 men and 54 batteries, remained for the present in their extensive positions between the mouth of the Seine and the Loire at Angers. In the neighbourhood of Vierzon stood General Pourcet's 25th Corps, some 30,000 men strong.

In consequence of the satisfactory declarations of the French generals, Prince Frederic Charles was able to withdraw on the 31st January the troops still standing in the neutral zone.

The armistice quarters were regulated in such wise that the 4th Cavalry Division was to take post between Sées and Alençon, the IIIrd Army Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division between the last-named place and Le Mans, the Xth Corps, with the 1st and 6th Cavalry Divisions, thence to Montrichard, the IXth Army Corps in the neighbourhood of Orléans, and lastly, General v. Rantzau's Detachment at Auxerre.

On 3rd February all the troops had reached their destinations. Only the last-named detachment, after leaving advanced troops at Bléneau and Gien, was brought up to Châtillon-sur-Loing on the 9th February. This removal was due to the circumstance that the mixed brigade of the VIth Army Corps, under General v. Fabeck,‡ with which it had advanced against Auxerre, had occupied this town on the 2nd February after its evacuation by the French troops.

In this way the armistice was carried out on the 6th February along the entire line of demarcation fixed by the Convention. It was only before the fortresses of Bitsch and Langres that there were any difficulties.

* The Gardes Mobiles south of Tours would not at first evacuate the neutral zone, until General v. Hartmann had threatened to re-commence hostilities.

† This consisted of the 16th, 17th, 19th, and 21st Corps, Cléret's Division, and several corps of franc-tireurs under Lipowski, Cathelineau, and others.

‡ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 226, and Vol. III, p. 122.

The commander of the troops investing Bitsch,* Colonel Kohlermann, had informed the commandant of the fortress on the 1st February of the conclusion of the armistice. The commandant, however, refused to acknowledge the Convention without express orders from his Government. The outpost duties had therefore to be continued with all the circumstances of war until the end of February, without, however, leading to any collisions. It was not until protracted negotiations had taken place, and the investing troops, reinforced for the purpose, had threatened to attack, that the French evacuated the fortress on the 24th and 25th March.

The garrison of Langres, the commandant of which had for similar reasons at first raised difficulties, retired on the 7th February to the line of the forts.†

On the 13th February, the armistice was also extended to the Côte d'Or, Jura, and Doubs departments, and also to the fortress of Belfort.‡ At two places only was any opposition offered to its execution. The commandant of Auxonne, owing to insufficient instructions, did not free the railway leading past the fortress until the 5th March; General Rolland, who was in command at Besançon, claimed for the supply of the fortress and the removal of the wounded the whole country situated to the south and east of the town as far as the Swiss frontier. Not until the 19th February did he consent to withdraw his troops to a distance of 10 kilometres from the forts. On the complaint of the French, and after a decision thereon by the Royal Headquarters, the Germans evacuated, on the 21st February, the town of Beaune, situated in the neutral zone.

The South
Army.

Opposite the South Army were the remains of the French East Army, which had escaped to the south of France, had been assembled by General Crémier at Chambéry, and had been again formed as the 24th Corps. It shortly attained an effective of some 23,000 men.

The Army of the Vosges, which, after Garibaldi's withdrawal on the 12th February, was commanded by Admiral Penhoat, stood with some 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of Chalon-sur-Saône. Between it and the 15th Corps were gardes mobiles and franc-tireurs in a strength of 15,000 to 20,000 men, under Generals de Pointe de Gévigny and Du Temple east of the Upper Loire, in the Nièvre and Yonne departments.§

In consequence of the winter campaign and the defeats they had suffered, these troops, almost without exception, were little fit for fighting.

* See Part II, Vol. III, p. 130.

† See Part II, Vol. III, pp. 84, 123, *et seq.*

‡ With regard to the position of the South Army, see Part II, Vol. III, pp. 84, 102, and Appendix CLXX.

§ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 222, note †, and Vol. III, pp. 76, 121, 123.

THE GENERAL SITUATION, MOVEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS
DURING THE ARMISTICE. POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE
CONTENDING ARMIES AT THE END OF THE ARMISTICE.*

After the conclusion of the armistice the divergence of opinion between the Paris Government and the Delegation in Bordeaux had given rise to serious difficulties in respect to carrying out the elections.

In the endeavour to exclude from the National Assembly those who were inclined for peace, Minister Gambetta issued, on the 31st January, special orders, in which, contrary to the liberty of choice stipulated in the Armistice Convention, he excluded from the Chamber all those who since the 2nd December, 1851, had stood in any official relation whatsoever to the Imperial Government. In spite of the protest of the German Chancellor, Count v. Bismarck, against these electoral decrees, the Dictator maintained his previous decision. Only after the Paris Government had sent several of its members to Bordeaux, in order to secure a majority in the councils there,† did Gambetta abandon all further resistance, and on the 6th February sent in his resignation. The elections then went on with speed and order.

Although these promised a result favourable to peace, the necessary preparations were made on both sides for a resumption, if necessary, of hostilities.

French
preparations
to continue
the war.

The French commanders perfectly well knew that the scattering of their forces would be very unfavourable for further operations. By the advice, therefore, of General Faidherbe, the North Army, which was inadequate to cope with the force opposed to it, was disbanded. The 22nd Corps, consisting of 18,000 men and 10 batteries, was despatched by sea to Cherbourg, whence, on the 26th February, it reached the neighbourhood of St. Lô and Bayeux; the 23rd Corps remained in the northern fortresses.

General Chanzy requested permission to transfer the bulk of his forces to the left bank of the Loire, in order to secure the connection with Southern France; the protection of Brittany was to be entrusted to a special corps. Accordingly, in a council of war held at Paris on the 9th—10th February, it was resolved to form an Army of Brittany, 100,000 to 150,000 strong, under General Colomb; its duty consisted in protecting the district west of the Mayenne hitherto held by General Chanzy's troops. It touched near Angers the Army of the Loire, now

* See Plan No. 40.

† On the 1st February a member of the Paris Government, Jules Simon, had arrived at Bordeaux, in order to regulate the elections, but was unable to overcome the opposition of M. Gambetta.

consisting of some 160,000 men, whose position extended as far as Châteauroux, along an arc of a circle open towards the north.*

Whilst before the capitulation of Paris, the main tasks of the armies formed in the provinces had been the relief of the capital and the severance of the enemy's communications, it was now contemplated, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, to remain at first on the defensive in south-east France. For this purpose, there were scarcely 251,900 effectives available.†

The German supreme authorities also made the necessary preparations during the armistice for a resumption of hostilities.

German
preparations
for continuing
hostilities.

The first step was to take measures for restoring the effective to the war strength and to complete the equipment of the army.

In order to be free to act against the French armies still in the field, it was necessary at once to nip in the bud by threat of the most serious reprisals any renewal of the resistance at Paris.

On the heights from Romainville to Aubervilliers, 158 guns, 62 of which French, were placed in battery; at Mont Valérien and in the south forts, besides 367 guns destined to cope with an assault, there were 83 more French guns‡ facing the city. Moreover, 72 Prussian guns were established along the line Ivry—Bicêtre, so that Paris could, after the 19th February, be cannonaded at close range by 680 guns.

At an earlier period it had been considered that two or three army corps could be dispensed with before Paris. A reinforcement of the Ist and South Armies did not appear necessary; on the other hand, the IInd, which was opposed to the most numerous and redoubtable army of the enemy, required an increased

* The 26th Corps, under General Billot, formed in Guéret, had been brought up to the army at Châteauroux.

Appendix CLXXXVIII shows the effective of the French troops behind the Mayenne on the 8th February, 1871.

† These details are based on the "Rapport sur la Situation de l'Effectif de l'Armée Française présent sous les Drapeaux le 5 Février, 1871," prepared by the Committee of Enquiry of the National Assembly.

According to it, the total of the field troops present under arms amounted to 534,452 men and 1,242 guns. The National Guards were reported as being at present "incapables de rendre aucun service à la guerre." The franc-tireurs, originally over 1,500 officers and 36,000 men, had been disbanded, except the most trustworthy members.

In the dépôts, camps of instruction, and in Algiers, there were 354,000 reserve troops, with 57 departmental batteries.

The 132,000 recruits inscribed for the year 1871 had not yet been levied.

The French fleet had given up a large number of men and guns to the field army, and had dismantled most of their fighting ships. It was therefore not in a condition to undertake an enterprise on a large scale. Only two flotillas, which were alternately stationed in the North Sea or at Cherbourg and Dunkirk, a division of despatch-vessels and gunboats at Le Havre, and two ironclad batteries on the Rhône remained in commission. The Loire flotilla had fallen into the hands of the Germans. (See Chevalier, "La Marine Française et la Marine Allemande pendant la Guerre, 1870-71," Rollin, "La Guerre dans l'Ouest," p. 361, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 364.)

‡ In Forts d'Ivry and de Bicêtre, 8 guns each; in Fort de Montrouge, 10; on Mont Valérien, 14; and in Forts de Charenton, de Vanves, and d'Issy, 43 guns. The forts received ammunition for a twenty days' heavy cannonade.

effective. In consequence, the Vth Army Corps was moved on the 9th February to the Loire, in order to relieve the IXth Corps there, while, on the 10th, the IVth Corps followed to Chartres.*

All arrangements were made so that on the resumption of hostilities, the offensive might be taken at all points with vigour and energy.

In consequence of a communication from the Federal Chancellor, according to which a prolongation of the armistice might be expected in view of the result of the elections, the Royal Headquarters instructed the Army Commanders, on the 13th February, to stop temporarily any movements which might already have been commenced in view of the resumption of hostilities.

In pursuance thereof, in the IInd Army the IVth Corps was quartered in the neighbourhood of Nogent-le-Rotrou, the IXth, on relief by the Vth Army Corps,† between Vendôme, Vouvray, and Blois, whilst the rest of the Corps remained generally in their previous positions.‡

Meanwhile, the National Assembly had met at Bordeaux on the 12th February, and the armistice was extended on the 15th until noon on the 24th. M. Thiers, who had been chosen as chief of the Executive Power, declared to the Chambers on the 19th February that he was resolved with all his might to terminate this hopeless war, and that same day, in company with Jules Favre, he proceeded to Paris, in order to commence negotiations for peace at Versailles.

As in spite of these favourable signs there could be no absolute certainty of the armistice being prolonged beyond the 24th, General Count v. Moltke on the 20th instructed the commanders of armies to complete at once all the movements necessary for their security, but not to commence hostilities without express orders.

Meanwhile, on the 21st February the armistice was again extended until midnight of the 26th.

Orders were therefore given by the IInd Army for the IVth Corps with the 4th Cavalry Division to form the right wing of the army at Fresnay-sur-Sarthe and Bonnétable, the IIIrd with the 2nd Cavalry Division remained at Le Mans, and the IXth was to move up between the IIIrd and Xth Corps.

The South Army had been instructed by the Royal Headquarters to turn to account on the resumption of hostilities its superiority and take a rapid offensive against the enemy's forces, which would probably still be found at Autun and Châlon-sur-Saône, and to drive them back upon Lyons. In doing so, they were however, in order to avoid the strong fortress, the siege of

* The Vth Army Corps remained under the orders of the IIIrd Army. The gaps created in the line of investment were filled by changes of quarters of the neighbouring corps.

† Its march had not been interrupted; it occupied Orléans, Blois, and Gien.

‡ The troops only concentrated, in order to make room for the IXth and IVth Army Corps.

which was not contemplated, in no case to proceed beyond Mâcon. In lieu of this the main forces of the South Army, after leaving the XIVth Corps at Châlon-sur-Saône, would then take the offensive towards Bourges by way of Nevers or Moulins. Moreover, preparations were to be made for the immediate investment and siege of Langres.

Accordingly, the IInd Army Corps at Poligny and Lons-le-Saunier, the VIIth at Dijon and Nuits, with a flank detachment on the Sombernon—Bligny-sur-Ouche road, were to hold themselves in readiness for an advance upon Bourg, as well as upon Chagny and Autun. The XIVth Corps was, after drawing in the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions, intended to invest Besançon and Auxonne; secure the communications, and with the remaining available troops* advance against Châlon-sur-Saône.

General v. d. Goltz was entrusted with the expedition against Langres, and Krenski's Detachment as well as ten landwehr battalions of the Government-General of Lorraine were assigned to him.† For the same purpose there were also placed at his disposal eight fortress artillery companies and three fortress pioneer companies, which, with the available material of the Belfort siege park, were to be brought up from the fortress, as also siege material already sent from Longwy to Chaumont.

Of the 1st Army, the 1st Corps had been on the Seine since the 19th February, the VIIIth with the 3rd Reserve Division and 3rd Cavalry Division on the Somme, the 17th Infantry Division as general reserve in Dieppe. As protection against a hostile attack the forces in the Somme district were as early as the 23rd collected in three groups between Péronne and St. Quentin, at Amiens, and at Abbeville respectively. On the same day the order arrived from the Royal Headquarters to concentrate the army on the left wing, after leaving a sufficient force on the Somme. The execution of this order, which had been occasioned by the news of the transfer of the 22nd Corps to Cherbourg, could, however, be countermanded on the 24th February in consequence of the favourable course of the peace negotiations.

For the same reason the intelligence which reached Versailles on the same day of an assembly of the Loire Army at Poitiers, and of the transfer of the command of the Vosges Army caused no further measures on the part of the Royal Headquarters, so that the changes in position of the IInd and South Armies already commenced were brought to a termination‡ in the next few days.

The German field army in France numbered on the 1st March, 1871, § 464,221 infantry, 55,562 horses, and 1,674 guns, whilst the garrison troops mustered 105,272 infantry, 5,681

* The Baden Division and some Landwehr battalions.

† See Part II, Vol. III, p. 84.

‡ See Plan No. 40.

§ Appendix CLXXX shows the effective of the German Army in France on 1st March, 1871.

The line of communication during the armistice.

horses, and 68 guns, so that the total strength of all the German troops in France amounted to 569,493 infantry, 61,243 horses, and 1,742 guns. Besides these there were numerous dépôt troops available in Germany.*

We have still to speak briefly of the line of communications of the German army during the armistice.†

The extent and carrying power of the railways at disposal had considerably increased since the conclusion of the Convention of the 30th January,‡ as the repair of the damaged lines was actively proceeded with on the part both of the French and the Germans. But the railways had now to endeavour to meet far greater demands upon them. Besides provisions for Paris, arrangements had to be made for forwarding the reserves of men and material which were needed in order that hostilities, if necessary, might be resumed with full force. Nevertheless, the different lines were not strained beyond what they could bear, as the German authorities exercised exclusive supervision over the traffic. This supervision extended also to those lines used in common with the French, to which were shortly added the lines Laval—Le Mans—Paris, Argentan—Dreux—Paris, Orléans—Tours, and Rouen—Poissy—Paris. The trains laden by the French ran only as through trains.

It was of no little importance that the French Government provided, on payment, 200 locomotives and 5,000 carriages, by which measure the previous scarcity of rolling stock could be more quickly supplemented.

The 1st Army received as a new means of communication the line Rouen—Dieppe, whilst a regular traffic was opened on the line Versailles—Houdan—Dreux, and was extended towards the west.§ The lines Amiens—Abbeville and Tergnier—St. Quentin, which had been repaired by the French, could now be jointly used by the Germans.

As regards the IIIrd and Meuse Armies the terminal stations could be pushed closer to Paris. On and after the 11th February the Paris circular railway ran goods and hospital trains, a matter of importance both for the troops west of Paris belonging to the IIIrd Army and also for the IIrd Army. The latter, after the restoration of the Yonne bridge at La Roche on 11th February,|| was able to send its trains not only along the central line through Paris, but also on the southern line through Juvisy and Paris to the heart of its cantonments. These communications were further supplemented by opening the lines Orléans—Tours and Le Mans—Beaumont-sur-Sarthe.

In the rayon of the South Army, the line Vesoul—Belfort was put in working order after the fall of the fortress. The

* Appendix CXC shows the effective of the German dépôt troops at the beginning of March, 1871.

† See General Map No. 10.

‡ See ante, p. 149.

§ See Part II, Vol. III, p. 108.

|| See Part II, Vol. III, p. 109.

viaduct of Xertigny* having been restored, the entire line from Blainville to Gray was opened to traffic on 24th February.

No further interruption of these communications took place, notwithstanding the circumstance that the franc-tireurs scattered over the country only submitted by degrees to the armistice, and that the German garrison troops had to be occasionally employed to entirely disperse them.

On the German coasts, as well, all measures of security necessary in the event of a resumption of hostilities were taken during the armistice. Besides the mixed brigades† intended for Hamburg and Bremen, 28 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 3 batteries were available for the immediate protection of the remaining points on the coast.‡ 13½ battalions, 5 rifle companies, 14 squadrons, and 1 battery, the employment of which was reserved by General Vogel v. Falckenstein, were held in readiness in the rearward garrisons.§ Consequently, for more extensive operations, a total force of 52½ battalions,|| 25 squadrons, and 6 batteries could be reckoned upon, while 22 garrison battalions and 22 dépôt squadrons were employed to guard the prisoners of war.

Proceedings
in the littoral
provinces.

The armament of the Emden batteries with heavy guns from Minden, as also an extension of the batteries at Cuxhaven and Hohen-Wieschendorf were in contemplation; at the same time, preparations were made for increasing the number of sunken ships and torpedoes, and for removing the buoys and landmarks at an opportune moment.

The greater part of the iron-clad fleet, together with four gunboats, was intended to protect Wilhelmshaven.¶ The embouchure of the Ems was to be defended by the gunboats "Comet" and "Natter," that of the Weser by the gunboats "Jäger," "Hay," and "Wolf," that of the Elbe by the ironclad "Prinz Adalbert," and the gunboats "Cyclop," "Fuchs," "Hyäne," and "Habicht."

* See Part II, Vol. III, p. 110.

† At this time the brigade appointed to protect Bremen numbered only five battalions. See Part II, Vol. III, p. 139.

‡ The following could also be employed for coast defence:—24 fortress artillery companies, 9 reserve marine artillery companies, 1 dépôt pioneer company, 4 fortress pioneer companies.

§ Besides these troops intended for use as a combined force, the Governor-General had reserved the following:—Parts of the dépôt divisions of Nos. 9 and 10 field artillery regiments, 6 fortress artillery companies, 2 pioneer dépôt divisions, 4 train dépôt divisions.

|| Including 14 Landwehr battalions, which the War Ministry had appointed to act as a reinforcement, if required, as also the marine and reserve marine battalions.

¶ The corvette "Augusta" was also ordered home during the armistice.

THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES.

Whilst the contending armies were making their preparations in case of a resumption of hostilities, the peace negotiations, commenced on the 21st February, continued their course.

After M. Thiers had left no stone unturned to obtain milder conditions, and the Germans had made some concessions, the preliminaries of peace were signed on the afternoon of the 26th February by the German Chancellor, as well as by representatives of the South German States.

France bound herself by this Convention* to renounce in favour of the German Empire, Alsace, excepting the fortress of Belfort, and part of Lorraine, and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs, of which one milliard at least was to be paid in 1871, the rest in the course of the next three years.

The evacuation of the territory occupied by the German armies was to commence immediately after the ratification of the Convention, and to be carried out gradually in proportion to the payment of the war indemnity.

The troops were not to make requisitions, but were to be fed at the expense of the French Government. Concurrently with the first evacuation, the French forces, with the exception of a garrison of 40,000 men for Paris and the necessary fortress garrisons, were to retire behind the Loire, and not to recross the river until the final signature of the Treaty of Peace. The opening of the necessary negotiations was to commence at Brussels immediately after the ratification of the preliminaries, as also the surrender of the French prisoners of war.

By two supplementary conventions, the armistice was prolonged until the 12th of March, with the reservation that it might be terminated by either party on and after the 3rd of March, with a delay of three days for the re-commencement of hostilities. Lastly, it was further agreed that on the 1st of March a force of 30,000 Germans should enter Paris, and until the ratification of the Convention† should occupy the part of the town bounded by the Seine, by the enceinte between Point du Jour and the Porte des Ternes, the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré and the Jardin des Tuileries.‡

The dethronement of the Napoleonic dynasty having been decreed, the Chief of the Executive Power succeeded, on the 1st of March, in inducing the National Assembly at Bordeaux to ratify the Convention. The arrangements for the occupation of the French capital were, in consequence, only carried out to a

* Appendix CLXXIX contains the Preliminary Convention and its Supplement.

† According to Article III of the Preliminary Convention.

‡ See Sketch No. 8.

limited extent. Nevertheless, the entry of part of the German army into Paris possessed great importance, as it thereby showed the complete submission of the adversary.

The troops were to enter the city on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th of March in three echelons, which relieved each other in succession.*

On the morning of 1st March, His Majesty the Emperor and King passed in review the first echelon on the Longchamps. After its termination, the German forces entered the enemy's capital, colours flying, to the strains of the Triumphal March into Paris which had been played in the year 1814.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 2nd March, the ratifications were exchanged, and in consequence thereof the Royal Headquarters gave orders for the occupied parts of the city to be evacuated. The first echelon left in the forenoon of the 3rd, whilst, at the same time, His Majesty the Emperor and King held a parade of the second echelon on the Longchamps. On the previous day, His Majesty, the Commander-in-Chief, communicated to Her Majesty the Empress and Queen Augusta the final glorious result obtained by the German army, in the following terms:—

"I have just ratified the Treaty of Peace, which was accepted yesterday by the National Assembly at Bordeaux. After seven months of glorious struggle, thanks to the bravery, devotion, and endurance of all ranks of the incomparable army, and the ready self-sacrifice of the Fatherland, the great work is now terminated. The God of Armies has everywhere visibly blest our enterprise, and has by His grace permitted this honourable peace. Glory be to Him! My heartfelt thanks to the Army and to the Fatherland.

(Signed) "WILLIAM."

* 1st Echelon :—11,000 men of VIth Army Corps.
 11,000 " of IIInd Bavarian Corps.
 8,000 " of XIth "
 IIInd Echelon :—29,200 " of Guard Corps and Guard Landwehr Division.
 2,200 " of 7th Grenadiers.
 3,000 " of Fortress Artillery and Fortress Pioneers.
 IIIrd Echelon :—15,000 " of XIIth Army Corps.
 7,200 " of Ist Bavarian Corps.
 7,000 " of Württemberg Field Division.

RETURN OF THE ARMY, AND THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT.

DISPOSITIONS FOR THE MARCH.

In accordance with Article III of the peace preliminaries,* the surrender of the forts situated on the left bank of the Seine was to be simultaneous with the evacuation of the capital; in the next place, the district between the Seine and Loire was to be quitted as soon as possible by the opposed armies.†

The departments on the right bank of the Seine were not retroceded to France until after the conclusion of the definite peace, and in proportion to the payments made to Germany. The departments of the Ardennes, Marne, Haute Marne, Meuse, Vosges, and Meurthe, as also the fortress of Belfort, were appointed as a special security for the three last milliards, but the number of German troops to be left in them was not to exceed 50,000 men. Germany, at the same time, declared herself ready to accept sufficient financial guarantees in lieu of the security agreed upon.

The Royal Headquarters issued general instructions‡ as to the mode of carrying out the evacuation of the territory west of the Seine, as also with regard to the changes necessary in the distribution of the army. In arranging the new positions regard was had to restoring the original order of battle, to comfortable quarters for the troops and the preparations for their return march, as also to the possibility of assembling rapidly in the event of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover, the troops selected for the permanent occupation of the newly acquired districts were now appointed, and moved off for their future garrisons. The reserve and Landwehr troops stationed in these parts or in French territory could be dismissed to their homes, whilst in place of them the VIIth and XIIth Army Corps, as also the Württemberg Division, were to take over the duty in rear of the army, and for this purpose were to be detached from their present commands.§

In consequence of these arrangements, the headquarters Ist Army moved the 1st Infantry Division from its position on the Rille to the right bank of the Seine at Rouen, which place it reached on 12th March. It relieved the detachments of the Guard Corps and XIIth Army Corps, which had been engaged

* See *ante*, p. 160, and Appendix CLXXIX.

† The details were regulated by a special military Convention, concluded on 4th March.

‡ Appendix CLXXXI gives the directions with regard to the execution of the preliminary Convention and the armistice Convention of 26th February, 1871.

§ They at the same time passed under the orders of the Royal Headquarters. By an Imperial Cabinet Order of 5th March, the Governments-General of Lorraine, Rheims, and Versailles, were abolished, and their functions transferred to the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies.

in these districts, and ordered the return march of the 17th Division in accordance with instructions meanwhile received from the Royal Headquarters.

The remaining troops continued to occupy the Departments of the Somme, Seine Inférieure, and Eure,* and that part of the Department of the Oise which lies west of the Gisors—Beauvais—Breteuil road.†

The 5th Cavalry Division had been transferred to the Meuse Army.‡

Greater changes became necessary with the IInd Army, which had, up to that time, been posted with its main forces on the Sarthe and in the Touraine. It had first to send away the IVth Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division. Both were in the neighbourhood of Alençon. The former returned by way of Mantes to the Meuse Army, the latter by way of Chartres and Melun to the IIIrd Army. The bulk of the IInd Army moved to the Upper Seine in three columns. The IIIrd Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division crossed the river at Nogent,§ the IXth Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division at Troyes, the Xth Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division at Châtillon. The Xth Army Corps had the longest distance to march, and consequently could not reach the right bank of the Seine until the 31st March.||

The army now occupied the whole of the country newly assigned to it.¶ This included the Department of Haute Marne, and also those parts of the Aube and Côte d'Or Departments situated on the right bank of the Seine, the last-named Department being separated on the south-east from the district assigned to the South Army by a line drawn from the sources of the Seine to Grancey-le-Château. As it turned out that the troops had not all been able to find the wished for good quarters, the IInd Army, together with the Württemberg Division, were assigned in addition the Departments of the Marne and Vosges, so that they could spread out more widely and enjoy greater comfort.

The Army Headquarters, which, during the march to the Seine, had remained for some time at Fontainebleau, were established in Chaumont from the 19th March. As the Commander-in-Chief had meanwhile received leave of absence,**

* Except those parts of the two last-named departments lying on the left bank of the Seine.

† See Map No. 41.

‡ It had crossed the Seine at Mantes, where, however, it was detained for two days by the presence of 12,000 French troops, who were waiting to be conveyed by train to Paris.

§ Some parts of this column followed the IXth Corps through Troyes.

|| The Convention of the 4th March had fixed the 28th as the limit for the evacuation. It was, however, extended by agreement to the 1st April, in consequence of the position of the Xth Corps.

¶ See Map No. 41.

** Prince Frederic Charles proceeded by Royal command from Fontainebleau to Berlin for the opening of the first German Reichstag.

General v. Voigts-Rhetz had been appointed to succeed him temporarily.*

The South Army, which had been much weakened by the departure of the VIIth Corps, as likewise of the landwehr and reserve troops, sustained a further diminution by the return home of the Baden Division.† It was, therefore, reinforced by the Vth Army Corps coming from Blois and Orléans, and by the 1st Cavalry Division, which was detached from the IIInd Army after the passage of the Seine. The South Army retained in general the former positions in the Haute Saône and Doubs Departments, which were assigned to it, and also occupied those parts of the Jura and Côte d'Or Departments‡ left to the Germans by the Armistice Convention of 15th February.§

The South Army was broken up by an Imperial Cabinet Order of the 31st March. Its troops were incorporated in the IIInd Army, and the chief command of the whole was entrusted to General v. Manteuffel, who established his headquarters at Dijon.

In front of Paris the Meuse Army occupied the Seine et Oise Department, or as much of it as lies on the right bank of the Seine and north of the Oureq Canal, as also that part of the Oise Department left free by the 1st Army. The 1st Guard Infantry Division, posted in front line towards the capital, occupied St. Denis as well as Forts de l'Est and d'Auberwilliers.¶

The IIIrd Army was placed in more difficult circumstances. The forts on the left bank of the Seine and the Gennevilliers peninsula, which were included in their rayon, were, it is true, handed over to the French authorities on the 7th March, but all the troops which were still south of the Seine could not be at once withdrawn. Moreover, it was first necessary to remove the siege park and the captured war material, and on the few available roads the movement which had been ordered could only be gradually carried out. On the 10th March the evacuation was commenced, and was then terminated without further interruption. On the 19th, Versailles was also to be given back to the French. But meanwhile the French Government had expressed a wish that the sittings of the National Assembly

* From the 18th March.

† It was still to remain mobilised for the present in Germany. For a time the South Army had only the IIInd Army Corps to maintain peace and order in the district assigned to it, as General v. d. Goltz's detachment had also been disbanded.

‡ Part of the last-named department had been given up to the IIInd Army. Towards the south-west this department was bounded by a line drawn from the sources of the Seine to Chagny. The arrondissement of Beaune was, however, evacuated on the 24th March. (See Map No. 41.)

§ See Part II, Vol. III, p. 84, and Appendix CLXX.

¶ With the evacuation of Paris, the control over the right of entry ceased, and the traffic for passengers and goods was thrown open.

¶ By a Convention supplementing the Agreement of 4th March, a new line of demarcation had been agreed upon for the troops on the north of Paris after the surrender of Mont Valérien. It commenced on the right bank of the Seine above St. Denis, and ran to the east of St. Ouen as far as the enceinte.

should be transferred thither with the least possible delay. The Royal Headquarters moved on the 7th to Ferrières, after declaring its readiness in the convention concluded on the previous day to evacuate Versailles and its immediate vicinity on the 11th March. In exchange for this, the IIIrd Army was allowed to march through the Gennevilliers peninsula,* to occupy provisionally Clamart and Vitry-sur-Seine,† and to use the Ivry bridge‡ for removing the war material.§ Versailles could not, however, be given up on the 11th March, as differences of opinion had meanwhile arisen between the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments as to carrying out certain provisions of the Convention.

The French commander, who presented himself this day at the German outposts, had offered to await on the right bank of the Seine near Paris the further decision. The difficulties which had arisen were quickly removed by negotiations at Ferrières. On the 12th, Versailles was given up. The Germans marched off, part by the north and part by the south of Paris, to the district assigned in future to the IIIrd Army, namely, the Seine and Oise Department south of the Ourcq Canal, and the Seine and Marne Department on the right bank of the Seine.|| The 22nd Division proceeded to occupy the Forts de Romainville, de Noisy, de Rosny, and de Nogent; it touched on the south the 2nd Bavarian Division, which was in first line. The headquarters had proceeded to Meaux. On the 21st March there were no longer any German troops in this direction on the south bank of the Seine.

From the 14th March the Meuse Army was disbanded, and all the troops remaining before Paris, placed under the orders of the Crown Prince of Saxony as IIIrd Army.

As for the future the German armies had only to watch the execution of the Convention, His Majesty the Emperor and King, accompanied by the Crown Prince of Germany, left Nancy, where the Royal Headquarters had been since the 13th March, and proceeded by way of Frankfort-on-the-Maine to Berlin.

The last movements had afforded several opportunities of assembling large bodies of troops for a review. On the 7th March the Ist Bavarian Corps, the XIIth Army Corps,

* For the 10th and 11th March. Marching quarters might also be occupied there.

† Both places were hitherto considered neutral. The Germans had, however, the right to guard the siege and captured material until it could be removed.

‡ Up to 19th March.

§ In the Convention of 4th March, a line of demarcation south of Paris had been agreed upon which ran from Bougival through Buzanval to St. Cloud, and from Bas Meudon to the Upper Seine, and which was to hold good during the interval between the surrender of the south forts and the complete withdrawal of the German troops. This line of demarcation was now extended round Versailles, so that it was indicated by the villages of Bougival, Louveciennes, Bailly, Noisy, Rennemoulin, Bois d'Arcis, Bouvier, then along the Bièvre to Petit Jouy, and further on by way of L'Hotel-Dieu, Vélizy, Villebon, Meudon.

|| See Map No. 41.

and the Württemberg Division were inspected by the Emperor on the plateau of Noisy-le-Grand and Villiers-sur-Marne near Paris; on the 12th March the 1st Army Corps and 17th Division were reviewed at Rouen; on the 13th, the VIIIth Army Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Reserve Division were reviewed at Amiens, by H.I. & R.H. the Crown Prince by special order of His Majesty.

On the day of his departure for Germany His Majesty the Emperor and King addressed the following army order to the whole Army:—

“Soldiers of the German Army!

“I leave this day French territory, upon which the German name has acquired so much fresh military honour, but upon which so much precious blood has been shed.

“An honourable peace is now assured, and the troops have already commenced to return to their homes. I bid you farewell, and I thank you once more from the bottom of my heart for all that you have achieved in this war by your bravery and endurance. You return home with the proud consciousness of having fought victoriously in one of the greatest wars the world has ever seen, of having preserved the Fatherland from being trodden by hostile foot, and of having reconquered for the German Empire countries which it had long lost. May the army of the now united Germany ever remember that only by constantly striving after perfection can it maintain its high position; then can we look forward to the future with confidence.

“Nancy, 15th March, 1871.

(Signed) “WILLIAM.”

INSURRECTION OF THE COMMUNE AT PARIS.

THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT.

The Emperor's words of thanks had hardly died away, the army was preparing to celebrate with festivities the birthday of its Commander-in-Chief, when, in striking contrast, civil war broke out in Paris.

The revolutionary movement* which had commenced in the capital during the siege had made more and more progress, so that the garrison of 40,000 men, allowed by the preliminary peace, proved to be quite inadequate for the maintenance of tranquillity. The masses, strengthened by National and Mobile Guards, gained possession of a large number of guns and quantities of stores, and, under the direction of a "Central Committee," offered open resistance to the Government. The latter sought in vain to repress the disorder. On the 18th March, M. Thiers moved the regiments that were still trustworthy to Versailles, partly for the protection of the Government established in the town, and partly to withdraw them from the corrupting influence of the Paris intriguers, so that the capital was now entirely given up to the revolutionary party.

The Germans, in view of their own security, were ready to afford every possible aid to the authorities, although they did not feel themselves called upon to intervene actively in foreign disorders without they were forced to do so.

In this sense, the Army Commanders-in-Chief were instructed to prevent any revolutionary movements in their own districts, as well as any departures for Paris likely to add fuel to the flame; but, so far as possible, to comply with any wishes of the French Government.

The troops of the IIIrd Army further in rear were brought up nearer the forts, the outposts again posted along the line of demarcation, and the process of disarming suspended. On the 23rd March the necessary movements were completed. The troops received instructions to resist with all the means in their power any sorties from Paris; the men in power there were also informed that any attempt to arm the fronts facing the Germans would at once entail an immediate bombardment of the city.† The insurgents were well aware that an attack

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 389.

† Of heavy guns, there were 9 in Fort de la Briche, 11 in St. Denis, 14 in Fort de l'Est, 25 in d'Aubervilliers, 28 in de Romainville, 14 in de Noisy, 14 in de Rosny, 14 in de Nogent, 18 in Charenton, 7 in the Redoute de la Faisanderie, and 10 in Fort de Gravelle. The disarming of the latter work was already carried out. Until the arrival of those 18 heavy guns a Bavarian 6-pounder battery was placed there.

Eleven fortress artillery companies were distributed among the forts, 9 more in

on the German positions could be only prejudicial to the object at which they were aiming, and consequently directed their efforts solely to securing their predominance in the capital, and to preparing a sortie against Versailles. Accordingly, the troops in front of Paris could on the 2nd April be once more distributed in more scattered quarters, which were, however, so arranged that a rapid concentration could be again easily effected.

Although these events had hitherto produced no influence on the positions of the 1st, 2nd, and South Armies, any diminution of the German troops in France did not appear advisable. For this reason the 17th Division, which in its return march had reached the south of Mézières, was detained by orders to remain temporarily in that neighbourhood.

The French Government, which required an increased body of troops in order to suppress the insurrection, applied to the German authorities for the necessary authorization.

On the 28th March a Convention was accordingly concluded at Rouen,* by virtue of which the French Government bound itself to employ its troops at Versailles only against Paris and for the protection of the National Assembly. For these purposes alone they were allowed to raise their force to 80,000 men, including 10,000 National and Mobile Guards; they were further permitted to collect the required number of men at Besançon, Auxerre, and Cambrai, while their transport to Versailles, so far as the districts occupied by the Germans were affected, was to be furthered by every possible means.

To supply the deficiencies, the French Government calculated chiefly upon the homeward bound prisoners of war, the transport of which along the lines Metz—Charleville, Strassburg—Lunéville, Mülhausen—Vesoul, had been regulated by a special Convention on the 11th March. Its execution, however, met with difficulties, as neither the rolling-stock to be furnished by the French, nor the Commissaries to be sent to the terminal stations for the reception of the troops, arrived at the proper time. Later on, after the outbreak of the revolution in the capital, the increasing insecurity necessitated great caution in setting at liberty these mostly well-drilled troops, for it was not beyond the range of possibility that part of them might side with the insurgents. On the basis of the Rouen Convention only 20,000 line troops, besides National and Mobile Guards, were at first allowed to return.

This augmentation of the Versailles army gave no cause for anxiety, inasmuch as the 3rd Army could within two days assemble 200,000 men before the capital.

the parks at Brou, Sévran, and Villiers-le-Bel. In the latter, 51 heavy guns were still left. Those fortress artillery and pioneer companies which were of no further service in France were sent home.

* Lieutenant-General v. Fabrice, hitherto Governor-General at Versailles, was charged with the negotiations. He was to represent the Federal Chancellor in settling all questions which might arise, whether legal, administrative, or diplomatic.

On the 2nd April the insurgents proceeded to attack Versailles, but were repulsed on this as well as on the following day. On the 4th April, the Government troops occupied the Châtillon plateau and the left bank of the Seine from Sèvres to near Courbevoie. This movement not only served to protect their own positions, but at the same time to prepare for the further advance against the fortifications of the city.

It was not until the 25th April that Marshal MacMahon, to whom had been entrusted the chief command of the troops assembled at Versailles, undertook the attack of Forts d'Issy and de Vanves. The former was found by the troops evacuated on the 10th May; the latter was captured on the 13th.

During these engagements the peace negotiations, commenced on the 28th March at Brussels and continued in the beginning of May at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, under the personal direction of the Imperial German Chancellor, had proceeded so rapidly that the definitive peace on the basis of the preliminaries, and with the condition that the ratification should be made within ten days, could be signed on the 10th May.*

The ratification having been effected by the Germans on the 16th, the French National Assembly accepted the peace on the 18th by 440 against 98 votes.

In view of the continuance of the bitter struggle between the troops of the Government and the insurgents, a fresh concentration† of the IIIrd Army in front of the capital appeared necessary. On the 17th this was completed.

On the 20th May Marshal MacMahon opened fire with such effect from the Bois de Boulogne upon the city fortifications, that on the following day the ramparts, abandoned by the insurgents, could be escalated at the Porte de St. Cloud.

On the news of the entry of Government troops into Paris, the traffic through all the gates in front of the German positions was suspended during the night of the 21st—22nd May. The outposts advanced in part to the positions they had held during the armistice, in part still nearer to the ramparts, as Article 7 of the ratified Convention gave the Germans, in the interest of their own safety, power over the neutral zone in front of the capital. Behind the front line supports were placed in

* Appendix CLXXXII contains the text of the Treaty of 10th May, 1871, with its supplementary conditions, and the final protocol of the same day.

† The IVth Army Corps assembled the 8th Division in the neighbourhood of Pontoise; the 7th, after crossing the Oise, moved into a district bounded by this river, the Seine, and the line St. Gratien—Beaumont. Next to this came the close cantonnements of the Guard Corps, which stretched southward as far as the Oureq Canal, eastward as far as the railway Mitry—Crépy-en-Valois. The XIth Army Corps brought up to Livry those parts of the 22nd Division which were unemployed as garrisons (*see ante*, p. 165); the 21st Division concentrated at Chelles on both banks of the Marne. The Ist Bavarian Army Corps brought up its troops in rear nearer to the forts, in order to make room for the VIth Army Corps. The army headquarters were established at Margency.

The Ist Army had pushed forward the 1st Division in the direction of Creil on the Oise.

readiness, in order to defeat any attempt to break through the line.

The further advance of the Government troops in the interior of Paris was apparent to the Germans by the flight of the insurgents and the crashing of the shells.* The masses who congregated before the gates were not allowed to pass. In order to prevent their departure from the city, the outposts were pushed forward close up to the barriers.†

After a terrible struggle, lasting for eight days, in the streets and at the barricades, Paris again passed into the hands of the recognised Government.‡ The restrictive measures of precaution taken by the Germans could now be removed. On the 30th the troops in general returned to their old cantonments.§

CONTINUATION OF THE RETURN MARCH AND THE DEMOBILISATION.

The German conditions having been fully complied with, and the French Government having re-established its authority in Paris, there was no longer any impediment to the withdrawal of those German forces which were not to be employed in the subsequent occupation. The arrangements to this end had been long since drawn up in a detailed manner.

After determining the main features of the plan, the Executive Commission,|| in concert with the Railway Direction, determined the amount of work to be done by the different lines, and the time-tables for the trains.

Further, in order to ensure the supplies while marching to the entraining stations, numerous magazines had been established on the great roads leading to the Rhine, which in case of need could be refilled within three to five days. The troops received orders to march in successive echelons at a day's march apart; these echelons, composed of all arms, were to have a total depth of three or four days' march. The opportune publication of the new peace distribution allowed of the exchange which had become necessary in certain units to take

* Lieutenant Egler, 11th Bavarian Regiment, and three men were wounded; also three men of the 9th.

Appendix CLXXXIII contains a return of casualties of the German troops in France from 1st February to the beginning of the occupation.

† In consequence of the threatening attitude of the masses who demanded to pass through, two battalions of the 2nd Foot Guards were called up. Château Vincennes was surrounded by a chain of posts until the arrival of the troops from Versailles.

‡ On 28th May.

§ The occupation of the neutral zone opposite Fort de Romainville in contravention to the Treaty led later on to a complaint. But the explanations tendered by the French military authorities quickly brought about an understanding.

|| See Appendix V, and Part II, Vol. III, p. 111.

place before the movement commenced. The regiments also of the Cavalry Divisions which had been broken up could mostly rejoin their corps while still on French soil. The return march was executed in four great echelons, the succession of which was so regulated that the march to the frontier could be carried out without any crossing of the columns, and thence their transport by rail could be at once commenced.*

Only the Guard and the IVth Army Corps were entrained at the nearest stations of the line Mitry—Soissons and Meaux—Epernay. The VIIIth, as also the bulk of the XIth Corps, and the Württemberg Field Division continued the march home by road.†

The transport proceeded according to the preconcerted plan. By the middle of July all the troops had reached their garrisons.

In order to restore to the country with the least possible delay the working power of which it had so long been deprived, it had been decided on the 4th March to disband the garrison battalions and the unmounted landwehr dépôt squadrons according as they could be dispensed with, and also to

* Part of these troops were not entrained until after they had crossed the Rhine.

† 1st Echelon—

Vth Army Corps, entrained at Belfort and Mülhausen from 27th May.

VIIth Army Corps, entrained at Saarlouis from 1st June.

17th Infantry Division, entrained at Mainz from 8th June, marching thither *via* Thionville and Saarlouis.

IInd Echelon—

Guard Corps entrained from 2nd June, on the lines Mitry—Soissons and Meaux—Epernay.

IXth Army Corps: 18th Division, by road *via* Lunéville—Kaiserslautern to Mainz, then entrained from 17th June.

25th Division by road *via* Saverne, Weissenburg, Mannheim to Darmstadt.

XIIth Corps (exclusive 24th Division) by road *via* Verdun—Metz to Mainz and Frankfort, then entrained from 26th June.

IInd Bavarian Army Corps, by road *via* Sezanne, Vitry—Nancy to Meaux, then entrained from 28th June.

Württemberg Field Division, by road *via* Neufchâteau, St. Dié, and Strassburg.

IIIrd Echelon—

IIIrd Army Corps (exclusive 6th Division), by road *via* St. Menchould and Metz—one part to Saargemünd, the other to Mosbach. Then both by rail, commencing respectively on the 21st and 26th June.

VIth Army Corps (exclusive 11th Division), by road to Nancy and Blainville-la-Grande, then entrained from 2nd July.

VIIIth Army Corps, by road.

XIth Army Corps (exclusive 22nd Division), by road, except the Cassel troops, which proceeded by rail from Mainz.

Ist Bavarian Army Corps (exclusive 2nd Division), by road *via* Nancy to Strassburg and Maxau, thence entrained from 8th and 9th July respectively.

IVth Echelon—

IInd Army Corps (exclusive 4th Division), entrained at Gray, Vesoul, and Belfort from 18th June.

IVth Army Corps, entrained on 12th June.

Xth Army Corps (exclusive 19th Division) entrained at Vitry, Bar-le-Duc, Blainville-la-Grande, and Nancy, from 21st June.

demobilise and dismiss all the garrison troops left at, or returning home.

At the same time the dismantling of the fortresses and coast fortifications had been commenced, but the latter were to retain for the time being a certain power of resistance. Moreover, the speedy removal of all the submarine defences which might impede navigation was commenced. A Cabinet Order of 4th April, 1871, ordered the complete disarming of the coast works, except so much as was necessary to retain for future purposes, as also the disbandment or return to their homes of the troops employed in the littoral provinces.* On the 9th March the command-in-chief of the forces in the Baltic and North Sea was abolished, and orders given for the reduction of the navy to the peace effective.† The state of siege for the districts of the 1st, IInd, VIIth, IXth, Xth, and XIth Army Corps was raised on the 27th March, and on 8th April the order followed for the demobilisation of the five Governments General which had administered the districts of the North German Confederation.

The demobilisation of the whole of the Prussian field army, in accordance with the Royal Cabinet Order of the 1st June, 1871, commenced with the Vth and VIIth Army Corps, which were the first to return home.‡ and with the Guard Corps. This order was applied to the other Corps according to the date that they returned to their districts.

The return of the South German troops to the peace footing took place on reaching their peace garrisons.

On the news of the long wished for return of the troops, preparations were made at all points to receive them.

Besides the triumphal entries which the respective sovereigns and the free towns contrived for the warriors returning to their homes, the whole nation prepared for them a splendid reception. The 16th June had been fixed to greet the German Army and Navy in the newly constituted capital of the German Empire, which wore a holiday aspect on the occasion.

After reviewing in front of the gates of the city the Guard Corps and those detachments deputed to represent the whole

* In the territory of the North German Confederation the advanced works of Saarlouis, Mainz, and Coblenz, were alone armed, as well as the works on the coast and the river mouths (*see* subsequent narrative). Orders were at the same time sent for the disarming, and for the raising of the state of siege, of the South German fortresses.

† The Volunteer Seewehr was also disbanded.

‡ The Landwehr troops necessary for guarding the prisoners of war were not dismissed until the arrival of these troops. Since the conclusion of the definitive peace the return of all the prisoners of war still in Germany proceeded without hindrance, and was assisted to a great extent by the circumstance that the rolling-stock, which had to be sent to France for the return of the German armies, could be utilised.

army, His Majesty the Emperor and King, surrounded by the German princes and his generals, made his entry into Berlin at the head of his troops.

After defiling past the statue of Frederick the Great, the Emperor proceeded to unveil the monument, which the filial piety of the Sovereign and the gratitude of the Fatherland had erected to the memory of Frederick William III, the Conqueror in the War of Liberation. This celebration formed a worthy close to a war which had been brought to a successful issue by following in the footsteps of our fathers.

THE OCCUPATION.

On the 27th May, 1871, the disbandment of the 1st Army had been ordered; on the 4th June, a similar order had been given for that of the IInd and IIIrd.^{*} For the occupation of the territory serving as guarantee for the payment of the war indemnity, his Majesty had appointed the following:—From the 1st Army, the 1st Corps; from the IInd, the 4th, 6th, 19th, and 24th[†] Divisions; from the IIIrd, the 11th, 22nd, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions. For the last period, after the payment of two milliards, the 4th, 6th, 19th, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions had been appointed. All the German troops on French soil were combined into the Army of Occupation in France, to the command of which his Majesty the Emperor and King appointed, on the 20th June, General von Manteuffel. In virtue of full powers conferred upon him by the supreme authorities, the General agreed with M. Thiers with regard to the details of the quartering and feeding of the German troops, as well as with regard to their relations with the inhabitants of the occupied districts.

In consequence of the foresight of the Commander-in-Chief, all these circumstances were arranged for the Army of Occupation in the most satisfactory manner. To facilitate further communication, the Chief of the Executive Power had delegated the Count de St. Vallier and the Intendant Blondeau to the headquarters of General v. Manteuffel.

The troops of the Army of Occupation established themselves in the quarters first proposed for them, at the same time that the bulk of the German forces returned to their homes. The 11th, 22nd, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions occupied the positions of the Guard, XIth and 1st Bavarian Corps; the 1st Army Corps occupied the district previously held by the 1st Army, including the Aisne Department; the 6th Division, the Marne Department; the 4th received the Vosges, Haute Saône, and Doubs Departments as well as those parts of the Jura and Côte d'Or Departments belonging to the occupation territory; to the 19th were assigned the Aube Department east of the Seine, the Haute Marne, Meurthe and Meuse as far as the Ste. Menchould—Verdun—Metz road; to the 24th was given that part of the Meuse Department situated to the north of that road, the part of the Moselle Department left to the French and the Ardennes Department.

^{*} The Crown Prince of Saxony, having relinquished the command of the IIIrd Army in consequence of the Royal Cabinet Order of the 3rd June, the Chief of the General Staff, General v. Schlotheim, carried on the work temporarily. At the same time, the 1st Army Corps was attached to this Army.

[†] The 24th Division had been for some time under the orders of the IInd Army.

In distributing these troops, the numbers of which were limited to the least possible,* over this extensive territory,† the main point kept in view was the permanent occupation of the fortresses and of the chief towns of the departments. The troops in excess of these requirements were to form reserves for unforeseen contingencies.

In respect to the exceptional task of this army and the dangerous position in which it might be placed should war break out, not only was it maintained in a condition for the field, but detailed arrangements were made for the employment of the different parts in the event of a concentration becoming necessary. The forts in front of Paris remained fully armed;‡ their ten days' supply of food was raised to three weeks.§

Belfort acquired enhanced importance in consequence of the gradual evacuation of the adjoining departments and the resulting separation from the rest of the territory of occupation. For this reason, not only was the strength of its garrison raised to the war footing, but the heavy artillery necessary for its defence together with the proper ammunition was placed there.||

After the breaking up of the existing Inspections-General of Etappen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation took upon himself the duties connected with the communications. The place of the Line Commissions at Rheims and Nancy was taken by the Railway Commission at Nancy, upon which devolved, besides its own duties, all arrangements with the French railway administrations.

Meanwhile the time was approaching for the payment of the first half milliard, which, according to the Frankfort agreement, was to take place thirty days after the re-establishment of the Government in Paris. In modification of the Preliminary Peace, it had been determined by the Treaty of Frankfort that, for this period, the Departments of the Somme, Seine

* The infantry and cavalry of these divisions were organised according to the peace distribution; the battalion had a total strength of 802. Besides these, there was with each Division a division of artillery, a pioneer company with entrenching tool column or field bridge train, an infantry and an artillery ammunition column, two commissariat columns, a sanitary detachment, two or three field hospitals, and half a field bakery column. To this must be added 13 fortress artillery companies employed before Paris, and 4 in Belfort. The Army of Occupation had, in consequence, a total strength of 106 battalions, 61 squadrons, 204 guns, 9 pioneer companies, and 17 fortress artillery companies.

The numbers drawing rations amounted on 1st July, 1871, to 119,337 men and 30,375 horses.

† See Map No. 42.

‡ See ante, p. 167.

§ As soon as the railway was available, room was made by the removal of 62 heavy guns, which were left in the siege park of Villiers-le-Bel, and did not belong to the armament proper of the forts.

|| Belfort was armed against an assault, and was provided with the fortress artillery material to resist a siege. Of the 316 heavy guns necessary for this purpose, part were derived from the stores found in the place and from the siege park employed before the fortress, and the remainder were brought up from Germany.

Inférieure, and Eure,* should alone be left in French hands, and not also those parts of the district nearest to the capital.

After the payment had been made, orders were given on the 20th July to evacuate the territory in question. Of the troops posted there the headquarters 1st Army Corps and the 1st Division commenced their march homewards, whilst the 2nd Division was transferred to the Oise and Aisne Departments.

For the remainder of the Army of Occupation no changes in position became necessary.†

The unexpectedly favourable results of the loan, which the French Minister of Finance had been at once empowered to raise, was a convincing proof of the amount of wealth still existing in the country, in spite of the immense losses that had been sustained. The country generally, and Paris in particular, lent a ready hand to the Government to pay off the war indemnity before it was due, and thereby liberate themselves the sooner of the German troops.

The withdrawal of the Germans from the Oise, Seine and Oise, Seine, and Seine and Marne Departments, and the evacuation of all the forts still occupied had, in accordance with the Treaty, to be preceded by the payment of another milliard. This sum having been for the most part paid by the 8th September, 1871, the dismantling‡ was at once commenced, so that the outer works could be handed over to the Paris military authorities on the 20th.

Meanwhile the 2nd and 22nd Divisions were already on their way home. The 11th, the return of which was likewise in the near future,§ occupied in anticipation thereof the district situated south of the Paris—Strassburg railway, and bounded by the line Nancy—Mirécourt—Chermont—Vitry-le-Français, from which the 19th removed, whilst the 4th, 6th, and 24th remained in their previous quarters. The 2nd Bavarian Division, to which fell the Aisne Department, received instructions to occupy also the Oise Department until the third half milliard was paid.||

The Army Headquarters had been at Compiègne since the commencement of the occupation and were transferred on the 14th September to Nancy.

With the object of bringing about the *last* period of occupation¶—during which only 50,000 men were to garrison six departments—further negotiations were entered into by the

* Of the Eure Department, only that part situated on the right bank of the Seine was still occupied (*see ante*, p. 163).

† On 11th August, the strength of the Army of Occupation amounted to 101,834 men and 26,610 horses.

‡ The French fortress artillery material was sent to Toul and Mézières.

§ The negotiations, which led to the Convention of 12th October, 1871 (*see subsequent narrative*), were at this time so far advanced that an agreement appeared no longer doubtful.

|| Up to the 8th October, 1871, 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery were moved to the Oise Department. The numbers drawing rations in the Army of Occupation on 1st October, 1871, were 72,316 men and 19,066 horses.

¶ *See ante*, p. 162.

French. As the result, an agreement was concluded on the 12th October, 1871, by virtue of which France bound herself to concede certain abatements of custom dues to the territory ceded to Germany, and to pay the deficient 500 millions of the second milliard by the 1st May, 1872. In exchange for this, Germany had offered to withdraw her troops at once from the Aisne, Aube, Côte d'Or, Jura, Doubs and Haute Saône Departments, which were to be considered neutral in a military sense until payment was made. Accordingly, the troops moved away on the 22nd October; the 11th and 24th Divisions were conveyed to Germany, and the 2nd Bavarian to the Ardennes Department, the Montmédy and Briey arrondissements, as also to the Châlons Camp. The 6th Division remained in the Marne Department; the 19th moved to the Meuse Department, exclusive of the Montmédy arrondissement, to the Meurthe Department and the French part of the Moselle Department, exclusive of the Briey arrondissement;* the 4th to the Haute Marne and Vosges Departments, and to the Belfort arrondissement.†

In arranging these positions, in which the troops had to remain until the probable end of the occupation, 2nd March, 1874, special attention was directed to carrying on the duties scrupulously on the peace footing. The training of the men could therefore be proceeded with in proper form. The regimental drills were followed by brigade drills, and afterwards by autumn manoeuvres.

On the 29th June, 1872, a further convention was concluded. By virtue of this, France bound herself to pay the three milliards of debt as follows: namely, half a milliard two months after the exchange of ratifications; half a milliard on 1st February, 1873; one milliard on 1st March, 1874; one, and the last, milliard on 1st March, 1875.

After payment of the first-mentioned half milliard, the Marne and Haute Marne Departments were to be evacuated, and when the fourth milliard was liquidated, the Vosges and Ardennes Departments.

Although 500 millions were paid on 7th September, 1872,‡ the corresponding evacuation could not be entirely carried out before the 4th November, as the erection of hut barracks, which the French Administration were constructing wherever permanent buildings were not available, had occupied more time than was anticipated.

On and after the 18th November, 1872, the troops were distributed as follows:—The 4th Division was in the Vosges Department, exclusive of the Neufchâteau and Coussey cantons, and in the Belfort arrondissement; the 19th in the Meurthe

* In the rayon of the 19th Division there were, in addition, 7 squadrons and 1 battery of the 4th quartered at Lunéville, and 7 squadrons of the 6th at Commercy.

† By sending back the 11th and 24th Divisions, and by causing the infantry battalions to revert to the peace effective of the Old Guard battalions, the strength agreed upon was arranged.

‡ The exchange of ratified documents took place on 7th July.

Department, and in the French part of the Moselle Department, exclusive of the Briey arrondissement; the 6th in the Meuse Department, exclusive of the Montmédy arrondissement, and in the Neufchâteau and Coussey cantons; the 2nd Bavarian in the Ardennes Department and in the Montmédy and Briey arrondissements.

At the beginning of December, 1872, the third milliard was paid. At the commencement of the year 1873, large payments towards the sum due on 1st March, 1874, were reported. The expectation that France would relieve herself of the remaining part of her debt at an early date found its justification. The final convention, concluded on 15th March, 1873, bound France to pay the fourth milliard by the 5th May, 1873, and to extinguish the fifth by successive instalments of 250 millions each on the 5th June, 5th July, 5th August, and 5th September, 1873. In exchange for this Germany agreed to evacuate the whole of the occupation territory after the second instalment. Only the fortress of Verdun, with the garrison increased by 1,000 men, and a line of communication leading to the frontier, was to remain in German hands as a last guarantee for the final payment.

After dismantling the fortresses of Belfort, Toul, and Mézières, the Army of Occupation returned home on the 2nd August. The garrison of Verdun,* which had been previously reinforced, followed on the 13th September, 1873. Three days later General v. Manteuffel quitted French territory with the last German troops.

* The detailed arrangements with regard to the occupation of this fortress were agreed to between the Commander-in-Chief and the French authorities. Besides the headquarters, there were to remain in the place—the 12th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Squadron 11th Lancers, the Staff as well as the 5th and 6th Heavy Batteries of 3rd Foot Division, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Field Pioneer Company 3rd Pioneer Battalion, the 2nd and 4th Companies 10th Foot Artillery Battalion, the 6th Company 3rd Foot Artillery Regiment, and No. 3 Commissariat Column IIIrd Army Corps.

THE FIELD TELEGRAPH, FIELD POST, SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION,
COMMISSARIAT, HOSPITAL, DIVINE SERVICE, AND MILITARY
LAW DEPARTMENTS.—THE RECRUITING OF THE GERMAN
ARMY.—EVENTS IN GERMANY.—RESULTS OF THE WAR.

The services in war of the combatant part of an army are to a great extent dependent on the mode in which the communications are regulated, so as to bring to the field troops their various requirements in food and ammunition, to tend their sick and wounded, and to replenish their losses in men, horses, and material. It is only by a careful direction of these important branches of the service and the fullest devotion of the persons employed, that the troops are able, amid the changing circumstances of war, to maintain the necessary strength for battle.

Besides, therefore, describing the operations and the battles, the history of the war of 1870-71 must give a picture of those services, so vital to the maintenance and support of that army, which were rendered by the army departments and by the home population during that period.

The organisation of the communications leading to, and in, the theatre of war, so far as the railways are concerned, has already been described in detail.* To complete the description it is desirable to glance in the first place at those departments which were charged with the transmission of intelligence and orders.

* See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 58-59, II, 456-458; and Part II, Vol. I, pp. 135, 179, and Vol. III, p. 103-112, 158-9.

THE FIELD TELEGRAPH.*

The function of the field telegraph is to organise as rapid a means of communication as possible between the different parts of the field army, and also between this latter and home territory, thereby facilitating unity of command over the immense masses composing an army. This service thus became of great importance in respect to the progress of military operations.

Preparation
and organiza-
tion.

The telegraph service in the field was divided into *field telegraph divisions* and *etappen telegraph divisions*, of which the former had to connect the headquarters of Armies with their Corps, the latter to connect the headquarters with the permanent lines of the country. By the joint action of both services the inter-communication of the headquarters of Armies was to be maintained, as also between these and the Royal Headquarters.

A third service, the *State telegraph*, which also furnished the officials necessary for the field stations, had to establish in a more solid manner the lines of *etappen telegraph*, and keep them in working order.

In order that these different services might work in unison, the Director-General of the State Telegraph, Major-General v. Chauvin, had at the Royal Headquarters a representative, the chief of the military telegraph, Colonel Meydam, with whom he was in constant communication. Colonel Meydam was specially charged with the direction of the telegraph of the Royal Headquarters and of that of the lines of communication, but was also in constant relation with the field telegraph divisions. He exercised his influence over their working through the Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-General v. Podbielski, who had to regulate the general transaction of business, especially the communication between the Commanders-in-Chief of Armies and between these and the Royal Headquarters. In other respects the Commanders-in-Chief of Armies had free disposal of the telegraph divisions attached to them for whatever special objects and requirements might seem best.

At the outset five field and three *etappen telegraph divisions* were mobilised in Prussia and attached to the field army.† In

* See General Map No. 10.

† The difference between these numbers and those given in Part I, Vol. I, p. 40, is explained by the subsequent narrative. The detachments were distributed as follows:—

Royal Headquarters—4th Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Friedheim, 3rd Engineer Inspection.

1st Army—1st Field Telegraph Division, Captain May, 4th Engineer Inspection; later, 1st Lieutenant Witte, 1st Engineer Inspection.

2nd Army—2nd Field Telegraph Division, Captain Heerfahrt, 2nd Engineer Inspection; 5th Field Telegraph Division, Captain Lüdecke, 1st Engineer Inspection. (This division only formed on 14th August.)

addition to these, Bavaria had mobilised one *etappen* and two field telegraph divisions,* one for each army corps, and Württemberg had also mobilised one field telegraph division.† The effective strength of these divisions in *personnel* and *matériel* was smaller than those of North Germany.

To replace the officials detailed for duty with the field telegraph, the State telegraph received non-commissioned officers and men of the army who had been already trained to these duties. In order to be able to extend the telegraphic network immediately after the commencement of operations, working parties and material were placed in readiness at the French frontier, and supplementary lines were erected in the area of strategical concentration of the German Army and on the coasts of the North Sea and Baltic.‡ The right of sending telegrams was regulated by the Quartermaster-General.

After the entry of the German Army into France the Royal Headquarters and the headquarters of the Ist and IInd Armies were restricted in the first instance for their telegraphic communication to the line Saarbrücken—Kreuznach, the IIIrd Army to the line Landau—Ludwigshafen. As the army gradually advanced, these permanent lines were connected with those of the field telegraph, which were laid by way of Remilly to Pont-à-Mousson for the Royal Headquarters and the IInd Army, by way of Boucheporn to Varize for the Ist, and by way of Hagenau, Ober-Modern, and Lunéville to Nancy for the IIIrd Army. To connect these lines together, there were the transverse lines St. Avold—Boucheporn, Lützelstein—Saargemünd—Bening, and, later on, Nancy—Pont-à-Mousson. Besides certain shorter branches, the line Hagenau—Vendenheim—Steinburg was prepared for communication with the Baden Division despatched against Strassburg.

Operations of the field telegraph until the investment of Metz and Paris.

During the engagements round Metz, the telegraphic net-

IIIrd Army—3rd Field Telegraph Division, Captain Kauffmann, 1st Engineer Inspection; later, 1st Lieutenant Fischer, 1st Engineer Inspection.

Etappen Inspection, 1st Army—3rd *Etappen* Telegraph Division.

" " IInd Army—2nd " " "

" " IIIrd Army—1st " " "

The 5th Field Telegraph Division was mobilised by the representative Corps Headquarters, IInd Army Corps; all other divisions by the Guard Pioneer Battalion.

The effective of a field telegraph division consisted of—1 Captain as Commander, 3 Lieutenants (inclusive of 1 from the train), 1 surgeon, 7 telegraph officials, 90 pioneers, 45 train soldiers, 15 riding and 58 draught horses and 13 carriages.

The effective of an *etappen* telegraph division of two sections consisted of—1 Director in charge. The first section—2 Lieutenants (1 from train), 7 telegraph officials, 35 pioneers, 37 train soldiers, 8 riding and 52 draught horses, 11 carriages. The second section—5 telegraph officials, 15 train soldiers, 4 telegraph foremen, 20 telegraphists, 3 riding and 18 draught horses, 5 carriages.

* 1st Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Ritter v. Renauld, Bavarian Engineers; 2nd Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Fuchs, Bavarian Engineers; *Etappen* Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Richter, Bavarian Engineers.

† Lieutenant Bauzenberger, Württemberg Field Pioneer Corps. The command changed hands frequently.

‡ In the littoral districts, 1,383 miles of wire and 44 new stations were opened.

work was extended to the vicinity of the battlefield, to Courcelles, Gorze, and Thiaucourt. During the investment of the fortress the headquarters of the Army Corps and of the different Divisions were connected together and with their Army Headquarters.* In order to establish communication with the Meuse Army, and later on with the Royal Headquarters, the State telegraph constructed in August another line, running from Pont-à-Mousson round Metz, and thence, avoiding Verdun, to Clermont-en-Argonne.

During the forward movement upon Châlons, the Royal Headquarters used the line Bar-le-Duc—Commercy, which here bifurcated on the one side to Thiaucourt for the Meuse Army, and to Frouard† and Vaucouleurs for the IIIrd Army. As at this period rapid communication between the various parts of the field armies was particularly necessary, every effort was directed between the 21st and 25th August to connect the different army corps headquarters of the IIIrd Army with the headquarters of that army, and with the Royal Headquarters.‡ The telegraph lines subsequently followed the army in its movement to the right as far as Varennes and Cernay-en-Dormois, whence, all the material having been expended, the despatches had to be conveyed by relays of orderlies. Immediately after the battle of Sedan this fortress was connected with the line Clermont—Metz by way of Montmédy and Consenvoye.

During the subsequent march to Paris, the Royal Headquarters and the Meuse Army connected themselves with the line Nancy—Paris, which later on was extended from Lagny as far as Ferrières and Versailles. In this way the Royal Headquarters remained in constant connection both with the troops investing Metz and Strassburg and with the advancing armies. Meanwhile, the Meuse Army, after the surrender of Laon, had connected this fortress with Rheims, and on its arrival before Paris, had, by the 20th September, placed the line Lagny—Roissy—St. Brice in working order. The IIIrd Army which, during its advance, had extended its communications from Epernay through Montmirail to Coulommiers, and from here had established connection with the great line at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, continued the lines from Coulommiers onward by way of Villeneuve St. Georges and Longjumeau to Palaiseau.

During these events, it had been evident that the resources of the field telegraph did not always suffice for the objects which were contemplated. Up to the present, the idea

* See Part I, Vol. II, p. 476. No telegraph was laid down between the outposts and their headquarters for want of material. Mounted orderlies and optical signals had to be employed instead. The line Maizières—Uckange was restored, in order to communicate with the troops investing Thionville.

† Avoiding Toul.

‡ The following lines were repaired:—Void—Ménil-la-Hergue, Vaucouleurs—Gondrecourt, Gondrecourt—Tréveray, Vaucouleurs—Pagny, Ligny—Nançois-le-Petit, Ligny—Tronville, Bar-le-Duc—Blesme—St. Dizier—Vassy.

of connecting the Army Headquarters with the daily halting places of the Corps headquarters had to be abandoned. On the other hand, the field and *etappen* telegraphs made every effort to secure telegraphic communication between the Army Headquarters and the permanent network in rear.

The field telegraph divisions worked usually in the front, their material being replaced later by that of the *etappen* telegraph divisions. The latter again gradually removed their material, as soon as the more permanent lines of the State telegraph were ready to replace it.

At the commencement of the war, more particularly, it was not always possible to prevent our own troops from thoroughly destroying the French lines which had been slightly interrupted, thereby rendering difficult the rapid repair of the lines. The German field lines were also occasionally damaged by carelessness. Furthermore, the pioneer detachments detailed to the telegraph divisions had neither any practice at the outset in repairing the French lines, nor had they the requisite material.* Although all these evils were overcome in course of time, yet at the end of August it became urgently necessary to increase the field telegraph.

In consequence of this, two more field and two more *etappen* telegraph divisions† were formed in September; they reached the theatre of war at the beginning of October.‡

In order to facilitate the administration of the State telegraph, which had replaced the *etappen* telegraph in the work between the field army and home territory, and was only able to carry out this service with difficulty,§ three *war telegraph directions* were formed at Nancy, Epernay,|| and Lagny.

In this manner the telegraph gradually succeeded in completely mastering the extensive field of its action, although the enormous extension of the theatre of war and the rapid

* Only the 2nd section of the *etappen* telegraph divisions was provided with the material and tools requisite to repair the permanent lines.

† The following were formed:—By 5th Pioneer Battalion in Glogau, the 6th Field Telegraph Division, Captain Bliesener, 3rd Engineer Inspection; later, Lieutenant Fleck, 4th Engineer Inspection; by the 10th Pioneer Battalion at Minden, the 7th Field Telegraph Division, Captain v. Woyna, 3rd Engineer Inspection; by the 2nd Pioneer Battalion at Stettin, the 4th *Etappen* Telegraph Division; by the 4th Pioneer Battalion at Magdeburg, the 5th *Etappen* Telegraph Division.

‡ After the addition of these divisions to the armies, the following were at disposal:—Royal Headquarters, 4th Field Telegraph Division and 2nd *Etappen* Telegraph Division; 1st Army, 1st Field Telegraph Division and 3rd *Etappen* Telegraph Division; IInd Army, 5th Field Telegraph Division; IIIrd Army, 3rd and 6th Field Telegraph Divisions, 1st and 4th *Etappen* Telegraph Divisions, 1st and 2nd Bavarian Field Telegraph Divisions, Bavarian *Etappen* Telegraph Division, and Württemberg Field Telegraph Division; Meuse Army, 2nd Field Telegraph Division; XIIIth Army Corps, 7th Field Telegraph Division; XIVth Army Corps, 5th *Etappen* Telegraph Division.

During the further course of the war, several changes took place in this distribution, according to the circumstances of the moment.

§ It was extremely difficult to augment the staff of officials.

|| Later at Rheims.

movements of the troops frequently gave rise to very serious difficulties. It not infrequently happened that the line which had been completed with much trouble had to be again removed, because some headquarter, in consequence of a change in the military situation, had altered its assigned destination, and the counter-order arrived too late. The construction was the most quickly effected when the telegraph divisions were attached to the advanced guards, and carried out the work at the same rate as the latter progressed. Often also they hastened forward to the vanguards under special escort. In such cases, it happened frequently that telegraph stations had to hold their ground under fire, or had to give way before the sudden advance of the enemy.

The unfavourable weather was also not without its influence, as it both delayed construction,* and frequently destroyed the lines which had been made ready. Lastly, the constant and premeditated damage done to the lines by the inhabitants and franc-tireurs gave much trouble. In consequence of the length of the lines and the small effective of garrison troops, it was frequently impossible, in spite of the greatest vigilance, to prevent this damage.†

From the investment of Metz to the end of the campaign.

During the siege of Paris Versailles became the permanent centre of the telegraphic network which was daily undergoing extension.

The telegraphic lines established at the commencement of the investment having gradually become formed into a continuous girdle, the capital was surrounded by two parallel wires which, starting from Versailles, touched Longjumeau, Villeneuve St. Georges, Lagny, Gonesse, Margency, and St. Germain-en-Laye. One of these wires, with which those leading to the provinces were connected, served more particularly for communication between the Royal Headquarters and the Army Headquarters and the Inspectors-General of Etappen; the other, with its numerous branches, for communication between the different parts of the Army of Investment. It not only connected all the Corps headquarters and the distant Divisional and Brigade staffs, but also brought within reach important points of the outpost line, the observatories, and, later on, the groups of siege batteries. Communication with Germany was maintained by two main lines, which led from Lagny past Bar-le-Duc and Nancy to Landau, and by way of Rheims and Metz to Saarbrücken. After the conclusion of the armistice, the forts were brought into communication with the wire running round the city and

* For instance, on 4th January, the 3rd Field Telegraph Division took 9½ hours in frosty weather to construct 5½ miles of line between Villacoubley and Sacy, near Paris: on the other hand, on 9th November, the 2nd Etappen Telegraph Division, in fine weather, only took 7½ hours to put up 15½ miles of wire between Juranvigny and Finy (east of Troyes) by way of Brienne-le-Château.

† Foreign apparatus was frequently found attached, especially to the etappen lines. French despatches were seldom intercepted.

with one another; during the occupation of Paris, three stations were pushed forward into the city itself.

In order to establish connection with the armies intended to cover the investment of Paris, the following lines were created from Versailles during the course of the campaign: namely, to Amiens, Rouen, Dreux, Chartres, Orléans, Montargis; to Dijon, by way of Melun and Montbard, and to Chaumont-en-Bassigny, by way of Troyes. These were connected afterwards with the wires leading to the armies and detachments fighting in the provinces.

When the 1st Army advanced towards the Oise after the fall of Metz, the field telegraph continued its operations in rear of the army, utilising the existing lines through Rheims and Soissons. Before the battle of Amiens, wires were laid from the previous terminal station at Montdidier to Breteuil and Moreuil, for the purpose of facilitating communication with the wings of the army. As soon as the wires were continued to Amiens after the occupation of that city, direct connection could be established with Versailles through Creil. In the further advance of the army upon Rouen, the two sections from Amiens, by way of Poix—Buchy and Poix—Gournay to Rouen, could be repaired.

After the victory on the Hallue, every effort was made to preserve the connection between the separated parts of the army. Lines were erected from Amiens, by way of Corbie, to Albert and to the neighbourhood of Péronne, and were continued from this latter point to Combles and Ham. After the battle of Bapaume and the fall of Péronne, these lines were prolonged further, and Amiens was connected with La Fère by way of Ham. By this means, the forces united on the Somme obtained all the advantages accruing from a rapid transmission of reports and orders, which were of much value also in the operations before the battle of St. Quentin. During the pursuit, the line Ham—St. Quentin—Bantouzelle was established.

When at the commencement of October, the 1st Bavarian Corps and the 22nd Division were dispatched to Orléans and Chartres, both places were quickly placed in telegraphic union with the line round Paris. The first of these lines had, however, to be partially abandoned after the engagement at Coulmiers, so that Toury now formed the terminal station for the recently-formed detachment under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. As soon as this detachment, on the approach of the IInd Army, took post between Chartres and Rambouillet, Epernon came into telegraphic connection with Nogent-le-Roi. When the Grand Duke advanced, in the middle of November, in the direction of Le Mans, communication was kept up through Nogent-le-Rotrou, whilst, at the same time, the rearward telegraphic network was extended by the two branches Versailles—Dreux and Chartres—Bonneval—Arpajon. In the subsequent movements of the detachment upon Beaugency and later upon Toury, not only was the connection with

Chartres maintained, but an immediate connection with the lines of the IInd Army from Bonneval through Viabon to Toury was established.

The IInd Army, on leaving Metz for the Middle Loire, had at first established two lines, which led from Blesme by way of Montierender, and by way of Chaumont-en-Bassigny to Troyes. During the forced march of the army from the vicinity of Troyes—Chaumont to the westward, the telegraphic connection was continued from Troyes by way of Sens to Nemours. Later on, communication was opened with Versailles from Pithiviers, by way of Corbeil, after restoring the French lines, and also by way of Angerville.

Up to the engagements at Orléans, the lines in the territory occupied by the IInd Army could be completed; during the days of the battle they were carried forward, and, on the 5th December, continued into the occupied city. In order to maintain connection with the corps pushed in advance, the branches from Orléans to Châteauneuf, Beaugency and La Ferté St. Aubin, were at once completed.

On the advance towards Tours of the Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment, supported by the IIIrd and Xth Army Corps, the line Orléans—Beaugency was extended through Blois to Vendôme. When, in the latter half of December, the IInd Army concentrated in the neighbourhood of Orléans, and the detachment took post at Chartres, the telegraphic network was extended by the branches Vendôme—Châteaudun—Bonneval, Châteaudun—Orléans, Chartres—Courville, and Châteauneuf—Montargis—Gien; this last branch was continued to Briare on 31st December.

The movements of the troops upon Le Mans, which commenced at the beginning of January,* were followed by lines of telegraph, both from Chartres through Nogent-le-Rotrou,† and from Vendôme through St. Calais. After the occupation of Le Mans, the connection of the latter town with Alençon, Conlie, Château Courville, La Fontaine and by way of Tours with Châteaurenault and Bois was at once completed. The XIIIth Army Corps, moving from Alençon to Rouen, opened the section Chartres—Evreux—Rouen on 24th January; another line through Buchy to Dieppe was afterwards established.

On the south-eastern theatre of war, during the siege of Strassburg, telegraphic lines had been constructed from the headquarters at Mundolsheim to Vendenheim, to Kronenburg near the scene of attack, to the Baden Division at Oberschöffelsheim and through Rastatt to the detachment posted at Kehl.

When after the fall of the fortress, the XIVth Army Corps moved to the southward, the line Blainville-la-Grande—Epinal

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 84.

† The connection between Chartres and Brœu by way of Illiers was first established.

was restored, in connection with the main line Landau—Nancy—Paris. All further extensions had to be provisionally deferred for want of material. It was only after the capture of Dijon that the section Epinal—Vesoul could be placed in working order.

When the Corps occupied very extended positions at the beginning of November, the necessity of more rapid communication became manifest. Although only one *etappen* telegraph division, and but little material were available, Vesoul was connected by way of Lure with La Chapelle, and by way of Gray with Dijon.* This connection contributed to a large extent in enabling the concentration of the Corps at Vesoul, ordered on 26th December, to be carried into effect in two days. The stations Dijon, Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, and Gray were evacuated; on the other hand, a fresh line was made for the 4th Reserve Division from Vesoul to Villersexel.

When, however, at the commencement of January the Corps again moved northward, the sections situated south of the line Vesoul—La Chapelle, and, during the final concentration behind the Lisaine the stations west of Lure, had to be abandoned, so that communication with the Royal Headquarters could only take place by way of Mülhausen. Within twenty-four hours the most important posts of the Lisaine position were connected together and with the headquarters. By this means, during the subsequent battle, reports and orders were transmitted by telegraph; this arrangement was of considerable importance for the conduct of the action. In the further movements after the battle, and in the joint operations with the other parts of the recently formed South Army,† the lines Lure—Villersexel—Rougemont and, as the movement progressed, Lure—Vesoul—Gray—La Barre—Byans were brought into use.

After the passage of the French East Army into Switzerland, the lines from La Barre through Dôle to Lons-le-Saunier and Dijon, and from Gray to Fontaine Française, Auxonne, and through Dijon to Beaune and Montbard, were placed in working order.

In spite of their want of experience at first, these new telegraph corps were able to comply with the manifold demands made upon them, and have shown that they are not only an effective but an indispensable means for facilitating military and political action.

The amount of line worked by the field telegraph corps during the war was 6,729 miles‡ with 407 stations; by the State telegraph, 7,765 miles with 118 stations.

* On 17th December another line was constructed from Gray through Dampierre to Port-sur-Saône.

† The 7th Field Telegraph Division had been assigned to it in January.

‡ Of these, 5,127 miles of repaired French lines, 496 provisional, and 1106 miles field telegraph. No detailed mention is made in this work of the telegraphic network laid down during the progress of operations, but all lines of the field and State telegraph used during the war are shown on General Map No. 10.

FIELD POST.

Organisation
and duties.

The organisation of the field post had for its primary object the rapid and safe transmission of military correspondence and other consignments for service purposes. In the second place it was intended to form a means of transmitting private letters, newspapers, and small private remittances.

Although for these purposes no special formations existed in time of peace, the German postal administration succeeded, in the shortest possible time, in providing a service which satisfied the requirements of the campaign.

This consisted of *field post offices* and *etappen post directions*. The former were charged with the postal service of the troops; the latter had to organise and maintain the communication to the rear and the connection with the Home postal department. The functions of the *etappen post* commenced at a distance of one day's march in rear of the headquarters of Army Corps, and included also the postal work at the stations on the line of communications. Both departments were, in a military point of view, subject to the military authorities, and, for technical matters, to the German postal authorities.

To facilitate the service, all consignments for the field army were sent to collecting depôts in Germany, where the letters were sorted by corps and forwarded to the first station on the line of the *etappen post*. From this point they were conveyed to the field-post offices, and there taken over by the troops. Correspondence intended for troops not on the move were sent to their fixed destinations without going to the collecting depôts.

At the commencement of the war the following field-post offices were established for the troops of the North German Confederation:—

One chief post office, under Chief Field Postmaster Zschüscher for the Royal Headquarters, 3 army post offices* for the three armies, and for the army corps 13 field-post offices, each having 3 subsidiary agencies for the two infantry divisions and the corps artillery.†

Besides these, three *etappen post directions* were organised for the Inspectors-General of *Etappen*.‡

These arrangements, however, proved inadequate during the course of the campaign. In consequence, the means still

* With the 1st Army under Army Postmaster Krause, with the IInd under Army Postmaster Bock, and with the IIIrd Army under Army Postmaster Lambrecht.

† With the IXth Corps there was an additional field-post agency for the 25th Division. Originally each field-post office had an "agency for the advanced guard," but this was soon abolished, and the agencies were employed for new formations.

‡ With the Inspector-General 1st Army, *Etappen Post Director* Wittmann; IInd Army, Schlieven; IIIrd Army, Lietz.

With the *etappen post-directions* only the Directors and the two Inspectors were mobilised.

available of the field and State post were employed later to form a subsidiary agency for each of the eight cavalry and five landwehr or reserve divisions, for the Governments-General of Alsace and Lorraine, and for the headquarters of the Meuse and South Armies, while a field-post office was organised for the XIIIth and for the XIVth Army Corps respectively.*

The technical direction of the entire service was centered in the General Post Office at Berlin, under the General Post Director Stephan, so that a close connection was established between the field-post and the home arrangements, while unity of direction and rapid communication of the necessary orders were secured. In order to organise the postal service, a field-post department was created at the General Post Office on the first day of mobilisation.

The South German Field Post was organised on similar lines. For the Bavarian Army Corps two field-post offices, with two field agencies each, and an *etappen* post office,† were organised; for the Württemberg Field Division one field-post office and three brigade field-post agencies, and a field *etappen* post;‡ for the Baden Field Division a field-post agency.§

Even at the commencement of the war the postal service had to contend with many difficulties, as the railways were almost entirely taken up with the troops.

It was not until the 7th–10th August that the *etappen* post offices could open at Saarlouis, Homburg, and Landau, after which, about the middle of August, the postal communication to the rear could be regularly organised. The 1st Army now received its letters by way of Saarlouis and Corny, the IInd by way of Homburg, Saargemünd, and Pont-à-Mousson, and the IIIrd, using partly the railways, by way of Landau, Hagenau, and Nancy. The necessary cross-communication between these postal routes was carried on by mounted messengers.

During the movements which now followed in quick succession, and the direction of which was frequently changed, it became necessary to abstain from laying down fixed itineraries for the post. It was not until the advance commenced from Sedan to Paris, that a courier post with fixed stations could be organised for the Royal Headquarters. This post, keeping pace with the

Work of the field-post until the investment of Paris.

* In all, 77 field post offices with 788 officials, 869 horses, and 168 waggons were formed during the war. Inclusive of *etappen* and home territory posts, 411 German post offices, with 2,140 officials, were organised in France. Besides these, 3,761 officials were withdrawn from the post-office to serve in the ranks, so that altogether 5,901 persons belonging to the post office in peace time were employed. The total length of the postal communication was 3,318 miles.

† A total of 101 officials, exclusive of the Landwehr called out for postal duties. 32 carriages and 60 horses, were available.

‡ Besides 18 field post divisions charged with collection and delivery to the troops. Besides postilions and train soldiers, there were 46 officials, who were drawn from post officials liable to military service. The material consisted of 8 waggons and 18 horses.

§ With 25 officials, 4 carriages, and 19 horses; postilions and drivers were taken from the army. An *Etappen* Post Inspector was appointed for the *etappen* post organised later by the postal authorities.

military operations, ran from the railway station at Remilly through Pont-à-Mousson, Bar-le-Duc, Châlons-sur-Marne, Meaux and Lagny to Versailles.* Very shortly after, the line was also utilised for a carriage postal service, and then formed the main artery of communication of the occupied district, into which flowed many of the branch lines and the circular post organised for the army investing Paris.† North and south of this line lay the postal roads of the Meuse‡ and IIIrd Armies; the former ran from Pont-à-Mousson, through St. Mihiel, Vouziers, Rethel and Dammartin, the latter from Nancy, round Toul, by way of Bar-le-Duc, Châlons, Eprenay, Coulommiers and Villeneuve St. Georges or Corbeil to the circular post round Paris.

These postal lines with their numerous transversal connections and branches were at first confined to the roads, and could only use by degrees the railways as they became open to traffic, and upon which travelling post offices were established.

On and after the 15th October the transmission of parcels in the same way as letters was commenced, and in spite of the immense number that were posted, this arrangement continued with short interruptions until the end of the war.§ The principal dépôts for parcels intended for France, were in the first instance at Remilly for the Ist and IIInd Armies, at Nanteuil-sur-Marne, later on at Lagny, for the IIIrd and Meuse Armies, with subsidiary dépôts at Corbeil and Dammartin.

The difficulties and impediments in the way of the field-post service increased during the course of the war, and became more accentuated during the war against the Republic. The great distances entailed by the diversity of the operations, the rapid and frequently changing movements of the armies, the masses of correspondence to be despatched, and at times the insecurity of the roads, demanded immense efforts on the part of the *personnel*.

Matters of great importance and difficulty were regulated on the spot by the General Post Director,|| or by the officials of

* The couriers completed the journey by road from Remilly to Versailles in 42 hours. From 9th November till the return of the Royal Headquarters, they were forwarded by rail through Strassburg as far as Lagny.

† The relays for the circular post were stationed at Lagny, Villeneuve St. Georges, Versailles, Argenteuil (later, St. German-en-Laye), and Gonesse.

‡ For the etappen post road of the Meuse Army the General Post Office sent a civilian—first Postdirector Hutscheureuter, afterwards in his place Postcouncillor Lehmann. After three weeks the *personnel* of the etappen post included 81 officials, 56 postilions, with 19 carriages and 144 horses. The carriage of correspondence from Pont-à-Mousson to the army of investment occupied on an average 2½ days.

§ During the first 55 days 1,219,533 parcels were received, for the despatch of which 81,922 bags, 560 railway wagons, and many hundred carriages were requisite. The Baden and Württemberg Field Post had previously forwarded private parcels. The transmission of Baden private parcels was undertaken on the 1st September by a military agency in connection with the Baden War Ministry.

|| For instance, the arrangement of the main courier line, the circular post at Paris, the field railway post offices, the conclusion of a Convention with Belgium, and the installation of Chief Post Directions at Strassburg and Metz.

the German Postal Administrations. To facilitate the service special field-post tables were prepared and distributed by the Postal Department in Berlin. In these tables was shown the distribution of the whole of the troops with the post offices upon which they were dependent, and any changes were inserted from day to day. Notwithstanding these precautions, it was impossible to avoid occasional delays, when in spite of enquiries the field-post was unable to find out in time the positions of corps, or when these latter on account of the distance were not in a position to send for their letter-bags. It happened at times, also, that the mails were attacked and captured by the inhabitants or by franc-tireurs.* Moreover, the horses speedily succumbed from heavy work in wet weather, from insufficient food and indifferent stabling, and were difficult to replace.

The temporary interruption of the railways, which were used to the utmost extent possible, did not cause any serious impediment to postal communication, as when necessary the mails were carried by road.

When the 1st and IInd Armies continued their march after the fall of Metz, the field post following in their wake placed the lines of advance in connection with the existing regular lines, and in a short time instituted a regular postal service in the permanently occupied districts. The 1st Army obtained a great advantage from the circumstance that by a treaty with Belgium the mails from Cologne were brought through Belgian territory by way of Sedan. It was not until after the fall of Montmédy and the opening of the railway from Metz to Sedan that the Belgian route was abandoned.

Services of
the field post
until the end
of the war.

In the middle of January the field-post communications extended in the north of France to St. Quentin, Péronne, Abbeville, Eu, Dieppe, and Yvetôt, in the west and south of Paris to Alençon, Le Mans, Tours, Orléans, and Montargis.

On the south-eastern theatre of war, an *etappen* post road was instituted from Blainville through Epinal, Vesoul, and Gray to Dijon.† In consequence of the rapid change of operations, the service on these lines had to be temporarily stopped, so that in January the mails could only be sent for some weeks by way of Strassburg, Mülhausen, and Dammerkirch. It was only after the battle on the Lisaine that those branches were again given over to traffic, and afterwards used by the entire South Army.‡ as the IInd and VIIth Army Corps had aban-

* On 14th November, Post Conductor Bodensohn, who had reached with a parcel post the town of Sens, not yet occupied by the Germans, was attacked by a raging mob. After a gallant resistance, and after receiving a severe wound, he was made prisoner, but was released next day on the arrival of German troops. Most of the bags were recovered. On 23rd December, Postillions Dickenbrock and Beckschäfer repulsed a hostile attack with their side-arms in a ravine between Chablis and Auxerre.

† In the middle of November the XIVth Corps had available, besides the Baden field-post agency, the field-post office organised at Coblenz, and the field-post agency of the 4th Reserve Division. Up to that time the Baden field-post had done the work single-handed.

‡ The *etappen* postal service of the South Army was arranged by the General Post Office.

Administra-
tion of the
post in
occupied
French
territory.

doned their communications by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine. After the passage of the French East Army into Switzerland the regularity of the postal service, which now extended to Dijon, Poligny, La Barre, and Baume-les-Dames, met with no further interruption.

The administration of the local post in the occupied French territory was taken over by the Germans. On 24th August, 1870, a German "Post Administration," under direction of the General Post Office, was established at Nancy.* During the course of the campaign it opened forty post offices, which carried on the communication between the different villages in the district, and also between these and Germany and thence with foreign countries. At the same time they had as much as possible to help the field-post offices, especially in opening up new lines and arranging the service on railways. Further, a Chief Post Direction was established at the beginning of October for Alsace and Lorraine at Strassburg and Nancy respectively;† through its agency 158 German post offices were opened by the end of March, 1871.

On the 24th of this month the French authorities once more took over the postal administration in the districts which had been occupied by German troops. In order to ensure unity of direction a *Chief Post Direction for the Army of Occupation* was established at Rheims.‡

The activity and perseverance of the field and home postal services had succeeded, in spite of circumstances of great difficulty, in fulfilling the duties imposed on them, and rendered eminent services not only to the army but to Germany.§ To show the extent of the interchange between the army and the mother country, it will suffice to state that up to the 31st March the following were despatched through the North German field-post from and to the Army:—

89,695,000 letters and post-cards.
2,354,310 newspapers.
6,453,520*l.* Government money.
2,526,370*l.* private remittances.
125,916 service parcels.
1,853,686 private „

Through the Bavarian post:—

about 3,240,000 letters.
72,000 registered letters and money orders.
90,000 parcels.

* From October, at Rheims.

† Later at Metz.

‡ Under Postrath Wittmann, formerly with the Inspection-General of Etappen-1st Army. The post administration at Rheims was at the same time broken up.

§ Further, the German post undertook the very extensive correspondence between the French prisoners in Germany, and allowed such to pass post-free when sent through the military authorities. Upwards of 200,000*l.* was paid to the prisoners in small sums upon post office orders from France.

Through the Württemberg post, from the commencement until the return home of the troops :—

6,898,000 letters, post-cards and newspapers.
454,233 parcels and money orders to the value of
483,498l.

Through the Baden post :—

1,470,500 post-cards, ordinary and registered letters.
114,400 newspapers.
190,810l. Government money.
102,810l. private remittances.
63,067 parcels.

SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.

The control of all measures respecting the reserves of ammunition had been entrusted to the officers commanding the artillery of the different armies by virtue of an order from the War Ministry on 25th July, 1870.*

At the commencement of the war 143 horsed ammunition columns were mobilised, of which 76 were exclusively for the artillery and 60 for the infantry, whilst 4 Bavarian and 3 Württemberg columns conveyed partly artillery and partly small-arm ammunition. The uniformity of armament which prevailed almost throughout the German Army facilitated in a high degree the replenishment of ammunition.

The Bavarian Army Corps alone were in a less favourable position, as not only were their foot soldiers armed with rifles of two different systems, but their artillery possessed, in addition to 4 and 6 prs., some 12 prs., and later on some mitrailleurs, and consequently the ammunition for four different calibres had to be carried.

The supply of ammunition was throughout abundant. The German infantry soldier carried, it is true, ten rounds less than the French, and the regimental transport conveyed a smaller number of rounds for each man; on the other hand, the ammunition columns carried larger supplies.†

The replenishment of ammunition during an action became a matter of the first importance even at the earliest collisions of the campaign.

In order to place themselves on equal terms with the heavy

The functions
of the
ammunition
columns of an
army corps.

* See Appendix V.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 13. In all, the supply carried by the troops and columns of an army corps, exclusive of the two Bavarian, with a total strength of 25 battalions and 15 batteries, or 24,525 rifles and 90 guns, amounted to:—

161 rounds per rifle.	
237 shell	} for each light gun.
21 canister	
220 shell	} for each heavy gun.
11 canister	
For a Bavarian Army Corps these numbers amounted to:—	
312 shell	} for each 4-pounder gun
10 canister	
212 shell	} for each 6-pounder gun.
11 canister	

The Bavarian 12-pounder batteries had in their limbers, wagons, and ammunition columns, 175 rounds per gun.

For all the cavalry, the supplies present furnished, according to the varied composition of the armies, from 62 to 100 rounds for the needle carbines, 34 to 56 for pistols.

The number of rounds for each arm in the reserve ammunition depôts (see subsequent narrative) likewise varied in different armies. The Prussian reserve ammunition columns conveyed in round numbers—

8 to 15 rounds	per rifle.
7 to 11 "	per carbine.
4 to 13 "	per pistol.
42 to 69 "	per light and heavy gun.

and long-range fire of the enemy, the German infantry found it necessary to fire more rapidly and at greater ranges than they had intended. The control of the firing became frequently very difficult in consequence of the great losses in leaders. The expenditure of ammunition soon reached in consequence a very high figure, so that the supplies with each individual man in the foremost fighting line were fully expended. Thus it was that cases frequently occurred when the infantry were hindered in their fighting from want of ammunition. There are no precise data available in respect to the number of cartridges expended by a given body of troops, whether in separate engagements, or during operations extending over a certain country or a certain period of time; neither would the number of rounds drawn from the ammunition columns to replace losses afford a just criterion.*

Want of ammunition in action was first apparent to a considerable extent in the battle of Mars-la-Tour in the case of the infantry of the IIIrd Army Corps.† It was also experienced on the 18th August by the troops of the Ist Army engaged to the east of the Gravelotte defile; on the 28th November by the detachments of the Xth Army Corps employed to garrison Beaune-la-Rolande, and in several other battles. Similar inconvenience occurred very frequently to the Ist Bavarian Corps during its engagements in the Eure district and on the Loire. In almost every one of the numerous actions fought there, battalions had to limit their action for want of ammunition, or had to be withdrawn in order to replenish.‡

Such an expenditure of ammunition, however, only happened to certain parts of the troops in front line, whilst the total consumption of the infantry was less than had been expected. The cause of the deficiency was in all cases that the connection of the fighting battalions with their ammunition wagons and the

* Appendix CJ,XXXIV shows the ammunition issued to replenish the columns from the three Prussian reserve ammunition depôts and two Bavarian chief ammunition columns during the war.

The expenditure of the Württemberg and Baden Divisions (not shown there) was:—

Württemberg,	5,125	Baden	9,197	shell	}	4-pounder guns.
"	8	"	30	canister		
"	2,904	"	7,062	shell	}	6-pounder guns.
"	—	"	27	canister		
"	1,063,291	"	577,455	needle-gun	}	cartridges.
"	32,000	"	(?)	carbine		
"	40,000	"	18,290	pistol		

In the Württemberg Division the artillery small-arm cartridges are included in the carbine; in the Baden, they are counted in the distribution of ammunition made by No. 14 Prussian Reserve Ammunition Column.

The total expenditure of the German Army is estimated at 362,662 rounds of field gun ammunition, and approximately 30,000,000 cartridges.

† The total expenditure of the corps this day was 720,436 cartridges; therefore, for each of the 25 battalions which bore about an equal hand in the fight, 28,819 rounds.

‡ The total expenditure of the corps between the 10th October and 16th December, however, amounted to 21 cartridges only per man per fighting day, taking into account the number of men engaged in each of the separate fights.

ammunition columns was severed, and it then became impossible to bring in good time the ammunition, which was in plenty further in rear, to those points where it was most needed.

The experience of previous wars with regard to the measures to be taken was insufficient to act as a guide; it was only, therefore, by degrees that the arrangements became perfected. As a general rule the infantry, in order to replenish their ammunition during an engagement, brought up their own cartridge wagons, but cases also occurred where the infantry ammunition columns issued ammunition on the battle-field under heavy fire.* The German infantry, nearly always acting on the offensive, was hardly ever able to accumulate a reserve of ammunition beforehand for use at decisive moments. When engagements followed in rapid succession, as during the operations at Orléans and Le Mans, it was even very difficult to bring the troops under fire at all times with their complete supply of ammunition. Lastly, some of the cartridges were probably lost by the general habit of casting off the knapsack before going into action.

The supplies of ammunition for the artillery were requisitioned to a greater extent even than in the case of the infantry.

This circumstance was manifest in the first engagements of the IIIrd Army. The expenditure of the batteries of the Vth Army Corps in the battle of Wörth was so great that it exceeded the reserve of the only two available ammunition columns,† and in consequence the whole of the expended ammunition could not be replenished on the morning of the 7th August. The artillery of the XIth Army Corps fired fewer rounds than that of the Vth, and as it had all its ammunition columns present, it could not only replace its own expenditure without difficulty, but was able to help the Vth Corps. The want of ammunition which temporarily occurred on the battle-field was solely due to the circumstance that the second echelons of battery wagons could only ascend the Elsasshausen heights with the greatest difficulty.

In the battles of the 16th and 18th August, the replenishment of ammunition gave more trouble than at Wörth, for, in consequence of their great losses, many batteries were unable to send their wagons to bring up the urgently required ammunition.

On the 16th the first echelon of columns of the IIIrd Army Corps moved close up to the batteries in action, whilst those of the Xth on account of crossing with other troops, could not reach the battle-field until night. On the 18th also, all available ammunition wagons of the IXth Army Corps‡ were

* For instance, with the IIIrd Corps on the 16th, and with the VIIIth Corps on the 18th August.

† The ammunition columns of the second echelon did not leave Posen until the 2nd August, and reached the Army Corps on the 8th.

‡ In the 1st echelon of the column there were only 1½ artillery ammunition columns.

brought forward to the firing line, and were sent separately as required to the batteries. In order to avoid unnecessary losses, the teams were sent to the rear, and they were again brought up later to fetch away the empty wagons. Both in the case of the Prussian and Hessian artillery of the IXth Corps, the echelons of wagons were not always able to follow, so that there was frequently a lack of ammunition, particularly with the guns engaged to the south of the Bois-de-la-Cusse. On the other hand, the batteries of the Guard in some cases kept their first echelons close up to them during the battle, and took out the ammunition direct from the wagons, in order to keep the limbers filled as long as possible.

How large the expenditure of artillery ammunition was in the two battles will be seen from the following figures:—

The 15 batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps* fired on the 16th August an average of 768 rounds, and 2 of them expended 1,164 and 1,148 respectively. On the 18th the 10 batteries which were engaged fired on an average 274 rounds, whilst the highest number of rounds fired in any one battery was 852. The Xth Army Corps, on both days, fired about 524 rounds per battery; the maximum was 1,048 rounds, namely, on the 16th August. Two Hessian batteries expended on the 18th August a total number of 1,880, two of the 18th Division 1,930 rounds. The average expenditure of the IXth Army Corps was 526. In such circumstances, it is plain why the IIIrd Army Corps on the 20th August emptied its own five and two ammunition columns assigned to it from other corps. Only the heavy batteries and the light of the 6th Division were again completely provided with ammunition; the others were each short of 305 rounds. The Guard Corps had at its disposal on this day only $\frac{1}{2}$, the VIIIth $1\frac{1}{2}$, the Xth one incomplete artillery ammunition column, whilst the IXth had issued all its supplies. Their replenishment was the more difficult, as the columns had also given up a large part of their men and horses† to the batteries which had lost heavily, and consequently the trying marches to Saarlouis and Forbach,‡ the quarters of the reserve ammunition columns, had to be done with reduced teams.

The operations of the IIIrd Army on Sedan gave rise to very serious difficulties for the columns, which had proceeded as far as Weissenburg and Hagenau to replenish their supplies. In order not to impede the troops in their sudden movement to the right, these columns could not in all cases follow, and afterwards had to make forced marches, during which the already weak teams suffered severely. In spite of this, there were only wanting, when the serious struggles commenced, $1\frac{1}{2}$ artillery ammunition columns to the VIth Army Corps, and $\frac{1}{4}$ of the main ammunition column to the Ist Bavarian Corps.

* A Prussian light battery carried in limber and wagon 864, a heavy battery 702, an artillery ammunition column about 1,750 shell.

† For instance, 225 horses in the IIIrd Army Corps.

‡ See subsequent narrative.

The expenditure of ammunition in the battles of Beaumont and Sedan reached almost the same amount as before Metz. For instance, with the batteries of the Vth Army Corps it reached an average of 390, in those of the XIth 500, the maximum being 731 rounds; whilst one Bavarian battery* fired 939 rounds. On the field of battle, a real want of ammunition was alone experienced about midday by the batteries of the XIth Army Corps, in action to the east of St. Menges, as their second echelon of wagons had to give way to other troops, and could not immediately follow. In the course of the afternoon two other ammunition columns arrived simultaneously with them, so that the firing had only to be diminished in force a few hours.

In the case of the Army of the Meuse, the replacement of ammunition bore a different character to that of the other armies, as a special commander of artillery had not been nominated, and no separate reserve ammunition supplies had been assigned. In these matters the Corps were immediately dependent on the headquarters of the IIrd Army. In consequence, the columns of the Guard Corps, after the battle of St. Privat, replenished their supplies at Saarbrücken, Faulquemont, and Forbach,† whence they rejoined the Corps with great difficulty. On the other hand, the XIIth Corps did not draw from its reserve ammunition columns,‡ although these were the first to arrive at Herny, until after the battle of Sedan. The expenditure of ammunition with the Saxon artillery in the numerous successive fights was, it is true, comparatively small.‡

The batteries of the Guard fired in the battle of Sedan an average of only 400 rounds, the maximum being 724, whilst of the IVth Army Corps only ten batteries generally took part in the fight, and altogether fired 780 rounds. In spite of the considerable expenditure in the recent battle of Beaumont, the replenishment in this case could be easily effected.

The replenishment of the columns exhausted by the battle of Sedan was done at Nancy for the IIIrd Army; the columns of the Meuse Army§ had to go back to Faulquemont and Herny, and arrived before Paris between the 22nd and 27th September.

The expenditure of ammunition in the actions which took place during the investment of Metz was very considerable, in consequence of the necessity of an obstinate resistance. For instance, in the Ist Army Corps, after the battle of Noisseville, all the columns were emptied, as they had also to provide for

* Each Bavarian 4-pounder battery had in its limber and wagon 1,100, each 6-pounder 798 rounds.

† See subsequent narrative.

‡ It amounted in all, from 18th to 31st August, 2,059 4-pounder and 3,016 6-pounder projectiles, while the equipment of the five columns was 4,080 and 4,980 respectively; consequently, besides the ammunition for the batteries, there were 2,021 4-pounder and 1,974 6-pounder projectiles available as reserve on 1st September. On this day 7,415 projectiles in all were fired.

§ In the Guard Corps all five, in the IVth Corps three, in the XIIth four artillery ammunition columns.

the troops of Kummer's Division. The replenishment had to be done for the Ist Army at Saarlouis, for the IInd Army at Faulquemont. In consequence, the columns were in part forced to make very considerable marches, but they succeeded in providing what was wanted. The army before Metz was even able, without risk of running short itself, to send away two large convoys of ammunition. Ten artillery ammunition columns sent on the 13th September to Pont-à-Mousson, for the purpose of replenishing the supplies of the Meuse Army, were not utilised by the latter. On the 23rd September, again, thirteen artillery ammunition columns proceeded to Rheims, where they formed a reserve for the Meuse Army, and also supplied the troops besieging Verdun.*

During the engagements of the Ist Army in Northern France the reserve ammunition columns† could not be in all cases brought up to the front, but, as a principle, the headquarters of the army endeavoured as far as possible to push forward supplies along the railway, as might be required, thereby shortening the laborious marches of the horsed columns. In this way intermediate depôts were gradually created at Breteuil, Longeau, Creil, and Nesle. At the commencement of the year 1871 the difficulties of replacing the ammunition increased, as the continued bombardment of Péronne with field guns entailed an exceptionally large expenditure of ammunition. The greatest expenditure took place with the VIIIth Army Corps, which at the end of December had but half a column remaining at its disposal, and on the 19th January had again entirely exhausted its supplies. The artillery also of the combined division of the Ist Army Corps had at times to limit its fire during the battle of St. Quentin, because its columns had not yet arrived.

In the troops belonging to the IInd Army and to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Detachment, the services of the ammunition columns during the engagements in the south and west of Paris had been so taxed, that extraordinary measures had to be adopted in order to keep the batteries supplied.

After the engagements in October great difficulties were already experienced. Besides the great expenditure there was also the awkward circumstance that the Reserve Ammunition Depôt could not be brought near enough to the Ist Bavarian Corps,‡ while the 17th and 22nd Divisions had actually no reserve ammunition columns of their own. These troops consequently found themselves mainly dependent upon the assistance of the rest of the IIIrd Army.

The rapid advance of the IInd Army from Metz to the Loire did not allow of the reserve ammunition columns keeping pace

* Most of these columns returned to their corps towards the end of October, part not until the end of November.

† See subsequent narrative.

‡ See subsequent narrative.

with it. In consequence of a demand made on the 19th of November, the Royal Headquarters allowed the Reserve Ammunition Dépôt to be pushed forward by rail as far as Vitry-le-Français, and the ammunition columns to replenish temporarily from the supplies of the IIIrd Army.

This latter despatched a number of its columns to the south, namely, some from the VIth for the 17th Division, some of the XIth for the 22nd Division, and some of the IInd Bavarian Army Corps for the 1st Bavarian Corps.

Later on, the IInd and Vth Army Corps were also requisitioned upon, and an intermediate dépôt was formed at Orléans out of six artillery and three infantry ammunition columns.

This dépôt, however, never became permanent; on the contrary, all the columns of the IInd Army, and of the Grand Duke's Detachment, as well as many of the IIIrd Army, were, up to the 30th January, in constant movement, in order to replace the great expenditure from the reserve ammunition dépôts in rear. The delivery from the columns of the IIIrd Army ensued first at Montgeron and Montlhéry; later on, chiefly at Etampes, Toury, and Orléans. The columns which took part in this service had an extremely difficult duty to perform, in consequence of the unfavourable weather, the bad roads, and the attacks of a hostile population. The four ammunition columns of the Vth Army Corps accomplished the distance to Angerville—41½ miles—in the night of the 3rd December, whilst two of the XIth Corps advanced still further, and completed 60 miles without a halt.

The columns of the IInd Bavarian Army Corps, from their quarters at Palaiseau to the supply dépôt at La Ferté-sur-Jouarre, and to Orléans, had in each case to march about sixty-two miles. Altogether, the main ammunition column of this Corps, during this period made, with its 386 carriages, 24 convoys, which delivered to the 1st Bavarian Army Corps 21,000 artillery projectiles, and 1,700,480 small-arm cartridges.

In such circumstances, it is intelligible that in spite of all efforts the service of replenishing the supplies might give rise to serious misgiving, while the effect of artillery fire gained in importance against the badly-trained levies of the Republic. In the Grand Duke's Detachment, between the 1st and 15th December, for every twenty small-arm cartridges, one artillery projectile was fired. In the first half of January, at which time the employment of artillery was much restricted by the character of the ground, the relative proportions were 134 to 1. The artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps in the Battle of Orléans expended hardly less projectiles than on 18th August; in the IXth Corps, also, four artillery ammunition columns were almost entirely emptied by the issues made on the 3rd and 4th December. In the 1st Bavarian Army Corps, ammunition had to be issued daily from the 2nd to the 11th December, so that ultimately there was a deficiency of 6-pr. projectiles, whilst some of the 4-pr. batteries, on account of the leading of the guns, were

obliged to cease firing. On 11th December, according to a return furnished from Army Headquarters, the IIIrd Army Corps had still 24 artillery ammunition columns at its disposal, the IXth, Xth, and the 17th and 22nd Divisions, had only the limber ammunition of the batteries.

During the engagements round Le Mans, the expenditure was somewhat less than that in the month of December. Yet this period was the most trying for the columns of the IIInd Army; often sent in directions which were subsequently changed, they had to make a series of very severe night marches along mountain roads slippery with ice, or deep in snow.

For the Army Corps lying in front of Paris, the replenishment of ammunition presented no difficulties.* The men and horses of the columns could therefore be partly employed for transport duties in the siege parks.

The troops which proceeded to South-east France, after the fall of Strassburg, were well provided with ammunition columns,† and completed their supplies without difficulty at Lunéville. It was not until the middle of January that difficulties arose, when the XIVth Army Corps moved away to the Lisaine, whilst the columns had for the most part to make the wide détour from Epinal by way of Lunéville, and thence by railway through Strassburg and Mülhausen. Consequently, on the 15th January, there were but two artillery and two infantry ammunition columns at disposal for the defence of the extensive Lisaine front. On the Lisaine, even on the first day, there occurred in places a want of ammunition, and several batteries were obliged in consequence to husband their fire. But owing to the gradual arrival of the remaining columns,‡ and with some assistance from the siege artillery, serious embarrassments were avoided. In the subsequent advance of the Army Corps, the replenishing of ammunition met with no impediment. The troops of the VIIth Army Corps which first reached the southern theatre of war were at times compelled to observe great caution in their expenditure of ammunition, as the 13th Division had only four columns with it, and for its replenishment was restricted to the reserve ammunition columns of the IIInd Army at Vitry-le-Français, or to the convoys pushed forward thence to Châtillon-sur-Seine. The remainder of the columns could not leave Rethel until towards the end of January, and rejoined the Army Corps on the 14th February.

In consequence of the enormous burdens thrown upon the railways, the transport of the reserve ammunition columns§

Reserve
ammunition
columns.

* The corps of the Meuse Army were in this respect placed under the orders of the Commander of Artillery of the IIIrd Army.

† On the 28th October, two newly formed columns of the 4th Reserve Division joined those enumerated in Part II, Appendices LXXXI and OXXXI.

‡ The column of Colonel Debschitz's Detachment marched by night from the detraining station to the battle-field.

§ Each Prussian reserve ammunition column consisted of 32 wagons without horses. Of those left available after the mobilisation was completed, the 13th was

met with great difficulties from the very commencement of the campaign.

Although the columns of the 1st Army* arrived at Saarlouis on the 23rd and 24th August, they could not be brought up to Metz until the middle of November, and at the end of the month to Laon. Three of them were moved thence with teams to Soissons with great difficulty, and remained there until the end of the war. In January, one of these columns proceeded to join the newly-formed South Army.

No. 1 Reserve Ammunition Depot† reached Saarlouis on the 1st September, and Soissons on the 5th December. No. 13 Reserve Ammunition Column, which had become available on the disbandment of the 3rd Reserve Division, brought up from Rheims, and later from La Fère, ammunition for the troops in front of Mézières and Péronne.

The reserve ammunition columns of the IInd Army‡ reached the neighbourhood of Forbach between the 24th and 26th August. By the 18th September, eleven of them were assembled at Faulquemont, whilst a Saxon column had been able to reach Herry by the 22nd August. During the advance of the army after the fall of Metz, they were for the most part confined to the ordinary roads, so that they could only be gradually brought up to Commercy and Vitry-le-Français, and did not reach Pithiviers until January, 1871. On the other hand, No. 2 Reserve Ammunition Depot§ which was organized at Forbach on 29th August, and transferred in part shortly after to Faulquemont, was moved after the fall of Metz to Pont-à-Mousson, and at the beginning of December to Vitry-le-Français, and here placed under the orders of the commander of artillery of the IIIrd Army. The duties of this depot exceeded, in consequence, very much what was contemplated beforehand, as it had to supply ultimately twelve army corps, the Guard, IInd, IVth, Vth, VIth, XIth, and XIIth Army Corps before Paris, the IIIrd, IXth, Xth, and XIIIth on the Loire, lastly the VIIth on its march to the south-east. In order to supply these corps more easily with ammunition, the supplies were stored at five different points—Lagny, Nanteuil, Epernay, Vitry-le-

assigned later on to the 3rd, and the 14th to the 1st Reserve Division, both without horses; Columns No. 15 and 16 were turned into field ammunition columns, and assigned to the XIIIth Corps.

* 2nd Division field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 9 to 12.

† This replenished from the artillery depôts at Coblenz, Cologne, Minden, and Saarlouis.

‡ 1st Division field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition columns Nos. 1 to 8.

§ Saxon reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 1 and 2.

Besides, two Hessian ammunition columns, which were detached on the 6th August at Kaiserslautern from those following the field army, and became reserve columns.

§ This depot was to replenish from the artillery depôts at Wesel, Küstrin, Posen, and Glogau; later also from those at Dresden, Königsberg, Spandau, Stettin, Darmstadt, Saarlouis, Cologne, and Minden.

Français and Rheims*—in proportion as the railway lines became available,

With the IIIrd Army, the control of the ammunition supply at the commencement of the war was the more difficult as the organization of the South German Columns was not identical, and the line of railway at disposal was ere long much occupied with the transport of siege material to Strassburg. The Prussian columns,† however, succeeded by the 14th August in pushing forward to Weissenburg, and thence to Hagenau and Nancy. On the 4th October, they reached this last-named town complete, although six of them had meanwhile again made the march to Erfurt, in order to replenish from No. 3 Reserve Ammunition Depôt, which remained there throughout the war.‡ After the fall of Toul, the division proceeded with six columns to Epernay, whilst the two left at first in Nancy supplied the XIIIth Army Corps and the other troops stationed in rear of the field army. In November these columns, with two others, were pushed forward to Nanteuil, and towards the end of the year the four others to Lagny, and from these two points supplied the IInd and IIIrd Armies.

Supplies of ammunition for the South German troops were pushed forward from the rear in a similar manner. The Württemberg Ammunition Reserve,§ without teams, proceeded from Ulm to Nancy on 2nd September; the reserve ammunition depôt|| of the IInd Bavarian Corps reached Nancy on the 1st September, that of the 1st Bavarian Corps, Lunéville on 26th August. Later on, the two last moved forward first to Vitry-le-Français, then to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whilst in their place two supplementary depôts arrived at Nancy, and a newly formed third depôt was opened at Ingolstadt. The Württemberg Ammunition Reserve was partly brought up to Paris, but was afterwards established permanently at Nanteuil, later on at Lagny.

The reserve ammunition columns of the XIVth Army Corps¶ proceeded in October to Lunéville and, while drawing their own requirements from Rastatt, supplied the Army Corps, as well as the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions. Although the Baden supplies were in this way placed under requisition in a manner which could not have been foreseen, they were never allowed to be completely exhausted. Later on, the newly created Prussian artillery depôt at Strassburg bore a hand in pushing

* The Saxon reserve ammunition columns were left here.

† 3rd Division of the field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 17 to 24.

‡ This depôt drew the supplies from the artillery depôts at Erfurt, Neisse, Danzig, and Magdeburg.

§ Two divisions of the ammunition depôt company, the third formed the convoy from Ulm and Ludwigsburg.

|| Each Bavarian reserve ammunition depôt consisted of 75 ammunition wagons without teams.

¶ No. 14 Prussian Reserve Ammunition Column (originally assigned to 4th Reserve Division) and a newly formed Baden column.

forward ammunition, and, from the 20th January, sent a considerable part of its stores to form a reserve ammunition dépôt at Epinal.

The experiences of the campaign showed that the expenditure of artillery, compared with infantry ammunition, was quite different to the proportion borne by the supplies of the two kinds carried in the ammunition columns of an army corps. The artillery projectiles were expended in a greater degree, the infantry cartridges in a less degree than had been expected.* This serves to explain why at different parts of the theatre of war the firing of the German batteries, when opposed to the enemy, had to be limited, and that also the reserve ammunition services were not always able to supply the requirements of the artillery, while for the small arms there was always a superfluity of cartridges. A comparison of the returns of issue made by those services shows that for one round of artillery ammunition an average of 45 small arm cartridges reached the field army,† whilst the field ammunition columns carried with them 188 cartridges for one round of gun ammunition.‡

That, in spite of the obstacles already mentioned, the army has been spared from any serious misadventure, affords a brilliant proof of the great care which all the officers in command, the men, and the authorities have devoted to their difficult duties.

Replenish-
ment of siege
artillery
ammunition.

There were no special columns set apart for replenishing the expended ammunition of the siege artillery. The artillery siege train, however, included, besides the guns, a definite quantity of ammunition for each, and the necessary supplies for its replenishment had to be drawn immediately from the artillery dépôts assigned to it.

For the siege of Strassburg, orders were at first given to bring up half the regulated allowance of ammunition for the siege train.§ The weight of the entire artillery material amounted to some 92,400 cwt. Its transport by rail presented no difficulty, but this was not the case as regards its removal from the railway station to the artillery park, as the wagons obtained

* In the Guard Corps, the supplies of 10 columns of 9-centimetre projectiles were used, and of 14 columns of 8-centimetre projectiles, during the campaign, while of small-arm cartridges only the supplies of 1½ infantry ammunition columns. The IIIrd Army Corps expended in the battle of Mars-la-Tour for its heavy guns the ammunition of nearly 7, for its light guns the ammunition of over 7 columns, but only the contents of 6 small-arm ammunition wagons; during the whole war, the supplies of 12 artillery and 2 infantry ammunition columns. In the Vth Army Corps the corresponding number of emptied columns was about 9 and 3, and in the entire 1st Army 21 and 3.

† About 45 in the case of the 1st Reserve Ammunition Dépôt, 39 in the case of the 2nd, and 53 in the case of the 3rd.

‡ The infantry received also the ammunition sent with the draughts from the dépôts; for instance the infantry of the VIIth Army Corps, 1,473,875 cartridges, that of the IXth, 989,560.

§ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 437. This would be some 100,000 shell and 10,000 shrapnel for rifled guns, 29,000 shell for smooth-bore mortars, 10,000 wall-piece, and 1,000,000 needle-gun cartridges.

for the troops and those requisitioned in the district were insufficient.* The expenditure was so considerable, that even by the 30th August the second half of the ammunition had to be despatched, and this in turn was followed by supplies from Spandau, Magdeburg, and Mainz. In addition, besides the ammunition for the Baden siege guns,† further assistance was given from Rastatt, and ultimately the supplies from Ulm were made available for the attack on the right bank of the Rhine. At the beginning of September the enormous flow of wagons caused some embarrassment, as they could not be unloaded in time, and the railways became blocked. Consequently, several trains had to be shunted to neighbouring stations until the necessary sheds were erected at the park to receive the contents. Generally, the administration of the park had to contend with great difficulties, the more so as the preparatory works had suffered interruptions owing to the early commencement of the bombardment. The productive power of the laboratory was so augmented by the utmost exertion that the daily turn-out was 6,650 shell and 4,500 cartridges; nevertheless, no reserve of ammunition could be accumulated, and all that could be done was to meet the daily requirements. The preparation of ammunition for high-angle fire presented especial difficulty, as this nature of fire was largely employed in the later phases of the siege. The expenditure also of wall-piece cartridges far exceeded the amount fixed for the equipment of the siege train, so that in the first half of September 50,000 rounds had to be furnished from the Prussian, and 20,000 rounds from the Baden arsenals.

Nevertheless, at the time of the surrender, the siege artillery was perfectly able to continue the struggle without abatement of energy.‡

The transport of ammunition to the batteries in action, or to those newly erected, had been regulated in such manner that the requisitioned country wagons only did duty within the parks, while on the ground occupied by the siege works the teams and columns of the troops were alone employed. Later on, the wagon train had to be largely augmented by requisitions made over a large area of country.

The siege artillery expended before Strassburg a total of 202,099 shell, weighing upwards of 4,000 tons, whilst the weight of all the projectiles fired by the field artillery of the North German Confederation during the whole campaign only amounted to some 1,375 tons.

The comprehensive measures which had to be taken in order to bring up the ammunition for the artillery intended for

* The simultaneous transport of the entire material by road would have required 428 teams (2,752 horses) and 3,560 country wagons and horses.

† See Part II, Vol. I, p. 62, and Appendix LXVIII.

‡ At this period, among others, over 74,000 rounds of 7- and 25-pounder shells were on the way from Coblenz and Cologne.

the siege of Paris, have been already described,* but the following may be added:—

The headquarters of the Meuse Army undertook the provision of the number of wagons requisite for the attack on Mont Avron. The Guard Corps formed a special park of 50 wagons, and the Saxon Cavalry Division collected by the 22nd December some 600 country wagons, whilst the IVth and XIIth Army Corps and the Württemberg Division with their own teams took over a quantity of transport work. As soon as the artillery attack on the north front was decided upon, the Army Headquarters fixed the strength of the wagon park at 700 wagons, and instructed the Army Corps to comply with all requisitions on the part of the siege artillery for working parties, teams, and material. It was of no slight advantage that all requisitions could be sent by railway as far as Villiers-le-Bel, consequently, to the immediate vicinity of the park.

The orders† given on the 7th December for the transport service on the south front could not naturally come into immediate effect; because the bringing up of the newly created wagon park column required a considerable time, the traffic along the line of relays, formed of teams from the ammunition columns, was interrupted by the temporary breaking down of the bridges over the Seine, and the number of country wagons collected was rapidly diminished by desertions and sickness. On 16th December orders were given in consequence for all the draught horses of the pontoon columns, light field bridge trains, and entrenching tool columns to be brought up, and for six infantry ammunition columns to be handed over for employment on the work. These latter were employed on and after the 2nd January.

In this way not only could the supply be properly kept up, but at the time of the capitulation there was so much ammunition on hand that the bombardment could have been maintained still more actively than had before been the case.

Provision had also been made in Germany for further supplies. The despatch of the second portion of the ammunition for all the guns on the south and east attack was commenced on the 6th January, and was to be so organised that a train was to reach Esbly every second day. On the 20th January a third portion was ordered to be forwarded.

In the siege of Belfort the German artillery had from the outset to contend with difficulties, as the material of the park brought up from Neu Breisach had already been heavily drawn upon. It arrived with only 100 rounds per gun. The

* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 128.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 128.

On 26th January, the following were working: at each of the 7 stations of the line of relay, Esbly—Villacoublay, 3 wagon-park and 1 infantry ammunition column; running through along the whole line, 2 columns of French country wagons; in the park itself, 3 wagon-park columns, 2 columns French country wagons, and 3 columns provided by a contractor.

Bavarian guns had each 200 rounds. During the course of the siege, applications for supplies had always been complied with by the authorities with the greatest willingness;* but the firing batteries had not the less to be careful in husbanding their ammunition. At Belfort, as elsewhere, the main difficulty lay in bringing up the material from the terminal stations; first, Colmar, later Mülhausen and Dammerkirch. The available means of transport† were always too weak to satisfy the claims made upon them; the distances were long, and the roads, at first sodden, afterwards became like ice or were buried deep in snow.

Consequently, at the commencement of the siege, only some 1,000 rounds could be fired daily. The circumstances did not improve even later.

The supply of ammunition in those sieges, for which French material was either exclusively or mainly used, was effected in different ways according to circumstances.

Thus in the bombardment of Verdun, which commenced on the 13th October,‡ with French artillery, difficulties cropped up from the first, as the wagons available for transporting the ammunition from Sedan were insufficient. The bringing up of the Prussian siege material was also a slow process, as it could only be transported by rail from Vendenheim as far as Commercy. Of the convoys of country wagons despatched thither, each could carry about one-fifth part of the contents of a railway train. Although the distance was only 35 miles, only four trains could be emptied by the 8th November. The bringing-up of French ammunition by road was considerably facilitated later on, so that when the fortress was unexpectedly surrendered there was a supply for each gun for many days.

In the other sieges considerable difficulties had to be frequently overcome when transferring the siege park from one fortress to another, and in sending forward the material brought up from Germany.

* Appendix CXXIX shows what was done.

† In the middle of December 100 Service and 250 country teams were available. The Bavarian park had a sufficient number of horses; the Baden had brought with it 6 teams. Later on, the two parks requisitioned 30 and 80 two-horse country wagons respectively.

‡ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 153.

THE COMMISSARIAT.

From the very commencement of a campaign a very great strain falls upon the authorities entrusted with the food supply of an army. The strategical concentration brings together large masses in a small area, whilst the railways are fully taken up with the transport of the troops and their trains.

The districts in which the German armies were concentrated possessed for the most part abundant resources. In spite of that, the Rhine provinces could not be expected to furnish more than two days' food for all the troops which were about to arrive. This expectation was the less hopeful, as the not over-abundant harvest of the current year still lay in part on the ground, and the prevailing drought both limited the power of the mills and the use of the communications by water.

The first general measures for ensuring the supplies have already been mentioned.* With the various armies, however, there were differences in the mode of procedure, due to the varying nature of the districts in which they were concentrated.

For the Ist Army, which had to advance through the unfertile Eifel country, Coblenz and Cöln served as collecting stations for all supplies. The supplies stored at Trier had been at first removed to the rear by order of the headquarters of the VIIIth Army Corps, in view of the dangers that might arise from a hostile irruption. But owing to the energetic help of the civil authorities and inhabitants, and with the aid of a requisitioned wagon-park, any serious embarrassments were avoided. By the 30th July a considerable magazine was again established at Trier. After the railway became free, supplies could be pushed forward to Fraulautern, and, on the 8th August, the bakery columns of the Army Corps were in active operation at that place.

The Commander-in-Chief of the IInd Army had on the 22nd July authorised his troops to bring with them by rail an independent supply of five days' food. On the 29th he ordered the food, within the limits of six days' supply, available in the district of strategical concentration to be purchased at any price, and, in order to facilitate the provision, allowed variations in the composition of the ration of food and fodder. Of special importance was the use of preserved provisions,† which this army was the first to employ on a large scale. The experiments previously made‡ had not been sufficiently conclusive to

* See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 75-76. Besides the measures there mentioned, the purchase of 3,000,000 lbs. of each of the following stores—Preserved meat, biscuit, oats, and compressed hay, were ordered in England; at the instance of the Intendant-General, Lieutenant-General v. Stosch. The articles were to be delivered at Cöln.

† Prince Frederic Charles, as early as the 16th July, forwarded a proposal on this subject to the War Ministry.

‡ Made chiefly by the IIIrd Army Corps at the instance of the War Ministry.

lead to a change in the authorised composition of the ration; but, at this time, a preserved food prepared from pea-meal, fat, and bacon had proved so excellent that, immediately after the mobilization, an extensive factory for making it was set up at Berlin, under Army Intendant Engelhard. The factory commenced work on the 8th August, and after a few days furnished the first 100,000 pea-sausages, which, under the name of *Erbswurst*, became afterwards so widely known.*

The provisions purchased in the Hanse Towns and in Holland, and transported up the Rhine in hired steamboats, the bakeries established with the columns and the regiments, lastly, the removal to Bingen of the extensive stores of the fortresses of Cöln and Wesel, not only furnished sufficient food during the concentration,† but rendered possible the creation of a reserve store of provisions.

During the concentration of the IIIrd Army, the food question presented much greater difficulties, as the supplies provided by contract could not arrive in time on account of delays in the railway transport. Even with this drawback no embarrassments occurred, as the food furnished in billets by the inhabitants exceeded all expectation, the South German Governments most willingly handed over their supplies, and, lastly, the Inspector-General of Etappen, who arrived at Mannheim on the 26th of July, at once set to work to create a large army magazine at that place, and collected a wagon-park of 1,000 wagons.‡

At the commencement of the operations, the following magazines were at the disposal of the German troops in the district of strategical concentration:—

The Ist Army had those at Fraulautern and Trier; the IIInd Army had those at Kreuznach, Alzey and Worms, as also the reserve magazines at Bingen and Mainz; the IIIrd Army had the magazines§ of the South German States already mentioned and the army magazine in process of formation at Mannheim.

During the advance of the Ist and IIInd Armies to the Moselle, the former was dependent at first on supplies forwarded from Saarlouis to an intermediate magazine at Boulay. The supplies captured at Forbach and other places|| formed a welcome addition; as did also the supplies obtained by requisition, and the quantity of bread baked by the troops themselves. The Ist Army received assistance also from the IIInd,

* This article of food met with such general approval, that for a long period the factory had to supply the whole army with it. The factory ultimately extended its business to making other kinds of meat preserves, and altogether sent some 40,000,000 rations to the field army.

† As base of supply, the line Bingen—Mainz—Worms served at first, but after the 29th July the line Kreuznach—Alzey—Worms.

‡ Of these, 400 were handed over to the Guard Corps as a provisional wagon-park.

§ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 75.

|| After taking several days' supplies, large quantities were transported from Forbach to Saarlouis.

as the Royal Headquarters, by an order of 12th August allowed it temporarily to receive supplies at Forbach, St. Avold and Faulquemont. Later on considerable quantities of provisions were given up to this army, in order to form a magazine at Courcelles-sur-Nied.

In consequence of the rapidity of the movements, the supplies of the IInd Army had to be rapidly pushed forward to the line Neunkirchen—Homburg; for this purpose the Royal Headquarters, from the 4th August, allowed three provision trains each day on the line Bingen—Neunkirchen. In order to forward as quickly as possible all the stores collected on the Rhine to that line and beyond, the Army Headquarters paid especial attention to utilizing every kind of carriage that was available. Magazines and bakeries were thus created in succession at Saarbrücken, Saargemünd and Saar-Union, later on at Forbach, St. Avold, Faulquemont, and on the 13th August at Remilly. In this neighbourhood considerable masses of food were collected, in order, as far as possible, to guard against any difficulties after the passage of the Moselle.

During the engagements before Metz it was only on rare occasions possible, as for example with parts of the 1st Army on the 14th August, to provide the troops with food on fighting days, but at any rate during the course of the next day sufficient food was supplied throughout the army.

With the IIIrd Army, there were no difficulties up to the first collisions with the enemy, the provision columns of the army corps being brought up within reach and replenished successively from the stores pushed forward on the 5th August from Landau, Homburg, Mannheim, and Würzburg to Weissenburg; and on the 6th to Sulz. During the advance through the thinly-populated mountainous country, where the columns had to remain in rear, the regimental supply wagons and wide-ranging requisitioning proved of great service, so that with most of the army corps there was no deficiency. The circumstances took a more favourable turn during the advance to the Marne, as in these rich districts the troops could be billeted on the inhabitants; moreover, the magazine formed by the IInd Army in Saar-Union was available, and at several points French supplies fell into the hands of the troops. After the railway to Nancy had been opened to traffic on the 21st August, the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army formed magazines at this town and at Lunéville.

For the Army of the Meuse, Pont-à-Mousson was first appointed as the advanced dépôt and stationary magazine. This magazine was quickly filled from the stores at Nancy and Remilly, and with supplies received from home. On the other hand, the bringing up of food to the troops was very difficult, as the IInd Army, being already overworked with the transport of the wounded, was unable to comply with the demands made upon it for carriage for the wagon-park columns. The XIIth Army Corps, with the aid of its own

wagon-park which arrived on the 24th August, was alone able to arrange for pushing forward supplies by stages. For the rest, until the end of the month, the troops were in general adequately supplied, either by food in billets, or by requisition or purchase. The stores in the smaller magazines established at St. Mihiel and Commercy also rendered assistance.

The movement to the right of the IIIrd and Meuse Armies, which commenced on the 26th August, very materially increased the difficulties of feeding the large masses concentrated in a small area. The commissariat wagons and the live cattle could not follow immediately after the troops, it was very seldom possible to bring up the trains, and neither requisition nor purchase furnished what was required.*

In general, the troops were at this time obliged to consume their iron-ration, and, if possible, to replenish it by bringing up some of the wagons of the commissariat train. A very welcome addition came to hand in the French supplies captured at various points, as, for instance, at La Besace, Carignan, Donchery, and Bazeilles.† At that time the troops were undoubtedly experiencing no inconsiderable privations. After the 2nd September, the commissariat and wagon-park columns could be again brought up within reach, while at the same time the unforeseen obligations of feeding the numerous prisoners of war devolved upon the army administration.‡

During this period the baking of bread at home was diligently proceeded with, in order to satisfy the wants of the Army. But as at first no commissariat railway trains could be sent forward to the army, the food ran great risk of spoiling, in consequence of the great heat, an evil which it was attempted to meet as far as possible by preparing desiccated bread. When subsequently, the railways could also be used for provisions, the transport of goods of every kind assumed immense proportions. The commissariat authorities in the field and the home authorities made equal efforts to furnish the army with supplies. Some merchants also, who were not engaged by contract, succeeded to a large extent in bringing up their goods. In this way, supplies of all kinds shortly flowed in, and to convey these neither the railways nor the means for unloading at the places of destination sufficed. In the result, the lines became blocked. These inconveniences frequently recurred during the war, and might have entailed disastrous consequences for the supply of the army, had not the adminis-

* The convoys for the IIIrd Army could not all be informed in time of the changes in the direction of march. In consequence, No. 2 Commissariat Column of the XIth Army Corps was seized by the enemy when proceeding from Vitry-le-Français to Rheims.

After the 29th August, the army in front of Metz placed at Etain 100 wagons every day to help the Meuse Army.

† On the 31st August a provision train containing seven days' supply for an Army Corps fell into the hands of the Guard Corps at Carignan.

‡ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 408.

trative authorities by their increased energy succeeded in clearing the lines,* and had not the bountiful resources of the occupied districts essentially contributed, with few exceptions, to provide what was needed.

Immediate relief could only be obtained by discharging with the least possible delay all trains that were blocked, even though large quantities of food were thereby exposed without protection to the weather, and, consequently, to rapid deterioration. The Chief Commissariat Officer of the IInd Army succeeded in bringing up to the army investing Metz, a large quantity of such supplies, which were blocking the station, and were intended chiefly for the army corps before Paris.

The army investing Metz shortly experienced serious difficulties in consequence of a deficiency of transport. The wagon-parks were so greatly diminished by having to give up carriages for railway construction, for the transport of wounded, and by sickness that, for instance, on the 17th October, the 1st Army had but some 20 wagons remaining of its original number of 2,000.

The scarcity of water which prevailed at Metz† was constantly felt, but by a regular issue from the ample stores of wine found on the spot, and, later, by increasing the coffee ration, and by sending brandy and mulled wine to the outposts, all disadvantageous consequences were avoided. The Army of Investment was, as a general rule, not only sufficiently provided during the whole period,‡ but was even able to help the Meuse Army and the prisoners coming from Sedan, and those made at the capitulation of Metz. It even provided for the inhabitants of the fortress.

During the advance of the IIIrd and Meuse Armies from Sedan to Paris, as the troops were widely distributed at the night-halts, the supplies furnished by the inhabitants on requisitions, and, when necessary, by the commissariat columns, sufficed for the purpose. Even the daily rations of bread were so adequately provided by requisition and by the troops baking for themselves, that tenders by contract could be cancelled. All the troops found themselves in possession of their iron rations, and, in addition, carried with them several days' supplies in their wagons.§ In order to keep up these advantageous conditions as long as possible, the Commissariat Department of the IIIrd Army caused main magazines to be formed at Rheims and Châlons-sur-Marne, and also put in

* By order of the Intendant-General of the Army, dated 11th August, the despatch of provision trains from Germany was not to take place unless it was expressly ordered by him or by the Inspectors-General of Etappen.

† The so-called American or Abyssinian wells, which had been provided in large quantities, were of little use in the generally stony subsoil of Northern and Central France.

‡ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 478, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 179.

§ By the Royal Cabinet Order of 12th September, the number of provision wagons had been fixed at two per battalion—one for each squadron, battery, or column.

working order by means of the columns of the Vth and VIth Army Corps the large bakeries found at Mourmelon.

The appearance of the rinderpest seriously compromised the certainty of the supply. In order to prevent the spread of this epidemic among the transport cattle, the Senior Commissariat Officer of the Army had adopted most comprehensive measures. Every horned beast now proceeding to the front along the line Landau—Nancy was to be killed, the good meat to be salted and the bad destroyed. The import from countries in rear was limited to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At times, it was wholly forbidden. Notwithstanding this, cases of the disease recurred later, in consequence of which it was exceedingly difficult to obtain meat, and still more so to get that change which is so desirable. The despatch of salt meat and other preserves, for the preparation of which a special factory had been opened at Mainz, did not suffice, even with a liberal supply of mutton, to prevent the inconvenience which the want occasioned.

In order to supply the army investing Paris, the Cavalry Divisions, immediately on arriving before the capital, were ordered to undertake requisitions over a large area. The produce of these requisitions were to be formed into magazines for the IIIrd Army at Versailles and Corbeil, for the Meuse Army at Chantilly.

For the former, the supplies could only be forwarded by rail as far as Nogent l'Artaud, for the latter as far as Château Thierry, so that the columns for the transport of the food were nine to ten days on the road. In consequence the available wagons, in spite of every effort, fell far short of bringing up what was wanted.* The Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army, who had, by the order of 25th September, been charged with the supply of the whole of the investing force, could not effect the supply by means of his park,† as part of it had been obliged to remain at dépôts in rear, and part was required for the transport of the siege artillery. The Meuse Army, in consequence of the favourable results of its requisitions, was able to form a sufficient reserve in its dépôt at Chantilly. Those made by the IIIrd Army produced little, so that the rations were not up to the regulation. In these circumstances, the Royal Headquarters ordered that requisitions should only be made in general by more extended movements, or in districts which had been abandoned by the inhabitants, or in those where no agreement could be come to with them; in all

* The Versailles magazine, for instance, had at its disposal 1,388 wagons of the commissariat and wagon-park columns, which, with only a seven days' march, could only convey 3,000 to 3,600 cwt. (200 wagon-loads) daily; consequently not the half of the 8,000 required daily. The blocks on the railway recurred, for reasons already stated; and consequently the conclusion of contracts, which necessitated the use of the railway, was reserved exclusively to the Inspector-General of Etappen.

† The Inspector-General of Etappen of the Meuse Army had no wagon-park of his own.

other cases purchases for cash were made the rule. The independent action of the troops was relied on to cover in this manner the consumption, and to turn to account uniformly the abundant resources of the district occupied. The harvest throughout the region occupied gave such a large yield of potatoes and vegetables, that some corps had an ample supply to last the whole winter.

Thrashing machines, mills, and bakeries were worked, and by ready money payments, opening markets, and by keeping open the communications as much as possible, such an impulse was given to contracts that from the end of October the current supply, so far as it was not brought by rail or delivered by the contractors into the magazines direct, could be regarded as secured. The supply also of the army with fresh meat, in spite of the reappearance of the rinderpest, was also arranged, as the purchases by the Commissariat, especially in the neighbourhood of Meaux and Epernay, were attended with success.* Moreover, the issue of preserved rations, for which a new factory had been established at Frankfurt-on-the-Main in addition to those at Berlin and Mainz, was materially increased. This description of food had the advantage for the Commissariat in being lighter for transport, and for the troops, especially those on outpost duty, that it was more easily prepared for consumption. The unavoidable sameness of the ration was successfully compensated for by the large stores of wine found in the neighbourhood of Paris, and by the occasional issue of an extra ration of brandy.

Supply was considerably facilitated by the opening towards the end of November of the traffic by rail to Gonesse, Mitry,† and Laguy. The relief thereby given to the wagon-park chiefly served the purposes of the siege artillery, but it was not until the end of the year that the constant blocks on the railways could be prevented and the traffic carried on with the regularity desirable.

The Commissariat Department also made arrangements to help, after the surrender of Paris, in the alleviation of the misery which prevailed in the capital. For this purpose considerable supplies were available on 28th January, but the French authorities only made use of them to a limited extent.‡ On 30th January they, it is true, requested supplies on payment, but gave up next day the receipt of cattle. A single train of provisions belonging to the Meuse Army reached Paris; on the other hand, immediately after the capitulation, 15,000 rations were handed over to the town of St. Denis gratuitously.

* In the middle of November some 100,000 head of sheep, among others, reached Corbeil.

† Since the fall of Soissons the Meuse Army had its own line of rail, but the transfer of loads (*see* Part II, Vol. I, p. 137, note §) at Soissons and Villers-Cotterêts, and the transport by land between those places necessitated considerable working parties and a large number of wagons.

‡ In all, at the various points, some 35,000 cwts. flour, 2,050,000 rations of meat preserved—smoked, salted, and tinned—and as much bacon.

The troops despatched to the south for the purpose of covering the investment of Paris received orders in the first instance to live upon the country, which had at present not suffered from requisitions. It became shortly very difficult to provide oats for the numerous cavalry, but the Commissariat Department of the IIIrd Army succeeded in pushing forward convoys in good time to Rambouillet and Chartres. In the latter town large purchases were also made for ready money.

The conditions proved less favourable for the IIInd Army in its march to the Loire. From the 24th October the Army Headquarters had made most detailed arrangements, that the country west of the Loing, which had been nearly exhausted of supplies, might be reached with the commissariat wagons filled. Up to that point, the supplies furnished in billets were in general to suffice.* Besides, there were still the magazines at Bar-le-Duc,† Commercy,‡ and Toul,§ and then, further in front, at St. Dizier, Joinville, and Neufchâteau. Further, the Commissariat Department authorised a provision railway train to be despatched daily to Blesme for the IIInd Army. The columns would thus be able, from the line Blesme—Chaumont, to follow the army with full loads.

On the other hand, the Royal Headquarters had charged the IIIrd Army to despatch for the use of the IIInd Army 300,000 rations of food and 60,000 rations of forage to each of the towns of Etampes and Malesherbes. In spite of all exertions, very few supplies could be sent thither for want of transport.|| Of much greater importance for the IIInd Army was the permission given on the 29th November for it to use the line Blesme—Lagny; to this latter town were sent to receive fresh supplies the wagons of the columns, which in all the army corps had been rapidly emptied after the passage of the Loing. Notwithstanding this, comprehensive measures were required on the part of the Commissariat to protect the troops from real want, especially as the requisitions yielded little, and at first also purchase for cash was by no means successful.

The capture of Orléans yielded but poor booty in respect of food, and the movement of the wagons sent after the troops by the Inspector-General of Etappen was greatly retarded. It was only by degrees, and by giving to the troops themselves considerable sums of money that an impulse was given to

* See Part II, Vol. I, pp. 258-259. At the same time, the wagon-park of each army corps was reinforced by 100 wagons, and 2,700 carriages were ordered in Germany by the Inspector-General of Etappen.

† For the IXth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division.

‡ For the IIIrd Corps.

§ For the Xth Corps.

|| The supplies were to be conveyed in wagons from Lagny to Juvisy or Corbeil, as the case might be, and from thence by rail to the depôts. For the transport by road there were but 50 wagons available. The railway Corbeil—Malesherbes was not open to traffic at all; that from Juvisy to Etampes was only open to light traffic (see Part II, Vol. III, p. 106).

trade, and the people were induced to bring the produce of the harvest to the markets which had been established at Orléans, Etampes, Jours, and Chartres, thereby saving themselves in the surest way from requisitions. The prices paid were in all cases very high. By the joint efforts of the intendants and the troops, it became possible to overcome the difficulties generally, so that the efforts demanded at this period could be borne by man and horse without overtaxing their strength.

In the latter half of December matters improved to such an extent that at the commencement of the advance on Le Mans the army was again adequately fed and its train was still filled with provisions. From the 3rd to the 6th January the latter could supply the rations which could not be provided in quarters, but in the subsequent days of fighting the supply of food was attended with almost insuperable difficulties. That part of the commissariat train which was full could not follow along the slippery and snowed-up roads; the exhausted country could furnish nothing more. The troops were therefore chiefly dependent on their iron rations. Thence it resulted that the men's food became shortly out of all proportion to the amount of increasing work required of them. After the capture of Le Mans the supplies captured there, and the system of purchase at once introduced, satisfied the most pressing requirements. The supplies forwarded from Orléans and Chartres, as also from Germany, were now coming freely, and by distributing the troops more widely in their cantonments, the inhabitants could furnish the rations.

The first troops of the 1st Army, which left after the fall of Metz, could only be furnished with four days' rations, as the supply of food for the prisoners necessitated great efforts, and the wagons demanded from Germany to complete the wagon-parks had not yet arrived. The troops which followed were more favourably placed in this respect, the transfer of the magazine from its original position at Courcelles-sur-Nied to Herry facilitating considerably the forwarding and distribution of supplies. As a general rule, provisioning in quarters was adopted during the march, and recourse was only to be had to the commissariat train when urgently necessary. In order to keep the latter filled, officials sent in advance organized magazines at Laon, Rethel, Rheims, and Soissons, the Intendant of the Army of the Meuse giving great help.* The supplies also captured at Sedan and Verdun were utilized, and for the rest purchases in the country were allowed. The arrangements proved adequate, and the army, provided with sufficient supplies, continued its march to North-West France. By the 7th December, the most advanced magazine was at Soissons, but the supplies of the Meuse Army already stored at Beauvais could be used in common.

* He placed at disposal 8,000 to 9,000 cwts. of oats at Clermont-en-Argonne.

After the communication by rail between Amiens and Rouen had been re-established,* the magazines formed at Rosières, Amiens, and Rouen could be filled by provision-trains from Germany, supplemented by requisitions and purchases. The supplies captured at La Fère and Péronne were stored in those magazines, while the contents of some commissariat wagons captured on 26th December from the French were distributed directly to the troops.

In the last period of the war, the 1st Army had not to contend with any serious difficulties.

During the siege of Strassburg the magazine at Lampertheim† was chiefly used; this was replenished daily from Rastatt. After the capture of the fortress the newly-formed XIVth Corps was able to leave this neighbourhood with its commissariat train filled with supplies.‡ The expended stores were first replenished at Lunéville;§ a magazine could now be formed at Epinal, and the bakery column commenced work. At the beginning of November the intendance created a magazine at Vesoul, in the middle of the month at Gray, and towards the end at Dijon, which were filled partly by convoys from Lunéville and later from Charmes, and partly by requisition. The results of the requisitions were however small, as the retreating French troops had either used or destroyed all supplies. There was so little oats that on some days not more than half a ration could be distributed.

When, after the formation of the South Army, in the month of January, the IInd and VIIth Army Corps proceeded to the southern theatre of war, the difficulties greatly increased. The IInd Army Corps had left Paris at first sufficiently provided with supplies. In the XIVth Corps the trains on account of bad weather and roads were not always able to follow. The 14th Division had not been able to bring up its trains from the north, so that the VIIth Army Corps up to the middle of January had but three commissariat columns and 270 auxiliary wagons at its disposal. During the fighting on the Lisaine, more particularly, it was not always possible to avoid actual want, as in consequence of the sudden transfer of the communications to Dammerkirch and Sentheim|| the magazines there could not at once provide sufficient supplies. The XIVth Army Corps, in this respect, remained dependent on its own resources, while for the other two corps the Intendant of the VIIth Army Corps took over the supply; a commissariat dépôt was at the same time created at Châtillon-sur-Seine. But as an *etappen* line could not be organized at

* See Part II, Vol. III, p. 104.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 444.

‡ Of the columns mentioned in Part II, Appendix LXXXI, p. 63 †, two wagon-park columns did not arrive until the end of November and beginning of December; the corps also received a Prussian field bakery column and two Prussian wagon-park columns. There were with the corps during its advance only three Baden commissariat columns and three wagon-park columns.

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 204.

|| See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 310, 323, and Vol. III, p. 110.

first to that place,* the supplies from the line Nancy—Châtillon were brought to Epinal and, with those still remaining to the XIVth Corps, united here to form an army magazine. The communications between this point and the troops could only be carried on by the very difficult land road. The trains required at least ten days to replenish. In consequence General v. Manteuffel found himself obliged on the 14th January to indicate to the Generals Commanding the IInd and VIIth Corps the necessity of combining supply from magazines with a careful system of requisitions; they were allowed perfect freedom of action in arranging the details. The food provided from the district found a welcome addition in the French military supplies which frequently fell into the hands of the troops during the course of the operations.†

In order to regulate the transport from the rear, the intendance with the assistance of the Prefecture in Epinal provided a number of wagons for the transport from this place to the army. When on the 22nd January a new magazine was formed at Dôle, the bakery columns also commenced operations at this point.

The Intendant-General had further instructed the Intendant of the IInd Army to secure a ten days' supply for the South Army on the line Blesme—Nuits-sur-Armaçon—Joigny, but this measure could not come into force at first. The transfer ordered on the 2nd February of the magazine from Epinal to Vesoul met with insuperable difficulties owing to the want of wagons, and it was only with the aid of all the regimental and departmental carriages that a regular communication could be maintained between Epinal and Dôle. Immediately after the reoccupation of Dijon a magazine was formed at that place.

The XIVth Corps was specially dependent for supplies on transports from the rear, as the district to be traversed during the advance had been already exhausted. The halting day on the 22nd January was employed to regulate the details of the situation. Notwithstanding this, the rations between the 25th and 29th were very sparing. It was not until sufficient supplies could be sent from Dôle, and all the columns of the Army Corps had reached Dampierre on the 30th, that the state of affairs improved again.

Towards the end of the operations the supply of oats and forage was difficult, especially with the troops of the South Army. The opening to traffic of the line Blesme—Dijon, however, which took place on the 11th February, enabled serious embarrassments to be avoided.

During the armistice it was a principle for all parts of the theatre of war to utilise in the first instance the resources of the country for the supply of the army. Rationing by the inhabitants was consequently employed as much as possible.

* See Part II, Vol. III, p. 110.

† On 21st January considerable supplies were found at the Dôle railway station; later on, a provision train was stopped on the railway at St. Vit, and a number of provision wagons captured at Pontarlier.

and the distribution of the troops regulated accordingly. All officers, surgeons, and superior officials received a money allowance in lieu.* Even after the signature of the peace preliminaries France had to maintain the German troops. In consequence of an agreement concluded on 11th March, the latter abandoned the systems of requisitions, and of rations provided in quarters. Supplies on the Prussian scale were to be drawn direct from the magazines.†

* The French Government paid for each man's ration $1\frac{1}{2}$ francs, and for each forage ration $2\frac{1}{2}$ francs. In order to supply herewith the food of the troops on a sufficient scale, means had first to be found to reduce the very high prices to a proper standard. By the conclusion of contracts with a trading company, which made the necessary purchase in the cheapest markets in districts as remote as possible, this object was attained, and gradually economies were made which partly benefitted the Army of Occupation and partly the Treasury.

Owing to the foresight and loyalty of all the intendants and supply officials, and of the officers and men employed in the train, and the never-failing initiative of the troops, those periods of difficulties of supply were tided over without endangering the health of man and horse in a way that had never been attained in any previous great campaign. If in isolated cases, as, for instance, on the days of battle, the food was deficient, or the rations could not be issued in the regulated proportions, this was due to circumstances which can never be entirely under control in time of war. The German troops have, however, shown that they are able to bear the hardest privations without detriment to their soldier-like qualities.

Lastly, we must not fail to mention in praise the very welcome help given to the field armies by the quantities of clothing and food of every kind sent as gifts from societies and private persons in all parts of Germany.‡

* By this means it was intended to give the officers, &c., the possibility of obtaining a sufficient ration in spite of the rise of prices, due to the opening of communication with Paris. The money allowance was 15 francs a day; the necessary sums had to be supplied by those parts of France which were in German occupation.

† The Agreement was based on Articles IV and VIII of the Preliminary Peace Convention. The officers and officials received the allowance until the end of March, 1871. All non-commissioned officers and men in France, exclusive of those in hospital, those under arrest, and those on leave, received after the 21st March a daily allowance, which for soldiers was 3*d.*, and for non-commissioned officers was the same as the field allowance of their rank.

‡ See subsequent narrative.

THE HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

Composition
of the
Medical
Department.

The hospital service of the German army demanded so large a medical staff that the available military surgeons of the active and furlough lists were quite insufficient to meet the requirements, and it was therefore necessary to bring into the army a large number of civilians, many of whom voluntarily offered their services.*

As a principle the military surgeons of the active list were attached chiefly to the newly created sanitary units,† and in these cases and in the regiments were supplemented by surgeons belonging to the furlough list. Eminent professors in the universities, and operators were attached to each of the field armies as consulting surgeons with the rank of surgeons-general, or to the army at home in the same capacity but without military rank, while part of the civil surgeons were attached to the field troops. The majority of these gentlemen were, however, attached to the field and reserve hospitals, more especially those foreigners who had entered into a contract with the German military authorities. To complete further the establishments, medical students who had not received their diploma, but who were sufficiently trained, were posted as sub-surgeons.

Civilians with the requisite qualifications were also appointed to fill the administrative posts in the hospitals. On the other hand, the situations of hospital assistants, hospitals orderlies, sick bearers, and field apothecaries were filled from the furlough lists and, later, from the depôt troops.‡

Very soon after the commencement of the campaign the

Medical
service with
the troops.

* Upwards of 2,000.

† Sanitary detachments, field hospitals, and reserve hospital staff (*see* Appendix V). Part of the vacancies for assistant-surgeons in regiments remained unfilled. The following new units were formed in the course of the war—

For XIIIth Army Corps, 1 sanitary detachment, 3 field hospitals, 2 divisions of reserve hospital staff.

For XIVth Army Corps, including 4th Reserve Division, 2 sanitary detachments, 5 field hospitals, 3 divisions reserve hospital staff.

In Bavaria, 2 field hospitals.

Including the new formations, there existed in the field army the following—
52 sanitary detachments or sanitary companies respectively and sanitary divisions.

197 field hospitals.

45 divisions of reserve hospital staff.

17 reserve hospital depôts.

‡ The following medical *personnel* were employed with the German Army and the reserve hospitals during the war—

7,022 surgeons.

8,336 hospital assistants.

12,707 hospital orderlies.

7,800 sick-bearers, including the auxiliary sick-bearers with regiments.

606 apothecaries.

254 dispensers.

1,309 hospital officials. Besides

523 officers.

8,398 train soldiers.

Total 46,955 persons.

regimental surgeons had plenty of work to do in attending to men not seriously ill and the footsore, the numbers of which shortly attained a considerable figure. In order to avoid causing inconvenience to the marching troops by conveying these men immediately in rear of the column, special detachments were formed of these men in most of the Divisions. They marched with the trains under the care of a surgeon, or were brought up to their Division in carriages after a three days' rest.* Those men who were incapable of marching after the lapse of this time passed to the field or *etappen* hospitals. If there were none of these in the vicinity, the men, so long as they were on German soil, were handed over to civil hospitals or religious institutions.

In the case of large bodies of troops remaining stationary, as during investments and sieges, the organisation of sick depôts, consulting rooms, and cantonment hospitals proved very practical, especially at the commencement of winter when the number of cases of catarrh increased.

It was particularly difficult to preserve the health of the army investing Metz. Its sanitary condition was very unfavourable owing to the strain of the outpost duties, the months of bivouac passed in ground infected with dead bodies and saturated with refuse, and the defective protection against the inclemencies of the autumn season.

Although some ninety hospitals were gradually established here, this number scarcely sufficed for the sick and wounded; the less so as a large number of the wounded from the battles before Metz were incapable of travelling, and had to be tended on the spot.

Between the 20th August and 31st October 135,636 sick and wounded were treated by the army of investment; of these 82,025 were attended to by the regimental surgeons. Of the sick 22,090 suffered from gastric fever and typhus, 27,959 from dysentery. During September and October 1,328 men died of typhus, 829 of dysentery.

In the fortress also malignant disease had also prevailed. In order to protect the troops from fresh contagion, not only were all places used as barracks and hospitals carefully disinfected,† but comprehensive measures were adopted to clear the neighbouring battle-fields.‡

The condition of things in and near Sedan was equally unfavourable, the town being full of sick and wounded. Typhus and dysentery did their ghastly work among the German troops who remained there. The Belgium Government under-

* Some of these detachments were temporarily employed on *etappen* duties.

† Soon after the mobilisation was ordered, an instruction was issued as to the measures to be adopted for disinfection in the field army, and a depôt of material was formed at Nancy in November, 1870.

‡ According to official calculation, there were some 10,000 corpses interred on the battle-field of 16th August alone; on all the battle-fields round Metz, some 25,000 to 30,000.

took in the early part of 1871 the disinfection of the field of battle.

The army investing Paris, being better housed, enjoyed generally speaking, a more favourable sanitary condition than that investing Metz, but was not entirely free from the diseases above mentioned. Small-pox having been spread by fugitives from Paris, all the men were re-vaccinated with success, so that notwithstanding the spread of the disease among the country people, it did not seriously affect the troops. In February jaundice appeared, and was probably due, like dysentery, to the presence of sulphate of lime in the water; on the whole however, the mortality before Paris did not greatly exceed the average death-rate in time of peace.

In the case of those troops which had to undertake severe active operations in winter, especially in the IInd Army and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Detachment, the effective speedily diminished through sickness even more than through losses in action. It was also very difficult to provide the necessary carriage to convey the sick after the army and to the hospitals.

In general the months of September and October were the most unfavourable for the entire German army in respect of health.* In the former month dysentery reached the highest point with a mortality of 34.09 per cent. of those affected, in the latter month typhus with 27.9 per cent. of deaths; toward the end of the campaign the number and virulence of the cases of these two diseases considerably decreased.

In the battles and engagements the sanitary detachments displayed an activity as great as it was beneficial. Naturally where enormous losses occurred in a brief interval of time help could not be always brought at once; at times also the positions of bandaging stations had to be shifted in consequence of their being reached by the enemy's fire. Generally speaking these stations were, however, quickly established, and at well selected spots.

In the greater battles single sanitary detachments have often treated upwards of 400 wounded, so that, like the regimental surgeons, they had to continue their work almost without interruption the whole day long. In such circumstances, the transfer of the wounded from the bandaging stations to the hospital caused no little difficulty, as the wagons of the detachment were not sufficient, and auxiliary transport was, generally speaking difficult to obtain.

The service was much more simple in the sieges; the sanitary detachments and the regimental surgeons could then do their work in permanent localities in rear, and at bandaging

* Appendix CLXXXVI shows the highest sick rate in the field army during the war and the number of sick on 19th February, 1871, in percentage of effective.

In January the number of deaths by dysentery was only 2.74 per cent. of those sick, typhus 6.58 per cent.; but in February this rate rose to 3 per cent. for the former and 15 per cent. for the latter.

stations established in the trenches. Before Paris field hospitals were also frequently pushed forward close up to the outposts, and, later on, surgeons and sick bearers were permanently told off to most of the siege batteries.

The sanitary detachments are also frequently employed to form hospitals, and to remove the sick from hospitals.

Immediately in rear of the sanitary detachments the field hospitals were established.* This was generally done with great rapidity, and in a manner suited to their special functions. Country houses, churches, and other public buildings generally offered the requisite accommodation, but in some cases the resources of a peasant's cottage or a barn had to suffice. During this war hospital hut barracks were for the first time erected on a large scale on the battle-field, as, for instance, at Spicheren, Wörth, and Sedan. The result was in all cases very favourable. Similar buildings were employed on a larger scale to increase the accommodation of stationary field, and etappen hospitals.†

Medical service in the hospitals of the field army.

Besides the field hospitals, the *personnel* of the reserve hospitals‡ became, at an early stage, an important part of the sanitary service. Although intended simply to relieve the field hospitals, and to convert these latter into stationary hospitals, they were also employed to form field and etappen hospitals.

In all, at nearly 500 places, stationary hospitals were formed from the field hospitals and the *personnel* of the reserve hospitals. The number of sick and wounded treated in all the field hospitals was 295,644.

The etappen hospitals were intended not only for the requirements in rear of the field army, but at the same time formed a network of organization for the forwarding of sick to the rear. In this respect, its work was most difficult where there was no regular railway communication, as the convoys of sick moving by land had for the most part to pass the night in the etappen stations.

At the commencement of the preliminary peace the existing hospitals of the IInd and IIIrd Armies were for the most part evacuated, and could be removed at the end of March. In the

* Each field hospital was arranged for 200 sick, but, if necessary, could receive considerably more. A Bavarian main field hospital was calculated for 500 to 800 sick.

† The largest German barrack (field) hospital was that at Notre Dame de Bonsecours near Nancy.

‡ The *personnel* of the reserve hospitals of each Prussian and Saxon Army Corps consisted at first of 3 staff and 9 assistant-surgeons, with the necessary officials and orderlies, but was afterwards strengthened by the addition of civil surgeons. It could be employed in three independent sections, and was placed under the orders of the Inspector-General of Etappen. The *personnel* of the hospital reserve of the 25th and of the Baden Division was correspondingly weaker. For the Bavarian Army Corps the main field hospitals served as reserve hospitals. For Württemberg no reserve hospital *personnel* was organised.

For instance, the *personnel* of the hospital reserve of the Army of the Meuse had treated 37,866 sick and wounded, including 28,836 in passage, and 9,192 more in the clearing stations at Mitry and Gonesse.

course of this month the sick and wounded, capable of being removed, who were still left in the hospitals of the Ist. Mense. and South Armies, were conveyed to Germany in six hospital trains. The further evacuation and removal of the hospitals kept pace with the return of the troops; the last large transports of sick were sent to Germany in November, 1872.

The reissue of medicines, bandaging materials, and other necessaries, was furnished to all hospitals by the reserve hospital depôts following the army, by the reserve hospital magazines, and by central reserve hospital depôts formed by the military administrative authorities as also by the depôts of volunteer ambulances.

Transport
and distribu-
tion of
sick.

Previous experience had shown that, as a principle, the sick and wounded should be distributed over as large an area as possible. This principle was observed so far as the means allowed. After the first great battles it was, however, very difficult to provide the surgeons, orderlies, and carriages necessary for the purpose.

All sick and wounded, who could bear movement, were assembled at suitable points, placed in wagons, and brought along etappen roads to the nearest working railway stations, in order to be thence forwarded to their homes. The railway trains proceeded to Germany by way of Weissenburg or Forbach, and from the commencement of September were worked by special evacuation committees at Weissenburg and Saarbrücken. Later on, another one was added at Epernay. These distributed the arriving convoys in corresponding groups, and sent them to hospitals in Germany, which were placed at their disposal for this purpose.*

Nancy and Lagny gained in importance during the war as points of assembly of sick and wounded. At the former town the entire sick transport of the German Army in France was at times collected; so that occasionally as many as 1,500 to 1,700 men assembled and passed the night there.†

Lagny formed from the 24th November the chief point of assembly for the army investing Paris, and temporarily for the wounded of the IInd Army coming from the neighbourhood of Orléans and Le Mans.‡

The sick and wounded, which chiefly arrived in the wagons

* The Evacuation Committees were informed by a regular system of returns of the number of beds vacant in the hospitals. 6,500 wounded from the battles of Beaumont and Sedan were by special agreement sent home through Belgium. These transports were directed by an Evacuation Committee at Aix-la-Chapelle, which was, however, broken up on the 10th October.

The Evacuation Committee at Saarbrücken had to be removed to Forbach on 10th October, in consequence of the unfavourable circumstances of the station.

† The total number of the sick and wounded which proceeded in this way through Nancy between 23rd August, 1870, and 5th May, 1871, amounted to 144,940; of these 70,282 men were treated in a barrack etappen hospital at the railway station.

‡ The principal line of evacuation of the IInd Army lay through Orléans—Montargis—Moret—Chaumont—Blesme to Nancy and Weissenburg.

Between 27th November, 1870, and 11th April, 1871, 48,242 sick and wounded were received at Lagny.

of the commissariat columns filling at Lagny, were, as a rule, conveyed next day to Epernay, whence they were either distributed to the field, and stationary field, hospitals in the Champagne and in Alsace-Lorraine, or were taken to Germany. The sick of the 1st and Meuse Armies were forwarded by way of Rheims—Mézières—Metz, later by way of Frouard, to Forbach; those of the IIIrd Army all proceeded by way of Nancy to Weissenburg.*

For the transport of the slightly wounded and sick, special *sick trains* were set apart; they were made up of covered goods wagons, provided with straw or mattresses, in winter with woollen blankets, and were under the charge of surgeons. On the other hand, all badly wounded were as far as possible placed in *hospital trains*, the introduction of which may be regarded as one of the most important advances in military hospital work.

The necessary wagons were provided by the German Railway Companies, whilst their equipment was carried out partly by the State and partly through the society for volunteer ambulances. Their internal arrangement was calculated to afford a number of comfortable cots, which were not immediately exposed to jolts, so that even badly-wounded men could bear without danger long railway journeys, while the surgeons and attendants could carry on their work without interruption.†

The Prussians and Saxons entrusted the care of the hospital trains to the hands of surgeons, while the South German States gave them to officers, officials, or private persons. The trains equipped by volunteer associations were under the control of delegated and directing surgeons. The non-medical *personnel* of all the hospital trains was furnished by the volunteer ambulance.

The first trains of this kind left Munich on the 7th, 8th, and 11th August. On the 16th of the same month the Würtemberg hospital train commenced their transport; in September the North German, and in November the Baden hospital train.

The total of sick and wounded brought by railway to Germany amounted to 240,426, of whom 36,426 men were forwarded by hospital trains in 164 journeys.

The organisation of *reserve hospitals* for the reception of sick and wounded from the theatre of war had been prepared in all German States in time of peace, so that before the arrival of the wounded from Weissenburg, Spicheren, and

Reserve
hospital
service.

* Between 8th November, 1870, and 23rd March, 1871, 84,827 sick and wounded passed through Epernay, of whom some 19,000 were brought thither in hospital trains.

† All the carriages had the means of heating, and were so connected with the kitchen carriage and surgeon's carriage, which also contained the dispensary, that there was through communication during the journey. Each train contained on an average 200 beds.

Which is more than sufficient number of beds for the first requirements were available. The reserve hospitals were arranged by the provincial authorities, but were under military direction and supervision. All peace garrison hospitals became reserve hospitals, but served primarily to receive the sick of the light and garrison troops. At the time of greatest need there were in all 111,332 beds available in 368 places; of these 7,189 were in hospital but barracks, the construction of which had already to be commenced in view of the increasing number of sick and wounded.*

The number of civil surgeons employed in the reserve hospitals increased considerably, as many military surgeons provisionally left behind at home had to be withdrawn from the reserve hospitals in order to accompany troops proceeding to the theatre of war, in consequence of new formations, or to take the place of others.

The care of the sick prisoners of war was also undertaken as well by the existing reserve hospitals. But when the numbers became excessive, separate hospitals were organized for them. With them the services of the French surgeons, who had followed their troops into captivity, were also utilised. Prisoners of war who were thoroughly unfit for service were dismissed to their homes.

Altogether in the State reserve hospitals, including the prisoners' hospitals, 812,021 sick and wounded were treated, in 17,633,397 working days.

The gradual closing of reserve hospitals commenced at the end of March, 1871.

Voluntary
medical aid.

In consequence of the experience gained in the year 1866 special attention had been paid in Germany to voluntary medical aid. A convention concluded on 21st April, 1869, had paved the way for a uniform working of the societies existing in all parts of the country, under the direction of the Central Committee of the German Association for Medical Aid in the Field for Sick and Wounded Soldiers.

At the invitation of Her Majesty, Queen Augusta of Prussia, the duties of the volunteer medical societies had at the same time been determined. The relations between them and the military administration, to which they must be unconditionally subordinate in the general interest, had been precisely regulated. In order to turn to account the resources and the spirit of self-sacrifice of the whole nation, the Central Committee issued on the 19th July, 1870, an appeal inviting every one to share in the charitable work.

To organize the personnel, who volunteered their services from all classes of society, to direct them in the proper groove,

* The largest of these establishments was that built in the Tempelhof Plain, by the Prussian War Ministry, the Municipality, and the Help Committee at Berlin. It consisted of 15 State 20 city, and 15 committee barracks, which in all contained 2,600 beds.

and to prevent them from acting without concert, was the task of the "King's Commissary and Military Inspector of the Volunteer Ambulances." The post, which had existed in the Prussian Army since 1866, was entrusted on 20th July, 1870, to Prince Hans Heinrich XI of Pless, his authority being extended to the army of the North German Confederation. The Prince called to his aid a number of delegates,* and distributed them in such wise to the field army and the interior, that each State of the North German Confederation had a State delegate, each Prussian province and some of the Government districts had each a provincial or district delegate. To each army was attached an army delegate, a general *etappen* delegate,† and a column director; to each army corps, an army corps delegate. The South German States also appointed similar delegates, who in Bavaria were under the Central Committee of the National Society of that country, and in Württemberg under Prince Hermann of Saxe Weimar, appointed Royal Commissary. The Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse had entrusted the formation of these auxiliary institutions to Prince Pless. The delegates present with the South German States placed themselves most willingly at his disposal for all general concerns.‡

In order to fulfil the first and most important duties of voluntary help, namely, to furnish attendants for the convoys of wounded and to help in the field hospitals, an appeal was made on the 22nd July, and in answer thereto a large number of patriotic gentlemen and ladies reported themselves for personal service. The well-trained *personnel* placed at disposal by several religious and lay societies was especially of great value. The societies charged themselves with training a reserve of attendants in order to form the necessary reserve. Numerous larger and smaller detachments were organized, and these, like the columns of attendants of the *etappen* delegates, rendered service partly on the battle-fields, but more particularly in the stationary hospitals and with the convoys.

At all the principal points of the railways used for the transport of troops and wounded in France, and at all the larger and many of the smaller stations of Germany, *refreshment stations* and *dressing stations* were established, which were of the greatest value.

In Germany, voluntary help was principally active in opening hospitals, partly independently and partly with the help of

* The delegates appointed by the Prince Pless for the interior were at the same time representatives of the Central Committee.

† The delegates of the *etappen* had at their disposal a column of some 200 volunteer sick attendants. To them were attached sub-delegates, who, as the communications extended, were left behind at important points.

‡ The total number of delegates under the Military Inspector in the theatre of war amounted to 363, of whom the majority belonged to the Orders of St. John and Malta. In addition to these, there were a number of other persons as representatives of various societies both in the theatre of war and in Germany, and in the latter case, particularly in the reserve hospitals.

the military administration. The numerous societies,* especially the *Aid Societies of Women*, under the direction of Her Majesty the Queen of Prussia and the other German Princesses, participated in the work in the most active manner, and showed a spirit of self-abnegation. At the end of the war there existed upwards of 1,500 of such hospitals; a large number of wounded and of convalescents were likewise received into private establishments and into private families.

In order to give information to relatives of the whereabouts of the sick and wounded, a central intelligence office was established in Berlin on 19th July, which was supplemented later on by similar establishments in almost all the principal towns of the country. Through the instrumentality of the Geneva International Committee, relations were maintained with the office of the *Société du Secours aux Blessés Militaires* in Paris. In all, the Berlin office, from 11,963 lists furnished by the hospitals, brought on its books and maps upwards of 509,837 men, including 60,000 Frenchmen.

The immense success of the volunteer ambulances was in great measure due to the spirit of self-sacrifice shown by the entire German nation in providing the necessary resources. From the earliest days of the war the free gifts streamed in by large quantities. Their collection, disposal, and despatch to the army formed an important branch of the duties of the Central Committee and its representatives. To receive these objects three principal depôts were in the first instance formed at Coblenz, Mainz, and Mannheim, and eleven reserve depôts were established as chief collecting depôts for the larger districts. When the German armies entered France, seventy-six branch depôts† were formed in the course of time, which were filled from the main depôts and distributed stores to the troops, to the hospitals, and to the dressing stations.

The total value of the gifts in money made from Germany to the army in this way amounted to eleven million thalers (1,650,000*l.*), and the value of the other gifts may be estimated at five million thalers (750,000*l.*)‡.

Foreign countries, and especially the Germans living there, have borne their share in the most generous manner, and have sent to the Central Committee and the societies affiliated to it valuable gifts of every kind, and upwards of 2½ millions of thalers (375,000*l.*).

In consequence of these valuable resources, the societies were also in a position after the war, to place health resorts within the reach of soldiers broken down by sickness, and to

* By the end of the war, 25 county, 25 provincial, and 1,987 branch societies, including the societies of women, with some 255,000 members, were at the disposal of the Central Committee.

† Four depôts or refreshment and dressing stations were formed at Libramont, Liege, Bouillon, and Aix-la-Chapelle, for the purpose of administering to the wounded sent back through Belgium.

‡ Numerous consignments of gifts were, in addition, sent direct to regiments and corps.

give help to invalided soldiers and to the families of soldiers killed in action.

During the war, the volunteer ambulances and the assistance of the entire nation have aided to an enormous extent the military institutions which, in keeping with the circumstances of the army, must meet the first necessities, and, for that help, have earned the warmest thanks of the German Army. This feeling was nobly expressed in a letter addressed by the Royal Commander to Her Majesty the Empress and Queen, on his return from France, in recognition of the work of the Central Committee.

In examining the results of the medical service during the war, they may be considered on the whole as exceedingly favourable. More especially is the circumstance worthy of notice that the number of men who succumbed to disease was far below the number who died by external force. While in the campaign of 1866, 59·1 per cent. of the deaths in the Prussian Army were due to disease, this number in the Franco-German War was only 28·95 per cent. Taking into comparison the duration of the campaigns and the forces employed, the number of deaths by disease and epidemics in 1870-71 was only one-half of the number in 1866.

Results of the
sanitary
service.

The small difference, which on the other hand tells to the disadvantage of the war of 1870-71, in the average number of recoveries from wounds, is to be attributed chiefly to the longer duration of the campaign and the greater extent of the theatre of war.

Cholera, which in the war of 1866 was the chief element in the death-rate, and exanthematic typhus, did not on this occasion attack the German Army, but it was not so with abdominal typhus and dysentery.

The number of deaths in the German Army, inclusive of the navy and civilians attached to the army, amounts to 40,881; of these 70·03 per cent. died by external force, viz:—

Killed in action	17,572
Died of wounds	10,710
Accidental death	316
Suicide	30
Total...	28,628

By acute internal disease, the deaths were 25·45 per cent., viz. :—

Typhus	6,965
Dysentery	2,000
Small-pox	261
Gastric fever	159
Acute chest disease	500
Other acute internal disease ..	521
Total...	10,406

By other maladies :—

Internal chronic complaints	778
Sudden death.....	94
Undetermined disease	556
Unknown causes	419
Total....	1,847

For the army, excluding navy and civilians, the were as follows :—

By external violence.....	28,596 deaths
„ internal acute disease....	10,319 „
„ „ chronic „	767 „
„ sudden death	93 „
„ unknown diseases	553 „
„ other diseases.....	415 „
Total....	40,743 „

The sanitary condition of Germany did not su serious deterioration in consequence of the war.

During this campaign the German military medical has proved its excellence in the most varied ways, w careful and ready help of the surgeons have contribut marked degree to maintaining the efficiency, and indirectly to the success of the German arms. In all of the army the self-sacrificing devotion of the entire *personnel* has been the theme of universal acknowle Not a few of those men have fallen victims to the ener and to epidemics while carrying out their duty, but, other hand, thousands of sick and wounded French Germans owe their lives to their ever-ready devotion.



DIVINE SERVICE AND MILITARY JUSTICE.

For carrying on the divine service in the field army, the peace establishment of military chaplains* was augmented from the large number of clergymen who voluntarily offered their services. A number were appointed, so that, generally speaking, each infantry, landwehr, and reserve Division had at least two, frequently three, divisional chaplains. According to the religion of the majority in the respective corps, the number of Evangelical or Catholic chaplains preponderated. Further, in most of the Army Corps, the corps artillery, and frequently the Cavalry Divisions, had their own chaplains. Besides the regular establishment, two extra were appointed to each army corps, the appointments being made, according to the requirements, by the Senior Protestant chaplain, or the Catholic representative.

Divine
service.

Although at the opening of the campaign, the rapid movements of the whole army, and the subsequent operations of the 1st, IInd, and South Armies did not always allow of divine service being held, yet before going into action the chaplains lost no opportunity by a short address of reminding the troops of their duty, and to beseech the Divine help in the impending struggle. It was at the dressing stations and in the hospitals, however, that the chaplains showed more particularly their zeal and devotion. Indefatigable in their calling to administer to the dying the consolation of religion and the comfort of the Holy Sacrament, they endeavoured, while ministering to their souls, to assist also the surgeons in nursing their bodies.† After the numerous glorious victories and actions, the serious duty devolved upon them of expressing the feelings of the troops by thanks to the Almighty, of consecrating the graves of the dead, and of reminding the troops of the sublime and consoling thought that their fallen comrades had sacrificed their lives by the faithful accomplishment of the highest duty towards their king and country.

For the troops who were forced to remain a long time in one and the same neighbourhood, as before fortresses, especially before Metz and Paris, a more regularly arranged divine service was possible than with the field army. The churches in the villages occupied were used for the service of both religions, mostly with the willing assistance of the French clergymen. Sometimes also large bodies of troops were assembled for divine service in the open air.

* The majority of the 1st class chaplains and many garrison chaplains, who, according to the regulations, were destined to remain at home in case of mobilization, were called in 1870 to take the field as chaplains.

† While hastening to the assistance of the surgeons at the bandaging stations, Divisional Chaplain Schwabe, of the 22nd Division, fell on the 18th October before Châteaudun. In the action at Ladon, on the 24th November, Divisional Chaplain Dietz, of the 19th, and in the battle on the Hallue, Divisional Chaplain Gross, were wounded.

In the hospitals, similar duties to those on the battle-field devolved, only to a greater extent, upon the chaplains. Special hospital chaplains were appointed to this duty, and for their assistance were added a considerable number of volunteer hospital chaplains of both creeds, Protestant field deacons and catholic priests despatched by religious associations* to the hospital establishments in the theatre of war and in Germany. Their distribution, and the ministration in the hospitals, devolved upon three field-hospital chaplains, who were at first attached to the Inspectors-General of Etappen of the three armies, but to whom, later on, were apportioned the duties by districts: all the hospitals in the districts falling to their charge, without regard to the armies to which they belonged.†

The relations with the sick, wounded, and dying opened to those having the care of souls a wide and thankful sphere of duty. Besides this, these chaplains had the special task of ministering directly to the spiritual well-being of the soldiers, by acting as intermediaries between the soldiers in their charge and their relatives, and also by providing suitable reading for those who were able to take advantage of it. Lastly, the chaplains were never absent from the side of the surgeons in the hospitals, and shared with them the cares and dangers of their calling, to which also many chaplains fell victims.

The work of the chaplains of both creeds, in the field as well as in the hospitals, was of the more value for the army, as these men, besides fulfilling their special duties in the care of souls, considered it their special task to maintain and develop the patriotic and moral sense of the army.

Military law.

The administration of military law was carried out in the field on essentially the same principles as in peace.

By a Royal Decree, prepared in 1867, but not promulgated until 20th July, 1870, the procedure of military tribunals was, however, simplified in some points, and thereby the administration of justice was made more speedy—a matter of special importance in time of war. By a second decree issued at the same time the relations between the army and the inhabitants of the enemy's country were also regulated. In this the principle had to be observed of securing absolute powers to the military authorities under all circumstances, and of dealing promptly and severely with any French subjects who did acts prejudicial in any way to the German armies. On the other hand, the complete co-operation of the authorities in the enemy's country had been calculated upon, in order, as far as possible, to lighten the inevitable

* From the Rhenish-Westphalian Association of Malta, the Order of St. John of Malta, and others.

† In all, there were employed in France during the war, 92 Protestant hospital chaplains, besides 30 chaplains and candidates in theology, who were temporarily or permanently posted to the reserve hospitals in Germany. All hospital chaplains and supernumerary field chaplains had refused any fixed remuneration during the term of their employment.

burdens of the war by distributing them in a just manner. This supposition was not always realised, and as the officials of the French administration, police and law, refused in most cases their co-operation, great difficulties occurred in carrying out these branches of the administration.

In spite of this, the German officials of military justice rendered possible throughout a rapid and vigorous action of the courts-martial, thereby contributing both to maintaining discipline in the German Army, and to deciding the legal questions arising with the French population. This latter duty was considerably facilitated by the circumstance that the German Judge Advocates very successfully fulfilled at times the duties of the prefects in the occupied departments.

The field gendarmerie, formed only at the moment of mobilization, was charged with the police duties of the army, especially in respect to men temporarily detached from their corps and to civilians following the army, and also with the local police duties in the occupied districts of the enemy's country.

Field
gendarmerie.

For the first of these services it was above all things important to keep the roads used by the army open and practicable for traffic. The great length of the trains, the drivers of which were not as a rule accustomed to military discipline, caused the field gendarmes a considerable amount of work. In the local police administration they had to share, in so far as seeing to the maintenance of the roads and bridges, and forcing the local authorities to make the necessary repairs.

The field gendarmerie had another important task—that of preventing unauthorised requisition. In this respect the strictest supervision had to be maintained over many of the civilian followers, like sutlers and purveyors, who easily found opportunities for unlawful acts, and whose crimes were then mostly laid to the charge of the troops. On the fields of battle the field gendarmerie had as much as possible to share in seeking out and protecting the wounded, and, later on, to perform important duties in clearing the battle-fields and carrying out measures of sanitary police.

The carrying out of the local police duties in the occupied districts soon proved extremely difficult, as, in consequence of the extent of territory the number of available men was far from adequate, while the difference of language and the apathy of the French authorities greatly increased the difficulty of co-operation with these latter. But even when the French police authorities could be employed in a regular manner, they had to be always supported by the German field gendarmerie, as the former could not be allowed to deal independently with any crimes that might be committed by German soldiers. Thus, for instance, a mixed duty was arranged in Rouen in such wise that patrols consisting of two Prussian field gendarmes and two *sergeants de ville* were charged with maintaining order in the streets.

As a general rule, in spite of its weak effective,* and of the difficulties, to which allusion has been made, the field gendarmerie succeeded in satisfactorily discharging its numerous duties, and has contributed in no slight degree to maintaining in this war as well the discipline for which the German Army has ever been renowned.

Independently of the field gendarmerie the Royal Headquarters had a special field police,† which, in addition to its protective functions in the enemy's country, had also to share in certain administrative duties. In the difficulties already described the duties of the director of police were very varied and onerous, so that other trained officials had to be appointed for his assistance. The field police had an important task at Versailles, where the protection of the Royal Headquarters and the observation of strangers demanded special attention. By increasing the *personnel*, the employment of French police officials and military aid,‡ it became possible to maintain tranquillity and security during the whole period that Versailles was occupied.

* With each of the three original Army Headquarters—1 detachment commander, 1 second officer, and 1 sergeant-major with a corresponding number of gendarmes detached from the army corps; with each army corps (including the two Bavarian)—1 officer, 1 sergeant-major, 40 gendarmes; with each Inspector-General of Etappen, a detachment of field gendarmerie under its own commander, formed of 1 sergeant-major and 20 gendarmes from each corps of the army. The Royal Headquarters, and, later on, the headquarters of the corps besieging Belfort received each 1 sergeant-major and 5 gendarmes. With the Württemberg Division, the duties were performed by the squadron of mounted messengers (*Feldjäger*) already existing in peace time, consisting of 3 officers and 82 men.

† Originally composed of a Director, Dr. Stieber, and 4 officials.

‡ 4 officers, 185 non-commissioned officers and men, of the 1st Reserve Rifle Battalion were ordered to Versailles to reinforce the field police.

THE RECRUITMENT AND OTHER SERVICES IN GERMANY.

At the mobilization of the army, the *depôt* troops in the districts of the North German Corps were formed partly of men of the reserve, the youngest classes of the 1st class *Ersatz Reserve*, and the first class of the *Landwehr*.^{*} Moreover, the general desire to take part in the war had brought hosts of volunteers to the colours.

It was necessary to train these recruits as soon as possible for service in the field. In order to ensure that the *depôt* troops might be in a position in this respect to fulfil the duties required of them, it was held as a principle during the whole course of the war that those charged with the training should be sufficient in numbers and equal to their task.

For the North German field troops, the rule for the filling up of vacancies was that every corps which had lost 10 per cent. of its effective by death, wounds, capture, or sickness,[†] was to apply, either directly or through the headquarters in the field, for a corresponding draft to its *depôt*, or to the temporary corps commander. As a rule, the drafts, by arrangement of the Inspector-General of *Etappen*, reached the terminal *etappen* station by train, and thence joined their corps by road. But the railways were unable in all cases to meet the demands. After heavy engagements, more particularly, they were so much taken up by the transport of wounded and prisoners that delays occurred in bringing up the drafts. It not infrequently happened that weeks elapsed before the drafts reached their corps, especially when the latter had advanced in the interval.[‡]

The vacancies, which occurred by the despatch of the drafts, were first filled by new levies. At the commencement of

^{*} For the strength of the North German *depôt* troops, see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 41-42.

The *depôts* of the cavalry, horse artillery, Guard artillery, rifles, fusiliers, and Guard infantry, raised no recruits for the *Ersatz Reserve*.

After the 9th September men of the older classes of the *Landwehr* were called up to the *depôts*.

In the district of the XIIth Army Corps and the Grand Ducal Hesse Division the same principles obtained as with the Prussian corps (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 36).

[†] After the 30th December this requisition had to be made when the loss became 5 per cent., as the previous mode of procedure did not render it possible to maintain the troops permanently at the war establishment.

[‡] For this reason, after heavy losses had injuriously affected the fighting powers of certain corps, as, for instance, after the battles round Metz, it not infrequently happened that two or more corps had to be combined into one. In order to equalise matters, an exchange often took place between very weak detachments and those which had suffered less (see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 388, 438; Vol. II, pp. 162, 473, note †; Part II, Vol. I, pp. 176, 197, note †; p. 256, note †; Vol. II, p. 145, note †).

Certain corps could not at first obtain the necessary numbers to replace casualties. The IIIrd Army Corps, for instance, required 382 officers and 13,064 men, to replace its losses on the 6th and 16th August, but by the end of September had only received 147 officers and 9,430 men.

In the artillery the losses were, in the first instance, replaced by men and horses from the ammunition columns.

September the recruits for 1870-71 were called up. When these did not suffice, recourse was had to the 1st Class of the Ersatz Reserve and the older classes of men who had already served.*

In this way, the men intended to replace casualties in the infantry could be drawn from three originally different groups. In the first place, there were the available number of men who had already served, estimated in each battalion at some 500, or a total of 60,000 men. This number was sufficient to cover the losses sustained in August and September. A second group, which comprised the recruits and volunteers enrolled on mobilisation, was assigned to the field troops, generally speaking, from the beginning of October, yielding a further increment of some 50,000 men. Lastly, at the commencement of 1871, the whole of the recruits of the year 1870-71 were available to the extent of some 70,000 men. Moreover, the depôts were considerably increased by men discharged from the hospitals as fit for duty. The condition of the other arms of the service was no less favourable.

The field landwehr troops did not at first receive any men to replace their casualties, but the unmobilised landwehr battalions,† and the garrison battalions, and the dismounted landwehr squadrons‡ were charged with training men for this purpose.

In order to cover the increasing want of officers, landwehr officers, whose services could not hitherto be spared, were drafted to the field regiments. Convalescent officers and officers on the reserve list also did duty with the depôts, so that others whom they relieved might join the field army.

To replace casualties in the field troops of the Bavarian Army Corps§ and their depôts, were used in the first place, as in North Germany, the trained men of the reserve and landwehr. The further reserves were ensured by calling out on the 4th October the whole of the contingent of 1870-71—16,000 in number—and also 2,520 of the 1st Class Ersatz Reserve, some of whom joined the field troops in December. In order to be able to satisfy the very large demands at this time, the period of training of new recruits had from the middle of this month to be shortened to six weeks.¶ Hand in hand with these arrangements, the depôt troops were further augmented. For instance, after the 17th December, the establishment of each depôt battalion was increased by 200

* On the formation of the depôts, and also in the subsequent course of the campaign, the prescribed effectives were often exceeded.

† At the commencement of February, 1871, each of these received 300 recruits from the 1st Class Ersatz Reserve, with orders to hasten the training, so that drafts might be ready for the field battalions in May.

‡ See subsequent narrative.

§ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 37-38 and 42-43.

¶ The cavalry recruits were not sent into the field until after six months' training, those of the artillery as they became ready.

men, each dépôt rifle company by 50 men.* The fourth company of the battalions was appointed to furnish the men for the corresponding landwehr battalions.

In the artillery, in consequence of the new formation of a field artillery division,† the eight dépôt batteries were reduced to four.‡

The drafts from the dépôts of the Württemberg Field Division§ were replaced by calling up trained ersatz reservists of the years 1859–1866, and untrained recruits and ersatz reservists of 1870, lastly, by volunteers.||

In Baden the arrangements for dépôts followed in their main features the North German regulations.¶ At the beginning of September the infantry dépôts sent reinforcements of 240 men each to the regiments in the field.** Large drafts proceeded to the theatre of war in November, at the end of December, end of January, and middle of February. Meanwhile, the recruits levied in 1870 had been gradually incorporated. Lastly, all men belonging to the classes of 1860 and upwards who were fit for active service and had not yet been incorporated, were ordered to join their respective landwehr battalions, the fortress artillery battalion, and the dépôts on the 31st January, 1871.

By these measures, not only were the requisite numbers in *all the German corps* secured to the fullest extent, but also, in spite of the numerous new formations, the dépôt troops were in almost every case maintained at their establishment, without being forced to have recourse to any other steps than those recognised by regulation.

By the beginning of March, 1871, the dépôts of the German Army had sent in all to France a reinforcement of upwards of 2,000 officers and some 220,000 men,†† thereby again bringing the field troops at that date to their full war establishment. On that same date the German dépôt troops amounted to 3,288 officers, 204,684 men, and 26,603 horses.‡‡

The men proceeding to the army were fully equipped, armed, and provided with ammunition; those of the cavalry, artillery, and train took with them the necessary drafts of

* The total dépôt troops were increased by this measure some 3,700 men.

† See later narrative.

‡ By this arrangement, the effective of each of the batteries was increased by 36 non-commissioned officers and 278 men.

§ As regards the dépôt arrangements in Württemberg, see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 38–39 and 43–44. Also see subsequent narrative as regards recruits for the dépôt troops.

|| Some 1,400 men.

¶ See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 39 and 44–45.

** The field battalions were originally only 900 strong (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 45, note *). The augmentation of the 5th Infantry Regiment did not take place until later.

†† Appendix CLXXXIX gives a summary of the drafts despatched to the German Army between the commencement of the war and the beginning of March, 1871.

‡‡ Appendix CXC shows the strength of the German dépôts at the beginning of March, 1871.

horses. The renewal of the clothing and equipment of all troops in the field was completed from home territory.*

In the case of the cavalry, artillery and train,† the requisite number of horses was applied for to the depôts, but in the case of the infantry, rifles, pioneers, and administrative services, to the horse depôts in the field. These horse depôts in urgent cases, however, rendered assistance to the other arms; in regard to this, there was the less hesitation, as they usually had a greater number of saddle and draught horses than their proper establishment. They formed their reserves by means of requisition, by captures, by the receipt of temporarily unfit horses, and by drafts from the depôts in Germany. The most difficult matter was to satisfy the demands for officers' horses. In order to provide sufficient numbers of these, the horses of killed and wounded officers were purchased.

For the North German troops, a central horse depôt was organised at Berlin, which was at first to receive 300 horses, viz., 100 saddle and 200 draught, but, generally speaking, had later on a larger establishment. Altogether it sent 3,585 horses to the field depôts, replacing its drafts by purchase in the open market.

In Bavaria, besides the depôts, the military studs and the riding school furnished the necessary horses. From home territory, 3,005 saddle and draught horses were sent to the Bavarian troops, 938 to the Württemberg, and 325 to the Baden troops.

In all, the German Army received from home a supply of about 22,000 horses.‡ To these must be added those taken from the enemy's country, of which some 16,000 horses were partly requisitioned and partly captured. The total supply for the German Army amounted during the war to upwards of 38,000 horses.

The artillery regiments of North Germany received 92 field guns in replacement of others. The demands were sent by the troops through the artillery commanders of the different armies to the War Ministry, which ordered the necessary issue from the artillery depôts; 23 guns were despatched to the Bavarian, and a similar number to the Württemberg field artillery § The total expenditure of field guns in the German Army amounted to 116 pieces.

During the war, the losses and replacement of rifles and side-arms and of field equipment was not very large,|| as the

* These drafts were formed into detachments by corps, and proceeded with a small escort to the advanced depôt of their army, where they were taken in charge and forwarded. As the equipment could not always be received in time, the troops had recourse to the private industry of the enemy's country in urgent cases.

† At the mobilisation, the remounts of 1870 were posted to the depôts. Their casualties in horses were replaced by purchases in the open market.

‡ See Appendix LXXXIX.

§ Generally the guns only had to be replaced (see also Appendix CLXXXIX).

|| For instance, 33 needle-guns, 39 breech-loading carbines, 146 sabres of different patterns, 179 side-arms, and 44 lances, were sent to the XIIth Army Corps to replace others.

German troops in the majority of cases remained masters of the battle-field.

During the armistice the whole of the losses in men, horses, and material had been replaced in such manner that at the time of the peace negotiations the German Army was in readiness to resume the struggle, with its full complement of men and equipment.

While the field troops were gaining decisive successes on the other side of the frontier, the home staff on this side of it were steadily pursuing their less prominent, but extremely important duties. In the first place, the War Ministry, the staff and the "provisional staff" in the army corps districts strove, as circumstances required, to render available for the manifold purposes of war those resources of the country which had been by no means exhausted at the close of the mobilisation. In their endeavours they were most energetically supported by their subordinates and the other authorities.

Home staffs, augmentations, and new formations.

The longer the war lasted, the more the theatre of operations extended and the more the losses increased, so much greater became the demands which the home authorities had to meet.* In North Germany, at the end of August, two reserve army corps had been assembled at Berlin and Glogau, each composed of six landwehr regiments, a reserve cavalry regiment, one heavy and two light reserve batteries.† The first-named of these corps was despatched to Freiburg in Baden at the end of September, and afterwards employed to form the 4th Reserve Division. It was augmented by the cavalry regiment and the batteries of the other reserve corps, whilst the twelve infantry battalions of this Corps were handed over to the Government-General of Alsace at the end of October.‡

At the same time that these reserve corps were formed, the augmentation of the landwehr troops intended for home fortresses and *etappen* duties had been taken into consideration. The garrison battalions in the North German fortresses accordingly received, to the extent required, an establishment of 1,002 men after the end of August. In the *dépôt* squadrons, detachments of sixty horses were told off for duty in the fortresses after the departure of the reserve cavalry regiments.

* Appendix CLXXXVII shows the average total effective strength of the German troops during the War of 1870-71 in the various months; Appendix CLXXXVIII the total strength during the war.

† The reserve corps at Berlin consisted of—

Landwehr Regiments Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 43, 45.

1st Reserve Lancers.

Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light, Reserve Batteries, IVth Corps.

The reserve corps at Glogau consisted of—

Landwehr Regiments Nos. 7, 10, 47, 50, 84, and 85.

3rd Reserve Lancers.

Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light, Reserve Batteries, Vth Corps.

Lieutenant-General v. Löwenfeld, hitherto Governor-General of the Vth and VIth Army Corps districts, was appointed Inspector of these two reserve corps.

‡ See Appendix CLXXV.

Further, in the districts of the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps the supernumerary men of the garrison troops, when not required to reinforce the battalions in the fortresses, were formed into companies of 200 men each, and assigned to the *etappen* troops of the 1st Army.* Supplementary to this measure, all the landwehr battalions intended for *etappen* duties were augmented later on from the supernumeraries of the *depôt* and garrison battalions. Hand-in-hand with these, six squadrons intended for *etappen* purposes were formed from the supernumeraries of the different *depôt* squadrons.

At the end of November, 1870, the effective of all landwehr battalions in the field and of those stationed on the coast was ordered to be raised from 802 to 1,002 men, a measure which might be extended by the provisional corps commanders, if required, to the other landwehr battalions left in the home districts.

As regards new formations, these were limited in North Germany at first to two reserve rifle battalions, which were formed of the *depôt* companies of the Guard Rifles, Guard Sharpshooters, and the 1st to the 8th Rifle Battalions, each on an effective of 802 men.† The progress of events in the theatre of war, and above all the increasing number of prisoners, however, rendered necessary further steps in this direction.‡ The cavalry having still a considerable surplus of trained men of the younger classes, who had as yet been unemployed, "dis-mounted landwehr *depôt* squadrons" were created at the end of November; by the end of the war sixty of them, in all some 15,000 men, had been formed.§

Shortly after, "garrison battalions" were formed of men on the furlough lists of all arms, of volunteers who had served and were no longer liable to military service, and lastly of *Ersatz* reservists.¶ For service with them, officers on the unattached lists of all arms were called out, besides landwehr officers and officers formerly of the line but now on the retired list. By the end of January, 1871, 23 garrison battalions were formed, and 39 were in process of formation. By April the number had risen to 72, a total

* See Part I, Vol. II, p. 458, note *, and Appendix CLXXV.

† These Landwehr battalions were to be thereby raised to an establishment of six companies of 200 men each.

‡ As to their subsequent employment, see Appendix CIXXV.

§ The more so, as the number of garrison and reserve troops left at home diminished more and more as the war progressed.

In the North German corps districts there were at the commencement of September, 1870, 81 Landwehr battalions, 4½ reserve cavalry regiments, 19 reserve batteries. About the middle of November, on the other hand, there were only 57 Landwehr battalions, 6 squadrons reserve cavalry, and 8 reserve batteries. In February, the number of North German garrison battalions was only 33, of which 17 were not on the war footing.

¶ To fill the officers' vacancies, officers of the retired list were called out when those on the furlough list were insufficient.

‡ 180 men from the 1st Class *Ersatz* Reserve and the same number from the youngest of the IInd Class.

force of 60,000 men.* Both the garrison battalions and the dismounted depôt squadrons passed under the orders of the infantry brigade provisional staffs.

Simultaneously with these augmentations and new formations taking place, the mobilisation of the troops which were despatched during the course of operations to the theatre of war was carried out. Besides the bulk of the landwehr battalions, this applied chiefly to a large number of fortress artillery and pioneer companies, various trains and columns† necessary for the siege parks and to those ammunition columns, trains, and administrative services necessary for the newly created army corps and reserve divisions.‡

In Saxony, during the continuance of the campaign, all the troops§ left at home were placed immediately under the Government-General established in that country. In consequence of the battles round Metz, the four garrison battalions after their mobilisation and formation into a brigade, followed on the 24th August to the theatre of war.|| As this left of infantry only the depôt battalions and companies at home, every two brigade staffs were combined into one. In the middle of December two fortress artillery companies proceeded to France,¶ whither by the 1st January the three reserve batteries were following.**

The total troops mobilised in Saxony amounted to 1,102 officers, surgeons, and officials, 56,272 men; those not on the war footing numbered 382 officers, surgeons, and officials, 15,363 men. The landwehr district staffs had during the war called in from the furlough list a total of 47,500 men.

The Grand Duchy of Hesse formed no landwehr troops, but towards the end of January created a garrison battalion of 480 men, which was mainly employed to guard prisoners.

In Bavaria, of the eight *line battalions* left originally as garrison troops, there remained at the middle of September on this side of the frontier only the 1st battalion of the 4th and the 2nd of the 8th. These also joined the field army in December.††

* The battalions, originally 602 strong, were raised later to upwards of 800 men.

† See Part I, Vol. II, p. 456, and Appendix CLXXV, and also the narrative of the sieges of the French fortresses *passim*.

‡ The XIIIth and XIVth Army Corps were first of all provided with these services.

§ (a.) Depôt troops:—9 depôt battalions, 2 rifle depôt companies, 6 depôt squadrons, 3 depôt batteries, 1 pioneer depôt company, 1 train depôt division. (b.) Garrison troops—4 Landwehr (garrison) battalions, 3 reserve foot batteries, 4 fortress artillery companies. The 4th Company 72nd Landwehr Regiment at Königstein also belonged to the garrison troops.

|| Each battalion had an establishment of 802 men (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 461, and Appendix CLXXV).

¶ See Appendix CLIII.

** See Appendix CLXXV.

†† They joined the 1st Bavarian Corps. The rest had already proceeded to France, viz:— $\frac{\text{IIrd and IIIrd}}{4}$ and $\frac{\text{Ist and IIIrd}}{8}$ to the detachment investing Bitsch; $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{12}$ and $\frac{\text{IIIrd}}{13}$ to the 1st Bavarian Corps; $\frac{\text{IIrd and IIIrd}}{4}$ were

Of the 16 landwehr battalions,* eight were despatched for etappen duties in the theatre of war.† After the augmentation of the dépôt troops‡ and of the landwehr battalions, there were still at disposal 10,000 trained and 24,000 untrained landwehr. No new formation of infantry took place in Bavaria. In the cavalry an etappen squadron of 5 officers and 164 men was formed of the dépôt squadrons of the six chevaux-legers regiments.§ The field artillery formed at the beginning of September from its dépôt batteries one division, which at the end of the month proceeded to the theatre of war.¶ Of the Bavarian fortress batteries left at home,¶ parks were formed for the sieges of Strassburg, Paris, Bitsch, and Belfort.** The two reserve ammunition dépôts†† formed at the commencement of the mobilisation were augmented by the 1st September by three auxiliary dépôts.‡‡

The Bavarian engineers formed at the end of August, two new bridge trains, which left Ingolstadt to join the field army.§§

The total of the Bavarian troops which did not proceed to the theatre of war numbered—||

39,261 men and 3,840 horses in September, 1870.
45,123 " 3,929 " January, 1871.
24,120 " 2,919 " April, 1871.

The new armament of the infantry had so far progressed during the course of the war that towards the end of the year, besides the four rifle battalions¶¶ provided at the outbreak of hostilities with the rifle M. 69, the eight line battalions originally intended for garrison duties were armed with that weapon.

temporarily at home in January to receive their new armament, and 1st and IIIrd
in February, 1871. 8

* By an order of 10th August, all 16 Landwehr battalions were reinforced by 40 men per company (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 43, note †).

† See Appendix CLXXV, especially with reference to the parts of the 31st Landwehr Battalion sent temporarily to France.

‡ As regards dépôt troops, see ante, p. 236.

§ The squadron was employed on etappen duties (see Appendix CLXXV).

|| The detachment consisted of: Staff, 2 rifled 6-pounder and 2 rifled 12-pounder batteries of 6 guns each, 1 mitrailleuse battery of 4 (after 24th October of 6 pieces), and 1 ammunition column. Its strength was 866 men, 807 horses, 28 (later, 30) pieces, 86 carriages.

A second mitrailleuse battery proceeded, on 24th October, to the field army (see Appendices V, XCII, XCV).

¶ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

** See Part II, Vol. III, p. 129, and Appendices LII, CXXIX, and CXLVI.

†† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 42.

‡‡ See ante, p. 203.

§§ Each of 2 officers, 66 men, 106 horses, 15 six-horse trestle wagons (see Appendices V, XCII, and XCV).

|| See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

¶¶ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 37.

In Württemberg, the command of all troops left at home during the campaign,* including the Ulm garrison, was entrusted to the Governor-General, under whom there was a provisional Corps Staff. Of the troops left originally at Ulm,† the 1st Battalion 4th Regiment proceeded in the middle of August to Alsace on *etappen* duties. At the beginning of September the 2nd battalion of the same regiment, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 6th followed for the same purpose.‡ In September also the 3rd and 4th squadrons 3rd Cavalry Regiment§ were brought to Paris, the 1st and 4th batteries of the Fortress Artillery Battalion|| to Strassburg. In the middle of October the 1st and 2nd *depôt* batteries,¶ and at the end of the month the 2nd and 3rd squadrons 2nd Cavalry Regiment** were employed on active service.

When only two of the six cavalry squadrons left originally in the country remained, three reserve squadrons†† were newly formed in Württemberg. From the middle of February the levies of recruits were placed in special companies, which served to form "*depôt battalions*" in the garrisons of Stuttgart, Ulm, Ludwigsburg.‡‡

The total force of the troops in Württemberg amounted at the beginning of March to 164 officers and 12,814 men.§§

In Baden, all the line battalions originally left at home followed by degrees the field army,||| the last of all being the 2nd Battalion 6th Regiment,¶¶ which had, till then, belonged to the garrison of Rastatt. Further, eight fortress artillery companies and a fortress pioneer company were brought up to the siege corps before Strassburg*** and Belfort.††† Of the six landwehr battalions formed on mobiliza-

* With regard to the Württemberg troops left originally at home, see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 43-44. Towards the end of the campaign there were still in Württemberg, 4 Landwehr *depôt* battalions, 1 *depôt* cavalry regiment, 2 *depôt* batteries, 1 fortress artillery division, 1 pioneer *depôt* division, 1 engineer company, 1 train *depôt* division, besides the *depôts* of the field troops.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

‡ See Appendix CLXXV.

§ These two squadrons joined the Division before Paris on 15th September.

|| See Appendix LII.

¶ See Appendix CLXXV.

** See Appendix CLXXV.

†† On 16th January, 1871.

‡‡ At this time the *depôts* of the infantry and rifles were employed to train recruits, a duty which up to that period had been wholly performed by the Landwehr *depôt* battalions (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 43).

§§ Exclusive of the *personnel* of the garrison and reserve hospitals.

||| See Appendices V, LII, LXXXI, and CLVII.

¶¶ This battalion had been temporarily employed between the 6th and 17th August, 1870, at Lauterburg, to guard the *etappen*; between the 31st August and 29th September, together with 300 men of the 5th *Depôt Detachment* and 4 guns, under Colonel Bauer, to protect Baden territory on the Upper Rhine. From here two companies took part in the siege of Strassburg. On 29th September the whole battalion was again assembled at Rastatt, whence on 24th December it proceeded to the seat of war.

*** See Appendix LII.

††† See Appendix CXXXI.

tion, the 1st was employed throughout the campaign, the 4th and 6th, and parts of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th at different times on *etappen* duties.* The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th battalions belonged, until the end of the war, to the garrison of Rastatt.†

The total strength of the Baden troops not placed on the war footing, inclusive of the *depôt* troops,‡ amounted in—

September, 1870	9,148 men.
January, 1871	10,951 "
March, 1871	13,604 "

Armed
fortresses.

All these were placed under the orders of the "Commander-in-Chief of the troops left in home territory."

After the arming of a certain number of fortresses was ordered on mobilization,§ the measures of the military authorities consequent thereon had been ably seconded by the civil authorities, more particularly by the Prussian Ministries of Finance and Trade.|| Zealously aided by all parties, the work proceeded with expedition and certainty.

Of the forces of the North German Confederation the following had been appointed at the commencement of the war as garrisons of the fortresses:—

Rhine front	87,500 men.
North Sea and Baltic Coasts ..	50,000 "
South front	55,200 "
Other fortresses.. ..	47,000 "
Total	239,800¶

These figures were, however, considerably modified by the withdrawal of numerous garrison troops to the theatre of war and for new formations. After the successes of the field army, all the armed fortresses** with the exception of those on the coast or at river mouths and of the advanced works of Saarlouis, Mainz, and Coblenz, could be ordered for disarmament towards the end of November.

* See Appendix CLXXV.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 45.

‡ As regards the *depôt* troops, see Part I, Vol. I, p. 45, and *ante*, p. 237.

§ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 40. The fortresses of Neisse and Glatz, the littoral fortresses of Friedrichsort, Geestemünde, Wilhelmshaven, Stralsund, Swinemünde, Colburg, Danzig, Pillau, and Memel, were at that time armed (see Part I, Vol. II, pp. 421-422).

|| The former furnished the necessary timber from the State forests, the latter the rails from the surplus stores of the State railways.

¶ In this number are included the *depôt* troops quartered in the fortress.

** Landau and Germersheim were not of importance after the end of the concentration. Rastatt retained its importance for the protection of the Baden Rhineland until after the fall of Strassburg and New Breisach (as regards the arming of the South German Fortresses see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 42 and 45).

Shortly after the commencement of the war when the first trains of French prisoners of war reached Germany, efforts were made to house them in a manner similar in all respects to that prescribed by regulation for the barrack accommodation of the German soldier. At first the prisoners were only interned in fortresses. When the available accommodation there did not suffice, steps were taken for forming large camps of tents or huts.* The number of prisoners increasing more and more during the course of the campaign, it was decided to place them in open towns whenever suitable troops were available to guard them, or could be temporarily housed there.†

Treatment
and maintenance of the
prisoners of
war.

Each dépôt formed in this way was placed under the orders of a German officer and divided into companies of 200 to 300 men.‡ The commandant of the dépôt exercised the higher disciplinary powers. In other respects the military legal code of the State in which they were interned was applied to all prisoners. The sick were sent to the hospitals. Regard was also paid to providing divine service.

The officer prisoners were permitted to occupy private quarters at their own expense,§ provided they gave their word of honour not to escape, and to pass their correspondence through the hands of the military authorities. If they did not agree to this, they were kept under military supervision in a manner suited to their rank. When the word of honour was withdrawn or broken, more vigorous measures were put in force.

The officer prisoners received a special pay according to rank, to which later on was added by the French Government a special allowance paid through the English Embassy.

The non-commissioned officers and men received their rations and the necessary clothing, in payment of which part of their prison-pay had to be deducted.

From the commencement it was considered desirable to employ the men as much as possible in regular and suitable work, the more so as this was the surest means to prevent disorders and escapes. The order originally adopted throughout the territory of the North German Confederation, that the privates should work gratuitously for five hours a day in aid of the military treasury, whilst all overtime should be properly

* On the approach of winter the tent camps were abandoned and the huts were provided with means for heating.

† In the middle of February the prisoners were distributed as follows:—

	Officers.	Men.
152 Dépôts in North Germany	10,718	305,287
26 " " Bavaria	547	39,536
7 " " Württemberg	119	12,839
8 " " Baden	333	11,750
2 " " Hesse Darmstadt	143	2,569

‡ Later on, the companies were increased to 500 men.

§ Quarters in barracks suitable for officers were given to those who had no private means.

remunerated, could not be maintained on account of the gradual overfilling of the dépôts. Voluntary work for payment was encouraged, and private persons were allowed to employ the prisoners; the majority, however, were utilized for building barracks, forming or altering drill grounds and ranges, in the workshops or in some other suitable manner.

If in consequence of the enormous influx of prisoners it was not always entirely possible, at times on convoy, to avoid certain inconveniences, the majority of the Frenchmen quartered in Germany during the war could have no just cause for complaint with regard to their food and treatment.

RESULTS OF THE WAR.

The total losses* of the German Army amounted to :—

6,247 officers, surgeons and officials.
123,453 men.
14,595 horses.
1 colour.
6 guns.†

On the other hand, up to the middle of February, 1871, this army had sent into captivity 11,860 French officers and 371,981 men. Besides these, 7,456 officers and 241,686 men had laid down their arms in Paris.‡ 2,192 officers and 88,381 men of the French East Army with 285 guns passed into Switzerland.§

The trophies of the German troops comprised||:—

107 eagles and colours.
1,915 field guns and mitrailleuses.
5,526 fortress guns.

The great struggle of the two nations had come to an end after a seven months' struggle.

Like their fathers half a century before, the sons had fought and bled for the independence of the German Fatherland. The latter could be restored in its integrity and untouched by foreign foot to the blessings of a peace honourably won.

However great the sacrifices entailed by the war, no people could have borne them more cheerfully. Every man, in a spirit of enthusiasm, had done his best from the very commencement of the war, and the sorrowful losses had been borne in silence and with the consciousness of duty.

But what the victorious army had won on the battle-fields of France counterbalanced those sacrifices.

* Appendix CXCH shows the total loss of the German Army in the war.

† Including two reserve guns (*see* Part II, Vol. I, p. 280). Two guns, which, however, fell again into the hands of the Germans at the capitulation of Metz, were also lost on 18th August (*see* Part I, Vol. II, p. 30).

‡ These belonged to the following troops—

	Officers.	Men.
Line	4,542	125,178
Navy	366	13,665
Garde Mobile	2,548	102,843

(*See* Vinoy, "L'Armistice et la Commune," p. 383; and as regards the National Guards; Appendix 156, Art. VII.)

§ *See* "Les Troupes Françaises internées en Suisse en 1871" (rapport officiel).

|| Appendix CXCI gives a list of the trophies captured by the Germans during the war.

With Metz and Strassburg, those lands which had been torn from Germany in the time of her weakness, were again restored to her, and the nation is indebted to the bravery and perseverance of her sons for the long looked for union. At the unanimous call of the sovereigns and free towns, the victorious King of Prussia assumed the dignity of German Emperor.

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APPENDIX CLXXVIII.

RETURN SHOWING THE FRENCH FORCES BEHIND THE MAYENNE
ON THE 8TH FEBRUARY, 1871, FROM OFFICIAL STATES.*

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Staffs - - - - -	231	1,889	897
Infantry of line - - - - -	1,124	44,170	1,207
Marine troops - - - - -	96	3,308	43
Garde Mobile - - - - -	1,413	62,163	410
Garde Nationale - - - - -	658	79,845	68
Franc tireurs - - - - -	217	5,115	79
Cavalry - - - - -	632	9,313	9,030
Artillery - - - - -	229	12,639	11,476
Engineers - - - - -	60	2,425	229
Gendarmerie - - - - -	68	1,727	817
Various services - - - - -	164	4,767	2,541
Total - - - - -	4,052	227,361	26,797

The artillery consisted of:—

5 12-pr. batteries.	7 4-pr. mountain batteries.
4 8-pr. „	10 mitrailleuses „
4 7-pr. „	15 batteries of different calibres.
29 4-pr. „	

Total, 74 batteries with 430 guns.

The part of the army which passed to the left bank of the Loire consisted of 128,733 men, 20,048 horses, and 54 batteries.†

The remainder was to defend Brittany, under the command of General de Colomb.

* According to Chanzy, "La Deuxième Armée de la Loire."

† Joined later by the 26th Corps formed in Guéret.

APPENDIX CLXXIX.

ENTRE le Chancelier de l'Empire Germanique, M. le Comte Otto de Bismarck-Schönhausen, muni des pleins pouvoirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse; le Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière, M. le Comte Otto de Bray-Steinburg; le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Wurtemberg, M. le Baron Auguste de Wächter; le Ministre d'Etat, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Son Altesse Royale, Monseigneur le Grand-Duc de Bade, M. Jules Jolly, représentant l'Empire Germanique, d'un côté;

Et de l'autre, le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, M. Thiers, et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères M. Jules Favre, représentant la France;

Les pleins pouvoirs des deux Parties Contractantes ayant été trouvés en bonne et dûe forme, il y a été convenu ce que suit, pour servir de base préliminaire à la paix définitive à conclure ultérieurement.

Article I.

La France renonce en faveur de l'Empire Allemand à tous ses droits et titres sur les territoires situés à l'est de la frontière ci-après désignée.

La ligne de démarcation commence à la frontière nord-ouest du canton de Cattenom vers le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, suit vers le sud les frontières occidentales des cantons de Cattenom et Thionville, passe par le canton de Briey en longeant les frontières occidentales des communes de Montois-la-Montagne et Roncourt ainsi que les frontières orientales des communes de St. Marie-aux-Chênes, St. Ail, Habonville, atteint la frontière du canton de Gorze qu'elle traverse le long des frontières communales de Vionville, Buxières, et Onville, suit la frontière sud-ouest respectivement sud de l'arrondissement de Metz, la frontière occidentale de l'arrondissement de Château-Salins jusqu'à la commune de Pettoncourt dont elle embrasse les frontières occidentale et méridionale pour suivre la crête des montagnes entre la Seille et le Moncel jusqu'à la frontière de l'arrondissement de Sarrebourg au sud de Garde. La démarcation coïncide ensuite avec la frontière de cet arrondissement jusqu'à la commune de Tanconville dont elle atteint la frontière au nord, de là elle suit la crête des montagnes entre les sources de la Sarre Blanche et la Verouze jusqu'à la frontière du canton de Schirmeck, longe la frontière occidentale de ce canton, embrasse les communes de Saales, Bourg-Bruche, Colroy-la-Roche, Plaine, Ranrupt, Saulxures, et St. Blaise-la-Roche, du canton de Saales, et coïncide avec la frontière occidentale des départements du Bas-Rhin et du Haut-Rhin jusqu'au canton de Belfort dont elle quitte la frontière méridionale non loin de Vourvenans, pour traverser le canton de Delle aux limites méridionales des communes de Bourogne et de Froide Fontaine, et atteindre la frontière Suisse en longeant les frontières orientales des communes de Jonchery et Delle.

L'Empire Allemand possédera ces territoires à perpétuité en toute souveraineté et propriété. Une Commission Internationale composée de Représentants des Hautes Parties Contractantes en nombre égal

des deux côtés sera chargée, immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, d'exécuter sur le terrain le tracé de la nouvelle frontière, conformément aux stipulations précédentes.

Cette Commission présidera au partage des biens-fonds et capitaux qui jusqu'ici ont appartenu en commun à des districts ou des communes séparés par la nouvelle frontière; en cas de désaccord sur le tracé et les mesures d'exécution, les membres de la Commission en référeront à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

La frontière telle qu'elle vient d'être décrite, se trouve marquée en vert sur deux exemplaires conformes de la carte du territoire formant le Gouvernement Général d'Alsace, publiée à Berlin, en Septembre, 1870, par la Division Géographique et Statistique de l'État-Major Général, et dont un exemplaire sera joint à chacune des deux expéditions du présent Traité.

Toutefois le tracé indiqué a subi les modifications suivantes de l'accord des deux Parties Contractantes: Dans l'ancien département de la Moselle les villages de St. Marie-aux-Chênes près de St. Privat-la-Montagne et de Vionville, à l'ouest de Rezonville, seront cédés à l'Allemagne. Par contre la ville et les fortifications de Belfort resteront à la France avec un rayon qui sera déterminé ultérieurement.

Article II.

La France paiera à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne la somme de cinq milliards de francs.

Le paiement d'au moins un milliard de francs aura lieu dans le courant de l'année 1871, et celui de tout le reste de la dette dans un espace de trois années à partir de la ratification des présentes.

Article III.

L'évacuation des territoires Français occupés par les troupes Allemandes commencera après la ratification du présent Traité par l'Assemblée Nationale siégeant à Bordeaux. Immédiatement après cette ratification les troupes Allemandes quitteront l'intérieur de la ville de Paris ainsi que les forts situés à la rive gauche de la Seine, et dans le plus bref délai possible fixé par une entente entre les autorités militaires des deux pays, elles évacueront entièrement les départements du Calvados, de l'Orne, de la Sarthe, d'Eure et Loir, du Loiret, de Loir et Cher, d'Indre et Loire, de l'Yonne, et de plus les départements de la Seine Inférieure, de l'Eure, de Seine et Oise, de Seine et Marne, de l'Aube, et de la Côte d'Or jusqu'à de la rive gauche de la Seine. Les troupes Françaises se retireront en même temps derrière la Loire qu'elles ne pourront dépasser avant la signature du Traité de Paix Définitif. Sont exceptées de cette disposition la garnison de Paris dont le nombre ne pourra pas dépasser 40,000 hommes, et les garnisons indispensables à la sûreté des places fortes.

L'évacuation des départements situés entre la rive droite de la Seine et la frontière de l'est par les troupes Allemandes s'opérera graduellement après la ratification du Traité de Paix Définitif et le paiement du premier demi-milliard de la contribution stipulée par l'Article II, en commençant par les départements les plus rapprochés de Paris, et se continuera au fur et à mesure que les versements de la contribution seront effectués; après le premier versement d'un demi-milliard cette évacuation aura lieu dans les départements suivants: Somme, Oise, et les parties des départements de la Seine Inférieure,

Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, situées sur la rive droite de la Seine, ainsi que la partie du département de la Seine et les forts situés sur la rive droite.

Après le paiement de deux milliards, l'occupation Allemande ne comprendra plus que les départements de la Marne, des Ardennes, de la Haute-Marne, de la Meuse, des Vosges, de la Meurthe, ainsi que la forteresse de Belfort avec son territoire, qui serviront de gage pour les trois milliards restants et où le nombre des troupes Allemandes ne dépassera pas 50,000 hommes. Sa Majesté l'Empereur sera disposé à substituer à la garantie territoriale consistant dans l'occupation partielle du territoire Français une garantie financière si elle est offerte par le Gouvernement Français dans des conditions reconnues suffisantes par Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi pour les intérêts de l'Allemagne. Les trois milliards dont l'acquittement aura été différé, porteront intérêt à 5 pour cent à partir de la ratification de la présente Convention.

Article IV.

Les troupes Allemandes s'abstiendront de faire des réquisitions soit en argent soit en nature dans les départements occupés. Par contre l'alimentation des troupes Allemandes qui resteront en France, aura lieu aux frais du Gouvernement Français dans la mesure convenue par une entente avec l'intendance militaire Allemande.

Article V.

Les intérêts des habitants des territoires cédés par la France, en tout ce qui concerne leur commerce et leurs droits civils seront réglés aussi favorablement que possible lorsque seront arrêtées les conditions de la paix définitive. Il sera fixé, à cet effet, un espace de temps pendant lequel ils jouiront de facilités particulières pour la circulation de leurs produits. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'apportera aucun obstacle à la libre émigration des habitants des territoires cédés et ne pourra prendre contre eux aucune mesure atteignant leurs personnes ou leurs propriétés.

Article VI.

Les prisonniers de guerre, qui n'auront pas déjà été mis en liberté par voie d'échange seront rendus immédiatement après la ratification des présents préliminaires. Afin d'accélérer le transport des prisonniers Français, le Gouvernement Français mettra à la disposition des autorités Allemandes à l'intérieur du territoire Allemand une partie du matériel roulant de ses chemins de fer dans une mesure qui sera déterminée par des arrangements spéciaux et aux prix payés en France par le Gouvernement Français pour les transports militaires.

Article VII.

L'ouverture des négociations pour le Traité de Paix Définitif à conclure sur la base des présents préliminaires aura lieu à Bruxelles immédiatement après la ratification de ces derniers par l'Assemblée Nationale et par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne.

Article VIII.

Après la conclusion et la ratification du Traité de Paix Définitif

l'administration des départements devant encore rester occupés par les troupes Allemandes sera remise aux autorités Françaises. Mais ces dernières seront tenues de se conformer aux ordres que les commandants des troupes Allemandes croiraient devoir donner dans l'intérêt de la sûreté, de l'entretien et de la distribution des troupes.

Dans les départements occupés la perception des impôts après la ratification du présent Traité s'opérera pour le compte du Gouvernement Français et par le moyen de ses employés.

Article IX.

Il est bien entendu que les présentes ne peuvent donner à l'autorité militaire Allemande aucun droit sur les parties du territoire qu'elle n'occupe point actuellement.

Article X.

Les présentes seront immédiatement soumises à la ratification de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne et de l'Assemblée Nationale Française siégeant à Bordeaux.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont revêtu le présent Traité Préliminaire de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux.

Fait à Versailles le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.

(Signé) A. THIERS.

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

Les Royaumes de Bavière et de Wurtemberg et le Grand-Duché de Bade ayant pris part à la guerre actuelle comme alliés de la Prusse et faisant partie maintenant de l'Empire Germanique, les soussignés adhèrent à la présente Convention au nom de leurs souverains respectifs.

Versailles, le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) COMTE DE BRAY-STEINBURG.

(Signé) BARON DE WÄCHTER.

(Signé) MITTNACHT.

(Signé) JOLLY.

ENTRE les Soussignés, munis des pleins-pouvoirs de l'Empire d'Allemagne et de la République Française, la Convention suivante a été conclue :

Article I.

Afin de faciliter la ratification des préliminaires de paix conclus aujourd'hui entre les Soussignés, l'armistice stipulé par les Conventions du 28 Janvier et du 15 Février dernier, est prolongé jusqu'au 12 Mars prochain.

Article II.

La prolongation de l'armistice ne s'appliquera pas à l'Article IV de la Convention du 28 Janvier, qui sera remplacé par la stipulation suivante sur laquelle les Soussignés sont tombés d'accord :

La partie de la ville de Paris à l'intérieur de l'enceinte, comprise entre la Seine, la Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré et l'Avenue des Ternes, sera occupée par des troupes Allemandes dont le nombre ne dépassera pas 30,000 hommes. Le mode d'occupation et les dispositions pour le logement des troupes Allemandes dans cette partie de la ville seront réglées par une entente entre deux officiers supérieurs des deux armées, et l'accès en sera interdit aux troupes Françaises et aux gardes nationales armées pendant la durée de l'occupation.

Article III.

Les troupes Allemandes s'abstiendront à l'avenir de prélever des contributions en argent dans les territoires occupés. Les contributions de cette catégorie dont le montant ne serait pas encore payé, seront annulées de plein droit ; celles qui seraient versées ultérieurement par suite d'ignorance de la présente stipulation, devront être remboursées. Par contre, les autorités Allemandes continueront à prélever les impôts de l'Etat dans les territoires occupés.

Article IV.

Les deux Parties Contractantes conserveront le droit de dénoncer l'armistice à partir du 3 Mars selon leur convenance et avec un délai de trois jours pour la reprise des hostilités s'il y avait lieu.

Fait et approuvé à Versailles le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.
(Signé) A. THIERS.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

CONVENTION REGARDANT L'OCCUPATION D'UNE PARTIE DE PARIS
PAR LES TROUPES ALLEMANDES.

Versailles, le 26 Février, 1871.

§ 1.

Les troupes Allemandes occuperont, dès Mercredi le 1 Mars, à 10 heures du matin, le terrain compris entre la Seine (rive droit), l'enceinte depuis le Point-du-Jour jusqu'à la Porte des Ternes, la Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré jusqu'à la Rue des Champs Elysées, le Garde Meuble et le Ministère de la Marine, le Jardin des Tuileries, ne réservant toutefois les bâtiments des vivres militaires et la circulation sur les deux Points de l'Alma et de Jéna.

§ 2.

Il est formellement interdit aux gens armés de franchir la ligne sus-indiquée. Toutefois la circulation pourra rester libre pour toute personne non militaire et non armée.

§ 3.

La troupe d'occupation aura la facilité de visiter les galeries du Louvre et l'Établissement des Invalides. Les détails de ces promenades seront réglés d'un commun accord par les autorités militaires des deux pays. Il est bien entendu que les soldats n'auront pas leur fusil et seront conduits par des officiers.

§ 4.

Les troupes Allemandes seront logées soit dans les bâtiments publics soit chez les habitants. Une commission mixte, composé des délégués des municipalités et d'un ou de plusieurs officiers Allemands, se réunira Mardi le 28 Février, à 2 heures, au Pont de Sèvres, pour faciliter les détails du logement.

§ 5.

Les soldats seront nourris par les soins de l'autorité Allemande.

APPENDIX CLXXX.

RETURN OF GERMAN TROOPS IN FRANCE ON 1ST MARCH, 1871.

1. FIELD ARMY.

Troops.	Combatants, excluding Officers and Train Soldiers.		Artillery.	Total.			Total Effectives, includ- ing Non-combatants.
	Infantry.	Cavalry.		Combatants, excluding Officers and Train Soldiers.		Artillery.	
				Infantry.	Cavalry.		
	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	
Ist Army.							
1st Army Corps - - -	22,336	1,194	84	—	—	—	40,202
VIIIth Army Corps - - -	24,276	1,207	90	—	—	—	33,612
17th Infantry Division - - -	11,703	1,672	36	—	—	—	17,009
3rd Res. Division, including Comb. Guard Cavalry Brigade - - -	6,033	2,280	18	—	—	—	9,638
3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade - - -	—	1,038	—	—	—	—	1,345
3rd Cavalry Division - - -	—	2,221	6	—	—	—	3,054
5th Cavalry Division - - -	—	5,049	12	—	—	—	6,311
Total Ist Army - - -	—	—	—	64,398	14,661	246	110,656
IIInd Army.							
IIIrd Army Corps- - -	22,973	1,143	84	—	—	—	31,854
IVth " " - - -	24,019	1,119	84	—	—	—	33,165
IXth " " - - -	21,636	1,756	90	—	—	—	31,487
Xth " " - - -	22,832	1,223	84	—	—	—	32,688
1st Cavalry Division - - -	—	3,448	6	—	—	—	4,272
2nd " " - - -	—	2,914	12	—	—	—	4,081
4th " " - - -	—	3,016	12	—	—	—	4,047
6th " " - - -	—	2,642	6	—	—	—	3,329
Total IIInd Army - - -	—	—	—	91,460	17,261	378	144,902
IIIrd Army.							
Vth Army Corps, less Fabeck's Brigade - - -	18,235	878	76	—	—	—	26,433
XIth Army Corps - - -	22,103	1,189	84	—	—	—	31,499
1st Bav. Army Corps - - -	25,242	2,067	114	—	—	—	37,646
IInd " " - - -	22,784	2,606	108	—	—	—	36,349
Total IIIrd Army - - -	—	—	—	88,364	6,740	382	131,927
Fabeck's Brigade - - -	5,854	283	8	—	—	—	6,826
Vth Army Corps - - -	23,460	1,181	84	—	—	—	31,187
Total Vth A.C. and Fabeck - - -	—	—	—	29,314	1,464	92	37,813
MEUSE ARMY.							
Guard Corps, less Comb. and 3rd G. C. Brigades - - -	29,655	2,435	90	—	—	—	39,208
XIIth Army Corps - - -	25,413	3,442	96	—	—	—	39,303
Württemberg Field Division - - -	14,545	1,699	54	—	—	—	21,398
Guard Landwehr Division - - -	11,033	—	18	—	—	—	12,537
Total Meuse Army - - -	—	—	—	80,646	7,576	258	112,468

Troops.	Combatants, excluding Officers and Train Soldiers.		Artillery.	Total.			Total Effectives, includ- ing Non-combatants.
				Combatants, excluding Officers and Train Soldiers.		Artillery.	
	Infantry.	Cavalry.		Infantry.	Cavalry.		
	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	
SOUTH ARMY.							
IInd Army Corps -	21,519	1,100	84	—	—	—	30,445
VIIIth " " (including Knesebeck's Brigade)	28,366	1,679	84	—	—	—	37,882
XIVth " " (Bad. Div., Goltz, and 4th R.D.)	34,617	4,249	114	—	—	—	47,043
Ist Res. Division -	10,421	568	24	—	—	—	12,963
Krenski's Detachment -	8,707	264	12	—	—	—	7,731
10 Landwehr battalions (for siege of Langres)	9,409	—	—	—	—	—	9,802
Total South Army -	—	—	—	110,039	7,860	318	145,866
Total Field Army -	—	—	—	464,221	55,562	1,674	683,672
Of which—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Before Paris -	—	—	—	169,010	14,316	640	244,395
In the Departments -	—	—	—	295,211	41,246	1,034	439,277

II. GARRISON TROOPS.

Inspector-General of Etappen Ist Army	4,954	135	—	—	—	—	5,246
" " " IInd "	9,113	758	—	—	—	—	10,700
" " " IIInd "	3,450	1,274	8	—	—	—	11,609
" " " Meuse "	4,234	287	—	—	—	—	4,664
Government-General of Alsace -	27,176	1,211	18	—	—	—	33,451
" " " Lorraine* -	18,709	990	18	—	—	—	22,188
" " " in Rheims -	18,466	750	18	—	—	—	23,478
Government of Metz (Thionville, Longwy) -	13,170	276	6	—	—	—	16,843
Three Fort. Art. Cos. with Ist Army -	—	—	—	—	—	—	543
Siege Art. South Front of Paris -	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,002
Fort. Pioneers " -	—	—	—	—	—	—	920
Siege Art. N. and E. Fronts of Paris -	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,548
Fort. Pioneers " " -	—	—	—	—	—	—	782
Total Garrison Troops -	—	—	—	105,272	5,681	68	139,974
Total Troops in France† -	—	—	—	569,493	61,243	1,742	823,646

* Not including 10 Landwehr battalions, which are counted with South Army.

† Exclusive of troops employed at Headquarters on railway and telegraph duties.

APPENDIX CLXXXI.

INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE EXECUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY
AND ARMISTICE TREATY OF 26TH FEBRUARY, 1871.

- (1.) The landwehr battalions, reserve rifle battalions, reserve cavalry regiments, reserve batteries, which are now in France and in the German provinces newly acquired, and the dépôt battalions of those regiments which are not intended for the permanent occupation of the new provinces, are to be sent home as soon as possible.
- (2.) The following are appointed to form the permanent garrison in Alsace:—

(a.) Prussian troops.

5th Grenadiers.
 14th Regiment.
 60th "
 47th "
 22nd "
 17th "
 25th "
 10th Dragoons.
 4th Lancers.
 14th Dragoons.
 15th "
 15th Lancers.
 2nd Field Division 8th Field Artillery Regiment.
 H.A. Division 11th " " "
 1st Field Division " " "
 2 Companies 8th Fortress " "
 10th Hanoverian Fortress Artillery Division.
 11th Hessian " " "
 5th Pioneer Battalion.
 9th " "

(b.)

92nd Brunswick Regiment.
 One Saxon Regiment.
 Two Bavarian Regiments.
 One Württemberg Regiment.
 One Bavarian Cavalry "
 12th Fortress Artillery Battalion.

The above regiments of infantry will be detached from their Corps and will be at once transported by rail to Alsace in relief of the present occupation troops.

- (3.) The VIIth Army Corps will pass under the direct orders of

the Royal Headquarters. It will henceforth occupy the Meuse and Vosges Departments and also those parts of the Meurthe and Moselle Departments which remain French, and it will relieve as quickly as possible the Government troops hitherto employed there. The 60th Regiment is, as is seen, intended to garrison Alsace, the 72nd to pass for a time to the Xth Army Corps, which will give orders as to the movement of the regiment. The 5th Reserve Lancers will return home.

- (4.) The XIIth Army Corps will also pass under the direct orders of the Royal Headquarters, and is intended to occupy the Aisne and Ardennes Departments; the Württemberg Field Division will pass under the same command and will occupy the Marne Department. The Government troops hitherto located in this department will be relieved with the least possible delay.
- (5.) The Ist Army, after entirely evacuating the left bank of the Seine, will be cantoned henceforth in the Departments of Somme, Lower Seine, and Eure (right bank of the Seine), and in the west portion of the Oise Department limited by the Grisons—Beauvais—Breteuil—Amiens road, including the villages on the road.

The troops detached from the Guard and XIIth Army Corps return to their commands.

The 5th Cavalry Division is placed at the disposal of the Meuse Army, General v. Strantz's Combined Cavalry Brigade and the three reserve batteries of the Vth Corps will at once move off in the direction of Mézières. The march route will be forwarded to this office.

- (6.) The IIrd Army, including the IIIrd, IXth, and Xth Corps, the 2nd and 6th Cavalry Divisions will at once move to the eastward between the Loire and Seine, cross the latter river between its source and the embouchure of the Aube, and occupy cantonments in the Upper Marne, Aube (right bank of Seine), and Côte d'Or (right bank of Seine) Departments, limited on the south-east by a line from the source of the latter river near Grancey.

The IVth Army Corps will revert to the Meuse Army, the 4th Cavalry Division to the IIIrd Army, the 1st Cavalry Division to the South Army.

Of the Xth Corps, the 17th and 92nd Regiments, will be replaced by the 67th and 72nd Regiments now belonging to the South Army.

The Meuse Army, to which are assigned the IVth Army Corps and 5th Cavalry Division, will canton in the Departments of the Oise (so far as this is not occupied by the Ist Army), and of the Seine et Oise (right bank of the Seine and Ourcq Canal), while continuing to occupy Forts St. Denis, l'Est, and Aubervilliers.

The Guard Landwehr Division will be forwarded by rail to Germany, and will at once march upon Rheims.

- (8.) The IIIrd Army will evacuate as soon as possible the forts on the left bank of the Seine, carrying away the material; it will occupy on the right bank the Forts Nogent, Rosny, Noissy, and Romainville, hitherto occupied by the Meuse

Army. The XIth, VIth, and IInd Bavarian Army Corps, and the 4th Cavalry Division, which again passes to the IIIrd Army, will then cross to the right bank of the Seine and canton in the Seine et Marne Departments, and the available part of the Seine et Oise Department.

The Vth Army Corps will pass to the South Army and will receive instructions to move at once *via* Auxerre on Dijon, whither the 19th Regiment, which replaces the 47th now being detached from the army, will be transported by rail.

- (9.) The South Army, to which are attached the Vth Army Corps and 1st Cavalry Division, will occupy cantonments in the Haute Saône, Doubs, and Jura Departments, so far as they have been occupied by the Germans; moreover, the Côte d'Or Department, excepting the part given to the IInd Army and the part bounded by a line drawn from the source of the Seine to Chagny; which, on the moving up of the IInd Army, will fall to the French zone of occupation.

The South Army will occupy Belfort.

The IInd Army Corps will receive the 34th Regiment in lieu of the detached 14th Regiment.

In consequence of the early return of the landwehr troops, &c., attached to the XIVth Corps, and also of the new destinations assigned to the 30th, 34th, 67th, and 25th Prussian Line Regiments, the XIVth Army Corps, the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions, and v. d. Goltz's detachment may be regarded as broken up.

The arrangements with regard to the *personnel* and the employment of the administrations, trains, &c., are reserved.

- (10.) The transport of the landwehr troops of occupation now present in the cantonments of the Ist, IInd, IIIrd, Meuse and South Armies will be arranged, as their relief, by line or etappen troops as the case may be, proceeds. To this end the Army Commanders-in-Chief will be good enough to report to this office with the least possible delay the dates at which the presence of the Government troops becomes no longer necessary.
- (11.) Lastly, attention is to be given to sending home the etappen troops at the earliest date. Their duties devolve in the rayons of the different Armies to the line troops of the latter; in the rayons of the XIIth and VIIth Army Corps and the Württemberg Division to these troops; in Alsace, &c., to the garrisons in accordance with instructions to be given by the highest military authorities there.
- (12.) With regard to the return of the fortress artillery and fortress pioneer companies (the latter so far as they do not belong to the Government or etappen troops or to the reserve divisions), further instructions will be issued.
- (13.) The Inspectors General of Etappen of the Ist, IInd, and IIIrd Armies will remain with their present functions. The latter will also conduct the business of the Meuse Army; the etappen inspection of this Army is to be subsequently placed at the disposal of the South Army.
- (14.) The telegraph stations situated in the districts to be

evacuated, and which are worked by officials not on the field establishment, can in the event of their not being previously relieved by the field and etappen telegraph divisions, continue to be thus worked until the departure of the troops; but the military authorities will make arrangements for their security and for providing the necessary means of transport for the officials and the instruments.

- (15.) The Army Commanders, Governors-General, &c., will be good enough to concert with regard to the execution of the reliefs, &c., indicated in the foregoing directions.

The transport of the troops will be reported, as herein set forth, to the respective Line Commissions, which have received corresponding instructions from this office. Meanwhile, all troops about to be transported by rail are to be instructed to conform to any direct requisitions made to them by the Line Commissions.

(Signed) COUNT MOLTKE.

APPENDIX CLXXXII.

TREATY OF PEACE, 10TH MAY, 1871.

Le Prince Othon de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Chancelier de l'Empire Germanique, le Comte Harry d'Arnim, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne près du St. Siège, stipulant au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'un côté; de l'autre, M. Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la République Française, M. Augustin Thomas Joseph Poyyer-Quertier, Ministre des Finances de la République Française, et M. Marc Thomas Eugène de Goulard, Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale, stipulant au nom de la République Française, s'étant mis d'accord pour convertir en Traité de Paix Définitif le Traité de Préliminaire de Paix du 26 Février de l'année courante, modifié ainsi qu'il va l'être par les dispositions qui suivent, ont arrêté:—

Article I.

La distance de la ville de Belfort à la ligne de frontière telle qu'elle a été d'abord proposée lors des négociations de Versailles et telle qu'elle se trouve marquée sur la carte annexée à l'instrument ratifié du Traité des Préliminaires du 26 Février, est considérée comme indiquant la mesure du rayon qui, en vertu de la clause y relative du Article I des Préliminaires, doit rester à la France avec la ville et les fortifications de Belfort.

Le Gouvernement Allemand et disposé à élargir ce rayon de manière qu'il comprenne les cantons de Belfort, de Delle, et de Giromagny, ainsi que la partie occidentale du canton de Fontaine à l'ouest d'une ligne à tracer du point où le canal du Rhin au Rhône sort du canton de Delle au sud de Montreux-Château jusqu'à la limite nord du canton entre Bourg et Félon où cette ligne joindrait la limite est du canton de Giromagny.

Le Gouvernement Allemand, toutefois, ne cédera les territoires sus-indiqués qu'à la condition que la République Française, de son côté, consentira à une rectification de frontière le long des limites occidentales des cantons de Cattenom et de Thionville qui laisseront

l'Allemagne le terrain à l'est d'une ligne partant de la frontière du Luxembourg entre Hussigny et Redingen, laissant à la France les villages de Thil et de Villerupt, se prolongeant entre Erronville et Aumetz, entre Beauvillers et Boulange, entre Trieux et Lommeringen, et joignant ancienne ligne de frontière entre Avril et Moyeuivre.

La Commission Internationale dont il est question dans l'Article I des Préliminaires, se rendra sur le terrain immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité pour exécuter les travaux qui lui incombent et pour faire le tracé de la nouvelle frontière conformément aux dispositions précédentes.

Article II.

Les sujets Français originaires des territoires cédés domiciliés actuellement sur ce territoire qui entendront conserver la nationalité Française, jouiront jusqu'au 1er Octobre, 1872, et moyennant une déclaration préalable, faite à l'autorité compétente, de la faculté de transporter leur domicile en France et de s'y fixer, sans que ce droit puisse être altéré par les lois sur le service militaire, auquel cas la qualité de citoyen Français leur sera maintenue. Ils seront libres de conserver leurs immeubles situés sur le territoire réuni à l'Allemagne.

Aucun habitant des territoires cédés ne pourra être poursuivi, inquiété ou recherché dans sa personne ou dans ses biens à raison de ses actes politiques ou militaires pendant la guerre.

Article III.

Le Gouvernement Français remettra au Gouvernement Allemand les archives, documents, et registres concernant l'administration civile, militaire, et judiciaire des territoires cédés. Si quelques-uns de ces titres avaient été déplacés, ils seront restitués par le Gouvernement Français sur la demande du Gouvernement Allemand.

Article IV.

Le Gouvernement Français remettra au Gouvernement de l'Empire d'Allemagne dans le terme de six mois à dater de l'échange des ratifications de ce Traité :—

1. Le montant des sommes déposées par les départements, les communes, et les établissements publics des territoires cédés ;
2. Le montant des primes d'enrôlement et de remplacement appartenant aux militaires et marins originaires des territoires cédés qui auront opté pour la nationalité Allemande ;
3. Le montant des cautionnement des comptables de l'Etat ;
4. Le montant des sommes versées pour consignations judiciaires par suite de mesures prises par les autorités administratives ou judiciaires dans les territoires cédés.

Article V.

Les deux nations jouiront d'un traitement égal en ce qui concerne la navigation sur la Moselle, le canal du Rhin à la Marne, le canal du Rhône au Rhin, le canal de la Sarre, et les eaux navigables communiquant avec ces voies de navigation. Le droit de flottage sera maintenu.

Article VI.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, étant d'avis que les circonscriptions diocésaines des territoires cédés à l'Empire Allemand doivent coïncider avec la nouvelle frontière déterminée par l'Article I ci-dessus, se concerteront après la ratification du présent Traité, sans retard, sur les mesures à prendre en commun à cet effet.

Les communautés appartenant, soit à l'Eglise Réformée, soit à la Confession d'Augsbourg, établies sur les territoires cédés par la France, cesseront de relever de l'autorité ecclésiastique Française.

Les communautés de l'Eglise de la Confession d'Augsbourg établies

dans les territoires Français cesseront de relever du Consistoire Supérieur et du Directeur siégeant à Strasbourg.

Les communautés Israélites des territoires situés à l'est de la nouvelle frontière cesseront de dépendre de Consistoire Central Israélite siégeant à Paris.

Article VII.

Le paiement de cinq cent millions aura lieu dans les trente jours qui suivront le rétablissement de l'autorité du Gouvernement Français dans la ville de Paris. Un milliard sera payé dans le courant de l'année et un demi-milliard au 1^{er} Mai, 1872. Les trois derniers milliards resteront payables au 2 Mars, 1874, ainsi qu'il a été stipulé par le Traité de Paix Préliminaire. A partir du 2 Mars de l'année courante, les intérêts de ces trois milliards de francs seront payés chaque année, le 3 Mars, à raison de 5 pour cent par an.

Toute somme payée en avance sur les trois derniers milliards cessera de porter des intérêts à partir du jour du paiement effectué.

Tous les paiements ne pourront être faits que dans les principales villes de commerce de l'Allemagne et seront effectués en métal, or ou argent, en billets de la Banque d'Angleterre, billets de la Banque de France, billets de la Banque de Prusse, billets de la Banque Royale des Pays-Bas, billets de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, en billets à ordre ou en lettres de change négociables de premier ordre valeur comptant.

Le Gouvernement Allemand ayant fixé en France la valeur du thaler Prussien à 3 francs 75 centimes, le Gouvernement Français accepte la conversion des monnaies des deux pays au taux ci-dessus indiqué.

Le Gouvernement Français informera le Gouvernement Allemand, trois mois d'avance, de tout paiement qu'il compte faire aux caisses de l'Empire Allemand.

Après le paiement du premier demi-milliard et la ratification du Traité de Paix Définitif, les départements de la Somme, de la Seine-Inférieure, et de l'Eure seront évacués en tant qu'ils se trouveront encore occupés par les troupes Allemandes. L'évacuation des départements de l'Oise, de Seine-et-Oise, de Seine-et-Marne, et de la Seine, ainsi que celle des forts de Paris, aura lieu aussitôt que le Gouvernement Allemand jugera le rétablissement de l'ordre, tant en France que dans Paris, suffisant pour assurer l'exécution des engagements contractés par la France.

Dans tous les cas, cette évacuation aura lieu lors du paiement du troisième demi-milliard.

Les troupes Allemandes, dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité, auront la disposition de la zone neutre située entre la ligne de démarcation Allemande et l'enceinte de Paris sur la rive droite de la Seine.

Les stipulations du Traité du 26 Février relatives à l'occupation des territoires Français après le paiement de deux milliards resteront en vigueur. Aucune des déductions que le Gouvernement Français serait en droit de faire ne pourra être exercée sur le paiement des cinq cents premiers millions.

Article VIII.

Les troupes Allemandes continueront à s'abstenir des réquisitions en nature et en argent dans les territoires occupés; cette obligation de leur part étant corréative aux obligations contractées pour leur

entretien par le Gouvernement Français—dans le cas où malgré des réclamations réitérées du Gouvernement Allemand le Gouvernement Français serait en retard d'exécuter les dites obligations, les troupes Allemandes auront le droit de se procurer ce qui sera nécessaire à leurs besoins en levant des impôts et des réquisitions dans les départements occupés et même en dehors de ceux-ci, si leurs ressources n'étaient pas suffisantes.

Relativement à l'alimentation des troupes Allemandes, le régime actuellement en vigueur sera maintenu jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts de Paris.

En vertu de la Convention de Ferrières du 11 Mars, 1871, les réductions indiquées par cette Convention seront mises à exécution après l'évacuation des forts.

Dès que l'effectif de l'armée Allemande sera réduit au-dessous du chiffre de 500,000 hommes, il sera tenu compte des réductions opérées au-dessous de ce chiffre pour établir une diminution proportionnelle dans le prix d'entretien des troupes payé par le Gouvernement Français.

Article IX.

Le traitement exceptionnel accordé maintenant aux produits de l'industrie des territoires cédés pour l'importation en France sera maintenu pour un espace de temps de six mois, depuis le 1er Mars, dans les conditions faites avec les délégués de l'Alsace.

Article X.

Le Gouvernement Allemand continuera à faire rentrer les prisonniers de guerre en s'entendant avec le Gouvernement Français. Le Gouvernement Français renverra dans leurs foyers ceux de ces prisonniers qui sont libérables. Quant à ceux qui n'ont point achevé leur temps de service, ils se retireront derrière la Loire. Il est entendu que l'armée de Paris et de Versailles, après le rétablissement de l'autorité du Gouvernement Français à Paris et jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts par les troupes Allemandes, n'excédera pas 80,000 hommes.

Jusqu'à cette évacuation, le Gouvernement Français ne pourra faire aucune concentration de troupes sur la rive droite de la Loire, mais il pourvoira aux garnisons régulières des villes placées dans cette zone, suivant les nécessités du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix publique.

Au fur et à mesure que s'opérera l'évacuation, les chefs de corps conviendront ensemble d'une zone neutre entre les armées des deux nations.

Vingt milles prisonniers seront dirigés sans délai sur Lyon, à la condition qu'ils seront expédiés immédiatement en Algérie après leur organisation pour être employés dans cette colonie.

Article XI.

Les Traités de Commerce avec les différents États de l'Allemagne ayant été annulés par la guerre, le Gouvernement Allemand et le Gouvernement Français prendront pour base de leurs relations commerciales le régime du traitement réciproque sur le pied de la nation la plus favorisée.

Sont compris dans cette règle les droits d'entrée et de sortie, le transit, les formalités douanières, l'admission et le traitement des sujets des deux nations ainsi que de leurs agents.

Toutefois, seront exceptées de la règle susdite les faveurs qu'une des Parties Contractantes, par des Traités de Commerce, a accordées ou accordera à des États autres que ceux qui suivent :—L'Angleterre, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, la Suisse, l'Autriche, la Russie.

Les Traités de Navigation, ainsi que la Convention relative au service international des chemins de fer dans ses rapports avec la douane et la Convention pour la garantie réciproque de la propriété des œuvres d'esprit et d'art seront remis en vigueur.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Français se réserve la faculté d'établir, sur les navires Allemands, et leurs cargaisons, des droits de tonnage, et le pavillon sous la réserve que ces droits ne soient pas plus élevés que ceux qui grèveront les bâtiments et les cargaisons des nations sus-mentionnées.

Article XII.

Tous les Allemands expulsés conserveront la jouissance pleine et entière de tous les biens qu'ils ont acquis en France.

Ceux des Allemands qui avaient obtenu l'autorisation exigées par les lois Françaises pour fixer leur domicile en France sont réintégrés dans tous les droits et peuvent, en conséquence, établir de nouveau leur domicile sur le territoire Français.

Le délai stipulé par les lois Françaises pour obtenir la naturalisation sera considéré comme n'étant pas interrompu par l'état de guerre pour les personnes qui profiteront de la faculté ci-dessus mentionnée de revenir en France dans un délai de six mois après l'échange des ratifications de ce Traité, et il sera tenu compte du temps écoulé entre leur expulsion et leur retour sur le territoire Français, comme s'ils n'avaient jamais cessé de résider en France.

Les conditions ci-dessus seront appliquées en parfaite réciprocité aux sujets Français résidant ou désirant résider en Allemagne.

Article XIII.

Les bâtiments Allemands qui étaient condamnés par les conseils de prise avant le 2 Mars, 1871, seront considérés comme condamnés définitivement.

Ceux qui n'auraient pas été condamnés à la date sus-indiquée seront rendus avec la cargaison en tant qu'elle existe encore. Si la restitution des bâtiments et de la cargaison n'est plus possible, leur valeur, fixée d'après le prix de la vente, sera rendue à leurs propriétaires.

Article XIV.

Chacun des deux parties continuera sur son territoire les travaux entrepris pour la canalisation de la Moselle. Les intérêts communs des parties séparées des deux départements de la Meurthe et de la Moselle seront liquidés.

Article XV.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à étendre aux sujets respectifs les mesures qu'elles pourront juger utiles

d'adopter en faveur de ceux de leurs nationaux qui, par suite des événements de la guerre, auraient été mis dans l'impossibilité d'arriver en temps utile à la sauvegarde ou à la conservation de leurs droits.

Article XVI.

Les deux Gouvernements, Allemand et Français, s'engagent réciproquement à faire respecter et entretenir les tombeaux des soldats ensevelis sur leurs territoires respectifs.

Article XVII.

Le règlement des points accessoires sur lesquels un accord doit être établi, en conséquence de ce Traité et du Traité Préliminaire, sera l'objet de négociations ultérieures qui auront lieu à Francfort.

Article XVIII.

Les ratifications du présent Traité par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'un côté, et de l'autre par l'Assemblée Nationale et par le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, seront échangées à Francfort dans le délai de dix jours ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Francfort, le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé)	v. BISMARCK.
(Signé)	ARNIM.
(Signé)	JULES FAVRE.
(Signé)	FOUYER-QUERTIER.
(Signé)	E. DE GOULARD.

ARTICLES ADDITIONNELS.

Article I.

§ 1. D'ici à l'époque fixée pour l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, le Gouvernement Français usera de son droit de rachat de la concession donné à la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est. Le Gouvernement Allemand sera subrogé à tous les droits que le Gouvernement Français aura acquis par le rachat des concessions en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer situés dans les territoires cédés, soit achevés, soit en construction.

§ 2. Seront compris dans cette concession :

1. Tous les terrains appartenant à ladite Compagnie, quelle que soit leur destination, ainsi que : établissements de gares et de stations, hangars, ateliers et magasins, maisons de gardes de voie, &c. ;

2. Tous les immeubles qui en dépendent, ainsi que : barrières, clôtures, changements de voie, aiguilles, plaques tournantes, prises d'eaux, grues hydrauliques, machines fixes, &c. ;

3. Tous les matériaux, combustibles et approvisionnements de

tout genre, mobiliers des gares, outillages des ateliers et des gares, &c.;

4. Les sommes dues à la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est à titre de subvention accordées par des corporations ou personnes domiciliées dans les territoires cédés.

§ 3. Sera exclu de cette cession le matériel roulant. Le Gouvernement Allemand remettra la part du matériel roulant avec ses accessoires qui se trouverait en sa possession au Gouvernement Français.

§ 4. Le Gouvernement Français s'engage à libérer envers l'Empire Allemand entièrement les chemins de fer cédés ainsi que leurs dépendances de tous les droits que des tiers pourraient faire valoir, nommément des droits des obligatoires. Il s'engage également à se substituer, le cas échéant, au Gouvernement Allemand, relativement aux réclamations qui pourraient être élevées vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Allemand par les créanciers des chemins de fer en question.

§ 5. Le Gouvernement Français prendra à sa charge les réclamations que la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est pourrait élever vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Allemand ou de ses mandataires par rapport à l'exploitation desdits chemins de fer et à l'usage des objets indiqués dans le § 2 ainsi que du matériel roulant.

Le Gouvernement Allemand communiquera au Gouvernement Français, à sa demande, tous les documents et toutes les indications qui pourraient servir à constater les faits sur lesquels s'appuieront les réclamations susmentionnées.

§ 6. Le Gouvernement Allemand payera au Gouvernement Français, pour la cession des droits de propriété indiqués dans les §§ 1 et 2 et en titre d'équivalent pour l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement Français dans le § 4, la somme de trois cent vingt cinq millions (325,000,000) de francs.

On défalquera cette somme de l'indemnité de guerre stipulée dans l'Article 7. Vu que la situation qui a servi de base à la convention conclue entre la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est et la Société Royale Grand-Ducale des Chemins de Fer Guillaume-Luxembourg en date du 6 Juin, 1857, et du 21 Janvier, 1868, et celle conclue entre le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et les Sociétés des Chemins de Fer Guillaume-Luxembourg et de l'Est Français en date du 5 Décembre, 1868, a été modifiée essentiellement de manière qu'elles ne sont applicables à l'état des choses créé par les stipulations contenues dans le § 1, le Gouvernement Allemand se déclare prêt à se substituer aux droits et aux charges résultant de ces conventions pour la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est.

Pour le cas où le Gouvernement Français serait subrogé, soit par le rachat de la concession de la Compagnie de l'Est, soit par une entente spéciale, aux droits acquis par cette société en vertu des conventions sus-indiquées, il s'engage à céder gratuitement dans un délai de six semaines ces droits au Gouvernement Allemand.

Pour le cas où ladite subrogation ne s'effectuerait pas, le Gouvernement Français n'accordera des concessions pour les lignes de chemin de fer appartenant à la Compagnie de l'Est et situées dans le territoire Français que sous la condition expresse que le concessionnaire n'exploite point les lignes de chemin de fer situées dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.

Article II.

Le Gouvernement Allemand offre deux millions de francs pour les

droits et les propriétés que possède la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est sur la partie de son réseau située sur le territoire Suisse, de la frontière à Bâle, si le Gouvernement Français lui fait tenir le consentement dans le délai d'un mois.

Article III.

La cession de territoire auprès de Belfort, offerte par le Gouvernement Allemand dans l'Article I du présent Traité en échange de la rectification de frontière demandée à l'ouest de Thionville, sera augmentée des territoires des villages suivants: Rougemont, Leval, Petite-Fontaine, Romagny, Félon, La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont, Angeot, Vauthiermont, La Rivière, La Grange, Reppe, Fontaine, Frais, Foussemagne, Cunelières, Montreux-Château, Bretegne, Chavannes-les-Grands, Chavanatte, Suarce.

La route de Giromagny à Remiremont passant au ballon d'Alsace restera à la France dans tout son parcours et servira de limite, en tant qu'elle est située en dehors du canton de Giromagny.

Fait à Francfort, le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.
 (Signé) ARNIM.
 (Signé) JULES FAVRE.
 (Signé) POUYER-QUERTIER.
 (Signé) E. DE GOULARD.

Les soussignés, après avoir entendu la lecture du Traité de Paix Définitif, l'ont trouvé conforme à ce qui a été convenu entre eux.

En vertu de quoi ils l'ont muni de leurs signatures.

Les trois Articles Additionnels ont été signés séparément. Il est entendu qu'ils feront partie intégrale du Traité de Paix.

Le soussigné Chancelier de l'Empire Allemand a déclaré qu'il se charge de communiquer le Traité aux Gouvernements de Bavière, de Wurtemberg et de Bade et d'obtenir leurs accessions.

Fait à Francfort s/M. le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.
 (Signé) ARNIM.
 (Signé) JULES FAVRE.
 (Signé) POUYER-QUERTIER.
 (Signé) E. DE GOULARD.

APPENDIX CLXXXIII.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE GERMAN ARMY IN FRANCE FROM 1ST
FEBRUARY, 1871,* TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OCCUPATION.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	2nd February.												
1st Cav. Div. -	8th Lancers - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Govt. Troops. -	Garrison Squadron 5th Hussars	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd February.												
XIIth. - -	101st Grenadiers - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	16th February.												
4th Cav. Div. -	2nd B.G. Hussars - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	22nd February.												
IVth - - -	27th Regiment - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Vth - - -	7th Grenadiers - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
3rd Res. Divn. -	19th Regiment - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	23rd February.												
Vth - - -	8th Dragoons - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	24th February.												
VIIth - - -	77th Regiment - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	26th February.												
5th Cav. Div. -	4th Cuirassiers - - - -	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	27th February.												
5th Cav. Div. -	13th Dragoons - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIIth - - -	77th Regiment - - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	1st March.												
Vth - - -	51st Regiment - - - -	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIIth - - -	74th Regiment - - - -	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Govt. Troops. -	Küstrin Landw. Battn.-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	1
	12th March.												
Govt. Troops. -	Prenzlau Landw. Battn.	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-

* The losses of the South Army and before Belfort up to the 7th and 19th February, respectively, are shown in Appendix CLXXII and CLXXXIII.

ny Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missil g.			Total.		
		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	13th March.												
d -	54th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	22nd March.												
l -	9th Grenadiers - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	23rd March.												
vl -	Headquarters Staff - -	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
	26th March.												
vl -	3rd Field Art. Regiment -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	19th May.												
-	58th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	22nd May.												
h -	51st Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	26th May.												
Bar. -	11th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	3	-
	27th May.												
h -	94th Regiment - - -	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
	Total - - -	1	4	-	3	27	-	-	4	1	4	35	1

NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	March 1st.		
VII . . .	74th Regiment . .	-	(1) 2nd Lt. Laeger.
Govnt. troops	Küstrin Landw. Btn.	(1) 2nd Lt. Kettlitz	
	March 23rd.		
III . . .	Headquarters . .	-	(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Viereck of the 12th Dragoons.
	May 26th.		
1st Bav. . .	11th Regiment . .	-	(1) Lt. Egler.

APPENDIX CLXXXIV.

RETURN OF AMMUNITION ISSUED TO THE AMMUNITION COLUMNS
FROM THE THREE PRUSSIAN RESERVE DEPÔTS AND THE TWO
BAVARIAN MAIN COLUMNS DURING THE WAR.

Nature.	Issued from					Remarks.
	Reserve Depôt.			Main Columns.		
	No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 3.	Ist Bav. A.C.	IIInd Bav. A.C.	
A.—ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.						
8-cm. or 4-pr. shells	38,271	85,575	37,743	21,565*	3,877*	* Inclusive of incendiary shells.
9-cm. or 6-pr. " "	26,687	54,901	17,242	32,541*	6,095*	
12-pr. shells -	—	—	—	?	570*	
8-cm. or 4-pr. case	89	745	396	561	4	
9-cm. or 6-pr. " "	200	322	98	857	—	
8-cm. or 4-pr. Shrpl	—	1,502	—	—	—	
9-cm. or 6-pr. " "	—	900	—	7,495	73	
Total -	65,247	143,945	55,479	63,019	10,619	
Grand total -	338,309					
B.—SMALL-ARM AMMUNITION.						
Needle gun -	2,720,659	5,266,138	2,773,174	—	—	
Podewils -	—	—	—	3,311,230	1,076,260	
Werder -	—	—	—	853,330	29,380	
Needle carbine	115,864	206,905	120,970	15,740	?	
Pistol -	110,680	129,142	77,595	16,044	?	
Total -	2,947,103	5,602,185	2,971,739	4,196,344	1,105,640	
Grand total -	16,823,011					

Under A the return shows the total expenditure of the German field artillery ; but under B the ammunition issued to the reservists, &c., sent to join the field army is not included. This amounted in the case of the Prussian reservists to some 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 of rounds. Hence the grand total expenditure of Prussian ammunition was some 20,000,000.

APPENDIX

GROSS TOTAL OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED
FRENCH

	8-cm. or 4-pr. field.		9-cm. or 6-pr. field and fort.		12-cm. or 12-pr.		15-cm. or 24-pr.		16 cm.		21 cm.		9-cm. or 6-pr. case.		15-cm. or 24-pr. solid.		9-cm. or 6-pr.		12-cm. or 12-pr.		15-cm. or 24-pr.	
	Shells.								Long shells.				Shrapnel.									
LICHTENBERG. (9th August.)	No return.																					
PFALEBURG. (10th and 14th August, 24th November.)	Approx. 3,280	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOUL. (16th and 23rd August, 10th to 23rd September.)	3,414	515	268	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	4	
METZ. (17th August to 28th October.)	3,064	1,808	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	
STRASSBURG. (23rd August to 27th September.)																						
Siege batteries - - - -	—	6,985	61,318	43,889	3,283	600	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Field batteries - - - -	—	5,383	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total for Strassburg - - -	202,099 rounds gun																					
BITSCH. (23rd August, 11th—17th September.)	?	?	Approx 6,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
VERDUN. (24th August, 13th—15th October.)	194	1,778	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
SOISSONS. (12th to 15th October.)	1,233	—	3,211	2,268	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	496	172	
SCHLETTSTADT. (20th—24th October.)	—	—	1,037	339	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	81	50	
NEU-BREMISACH. (2nd to 10th November.)	—	37	1,962	2,736	880	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	122	74	
THIONVILLE. (22nd—24th November.)	9,914	—	3,997	1,500	911	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
LA FÈRE. (25th—26th November.)	191	—	719	412	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	58	32	

	8-cm. or 4-pr. field.	9-cm. to 6-pr. field and fort.	12-cm. or 12-pr.	15-cm. or 24-pr.	15-cm.	21-cm.	9-cm. or 6-pr. case.	15-cm. or 24-pr. solid.	9-cm. or 6-pr.	12-cm. or 12-pr.	15-cm. or 24-pr.
	Shells.			Long shells.					Shrapnel.		
BELFORT. (3.12.70. to 13.2.71.)	1,448	1,719	42,551	33,468	3,128	1,164	2	—	277	2,092	1,028
MONTMÉDY. (12th—13th December.)	611		1,121	493	620	140	—	—	—	—	—
PARIS. (22.12.70. to 26.1.71.)											
South Front - - - - -	—	613	18,680	26,843	3,530	2,886	—	—	—	248	80
East and North Front - - - -	—	—	26,111	21,519	7,980	239	—	—	—	612	296
Tot. 4 for Paris- - - - -	110,286 rounds gun										
Pinowas. (23.12.70. to 9.1.71.)	No return.										
Mimizass. (31.12.70. to 2.1.71.)	1,600 rounds for 12-cm.										
Bocbor. (5th January.)	1,518	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Longwy. (17th—24th January.)	380	3,841	1,813	—	—	—	—	—	—	213	—

Prussian.			French.					Needle.	Wallpiece.	Chasepôt.	Remarks.
7-pr.	25-pr.	50-pr.	22-cm.	27 cm.	32-cm.	12-cm.	15-cm.				
Shell.			Shell.		Shells for rifled guns.		Cartridges.				
3,947	3,128	3,697*	670	5,755	—	—	7,386	—	2,130	3,434†	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
—	—	347	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
ammunition.											
No return.											
3,300 rounds for 15-cm.											
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
—	—	—	76	—	—	—	—	—	—	14‡	

* Including 2,059 60-pr. Baden.

† Tabatière.

‡ Mitralleuse.

APPENDIX CLXXXVI.

MAXIMUM PERCENTAGE OF SICK IN THE FIELD ARMY DURING
THE WAR, AND ON 19TH FEBRUARY, 1871.

		During War.	19 Feb., 1871.			During War.	19 Feb., 1871.
Ist Army.	1st Army Corps	20.0	12.0	South Army, Meuse Army.	Guard Corps (exc. 3rd Grd. Cav. Brig.)	26.2	20.6
	VIIIth "	25.0	22.0		XIIth Army Corps	26.0	22.2
	17th Inf. Division	29.0	21.0		Württemberg F. Div.	17.6	13.5
	8rd Reserve "	11.0	7.0		Siege Art. (Paris)	13.4	13.4
	3rd Cavalry "	9.0	6.0		Etappen troops	19.0	3.7
	5th "	14.0	6.0		IIInd Army Corps	24.7	16.6
	3rd Guard Cav. Brig.	15.0	12.0		VIIth "	33.7	26.4
	Etappen troops	17.0	5.0		XIVth " (in- cluding siege corps at Belfort and Krenski's Detmt.)	20.5	19.8
	IIIrd Army Corps	39.0	30.0		Troops of Gov. Gen. Alsace	10.9	7.3
	IVth "	13.2	10.0		Ditto Lorraine	17.2	11.5
IIInd Army.	IXth "	27.2	15.3		Ditto Metz	16.7	11.0
	Xth "	33.5	22.7		Ditto Rheims	13.1	9.8
	1st Cav. Division	13.5	7.0				
	2nd "	13.6	10.0				
	4th "	13.7	8.3				
	6th "	16.0	10.5				
IIIrd Army.	Etappen troops	27.0	12.8				
	Vth Army Corps	32.0	15.8				
	VIth "	11.2	7.9				
	XIth "	42.7	26.2				
	Guard Landw. Div.	11.0	8.0				
	1st Bav. Army Corps	52.0	21.0				
	IIInd "	13.0	6.5				
	Siege Artillery (Paris)	15.7	14.1				
	Etappen troops	12.8	8.0				

APPENDIX CLXXXVII.

IN taking leave of those my brave and victorious troops who remain behind on foreign soil, my heart prompts me to express to Your Majesty our deep and joyous gratitude for the loving care and help bestowed through the initiative and protection of Your Majesty upon the army by those at home throughout the Fatherland. German unity, by the agency of the Central Committee for the Relief of the Sick and Wounded, became accomplished in the domain of humanity, while the political unity of our Fatherland was still in the circle of our wishes. From the commencement of hostilities this Committee became a solidly organised body, in which the local societies of all German States were represented, and to which even the American associations have extended their hand across the ocean. It is with joy that I have seen how by this union of all the German forces, supported by the general spirit of self-sacrifice and the indefatigable activity of those who devoted their strength and time to this laborious work, results have been attained which exceeded all expectation and have essentially contributed to maintain the strength and spirits of the army amid the heavy burdens of war.

The thankful remembrance of this will never cease to live in the army and in the nation. I cannot better testify my appreciation and gratitude than in begging Your Majesty to express them yourself, in my name, to the Central Committee of the Associations.

Nancy, the 14th March, 1871.

WILLIAM.

Her Majesty the Empress and Queen.

APPENDIX CLXXXVIII.

TABLE SHOWING THE MONTHLY AVERAGE OF EFFECTIVES IN
THE GERMAN FORCES DURING THE WAR, 1870—71.*

		Men.		Horses.
August, 1870	{ field -	780,723	- -	213,159
	{ garrison -	402,666	- -	37,214
	Total -	1,183,389	Total -	250,373
September, 1870	{ field -	813,280	- -	218,093
	{ garrison -	350,238	- -	34,100
	Total -	1,163,518	Total -	252,193
October, 1870	{ field -	840,857	- -	225,401
	{ garrison -	369,799	- -	33,785
	Total -	1,210,656	Total -	259,186
November, 1870	{ field -	827,271	- -	225,856
	{ garrison -	390,380	- -	32,601
	Total -	1,217,651	Total -	258,457
December, 1870	{ field -	841,196	- -	227,860
	{ garrison -	404,611	- -	31,618
	Total -	1,245,807	Total -	259,478
January, 1871	{ field -	913,967	- -	232,689
	{ garrison -	398,826	- -	31,619
	Total -	1,312,793	Total -	264,308
February, 1871	{ field -	936,915	- -	232,398
	{ garrison -	418,872	- -	31,337
	Total -	1,355,787	Total -	263,735
March, 1871	{ field -	925,800	- -	233,196
	{ garrison -	424,608	- -	32,312
	Total -	1,350,408	Total -	265,508
April, 1871	{ field -	717,572	- -	205,936
	{ garrison -	366,614	- -	34,730
	Total -	1,084,186	Total -	240,666
May, 1871	{ field -	671,451	- -	195,712
	{ garrison -	320,248	- -	33,543
	Total -	991,699	Total -	229,255
June, 1871	{ field -	502,815	- -	155,378
	{ garrison -	366,392	- -	57,568
	Total -	869,207	Total -	212,946

* According to the returns of the Special Commission. These numbers include officers, officials, surgeons, sick and other non-combatants.

APPENDIX CLXXXIX.

SUMMARY OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY
DURING THE WAR OF 1870—71.

	Employed in the field, i.e., crossed the French frontier.		Left at home.	
	Officers, surgeons, and officials.	Men.	Officers, surgeons, and officials.	Men.
Prussia and the smaller States of the North German Confedera- tion - - - - -	26,322	847,796	7,039	244,595
Saxony - - - - -	1,102	56,272	382	15,363
Hesse - - - - -	438	18,676	121	8,112
Total for North German Con- federation - - - - -	27,862	922,744	7,542	268,070
Bavaria - - - - -	3,842*	130,902	1,352	44,004
Württemberg - - - - -	823	29,410	264	13,060
Baden - - - - -	574	30,198	161	13,604
Grand total - - -	33,101	1,113,254	9,319	388,738

* Besides 797 civil officials.

APPENDIX CXC.

RETURN OF REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO THE GERMAN ARMY
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR UNTIL BEGINNING
OF MARCH, 1871.

From the Recruiting District.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s and men.	Horses.	Field Guns.	
				8-cm. or 4-prs.	9-cm. or 6-prs.
Guard Corps - - -	97	17,471	1,195	14	—
Ist Army Corps - - -	81	9,564	1,346	14	—
IIInd " - - -	101	11,962	1,296	—	—
IIIInd " - - -	125	17,096	2,069	2	—
IVth " - - -	118	9,910	1,114	—	—
Vth " - - -	86	9,803	1,148	—	—
VIth " - - -	84	4,796	694	4	—
VIIth " - - -	96	13,838	1,749	1	—
VIIIth " - - -	141	15,350	871	5	—
IXth " - - -	71	13,520	1,044	10	2
Xth " - - -	115	11,938	1,876	9	—
XIth " - - -	84	10,300	1,322	27*	—
XIIth " - - -	82	11,228	989	1	—
25th Division - - -	27	4,649	377	3	—
Total for the North German Confederation - - -	1,308	161,420	17,090	90	2
Ist and IIInd Bavarian Army Corps - - -	770	47,487	3,005	13	10
Württemberg Division - -	76	7,836	938	1	—
Baden Division - - -	18	3,847	325	—	—
From Central Horse Depôt for special corps - - -	—	—	654	—	—
Grand total - - -	2,172	220,590	22,012	104	12

* Of these, 24 for the 22nd Division.

APPENDIX CXCI.

SUMMARY OF STRENGTH OF GERMAN DEPÔT TROOPS AT THE
BEGINNING OF MARCH, 1871.

Corps.	Officers.	N. C. O.'s and men.	Horses.
Guard Corps -	172	9,442	2,086
1st Army Corps -	195	11,490	1,649
IInd "	182	10,310	1,329
IIIrd "	165	11,882	1,700
IVth "	205	11,000	1,783
Vth "	156	9,905	1,707
VIth "	186	11,527	1,664
VIIth "	166	10,373	1,266
VIIIth "	231	13,522	1,240
IXth "	216	11,887	1,386
Xth "	195	10,028	2,011
XIth "	163	9,266	1,410
XIIth "	151	12,044	1,617
25th Division	94	5,987	637
Total for North German Confederation - .	2,477	148,663	21,435
1st and 2nd Bavarian Army Corps - .	653	37,879	3,643
Württemberg Field Division - .	115	11,509	941
Baden	43	6,633	584
Total for German Army - .	3,288	204,684	26,603

APPENDIX CXVII.

RETURN OF TROPHIES CAPTURED BY THE GERMANS DURING THE WAR. (NOTE.—There are no records of the number of small arms captured.)

	Captured.	In the field and before fortresses.				Surrendered.				Total.			
		Rifles and carbines.	Field guns and howitzers.	Fortress guns.	Rifles and carbines.	Field guns and howitzers.	Fortress guns.	Small arms.	Rifles and carbines.	Field guns and howitzers.	Fortress guns.	Small arms.	
1	At Weissenburg and Würth	5	35	—	56	691	876	280,000	5	35	876	—	—
2	Before and in Metz	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	56	691	876	230,000	—
3	At Beaumont and Sedan	9	97	13	—	364	139	85,000	9	441	139	64,000	—
4	Before and in Strasbourg	—	3	—	—	—	1,200	200,000	—	—	1,213	200,000	—
5	On the Loire up to the second occupation of Orléans by the Germans	4	35	52	—	—	—	—	4	35	52	—	—
6	In the subsequent battles on the Loire and at Vendôme	1	22	—	—	—	—	—	1	22	—	—	—
7	During the operations against Le Mans	6	17	1	—	—	—	—	6	17	—	—	—
8	During the battle in the north of France	5	12	29	—	—	30	—	5	12	30	—	—
9	On the south-east theatre of war	4	3	9	—	672	1,362	177,000	4	3	1,371	177,000	—
10	Before and in Paris	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11	(a) In August:—At Lichtenberg, Litzelsheim, Mural, Viller le François	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	(b) In September and October:—At Laun, Coul, Solman, Schellesdorf	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	(c) To the end of 1870:—At Verdun, Neu-Bredach, Montigny, Thionville, La Fère, Flaburg	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	(d) From January, 1871, to the peace:—At Mézières, Rocroy, Peronne, Longwy, Hiesch	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12	At Belfort	3	—	—	—	—	409	5,000	3	—	409	5,000	—
13	Miscellaneous	—	—	—	—	—	341	22,000	—	—	341	22,000	—
	Total	45	256	104	62	1,660	5,453	893,000	107	1,916	5,898	893,000	—

APPENDIX CXIII.

RETURN SHOWING THE TOTAL LOSSES DURING THE WAR (UP TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OCCUPATION).

Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Headquarter Staff of 1st Army	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
" " 2nd " "	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
" " Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Detachment	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
Guard Corps	172	2706	699	238	6672	378	1	319	10	411	9697	1087
				Also 2 Staff Surgs.						Also 2 Staff Surgs.,		
				1 Assist.-Surgeon,						1 Assist.-Surg.,		
				1 Paymaster.						1 Paymaster.		
1st Army Corps	82	1593	311	234	5291	317	3	460	28	319	7346	656
				Also 2 Staff Surgs.						Also 2 Staff Surgs.,		
IInd Army Corps	61	807	152	167	3191	83	1	165	6	229	4163	241
				Also 3 Staff Surgs.						Also		
				1 Staff Surg.-Major.						1 Staff Surg.-Major,		
				1 Assistant Surg.						3 Staff Surgeons,		
				1 Sub-Surgeon.						2 Assistant Surgs.,		
IIIrd Army Corps	172	2655	724	408	8299	331	1	394	18	581	11348	1073
				Also						Also		
				2 Staff Surg.-Majors,						2 Staff Surg.-Majors,		
				3 Staff Surgeons,						4 Staff Surgeons,		
IVth Army Corps	63	836	138	132	3029	159	1	197	3	196	4062	300
				Also 1 Staff Surg.						Also 2 Staff Surgs.,		
				4 Assistant Surgs.,						4 Assistant Surgs.,		
				1 Sub-Surgeon.						1 Sub-Surgeon.		
Vth Army Corps	97	1697	182	290	5961	164		846	18	388	8504	264
				and 1 Staff Surg.						Also 3 Staff Surgs.		
Vth Army Corps	17	282	24	43	738	*		30	—	60	1050	32
VIIth Army Corps	79	1225	247	207	3991	159	3	527	17	289	5743	420
				and						and		
				1 Assistant Surg.						1 Assistant Surg.		
VIIIth Army Corps	148	1707	406	325	6124	434		351	15	473	8182	855
				Also 1 Staff Surg.,						Also 1 Staff Surg.		
				1 Chaplain.						1 Chaplain.		
IXth Army Corps (including 25th Div.)	119	1799	618	242	4767	254	2	174	43	363	6740	915
				Also 1 Staff Surg.,						Also 1 Staff Surg.,		
				2 Sub-Surgeons.						3 Sub-Surgeons.		
Xth Army Corps	110	2128	416	234	4704	307	15	1035	62	359	7867	785
				Also 1 Staff Surg.,						Also 1 Staff Surg.,		
				6 Assistant Surgs.,						9 Assistant Surgs.,		
				1 Chaplain.						1 Chaplain.		
XIth Army Corps	39	467	230	130	2023	130	—	171	1	169	2661	361
				Also 1 Assist. Surg.						Also 1 Assist. Surg.		
XIth Army Corps	55	747	225	167	2749	131	1	462	5	223	3958	361
				Also 1 Chaplain.						Also 1 Staff Surg.,		
				1 Assist. Surg.						2 Assistant Surgs.,		
XIIth Army Corps	104	1331	291	190	4203	264	5	1009	115	299	6543	670
				Also 1 Assist. Surg.						Also		
				1 Staff Surg.-Major.						1 Staff Surg.-Major.		
				Also						1 Assistant Surg.		
XIIIth Army Corps	49	644	138	101	1718	113	—	190	9	150	2552	260
				Also 1 Assist. Surg.						Also 1 Staff Surg.,		
				2 Assistant Surgs.						3 Assistant Surgs.,		
XIVth Army Corps	11	14	2	6	84	6	—	13	—	6	111	8
				10	307	20	—	89	—	22	498	35
				141	2538	133	5	293	19	193	3546	297
				Also 1 Field Surg.						Also 5 Staff Surgs.,		
										2 Assistant Surgs.,		
										1 Field Surgeon.		

* For losses of 22nd Division after 4th January, 1871, see XIIIth Army Corps.

Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
1st Bav. Army Corps - - -	195	1768	536	350	6964	582	12	2270	141	557	11002	1259
							Also			Also		
112d Bav. Army Corps - - -	71	737	89	107	2475	91	1	699	1	178	3811	181
Württemberg Field Division - - -	37	641	121	79	1736	80	1	178	8	117	2535	209
				Also						Also		
Baden Field Division* - - -	9	77	36	16	235	24	—	31	12	25	393	72
Strassburg Siege Corps† - - -	8	123	5	Also 1 Assist. Surg.	32	492	—	66	1	Also 1 Assist. Surg.	40	671
Belfort Siege Corps‡ - - -	6	67	2	Also 1 Assist. Surg.	9	270	—	—	—	Also 1 Assist. Surg.	15	337
Guard Landwehr Division - - -	10	210	10	44	1072	13	4	349	—	58	1631	23
1st Reserve Division - - -				Also 1 Staff Surg.,			Also			Also 1 Staff Surg.,		
				1 Assistant Surg.,			1 Assistant Surg.			2 Assistant Surg.,		
				1 Paymaster.						1 Paymaster.		
	1763	25080	5762	3904	79684	4206	57	10208	532	5724	114972	10609
	Also			Also			Also			Also		
	2 Staff Surg.-Majors,			2 Staff Surg.-Majors,			6 Staff Surgeons,			1 Staff Surg.-Major,		
	2 Staff Surgeons,			1 Regimental Surg.,			11 Assistant Surgs.,			1 Regimental Surg.,		
	1 Assistant Surg.,			19 Staff Surgeons,			1 Sub-Surgeon,			27 Staff Surgeons,		
	1 Chaplain,			1 Field Surgeon,			1 Intndnce. Official			1 Field Surgeon,		
	1 Paymaster.			21 Assistant Surgs.,						13 Assistant Surgs.,		
				4 Sub-Surgeons,						5 Sub-Surgeons,		
				2 Chaplains,						3 Chaplains,		
				1 Paymaster.						2 Paymasters,		
										1 Intndnce. Official.		
2nd Landwehr Division§ - - -	26	291	46	51	1338	30	3	642	18	80	2271	94
3rd Reserve Division - - -	and			and			and			and 2 Staff Surgs.,		
	1 Assistant Surgeon.			1 Staff Surgeon.			1 Staff Surgeon.			1 Assistant Surgeon.		
4th Reserve Division - - -	12	222	66	36	859	27	2	414	9	60	1195	102
				and 1 Sub-Surgeon.						and 1 Sub-Surgeon.		
1st Cavalry Division - - -	6	51	163	24	193	255	3	109	133	33	353	551
2nd Cavalry Division - - -	6	42	157	13	146	218	2	83	85	21	271	160
3rd Cavalry Division - - -	4	38	109	4	79	75	4	52	107	12	199	24
4th Cavalry Division - - -	6	62	146	15	144	270	5	150	133	26	356	549
	1 Staff Surg.-Major,						1 Staff Surgeon,			1 Staff Surg. Major,		
	1 Assistant Surgeon.						1 Assistant Surg.			1 Staff Surgeon,		
5th Cavalry Division - - -	17	227	519	52	692	228	6	182	443	75	1101	1180
6th Cavalry Division - - -	13	137	341	1 Staff Surg.-Major,	29	285	2	125	135	1 Staff Surg. Major,	44	647
				1 Chaplain.						1 Chaplain.		
Etappen and Government troops -	9	162	22	28	537	29	16	616	128	53	1315	179
							1 Commet. Official,			1 Commet. Official,		
							1 Sub-Surgeon.			1 Sub-Surgeon,		
							1 Paymaster.			1 Paymaster.		
Siege Artillery before Paris - - -	9	80	1	25	336	1	—	—	—	34	416	2
Fortress Pioneers before Paris -	—	1	—	1	10	—	—	—	—	1	11	—
1st Division of the Field Ammunition	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	3	—
Reserve Park - - -	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	139	—	3	139	—
3rd Field Railway Division - - -	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	4	—
4th Field Railway Division - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total casualties of the German Army -	1871	26397	7325	4184	84304	5547	102	12752	1723	6157	123453	14585
	3 Staff Surg.-Major,			3 Staff Surg.-Major,			3 Staff Surgeons,			3 Staff Surg.-Major,		
	2 Staff Surgeons,			1 Regimental Surg.			2 Assistant Surgs.,			1 Regimental Surg.,		
	3 Assistant Surgs.,			20 Staff Surgeons,			2 Sub-Surgeons,			30 Staff Surgeons,		
	1 Chaplain			1 Field Surgeon,			1 Paymaster,			1 Field Surgeon,		
	1 Paymaster.			21 Assistant Surgs.			Intndnce. Official.			36 Assistant Surgs.,		
				5 Sub-Surgeons,			1 Commet. Officer,			7 Sub Surgeons,		
				3 Chaplains,						4 Chaplains,		
				1 Paymaster.						1 Paymaster,		
										1 Intndnce. Official,		
										1 Commet. Official.		

* The losses of this Division are included in the Siege Corps before Strassburg and in the XIVth Corps

† Excluding the Guard Landwehr Division and 1st Reserve Division.

‡ Excluding the 1st and 4th Reserve Division.


§ See XIIIth Army Corps.

|| Including losses before the fortresses.

CASUALTIES TO OFFICIALS ON THE FIELD RAILWAY SERVICE.

Killed, or Died of Wounds	2
Wounded	5
Missing	27
					<hr/>
Total	34

By accidents on the railway, 14 officials were killed and 17 wounded.



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